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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS 
Full Tibetan spellings, where appropriate, are given according to the Wylie system 
{1959). Tibetan words, including proper nouns, which are commonly used in their 
unuanslated form by English speakers are rendered in the popularly romanized 
form and italicized only when they are not proper nouns. Sanskrit terms are 
transliterated according to modem conventions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Tibetan Predicament 
In March of 1990, I travelled to Dharamsala, India, home of Tenzin Gyatso, the 
14th Dalai Lama of Tibet (referred to by his followers as "His Holiness"), and the 
largest concentration of Tibetan refugees outside of Tibet. While there, I attended 
the "First International Contact Conference of Tibet Supporters," a meeting which 
brought together 231 enthusiastic Tibet supporters from 26 countries around the 
world. One day, towards the end of the conference, a cabinet minister from the 
government-in-exile, known in Tibetan as a kalon (bka'-blon) stood up to speak. 
Addressing the Westemers1 in the audience, he said: 
You think most Tibetans must have qualities of His Holiness, but we 
are just ordinary humans. Basically we are good natured, but I must 
warn you, we are very much human beings. 
The audience laughed along with their Tibetan hosts at the minister's comments and 
the conference proceeded. A week or so later, a well-known Tibetan activist made a 
similar comment to me during a videotaped interview in his office at the Tibet 
Youth Congress in Dharamsala: 
Sometimes when people speak about Tibetans as though they are 
some special thing from Shangri-La, you know, we're not special, 
we're just ordinary human beings; at other times, we're so totally 
ignored, we're not counted among the peoples of the world! 
In many ways, these comments epitomize the contradictory predicament in which 
Tibetans living in the diaspora find themselves today. Perceived by many of their 
Western friends as "special beings," diasporic Tibetans at the same time feel they 
1 
are noc ·counted among the peoples of the world.• having failed over the lase three 
decades co win recognition from the world community for their claim co be the 
legicimate rulers of TibeL This tension between Western fantasy and Tibetan 
political reality lies at the hean of this dissenation. 
When thousands of Tibetans began flooding out of Chinese-«:cupied Tibet in 1959-
1960. following their revered leader into exile. the West knew little about them 
except what was depicted in travel and adventure books and films such as James 
Hilton's •t.ost Horii.on.• In these texts. Tibet is usually represented as an 
cxherworldly place. popuWed by enlightened beings who devote their lives to 
religious pursuits and who embody a spiritual wisdom entirely lacking in the West. 
I argue tha1 this history of Western representation has shaped the interaction 
between non-Tibe!ans and Tibetan refugees in ways that have had a profound 
impact on Tibetan life in exile. This dissertation attempts to explore several 
aspects of this claim and is orpnized around several inrerrclared questions: how do 
Western fantasies and stereo<ypes enter into processes of cultural and political 
reproduction in exile? AJ a diasporic people. Tibetans have had to construct a 
political identity aaoss national boundaries. How do Western notions of 
Tibetanness mediate the production of this identity in various host societies? How 
is this cransnational politic:al identity used co mobilize outside support for the 
Tibetan struggle'? ln order to answer these questions. this dissertation focuses on 
an cthnographically rich arena in which these processes are most visible and to 
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which I had the most access. namely the •Tibet Movement.• Comprised of 
diasporic Tibetans and their non-Tiberan supponers around the world. the Tibet 
Movement emerged in the late 1980s as a response to changing local and global 
conditions. most nolably heightened Chinese repression in Tibet. 
By focusing on the Tibet Movement as the context in which Tiberan 
identities are produced. this thesis engages Arjun Appadurai's call for 
anthropologists to study the ·cosmopolitan cultural forms of the contemporary 
world• (1991:192). 
A5 groups migrare, regroup in new locations. reconstruct their 
histories, and reconfigure their ethnic •projects.• the nhno in 
ethnography rakes on a slippery, nonlocalized quality, to which the 
descriptive practices of anthropology will have to respond. The 
landscapes of group identity-the cthnoscapes-around the world are 
no longer familiar anthropological objects. insofar as groups arc no 
longer tightly territorialized. spatially bounded, historically 
unselfconscious. or culturally homogenous. (ibid.:191) 
Studying complex cultural formations. Appadurai argues. is essential if we are to 
understand the changing nature of contemporary production of identity. 
Appadurai's call refleas a growing recognition in the discipline of the new 
levels of complexity and multiplicity of interactions that are shaping the world 
around us and the need to address them in our work. Anthropologists have not 
been the only ones. of course. to notice these transformations. Since the 1980s 
there has been an explosion of theory about the spread of global capiral and its 
effects (e.g. Featherstone 1990: Giddens 1990: Harvey 1989: Jameson 1991). 
tran.snationalism (e.g. Glick Schiller. Basch. and Szanton Blanc 1992: see also 
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Kearney 1996) and nationalism (e.g. Anderson 1991). across the social sciences 
and the humanities. This literature argues that we have enrered a new historical 
moment. one characteriz.ed by simultaneous displacement and fragmentation and 
inrensified global integration and connectedness. for which there is little historical 
precedent (see discussion below). 
The analytic challenges of making sense of the complex cultural forms of 
the contemporary moment. such as global grassrootS activism for Tibet. are 
formidable. Although recently there has been much theorizing about the 
emergence of new transnational forms of political organi1.ation. mobili1.1tion and 
practice (Appadurai 1990. 1993: Hegedus 1990: Smith 1994), very little 
ethnographic work has been done on them. Indeed. as Michael Smith suggests. 
·we ha-.·e yet to invent the discursive terms appropriare for representing the 
agencies and practices currently constituting bifocal subjects, transnational social 
space. and globaJized political space• (1994:15). Frustrated by the lack of 
anthropologic:al models to explain what I saw ·on the ground.• I have found myself 
tacking between several bodies of literarure in order to make sense of my data and 
develop a theoretical frameworlc in which to place them. These include work on 
migration and transnaiiona.I processes. cultural studies on identity and 
represcnwion. writin1 on diasporas. 1lobalization theory, contemporary cultural 
theory. and social MOYCmenu literature. In the last few years. exciting new work 
by <Kher anthropologists has begun to appear that addresses some of the issues with 
which l have been preoccupied and that I have sttuggled to understand since I 
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began my research. Most of thi.; riew work is concerned with similar transnational 
or global movements that bring activists together across cultural and spatial 
boundaries. deploy "universal" discourses such as human rights, cultural survival. 
environmentalism, etc., and create new political spaces for themselves--like Tibet 
activists have-in the international arena (e.g. Brosius 1995a 1995b; Conklin and 
Graham 1995; Ramos 1991, 1994a, 1994b). 
One example of the analytic challenges we face in exploring phenomena 
such as Tibet activism is the fact that increasingly the groups with whom we work 
are involved in complex representational activities similar to our own. Many 
groups now actively participate in their own objectification, deploying concepts 
such as "culture" that used to be the sole province of the professional ethnographer 
and mediating their identities in ever more sophisticated ways. This point is 
illustrated in chapters 8-10 where we see the centrality of image production and 
media management to the "Year of Tibet" campaign. 
The production of the Movement: Some notes on methods 
Examining complex social formations such as the Tibet Movement also presents a 
number of interesting methodological issues to be addressed or resolved. 
Obviously, it requires tracing a cultural formation "across and within multiple sites 
of activity" (Marcus 1995). thereby breaking with the trope of community in the 
classic sense of shared values, shared identity, and shared culture (Marcus 
1992:315)-a trope which for so long has organized anthropological thinking and 
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practice. At the same time it entails a blurring of boundaries between "us" and 
"them" in new and interesting ways. In the past, anthropology rested on a dualism 
between the anthropologist. on the one hand. and the people being described, on 
the other. Separated by space and culture. professional practice emphasized the 
distance between the two. Now this distance is being collapsed as anthropologists 
increasingly participate in the social and political processes they describe. During 
the course of my research, I was constantly confronted with the inseparability of 
"us" and "them." finding myself drawn into an advocacy relationship with my 
"informants" that blurred the boundaries between anthropologist and activist. I 
played a dual role, participating in demonstrations, marches. and other political 
activities. all the while watching, taking mental notes, and rransforming my 
experiences into "data." The fact that I was a Western activist and that one of my 
main interests was the interaction between Tibetan and Western activists further 
blurred the boundary for me. Constantly shifting between researcher and 
participant, between outsider and subject, my position was simultaneously an 
ambiguous, productive, and frustrating one (see discussion below). Negotiating 
my ambiguous status was never easy. I struggled when asked to identify myself at 
Tibet Movement meetings, unsure how others sitting around the table woulu react 
to being subjects of my study. Some did not appreciate being observed and told 
me so; others, despite being reminded repeatedly, forgot that I had interests 
different from theirs. 
In devising this study, I wanted to use a multiple-site method that addresses 
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the Movement's global organization without sacrificing ethnography of a local 
community. [ adopted a two-track approach which involved long-term participant 
observation in the local community of Tibet activists based in New York City as 
well as shoner-term research in a number of other sites which reflect the spread of 
the Tibetan diaspora and represent important "nodes" in the global Tibet network. 
One of the advantages of doing research in this way is that it has enabled me to 
compare how Tibetans reconstitute their lives in different host societies and to see 
how transnational networks are established among the different diaspora 
communities in an effort to constitute a Tibetan identity that transcends local 
difference. At the same time, it has allowed me to embed the New York 
community in the larger transnational web of Tibet activism. 
When [ began spending time with Tibet activists in Manhattan, l remember 
being struck by two things. The first was the intense identification some 
Americans had with their Tibetan colleagues and/or with Tibetan culture. This 
observation is summed up by the same cabinet minister cited above in a speech at 
another Tibet support conference held in 1993: 
Sometimes people ask, why is the Tibet Movement so successful? 
My answer is that ... for all of you, it is part of your life. You don't 
only live with it, but you dream about it ... everyone of you makes 
tremendous sacrifices. You all came to the conference and paid 
your own expenses ... We have not lost a single friend, and [ know 
all of you will stay with us until the day we go back to Tibet. 
Alternately fascinated and puzzled by this phenomenon, I sought to understand it 
by eliciting what I call "Tibet narratives" from non-Tibetan supporters. 
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The other aspect of Tibet activism that I immediately found striking was che 
amount of "work" that went into it. Having had little experience with other 
grassroots political movements prior to starting the project, much of the work 
seemed pointless or to have little chance of effecting dramatic change in Tibet. 
soon realized. however, that this "work" was the means through which the 
Movement was constituted. As a result, I became interested in che daily 
experiences of activists and the daily production of the Movement. One pan of 
this interest in the quotidian centered on intercultural interactions and negotiations 
among participants. I paid particular attention to the arenas where activists come 
together. such as Movement meetings, where the pragmatics of che collaboration 
are most visible. Through this method, I gathered useful data on how Tibetans and 
Americans construct each other in the process of co-producing the Movement. 
In addition to panicipating in and observing Movement activities, I attended 
a number of Tibetan community events such as parties, receptions, picnics, as well 
as tantric initiations (see chapter 9). It is important to note that not every Tibetan 
living in New York was an activist; in fact the number of Tibetan activists was 
small and limited mainly to a group that had lived in the U.S. for a long time and 
were comfortable interacting with non-Tibetans (see chapter 6). Given the small 
number of refugees living in New York, community activities and Movement 
activities often overlapped. I also volunteered my services and worked for several 
organizations once a week in 1991-92 which enabled me to observe daily activities 
and help out with tasks around the office. I videotaped demonstrations, 
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celebrations, visits by the Dalai Lama, and Buddhist teachings, copies of which I 
made available to anyone interested. 
Although my research took place in New York City, I carried out short-
term fieldwork in San Francisco and Washington, D.C., other key sites of Tibet 
activism in the U.S. Their significance lies in the fact that each is home to a well-
funded organization whose work on behalf of Tibet has been quite professional and 
effective, though in very different domains of political action. One, an 
organization of lawyers for Tibet, has focused on helping Tibetans assert (and 
insert) themselves in various legal arenas, notably those associated with the United 
Nations, while the other focused its energies on Capitol Hill and the U.S. 
administration where it has met with considerable success (see chapter 7). 2 
I conducted short-term research in a number of sites around the world, 
including Switzerland, England, and India. This enabled me to think 
comparatively about how Tibetans reconstitute their lives in different host societies. 
and to "map" the Movement's larger structure. In mapping the Movement I traced 
the ways in which organizations in various "nodes" of the transnational Tibet 
network interact with one another (see Marcus 1995 on "mapping" in multi-site 
ethnography) which in turn helped me to explore about the shape Tibet activism 
takes in different national contexts. While in Switzerland, where more than 2,000 
Tibetans were resettled in the 1960s and 1970s, I visited towns and cities including 
Zurich, Horgen, Rikon, Winterthur, Flawil, Trogen, Jona, Heitzingen, and 
Geneva. I interviewed Swiss Tibetan activists as well as several individuals who 
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were not activists but were resettled in Switzerland for two decades. I attended 
community meetings and participated in the annual "Democracy Day" celebration 
marking the Dalai Lama's promulgation of a democratic draft constitution in 1963 
(see chapter 6). While in England I limited my research to interviews with a small 
number of London-based Tibetan intellectuals, activists, and employees of the 
government-in-exile, and an Englishman who runs "Tibet Information Network" 
(see Mclagan 1996 for extended excerpts from two of these interviews). I spent 
six weeks in Dharamsala, India in 1990 where I interviewed exile government 
officials and leaders and participated in the first Tibet support conference ever 
organized. One of reasons l went to India was to make a video documentary on 
the resettlement of children smuggled out of Tibet. This piece underscored for me 
the harsh political realities of life under Chinese rule in Tibet and remained a 
poignant reminder throughout my research of what is at stake with the Tibet issue. 
In order to supplement understanding of Tibet activism and to gain insight 
into how the Tibet issue is mediated in the West l created an archive of Tibet-
related material from print journalism, electronic media, and various refugee and 
support organizations that ranges from 1989 to the present. The archive has 
proved especially valuable in helping get an overall sense of the Movement's 
trajectory and its shifting embrace of various discourses and strategies. 
Identity, culture, and representation 
The problem of producing a national or ethnic identity in the absence of a 
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recognized territorial base is one of the most interesting and challenging issues of 
contemporary life. What makes the Tibetan case interesting and important is the 
degree co which non-Tibetans and their fantasies are incorporated into this process. 
In the text I argue that it is Tibetans' "culture," specifically Tibetan Buddhism. that 
provides means for this incorporation. It attracts most Westerners to the Tibetans 
and is the medium through which they establish significant relationships with 
outsiders. These relationships have lead not just to extensive material support that 
has helped the refugee community to flourish in exile, a remarkable achievement in 
and of itself, but more importantly, to the creation of a global political movement 
which has given Tibetans a presence and profile ir: the West and in the 
international arena out of all proportion to their numbers. 
By foregrounding the relationship between Tibetans and Westerners in my 
analysis, and by tracing the interpretive frameworks through which each group 
constructs the other, this thesis provides grounded work on the problem of culrural 
translation, representation, and culrural objectification. Building on contemporary 
cultural theory, especially work on culrural production and performance (e.g. 
Appadurai 1990, 1991; Clifford 1988; Ginsburg 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Myers 1991, 
1994a; T. Turner 1993), as well as postcolonial and poststructural theorizing about 
identity, difference, and "othering" (e.g. Hall 1990; Bhaba 1990; Mercer 1990, 
Said 1978), my text, rather than focusing on how Tibetans are situated by 
orientalist discourses produced by Westerners, traces how Tibetans productively 
engage Western fantasies about Tibetanness in the process of constituting 
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themselves in exile and mobilizing political support for their cause. This process 
is highlighted in Pan Three of the dissertation (chapters 8-lO), which explores the 
production of a series of cultural and religious events in New York City. My 
analysis reveals that it is not enough simply to critique these events for reinforcing 
problematic Western fantasies about Tibetanness. As self-conscious performances 
of cultural difference co-produced by Tibetan and Western activists, the events 
demonstrate that we must attend to the complex ways in which groups participate 
in their own objectification for political purposes. In this sense the Tibetan case is 
a significant example of how "culture" is increasingly becoming both the means 
and the ends of social action. 
Tibet activism: The shape of things to come 
As I noted above, recently there has been an explosion of theorizing about the 
current historical moment. This moment, it is suggested, is characterized by the 
rise of global capitalism, the spread of global communications and media networks. 
the breakdown of traditional cold war alliances and enmities and the concomitant 
surge of ethnic and identity politics, and the proliferation of institutions and 
communities that supercede the boundaries of the nation-state. I use the term 
"post-cold war era" in the title of this thesis to flag these economic and social 
factors as well as arguments that they have laid the foundation for a transformation 
in the contemporary world order (e.g. Rosenau 1990) whereby nation-states have 
to share the global stage with international organizations, transnational 
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corporations, and transnational social movements. I argue that the Tibet 
Movement, with its global organization and interventions, is representative of these 
transnational or "postnational" social formations (Appadurai 1993) and that it 
exemplifies a new form of political activism, one that is profoundly interculrural. 
dependent upon complex production and circulation of representations. 
Tibetan diaspora studies 
Until recently, very little anthropological research had been done on the Tibetan 
diaspora. That which had been done tended to focus on the resettlement of 
refugees in India (e.g. Calkowski 1991; Devoe 1983, 1987; Goldstein 1975; 
Klieger 1992; Nowak 1984). Over the last several years, however, the number of 
scholars writing about Tibetans in the diaspora has grown significantly (see Korom 
in press for a representative selection of contemporary ethnographic work on 
Tibetan diasporic culture). Despite the growing interest in Tibetan refugees on the 
part of anthropologists, very little work has been published on Tibetans in the 
United States, for instance, and virtually nothing is available on Tibetans in 
Switzerland in English (for a sample of publications in German, see chapter 2, 
footnote 3). This thesis is the first study of Tibet activism in any discipline. It 
includes the only comparative analysis of Tibetan diasporic communities written in 
English. As such, it makes a significant contribution to the emerging body of 
anthropological studies on the Tibetan diaspora and provides a preliminary baseline 
account or outline of the Movement's history, development, and structure on which 
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other scholars will be able to improve and build. 
Thesis organization 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Each focuses on a different facet of 
the Tibetan diaspora and Tibet Movement. Pan One, "Representing Tibet" 
(Chapters 2, 3, and 4), demonstrates the ways in which representations of Tibetan 
history have become pan of an extended discursive space in which Tibetan identity 
is constructed, circulated, and contested by refugees, activists, Chinese officials, 
and scholars. Pan Two, "Transnational Tibetans and the emergence of the Tibet 
Movement" (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), examines the resettlement of Tibetan iefugees 
in three sites-India, Switzerland, and the U.S.-and traces the emergence of the 
Tibet Movement. Pan Three, "Mobilizing "culture": The Year of Tibet" 
(Chapters 8, 9, and 10), analyzes the co-production of Tibetan Buddhist "culture" 
by activists in New York City during the Year of Tibet campaign. 
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Notes 
l. ln this thesis. "Western" is an analytic. political. and geographical category referring 
to members of industrialized societies in the Western hemisphere. It is in keeping 
with the Tibetan term inji. which originally referred to the English. the first non-
Asian foreigners Tibetans had extensive contact with. but which today is used by 
Tibetans to refer to any person from the West. regardless of nationality. 
2. ln 1989 I also conducted preliminary research in Los Angeles where I attended a 
Kalachakra initiation given by the Dalai Lama. Two years lacer I attended several 





Chapter 2 Tibet's pre-1951 political structure 
The traveller's perception of Tibet has contributed little to our 
understanding of Tibetan culture, but its influence has far 
outweighed its significance; it has sustained a popular and continuing 
perception of Tibet as the "hidden kingdom" and as a land of 
adventure and mystique. (Shakya 1994:4) 
Introduction: A confrontation of representations 
There is no doubt that popular writing on Tibet has contributed to the perception of 
Tibet as a sealed off Shangri-la-a containuble ethnographic object rather than a sire 
of complex and diverse political, cultural and social realities. ln his book. The 
Myth of Shangri-La: Tibet. travel writini. and the creation of a sacred landscape 
(1989), Peter Bishop explores the production of Tibet as a sacred place in the 
Western imagination through travel accounts in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Following Said (1978), he argues that Tibet, like the Mediterranean. 
Greece. and the rest of the "Orient," could "be located precisely, geographically. 
on a map, yet at the same time was imbued with additional symbolic meaning" 
(Bishop 1989: 13). For those who travelled co the Himalayan plateau, Tibet 
"promised a different order of time and space outside the strictures of European 
modernism" (145). Constructed as one of the last frontiers in an era of unbridled 
exploration, Tibet became an object of Western fantasy, a mystical Shangri-La that 
stood apart from-and above-the political and economic turmoil of the 
contemporary world, a symbol of all that the West had supposedly lost during the 
transformation co industrial capitalism-most notably spiritual wholeness. 
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This popular vision of Tibet presents a special challenge to those scholars 
anempting to write about Tibetan history and about the everyday lives of Tibetans 
in the past and present. This difficulty has been compounded by the fact that very 
little observation of social life on the ground, so to speak, was done by trained 
ethnographers before China's reorganization of the Tibetan polity. 1 Scholarship 
on Tibet has tended toward formal description and focused almost exclusively on 
visible structures of power. It has been hampered by the inaccessibility of archival 
records to Western researchers and by the fact that there was no secular literary 
tradition to speak of in pre-1951 Tibet (referred to in this text as "old Tibet" and 
"premodern Tibet"). Literature in Tibet consisted solely of Buddhist texts. of 
which there were thousands and thousands of volumes. 2 Indeed, Tibetans placed 
immense sacred value on the written word: 
It is remarkabie that when the refugees escaped over the Himalayas 
to India many of them carried on their backs heavy loads of sacred 
books, and one of the first activities in the diaspora was the 
republication of these religious texts. (Stoddard 1994: 128) 
One of the major activities of academic Tibetan studies today involves the 
translation and analysis of such Buddhist texts. This work, while important, is 
generally presented without a discussion of social context, rendering it less useful 
for those trying to reconstruct traditional Tibetan societies. To get around this 
problem, scholars have conducted fieldwork in the pockets of traditional Tibetan 
culture that exist in the Himalayas or amongst refugee populations from Tibet 
(e.g., Aziz 1978; Calkowski 1991; Fiirer-Haimendorf 1990; Goldstein 1968, 1989; 
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Levine 1988; Mumford 1989; Nowak 1984; Ortner 1978; 1989).3 Despite these 
efforts by trained anthropologists. a large portion of our empirical knowledge of 
premodern Tibet comes from popular and semi-academic writing by what I call 
"lay ethnographers" --travellers. explorers. missionaries. soldiers. diplomats. 
administrators and other agents of Imperial India (see Bishop 1989; Clarke 1983)." 
While there is a dearth of scholarship based on first-hand ethnographic 
research in Tibet before 1951. there is no lack of debate over how to characterize 
Tibet's history and its political and religious structures. In fact. since 1959, 
scholarship on Tibet has been mobilized in a discursive struggle between Tibetan 
exiles and the Chinese over the legitimacy of China's rule in Tibet. s As Goldstein 
suggests. 
After 1959, the Tibetan exiles and China competed to legitimize 
their own representations of recent history and current events in 
Tibet. The Chinese talked about the cruelty and abuses of the old 
feudal system and serfdom, and the Tibetans in exile accused the 
Chinese of committing a host of cultural and human rights 
violations, including genocide. This confrontation of 
"representations" continues to the present. (1994b: 15) 
In the next two chapters, I describe Tibet's political and religious culture before 
1951, and at the same time. examine the role scholarship on Tibet has played in 
the "confrontation of representations" between Tibetan exiles and Chinese 
government officials. 6 As any scholar doing work on Tibetans today knows, it is 
nearly impossibie to avoid becoming entangled in the politicized debates over how 
to portray Tibet's pre-1951 economic, social, and political structures. 7 These 
highly-charged debates, which rage in both academic and popular discussions of 
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Tibet. focus on the special nature of the Tibetan polity and its representativeness or 
legitimacy in outlying areas. For instance, scholars who describe the system as 
"feudalistic" are regularly accused by exile Tibetans of supponing China's claim to 
having "liberated" Tibet in 1951. Those who argue that there was no unified 
Tibetan state and no "nationalism" to speak of before the Chinese arrival in Tibet 
are accused of playing directly into China's hands. This response reveals a deep 
and vigorous engagement by Tibetans with their own history (and historiography). 
In my discussion, I suggest that the debates over representations of Tibetan history 
and culture are part of an extended discursive space in which the Tibet issue, and 
more importantly, contemporary Tibetan identities, are negotiated. 
Given the lack of fine-grained ethnographic studies of old Tibet, everyday 
life is notably absent in the following account. Studies by Western anthropologists 
have been possible in Tibet only since the 1980s, and under restricted 
circumstances. 8 The most well-known work has been done by Melvyn Goldstein 
and Cynthia Beall on a pastoral population at Phala Xiang near Lake Dangra 
(Goldstein and Beall 1986, 1989, 1990; Goldstein 1987). 
Women are also notably absent in the literature on premodem Tibet. 
Barbara Aziz, in an article published in 1988, laments the lack of attention paid by 
scholars to the lives of Tibetan women, both past and present. 9 She argues that 
while Tibet's religion is given a central place in our interpretation of its culture 
and history, there is not much discussion of how Buddhism shapes the lives of 
Tibetan women. For instance, we know very little about nuns and nunneries in 
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Tibet or in exile. Tibetologists have been slow to acknowledge and remedy this 
lack. although in recent years small steps have been taken by a younger generation 
of Western and Tibetan scholars eager to recuperate the contribution of women co 
Tibetan history and religion. 10 
Although the literature on Tibet is rather thin. there are several scholars 
whose work on the subject is very fine and from whom I draw heavily, particularly 
Melvyn Goldstein and Geoffrey Samuel. These anthropologists make valuable 
contributions to a more refined and problematized understanding of Tibetan 
societies, one which challenges both exaggerated popular images of Tibet. as well 
as the divergent representations put forward by Chinese officials and Tibetan 
exiles. 
The iise of monasticism 
Goldstein's depiction of the monastic system introduces us to some of the most 
fundamental aspects of Tibet's religio-political culture, and, in light of the 
notoriety this work has brought him within Tibetan circles, his historical narrative 
seems an appropriate place to begin an examination of the complex issues 
surrounding scholarship on old Tibet. In his book, A History of Modern Tibet. 
1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989), he outlines the complicated 
web of internal affairs and events that led to the fall of Tibet in 1951. He writes: 
"Tibet's commitment to the universality of religion as a core metaphor of Tibetan 
national identity ... was a major factor underlying Tibet's inability to adapt to 
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changing circumstances" (1989:2). The term chos-srid zung- 'brel, "religious and 
political affairs joined together," characterizes the Tibetan political structure which 
was governed by an incarnation, usually the Dalai Lama or his regent, and closely 
linked to the Gelugpa religious order of which the Dalai Lama was the most senior 
incarnate lama. 11 Beneath the ruler was a simple bureaucracy with a system of 
hierarchically ranked offices. The positions were filled by members of the lay 
aristocracy and monk officials. Lay officials were recruited from the hereditary 
landed aristocracy which consisted of roughly 150 to 200 families, all of whom 
held at least one estate, and some of whom held many estates. 12 The aristocracy 
had an ambiguous status: each family was required to provide one male for 
government service and failure to do so could result in confiscation of estates; yet 
since estates were hereditary, their size was not tied to the official's position in the 
government. Goldstein argues that while aristocratic families were clearly 
subordinate to the government, they saw themselves as an hereditary elite. 13 
Similarly, though the lay bureaucracy was subordinate to the government, it 
controlled its own recruitment (l 989: 8). 
The majority of monk officials were recruited from the Lhasa middle class 
or from the families of existing monk officials, known as shag-tshang families. 
They owned property and functioned much as lay families did except that, as monk 
officials were celibate, they had to adopt sons either from relatives or unrelated 
families. Trained and educated by the head of the shag-tshang, the young 
"disciples" became part of the family with full inheritance rights. 
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As Goldstein points out. monk officials. though celibate, were actually 
more like "token monks" in that most of them had merely registered in one of the 
big Gelugpa monasteries and stayed from one night to a few weeks. Consequently. 
monk officials did not share the same devotion and loyalties to the monastery as 
ocher monks, who tended to view them with some suspicion. Unlike lay officials 
who relied on hereditary estates for suppon, monk officials depended on the 
government for income. a situation which led them into believing that they were 
the "true upholders of the interests of the government" (1989: 10). 
The Dalai Lama and the lay and monk officials constituted two out of the 
three major political forces in Tibet. The monastic system and in panicular the 
three large Gelugpa monasteries near Lhasa--Sera, Drepung, and Ganden. known 
in Tibetan as the gdan-sa gsum, or "Three Seats" -made up the third force. Unlike 
the other Tibetan Buddhist lineages-Nyingma, Kagyu, and Sakya--the Gelugpa 
were reformers, committed to celibacy and scholasticism as prerequisites to 
advanced Tantric practice. After coming to power in 1642, they set about 
transforming the existing religious landscape, creating numerous monasteries and 
endowing them with large estates as well as reorganizing the economic support 
system for others by giving many large Gelugpa monasteries estates with attached 
peasants, or what Goldstein calls "serfs" (mi-ser in Tibetan) (see discussion of 
terminology below). The new government established subsidies for barley. butter 
and tea for monasteries without large estates and created funding for major ritual 
prayer ceremonies. 
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According to Goldstein and Tsarong (1985), Tibetan history after the 
Gelugpa rise to power can be conceptualized as the "monasticization" of a society 
in that "the primary goal of the polity was the production and reproduction of as 
many monks as possible" (17). This large scale commitment to monasticism is 
what differentiated Tibet's Mahayana monasticism from that of Theravadin 
societies. Goldstein (1989) estimates that traditionally 10 to 20 % 14 of the male 
population in Tibet were monks as opposed to 1-2 % of the male population in 
Thailand (Tambiah 1976). Parents placed their children. usually between the ages 
7-10, in the monastery where they were expected to remain for life, regardless of 
disposition or their own desires. Some families felt it was a deep honor and 
privilege; others found it a culturally valued way to reduce the number of mouths 
to feed. On occasion, parents made a son a monk to fulfill a promise made to a 
deity when the son was ill. Once accepted, many mechanisms worked to keep a 
monk in the monastery. Monks had a higher status than ordinary laypersons. 
though ex-monks did not. It was not competitive to stay: there were no exams that 
novices had to pass in order to remain in the monastery and monks who had no 
interest in pursuing higher studies were as welcome as scholarly monks (Goldstein 
1989:23). The only causes for expulsion were murder or heterosexual intercourse. 
This dedication to mass-scale monasticism meant that a large proportion of 
Tibet's resources was absorbed by monks who had to be subsidized by government 
grants, estates, endowments from private donors and banking activities by 
monasteries. Consequently, the "Three Seats" and thousands of smaller Gelugpa 
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monasteries scattered throughout Tibet had a vested interest in blocking any 
attempts at modernization. which they believed threatened both the economic base 
of monasticism and the religious values of the state. While there is not enough 
space here co explore in detail the various attempts at modernization, such as the 
short-lived English-language school in Gyantse (1924-26) advocated by aristocratic 
officials and the 13th Dalai Lama. or the proposed expansion of the army argued 
for by Tibet's military commander Tsarong and his supporters, it is important co 
note that there was a small segment of the population interested in changing 
Tibetan society.15 This aspect of Tibetan history is often overlooked by those 
who seek to portray premodern Tibet as a country completely isolated from the rest 
of the world, lost in its spiritual pursuits. In fact. as Goldstein's account reveals. 
many individuals-including the Dalai Lama, progressive aristocrats and 
intellectuals-recognized the necessity to modernize or create new institutions in 
order to be better prepared for the inevitable confrontation with China. 16 Had 
such modernization occurred, Goldstein suggests, the outcome of Tibet's encounter 
with the People's Liberation Army in 1951 might have been entirely different. 
In any event, however modest the proposed changes may seem in 
retrospect, at the time they generated a lot of controversy, with monasteries the 
most vehement opponents of change. 
From the monastic point of view, military expansion cut right to the 
heart of their traditional power, draining resources that otherwise 
went to the monastic system and also neutralizing the coercive force 
of the large numbers of uneducated and fighting monks. They saw 
Tsarong's proposal as a shift to secularism, to the diffusion of alien 
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(and heathen) British ideas which would harm Buddhism by creating 
an aristocracy less inclined to act as patrons of the monasteries. For 
the monks, nothing less than Tibet's unique theocratic political 
system and the dominant position of the monastic segment were at 
stake. (Goldstein 1989:92) 
Ultimately, the monasteries won-the Dalai Lama and aristocratic reformers were 
forced to back down, modernization efforts were stopped. and the possibility for 
changing the trajectory of Tibetan history was lost. 
Goldstein's description of the confrontation over modernization raises 
several important points. First, it underlines the widespread agreement among all 
factions of the political structure that the Tibetan state was first and foremost the 
supponer and patron of religion. Second, it highlights the fact that although this 
was agreed upon in principle, there "was no unanimity on who was to determine 
what in fact was in the best interests of religion" (1989:23). For the monasteries. 
change meant secularization and Buddhism's loss of patronage, power, and 
position, while for the aristocrats, modernization meant the ability to defend Tibet 
and to preserve its unique religio-political structures. Finally, and most important 
for our purposes, the confrontation reveals the extent to which Tibetans' primary 
loyalty was to Buddhism rather than to any nationalistic entity called Tibet. The 
ramifications of this fact in terms of political consciousness and mobilization are 
explored throughout the rest of this dissertation. ln the meantime, however, l 
briefly examine the Tibetan exile community's reactions to Goldstein's conclusions. 
Goldstein's account of the role of monastic conservativism in twentieth 
century Tibetan history, however accurate, has not won him many friends. Most 
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of his Tibetan critics have not read his long History of Modem Tibet. 17 
Nonetheless, they have not hesitated to accuse him of being "pro-Chinese" and of 
depicting Tibetan history from the Chinese point of view. 18 One of the most 
obvious reasons for these attacks on Goldstein stems from the fact that criticism of 
religious institutions and leaders was and is simply not tolerated; in the past, 
ordinary Tibetans both revered and were afraid of powerful monastic figures. 
Respect for religious persons and structures is a fundamental aspect of Tibetan 
society, whether in Tibet or in the diaspora. On another level, Goldstein's claim 
chat Tibet was lost because of religion also challenges exile Tibetans' 
representations of old Tibet as an unified, independent nation-state with an 
uniquely spiritual culture. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, nations are entities which are 
continually imagined, invented, and contested. Pan of this process of imagining 
community, Anderson (1983) tells us, is the construction of a national history, a 
collectively agreed upon narrative. Inevitably, there are struggles over the 
constitution of an authorized past, but in the Tibetan case, these struggles have 
been largely hidden from non-Tibetans. In fact, as I attempt to show throughout 
this dissertation, exile Tibetans have been very successful in constructing a 
coherent and compelling version of their history which is easily digested by 
outsiders. It is no small irony that this history celebrates Tibet's uniqueness and 
depicts that uniqueness as being largely due to Buddhist monasticism. On other 
hand, given Buddhism's dominance, we should not be surprised at the absence of 
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alternative, lay versions of the past. 19 Recently, however, emboldened by cheir 
leader the 14th Dalai Lama's own criticism of old Tibet, a few Tibetan intellectuals 
have begun to criticize openly the dominant (and sanitized) version of Tibetan 
history and the monasteries' devastating role in the past. By undermining che 
accepted exile version of history and by revealing the widespread factionalism and 
sectarianism which shaped events in Tibet before 1951, Goldstein threatens the 
refugees' most important symbolic resource on which they base their appeals for 
support co non-Tibetans and contest Tibet's current political status. 
Goldstein's interpretation of monasticism, though it is shared by many 
Tibetan intellectuals, is just one of many aspects of old Tibet on which exile 
officials have refused to allow serious debate, preferring simplistic portrayals of 
Tibetan innocence to more complex discussions of historical causality and 
responsibility (Shakya 1994; see also J. Norbu 1994). Another one of the sensitive 
topics Goldstein's scholarship has broached is the so-called feudal system in old 
Tibet. This issue has elicited a spirited debate among scholars and Tibetans in 
general, which I elaborate in the next section. 
Tibet's economic-political system: Goldstein's view 
Many scholars have encountered difficulties in applying Western analytic categories 
co Tibet's religio-political system. Some have argued that it was feudal, similar co 
chat which existed in fourteenth century Europe; others have proposed that while 
certain aspects of the system were feudalistic, it is better characterized as a 
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marginal, centralized bureaucratic state. In his doctoral dissertation on Tibet's 
political system, Goldstein suggests that it "moved from a type of late feudalism co 
an incipient form of centralized bureaucracy when the Gelugpa sect under the Dalai 
Lama obtained secular control over Tibet" ( 1968:255). 
This characterization of Tibet's economic system reflects the experiences of 
Goldstein's informants-refugees living in Bylakuppe, Mysore, in southern India. 
who had been farmers from the village of Samada in the Gyantse district. Tsang 
province. Through formal and informal interviews, Goldstein reconstructed the 
various levels of political and economic organization in Central Tibet, the 
country's political and agricultural heartland. This part of Tibet was characterized 
by proximity to major rivers and long-distance trade routes as well by two types of 
economically productive landholdings: hereditary "manorial estates" held by lay 
aristocrats, monasteries and incarnate lamas, and land directly held by the 
government. Goldstein cites the estimate of Surkhang, a former cabinet minister. 
that estates accounted for well over half the total land in Central Tibet 
(1968: 141). 20 
The estates consisted of arable land and a "bound" labor force of "serfs" 
obligated to farm it and who received no wages in return for cultivating the lord's 
demesne fields, the yield of which went wholly to the lord (Goldstein 1989:4). 
According to Goldstein, 
in Tibetan social theory, serfs were obliged to provide this free labor 
because they held a khral-rten ("tax base"), consisting of their 
hereditary tenement fields. They had complete control over these 
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fields with the exception of the power of sale. They planted what 
and when they wanted. and they retained the entire harvest. They 
could also lease their fields to others. (1989:4) 
Goldstein's application of "serfdom" to Tibet's productive system has been 
contested by both diaspora Tibetans and Western scholars, including Aziz (l 978). 
Dargyay (1982), Michael (1982). Miller (1987), and Samuel (1993). whom 
Goldstein argues refuse to use the terminology for reasons of contemporary 
political expediency (1986: 109) (see discussion below). ln an article on Tibet's 
social system, Goldstein suggests that we treat serfdom as a "cross-culturally 
relevant type" of productive relations in which "an elite controls both land 
resources and the critical labor force (serfs) it needs to produce foodstuffs from 
that land" (1986:82). 21 In the case of Tibet, Goldstein writes, serfdom provided 
the foundation for the manorial estate system and for the political and monastic 
system: 
lt was an efficient system of economic exploitation that guaranteed 
to the country's religious and secular elites a permanent and secure 
labor force to cultivate their landholdings without burdening them 
either with any direct day-to-day responsibility for the serfs' 
subsistence or with the need to compete for labor in a market 
context. ( 1989:5) 
Goldstein is careful to point out that while he believes serfdom existed in Tibet, it 
did not preclude the presence of considerable social mobility and "that one of the 
distinctive features of the Tibetan variant of serfdom was that a large proportion of 
the serfs were not physically tied to an estate on which they were compelled to 
provide corvee labor, although they were still bound to lord and estate" (1986:85). 
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These were "landless serfs" permitted by their lord to leave their natal estate but 
who had to pay him an annual fee (mi-bogs) and who still were obligated to 
provide various labor services to the lord upon his request (1986:97). According 
to Goldstein, the institution of mi-bogs provided 
a valuable escape-valve to the otherwise rigid system by allowing 
miser whC' would otherwise be tied to an estate to physically leave 
the estate with a legal identity. This allowed the mi-ser the 
opportunity to earn a living either there or elsewhere. (1986:96) 
He concludes that the mi-bogs institution, along with other factors such as the 
opportunity for economic mobility (see Goldstein 1968, chapter 4), the shortage of 
labor, strong religious supports for the traditional system of ascribed inequality. the 
right to petition the government, and the option of running away to another part of 
Tibet, eased the oppressive nature of the economic system. 
At the same time, serfdom "delegated substantial government rights co the 
lords" (1989:5). lndeed, Goldstein argues that lords of manorial estates were not 
mere landlords but rulers who collected taxes and corvee service from their mi-ser 
(peasants) and who had the authority to adjudicate disputes and punish crimes. 
Consequently, there was no need for the central government to maintain a police or 
judicial force in rural areas which in turn greatly reduced the need for a complex 
structure of government. Similarly, the estates generated wealth, relieving the 
government of the necessity of raising revenues to support the salaries of lay 
officials and the huge monastic system. Goldstein argues that "the combination of 
a centralized bureaucratic government and numerous political sub-systems 
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possessing considerable autonomy produced a highly viable system of government 
that ruled a large territorial area for centuries without any large scale disturbances" 
(1968: 15). 22 
Administrative organization 
The government-maintained transportation and i:ommunication network was "one of 
the backbones of the central government's administration of the country" 
(Goldstein 1989:4). Tibet was divided into routes which were subdivided into 
stations (sa-tshigs) each of which was located one half-day's walk from the next to 
insure that peasants could make a round trip in a single day. Corvee service could 
be commanded by permits (lam-yig), issued by the central government and 
authorizing the holder to demand transportation and riding animals from mi-ser 
upon presentation at a station. Food and shelter could also be obtained at little or 
no cost to permit holders. There were many permanent users of the service, 
including those involved with transporting regular shipments of such items as 
paper, dried fruits, rice, and butter. Permits were also issued to government 
officials, messengers, and so-called "postmen." This infrastructure based on 
corvee labor enabled the central government to move goods and people at no 
expense to itself and without employing officials throughout the countryside. 
Goldstein points out that providing animals and shelter on demand was not easy for 
most peasants who were forced to maintain large numbers of carrying animals 
(khal-ma) and riding animals (rta 'u), near their homes rather than in distant 
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pastures and to grow or purchase large amounts of fodder in order to feed them. 
The degree of participation by villagers in this form of taxation depended on the 
amount of land held by each household. (For a more detailed examination of 
corvee taxation in Central Tibet, see Goldstein l 968, chapter three.) 
The basic administrative unit of the Tibetan government was the district 
(rdzong), headed by a district commissioner (rdzong dpon), who was appointed by 
the central government in Lhasa for a three-year term. In some of the more 
important districts, a lay and a monk official shared the position. The district 
commissioner was the only member of the Lhasa bureaucracy stationed in his area 
on a permanent basis and his functions included the collection of taxes, acting as a 
liaison between the central government and district residents, adjudication of 
disputes. and trials and punishments of those accu~ed of wrong-doing (Goldstein 
1968:20). In addition, a district commissioner validated permits related co the 
communication and transportation network. 
As for adjudication, a district commissioner could not initiate action because 
he had no police force. Disputants had to seek his aid and in the case of a crime, 
victims had to find the offender and bring him/her before the district commissioner 
for punishment, which could include flogging, shackling, prison terms in the 
district's prison, and fines. More serious punishments, like mutilations, had to be 
approved by central government before being meted out (Goldstein 1968:23). 
The position of district commissioner was perceived as a source of income 
rather than as a source for increasing personal power and influence. These 
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officials enriched themselves by manipulating taX collection. Like officials at other 
administrative levels. district commissioners also frequently received gifts from 
disputants in pending cases. though these were not bribes. as acceptance by the 
adjudicator did not necessarily guarantee a favorable judgment for the gift giver 
(Goldstein 1968:26). 
At certain times and in certain places. larger provincial adminstrative units 
were deemed necessary. Goldstein writes that "the motivation for establishing such 
super-district regions (provinces). was either a result of need for higher ranking 
officials to deal with officials of other political units or to lessen the amount of 
administrative items received in Lhasa" (1968:25). ln size. population. economic. 
and political power the provinces were of unequal importance. Provincial 
governors (spyi-khyab) mediated disputes between districts and informed district 
commissioners of their duties. 
Goldstein identifies two sub-units in the districts in Central Tibet: the 
village of "landed government serfs" (gzhung-rgyugs-pa), and aristocratic and 
religious estates with serfs. lt is important to note that he defines "estate" as the 
hereditary land of a lord and "manorial estate" as an estate divided into demesne 
and tenanted lands with attached serfs. Goldstein uses manorial estates mainly to 
refer to land held by aristocrats and religious institutions. The main government 
lands. on the other hand, were not really estates at all but were villages with 
landed serfs ( 1968: 105). 
Gzhung-rgyugs-pa villages had two levels of mi-ser. "taxpayers" (khral-pa) 
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and dud-tshang. whom Goldstein defines as day laborers or those who leased land 
from taxpayers (see discussion below of these strata). Although these villages 
were attached to government-owned estates. they were relatively autonomous 
internally. Government involvement was limited to the collection of taxes; Lhasa 
exerted no control over the behavior of village residents. For instance, the duty co 
deliver taxes and services to the government was imposed on the villagers 
collectively and the village council decided how to distribute these duties to each 
family. 
ln the village of Samada (which was a gzhung-rgyugs-pa village). Goldstein 
found that equality existed among the eight taxpayer families but that the day 
laborers had no part in the village's decision-making processes. Headmen (rgan-
po). chosen by consensus by the taxpayers, were highly capable persons who could 
read, write. and calculate and who had verbal skills. The emphasis on verbal skills 
continues to be an evaluative criterion for leadership in the exile community. 
Wealth and access to economic resources were also important criteria and headmen 
usually came from the upper strata of taxpayer families. Unlike district 
commissioners. village headman could not expect to dominate or profit greatly 
from their position. They could, however. expect to be shown a high degree of 
respect and to gain prestige in their local community. 
There is an obvious continuity between the past and present in terms of 
leadership and social status. The majority of exile government officials are from 
what Tibetans refer to (in English) as "high" backgrounds, that is, they are either 
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aristocrats (which by definition means they formerly lived in Central Tibet, as 
opposed to the other two Tibetan regions-Kham and Amdo). from wealthy 
Khampa (Khams-pa) families. or monks or reincarnate lamas. known as tulkus. 
Most of the Tibet-run organizations in the U.S. and Switzerland are headed by 
educated individuals (both men and women) from similar backgrounds. At this 
point, l merely want to draw attention to the role of traditional status in terms of 
how political leadership and structures are reconstituted in exile. These 
continuities, and the interrelatedness of political power, social status, and activism 
are examined later in the dissertation. 
Social stratification in Central Tibet 
As suggested earlier, one of the ongoing themes in the war of representation 
between Tibetan exiles and the Chinese government is the nature of social mobil icy 
and stratification in old Tibet. Tibetans and sympathetic Western scholars are very 
sensitive about Goldstein's use of such terms as "serf," "lord," and "feudalism" in 
describing pre-1951 Tibet. While most do not deny the existence of social 
hierarchy as depicted by Goldstein, they argue that not only does the use of this 
nomenclature have "obvious political overtones." in light of Chinese attempts to 
legitimize their overthrow of an exploitative system (Samuel 1993: 117; see also 
Michael 1982 and Miller 1987). it also suggests to the Western reader a situation 
of abject poverty which "was emphatically not the case" (Samuel 1993: 119).23 
The main difference between Goldstein and other scholars thus appears to 
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be one of emphasis. For instance, Aziz (1978), Dargyay (1982), and others stress 
the considerable flexibility and mobility inherent in the traditional system. whereas 
Goldstein (1968; 1986) emphasizes the system's determining structures. He 
accounts for the discrepancy by suggesting scholars have confused the difference 
between the jural structure of the social system, which gave lords control over 
their mi-ser and the actual operation of the system which in fact allowed for 
significant physical mobility (1986: 104). 
Despite their different emphases, all those who have studied Tibet's social 
structure agree that mi-ser were neither a homogeneous category nor inevitably 
poor with no opportunity for social or economic mobility. In some cases. they 
were quite affluent and held substantial amounts of land, making the differences 
between sub-categories of serfs as great as those between the aristocracy and the 
serfs themselves. At this point, I want to explore some of the distinctions within 
the category of mi-ser which Aziz argues are missing from Goldstein's account. 
Aziz bases her reconstruction on interviews with refugees from Ding-ri, a trading 
community located near the Tibetan-Nepalese border in Central Tibet. While her 
data may represent stratification in Central Tibet in general, we cannot assume that 
they reflect social reality in the ethnically Tibetan regions of Kham and Amdo. as 
we shall see in the next section. 
The household formed the basic unit in the Central Tibetan villages: it was 
the "unit of production, the unit of taxation, the land-holding unit and the unit for 
political representation" (Aziz 1978: 108). Households, as opposed to families, 
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were "named. status-ranked entities. with inherited property and economic 
obligations. passed on normally in the male line" (Samuel l 993: l l 7). 24 Villagers 
initiated a series of schemes in order to retain members within the household: 
These strategies included polyandrous marriage, the sending of 
"surplus" children to monasteries, uxorilocal marriage or adoption in 
cases where there was no male heir. and the retirement of parents to 
small adjacent houses so that their children could take over the 
household proper ... The households in a village generally also all 
belonged to the same estate. Each household was allocated land by 
the estate, and had various tax and corvee obligations towards it. In 
addition, the village as a whole (that is, the body of full household 
members) had obligations which its members were collectively 
responsible for fulfilling. (Samuel 1993: 118) 
Tibet is best known in the anthropological literature for the widespread practice of 
plural marriages, most notably fraternal polyandry and sororal polygyny, which are 
seen as ideal ways to restrict household partition, and which contributed greatly to 
Tibet's overall economic and social stability (Dargyay 1982:23). Indeed, 
polyandry is a fascinating topic which has been explored by a number of scholars. 
most notably Furer-Haimendorf (1964); Goldstein (1971): and Levine (1988). This 
aspect of Tibetan culture is not usually discussed outside the community by its 
members. and with good reason. During the course of my fieldwork in 
Switzerland, I was told that Tibetan refugees were advised by Swiss Red Cross 
officials who helped them to resettle in Switzerland to hide the practice from 
government officials by naming the eldest brother as the sole husband. 
Not all mi-ser villagers were full household members. Some were from the 
lower status group, dud-tshang, defined by Aziz as sharecroppers. laborers, 
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servants. and anisans and whose households had no corporate identity. In other 
words. as a social category, mi-ser included dud-tshang, full tax-paying villagers 
(grong-pa), traders (tshong-pa), and tax-paying farmers who were pan-time 
religious specialists, or cleric householders (ser-khyim-pa). 
Aziz argues that her reconstruction of social stratification in Central Tibet is 
an improvement over earlier accounts that put forward a simple peasant-feudal 
model, and one which challenges Goldstein's rigid typologizing of the Tibetan 
system. She distinguishes between rural and urban contexts, the long-settled and 
the recent itinerant migrants, and other categories of persons who were not tied co 
estates. such as bandits and military officers. And contrary to Goldstein, Aziz 
argues that tax-payer (khral-pa) is not a distinctive social class but rather a term 
used to refer to grong-pa and tshong-pa tax-paying status. She notes that while 
dud-tshang had tax obligations to an estate, they were generally much less onerous 
than those of the grong-pa. As a result, dud-tshang, though often poorer than the 
grong-pa, could be socially quite mobile. 
My day-to-day observations of dud-tshang and my many 
conversations with them suggest that they are a class of extremely 
mobile and adventurous people-far from the oppressed and pitiable 
image of dud-tshang ... it is true that on the whole these people are 
poorer than others; they are also without many rights, as a result of 
having abandoned their land holdings. Some have been forced into 
this position through debt, others through exploitation. But many 
dud-tshang have freely chosen this status, and they find it far more 
preferable to remain on their land and deal with all the obligations 
that beset tenant farmers. (Aziz 1978:71)25 
Dud-tshang were an economic boon to Ding-ri as a ready and flexible labor force. 
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Some worked as cultivators in rural areas; ochers were artisans and servants to 
merchants and administrators in the larger towns. Aziz met some who had worked 
independently as inn operators and craftsmen. Freed from tax constraints and the 
social obligations of other classes, dud-tshang was a fluid social rank. 
In her book, Aziz identifies two groups above mi-ser in status, the 
aristocrats (ger-pa), and the hereditary lama families (ngag-pa). Both were 
hereditary owners of estates, although a hereditary lama's residential estate (bla-
brang) could be small and did not necessarily have attached mi-ser (Aziz 1978:53). 
Below the mi-ser were the outcastes (rig-ngan). This low status group was 
considered defiled; as butchers and hide preparers, they violated the fundamental 
Buddhist restriction against the taking of life. Members of other groups avoided 
drinking from the same cup as the outcastes, which basically prevented the group 
from normal social intercourse since virtually all gatherings began and ended with 
drinking. All of these ascribed statuses were inherited, although there was 
mobility between them, especially, as mentioned above, between the mi-ser 
categories of grong-pa, tshong-pa, and du.d-tshang. 26 
With the loss of their estates, the upper strata of Tibetans who followed the 
Dalai Lama into exile lost their means of revenue. Like their poorer compatriots, 
they faced the same difficult process of resettling and the same health problems 
posed by going from the 12,000 feet high Tibetan plateau to the hot and humid 
Gangetic plain. Certainly many Tibetans from aristocratic or wealthy trading 
families had access to substantial resources, having spent part of each year doing 
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business in places like Darjeeling and Kalimpong in northeastern India. 
Nevertheless, without an estate system, nor the possibility of owning land (at the 
time Indian law prohibited the ownership of land by foreigners). the traditional 
structure of social class based on property has become irrelevant in exile. 
Similarly, the monastic hierarchy, sustained by property as well, lost its power. In 
fact, there has been a growing disenchantment with the traditional religious order 
"which failed to deliver the goods at the moment of crisis" (Saklani 1978:43). 
Thus. although aristocrats still enjoy superior social status in exile and are highly 
placed in the government-in-exile, the rationale of the old status hierarchy in Tibet 
has been increasingly challenged, especially as the generation of young Tibetans, 
products of new educational system designed to eliminate status differences. reach 
adulthood and are employed in the government-in-exile (see Nowak 1984). 
As refugees, Tibetans have experienced more opportunities for social 
mobility than at any time in the past. One new means is through education, as 
Nowak (1984) suggests. Another (classic) way to raise one's status is to emigrate. 
Many young Indian-educated Tibetans have done this in recent years, a 
development discussed later in the dissertation. rr 
Interestingly, a form of what [call "community status" has emerged as the 
Tibetan diaspora has spread across the globe. During my research, I found that 
there is a "pecking order" of host countries with Tibetans living in Switzerland 
located at the top, followed by Tibetans in the U.S. and Canada, India, and at the 
bottom, Nepal. This hierarchy appears to be based largely on standard of living, 
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with the exception of Nepal. where there are many wealthy Tibetans who have 
made their fortunes in the carpet industry. but who are not always accorded the 
same status as rich Tibetans from other pans of the diaspora. 28 One possible 
reason for this is that Tibetans in Nepal are frequently accused of being too 
concerned with earning a I iving and not contributing enough to the Tibetan 
struggle. both financially and politically. 
Thus far. this has been a normative sketch of the religio-political system 
and social stratification. Yet despite the elaborated governmental bureaucracy and 
complex monastic structure. most of Tibetan life was conducted beyond the limited 
scope of the Lhasa government. At this point, I tum to an argument made by 
Geoffrey Samuel, an anthropologist and Tibetan Buddhist practitioner. who writes 
against the problematic tendency to view Central Tibet as representative of all 
Tibetan societies. 
Tibet and the galactic polity model: Samuel's view 
In his book. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan societies (1993). Samuel 
criticizes the Lhasa-centric view of Tibet, arguing that the Dalai Lama's regime 
was "only one, if in recent times the largest, of a variety of state formations within 
the Tibetan region" (39). As suggested earlier, the major political units have 
always been centered in agricultural areas like the provinces of U and Tsang in 
Central Tibet which provided a tax base to suppon the state bureaucracy. Samuel 
argues, however, that outlying regions, especially remote agricultural and pastoral 
42 
areas of Kham and Amdo. "have never been more than partially incorporated into 
the Tibetan state" (1993:44). lnstead, the population in these areas owed primary 
allegiance to local estate-holders or were too distant from Lhasa to be under 
effective political control. ln light of this. he proposes that we conceptualize the 
Tibetan state in terms of a "galactic polity" model developed in relation to 
Theravadin societies of Southeast Asia (see Tambiah 1976: 102-131: 1985 :252-
286): 
The galactic polity, with its mandala-type structure based on an 
exemplary center, and regional administrations that replicated the 
structure of the center, bears some relationship to the Lhasa state 
(and also to the relationship between the Manchu regime in China 
and the various Tibetan polities). Regional administrations within 
the galactic polity drift historically between periods of attachment to 
one or another center and periods of autonomy ... Central rule is as 
much a matter of performance (as in the elaborate rituals of the 
Lhasa administration) as administration, and the primary focus of the 
whole enterprise is on the extraction of produce and the control of 
personnel. (Samuel 1993:62) 
The analogy to traditional galactic polities of Burma or Thailand is not perfect. but 
Samuel suggests that a view of Tibet as characterized by fluctuating periods of 
greater and lesser centralization is closer to historical reality than a representation 
of Tibet as a centralized bureaucratic state (1993:63). 
ln making this argument, Samuel is debunking both popular and exile 
representations of Tibet as a unified independent state ruled by a central 
government in Lhasa. ln so doing, he is in agreement with many scholars, 
including Goldstein, who recognize that the Tibetan world can be divided into two 
categories: a "political" Tibet" which refers to the polity ruled by the Dalai Lamas, 
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and an "ethnographic Tibet." which refers to the wider areas across which ethnic 
Tibetans were distributed, such as Amdo and Kham (see Figure l). As Hugh 
Richardson, the well-known British diplomat and historian writes: 
ln "political" Tibet the Tibetan government have ruled continuously 
from the earliest times down to 195 l. The region beyond that co the 
north and east [Kham and Amdo) ... is its "ethnographic" extension 
which people of Tibetan race once inhabited exclusively and where 
they are still in the majority. In that wider area, "political" Tibet 
exercised jurisdiction only in certain places and at irregular 
intervals: for the most part, local lay or monastic chiefs were in 
control of districts of varying size. From the 18th century onwards 
the region was subject to sporadic Chinese infiltration. But in 
whatever hands actual authority might lie, the religious influence of 
Lhasa was a long-standing and all-pervasive force and large 
donations of money and valuable goods were annually sent to the 
Dalai Lama ... (Richardson 1984: 1-2) 
This issue of whether or not the ethnically Tibetan sub-regions of Kham or Amdo 
were part of Tibet has been vigorously contested by Tibetan exiles and scholars. 
For instance, Goldstein and the Dalai Lama's former representative in New York. 
Phintso Thonden, have publicly argued over the question in the exile monthly 
Tibetan Review (1991) and elsewhere (Goldstein l994a:79). Thonden and many 
other Tibetans claim that Kham and Amdo were part of political Tibet until 1949. 
when the Chinese invaded those areas. Goldstein, on the other hand, argues that 
the Lhasa government did not rule in these areas, and that therefore they cannot be 
considered part of the Tibetan state in modern times. He notes that "Thonden's 
article may be good politics, but it is bad history." In the same article, however, 
following a brief history of Kham and Amdo, Goldstein concludes his discussion 
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Because the future re-integration of Kham and Amdo with what was 
political Tibet (now the TAR) appears to be a very emotional issue 
for many Tibetans in exile and Westerners who support them, let me 
add that the historical information I have outlined above does not in 
any way preclude Tibetan nationalists such as Thonden from today 
advocating and working to reunite these areas into a unified 
"greater" Tibet in the future. Nor does it argue against the 
legitimacy of creating such a •greater' Tibet since these areas share 
obvious cultural characteristics and were once part of a unified 
Tibetan state. On the other hand. scholars such as myself did not 
make Tibetan history-Tibetans did-and it might be useful if they 
and their Western supporters tried to understand it objectively. 
( l 994a:87) 
Goldstein is right in suggesting that discussions of Kham's and Amdo's status 
evoke strong reactions from exile Tibetans and their Western supporters. Many 
Tibetans fear that if it is determined that Kham and Amdo were not part of Tibet 
in the past. they will not be part of an independent Tibet in the future. This 
concern surfaces periodically within the exile community and in Tibet Movement 
meetings when the possibility of negotiations with China and what the exile 
government is willing to settle for territorially comes up. 29 I come back to this 
discussion further on in the dissertation. 
Using a galactic polity model, Samuel manages to reframe the debate over 
the nature of the Tibetan system in slightly less polemical terms. He attempts to 
account for the tendency to see Tibet as a strongly centralized state with its capital 
at Lhasa by reminding us that many of the best known descriptions of Tibetan 
society were made by colonial officials and others based in central Tibet at a time 
when the Lhasa government was at its strongest (for example, Bell 1924, 1928; 
Richardson 1962; see also Harrer 1955). Thus, Samuel argues. the picture they 
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paint of Tibet is "skewed" towards the Lhasa government and the "Three Seats." 
the Gelugpa monasteries near the capital (1993: 143). He then makes an interesting 
observation about the unique relationship between Tibet and China. which 
Goldstein's work does not explicitly address: 
It is unfortunately one of the realities of present-day international 
politics that claims to independence are afforded more recognition 
when stated in terms of the nineteenth-century European ideal of the 
nation-state under a nationally representative government. The 
relationship between Tibetans and Chinese can. however, scarcely be 
understood in terms of the relationships between two nation-states. 
(1993: 143) 
Indeed. relations between Tibet and China (specifically the Mongol and Manchu 
empires) were characterized by a form of patronage known as mchod-yon. a state-
level expression of a general patron-client relationship. sbyin-bdag, in which 
spiritual guidance is exchanged for material support. This practice dates back to 
the thirteenth century when a famous lama. Sakya Pandita. went to the Mongol 
court to teach Buddhism to Ghengis Khan's grandson, Prince Godan; it was later 
consolidated by the Tibetan leader Phag-pa who initiated Kubilai Khan into 
Buddhism. Shakabpa argues that the patron-lama relationship, uniquely Central 
Asian, cannot be defined in Western political terms (1967:71). According to 
native interpretation, the Tibetan state was considered at least equal, if not 
superior, to those agents which supported it, and by entering into a mchod-yon 
relationship with Tibet. the Mongols and Manchus obtained no rights of 
sovereignty. 
With the fall of the Manchu empire in 1911, the special relationship 
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between Tibet and China, which had been operative off and on for six centuries. 
ended and the 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet independent of the succeeding 
Republic of China. 30 Subsequently, Tibetan leaders tried. without success. to re-
establish patron-client relationships with the Russian and British empires. Mchod-
yon continues to be a fundamental category in Tibetan life in exile, with 
sympathetic Westerners replacing traditional Central Asian agencies of patronage. 
This crucial social relation and its role in the production of Tibetan identity in the 
diaspora are discussed at greater length in chapter 5. 
As Samuel's description suggests, Tibet was not a nation-state nor was it 
incorporated into the Chinese empire: its political status was ambiguous, a fact 
which suited both Tibetans and Chinese regimes, at least until the twentieth 
century. 31 The mchod-yon relationship which obtained between the two polities 
appears by Western political standards to have provided Tibetans (and the Chinese) 
with plenty of room to maneuver.32 As French points out, 
Attempts at discussing acts by these two powers in modern 
international law terminology belies the fact that both countries 
worked very assiduously to keep their relations ambiguous. China's 
several claims of sovereignty over the Tibetans prior to 1950 were 
never followed by acts demonstrating that power nor were they 
viewed, by either Tibetans or the Chinese, as affecting the internal 
operations of Tibet. Similarly, Tibetan foreign policy often 
consisted of the avoidance of problems by not responding to 
letters ... or fleeing advancing armies and awaiting their withdrawal. 
(1991: 199) 
This latitude ended in 1949, when the newly formed Chinese Communist Party 
began a military campaign to gain control of Kham and Amdo, and eventually 
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Central Tibet. 
Since 1959, che ambiguity which once served both sides so well has become 
a liability: China has had co rewrice its history in order to juscify its claims co 
legicimacy in Tibet, while Tibetan refugees have been forced co construct a Tibetan 
national narrative in order to have their claims taken seriously by the world 
community. Thus it is not surprising that history and historiography have become 
central issues in the discursive struggle between Tibecans and Chinese, and that 
scholars whose work addresses the nature of the Tibetan polity and its boundaries 
have been drawn into the debate. 33 
Kham and Amdo 
Although the provinces of U and Tsang have received the bulk of che attention in 
che literature, most Tibetans lived outside Central Tibet in Kham and Amdo. 
Kham is in the eastern part of Tibet and Amdo is che region to its north. The 
ethnographic information available on these areas is extremely limited, the bulk of 
it gathered by former missionaries Robert Ekvall and Matthias Hermanns. We 
must therefore also rely on reports by Western travellers and refugees to 
reconstruct Kham and Amdo's premodern social and political structures. 34 
Kham's major towns grew up along the trade routes that connected China 
and India, Mongolia and Lhasa and which were travelled by caravans filled with 
tea, cigarettes, cloth, wool, musk or hides. 35 Although the Chinese had been 
present in Kham off and on for several centuries, Tibetan au.:ounts of life in the 
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region in the first half of the twentieth century suggest that Chinese effectiveness 
was nominal. at best. Samuel writes. "lt was only in the 1950s that the new 
Communist regime began to impinge directly on the lives of Tibetans. In other 
words, Kham east of the Drichu ('Bri-chu) was. during the premodern period, for 
all practical purposes independent of both the Lhasa government and the Chinese 
authorities" (1993:72). The people of Kham. called Khampas, are known for their 
independent nature and fighting spirit. When the People's Republic of China 
began to integrate pan of Kham directly into its adminstrative structure in the 
1950s, fighting broke out. The rebellion spread to Lhasa in 1959, culminating in 
the flight of the Dalai Lama and the fall of the Lhasa government. 36 Later. 
Khampas were the main group involved in guerrilla fighting against the Chinese on 
the border between Nepal and Tibet and were trained and funded by the CIA (see 
J. Norbu 1994). I come back to the issue of resistance and Tibet's fall in chapter 
4. 
Kham was known for its crafts-each district specialized in something-
woodblock printing, pottery, metal work, including gold and silver. Informants 
told one researcher that income from crafts exceeded income from land or herds 
and that a large portion of the profits obtained from crafts and trade were used for 
religious ceremonies and services, for the upkeep of monasteries, and for the 
support of monks as practitioners and teachers (Michael 1982). 
Very little information is available about Kham's social structure. There is, 
however, some information on the political structure of the region, including 
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Teichman's survey (1922). Teichman, a British consular official involved in the 
1918 Chinese-Tibetan peace negotiations in Kham, lists twenty-six Tibetan "states" 
under Chinese protection in the pre-1905 period. Referring to this list, Samuel 
notes that 
some of these might be better described as stateless areas although 
all had some kind of formal head ... the largest of these states was the 
"kingdom'' of Derge, which was ruled by a hereditary king or 
gyelpo. Four other states in Kham had rulers called gyelpo. Most 
of the other twenty-one states also had lay rulers, generally referred 
to as depa or ponpo, which are less specific titles than generic terms 
for lay rulers and administrators. Five had lama rulers. (1993:73-
74) 
Each of these semi-autonomous principalities had a distinct history and identity. 
Samuel points out that at any given time, the large, settled communities of Kham 
"normally owed clear allegiance to one state or another through their local 
headman and dpon-po, and travelers along the main roads knew when they were 
passing from one domain to another" (1993:82). The areas inhabited by 
pastoralists were not always effectively integrated into these petty states; there 
were also "wild bandit" regions with no authority whatsoever (Samuel 1993:82). 
Although Kham provides "a bewildering variety of Tibetan polities," 
according to Samuel, a number of "leadership patterns" can be identified. These 
include hereditary lay princes, hereditary lamas and reincarnate lamas, as well as 
officials appointed by the Lhasa government. Many of the lay princes were 
affiliated with lamas and gompa (dgon-pa) in the region (Samuel 1993:83). (It is 
important to note that the term gompa can encompass many things, including 
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remote hermitages, residences of a hereditary lamas, communities of non-celibate 
practitioners, or monasteries of celibate monks.) In addition, "a particular ·scare' 
might have subordinate status within a larger 'state'" and most states. regardless of 
size. included "subordinate centers of power." usually called rdwng, as in Central 
Tibet (Samuel 1993:83; see also Teichman 1922:171, 176). Another interesting 
feature in the Hor states in Kham was the lack of territorial boundaries; jurisdiction 
was over families and villages, as it was in Central Tibet, rather than over 
contiguous land or fixed territory. Finally, the degree of control exercised by 
these various polities over their inhabitants varied greatly: at one extreme were the 
settled village and urban populations and at the other extreme were "wild" 
populations described by Teichman as "unruly" and "notorious" (1922:203 n.l. 
207). 
Amdo, like Kham, was and continues to be an ethnically complex region. 
Most of the Tibetans living in Amdo were nomadic pastoralists. There were also 
Mongol pastoralists and other Tibetanized groups such as the Sokpo Arik (Sog-po-
a-rigs) (Samuel 1993:87). Settled Tibetan agriculturalists could be found too. 
many of whom lived in close contact with other ethnic groups, including Hui or 
Chinese Muslims, Han Chinese, and a Turkic group known as the Salar, in walled 
towns that served as trading centers for the region (Samuel 1993:89). 
Many large Gelugpa gompa could be found in Amdo, which must have 
meant that at some point Amdo had ties to the Lhasa government (which was 
Gelugpa). But Lhasa never had direct control over Amdo and the gompa in the 
52 
region were politically autonomous (Samuel 1993:90). During the Manchu period. 
the entire region was ruled by the Chinese amban in Xining. Amdo had a history 
of rebellions by the Hui against Chinese government troops. After the major 
rebellion of 1861-1874, the Muslims became the dominant power in the area. 
Fighting then broke out between the Tibetans and the Muslims in 1925, leading to 
a reorganization of the province in 1928. In 1949, the entire region was directly 
incorporated into the Chinese People's Republic. 
Most of the ethnographic work done on Amdo relates to pastoralist 
populations (Ekvall 1939, 1952, 1968, 1981; Hermanns 1949; see also Rock 1956: 
N. Norbu 1983). "Tentholds"-as opposed to Central Tibetan households--formed 
the basic social unit (Ekvall 1968). They were grouped into encampments (rus-
kor) which in turn were organized into tribes (ts'o), with an informally recognized 
headman. In practice, leadership was exercised by the elders (rgan-po) (Ekvall 
1939:68). In some cases, there was a hereditary chief ('go-pa) whose power 
depended on personal attributes, though autocratic control was limited "not by any 
competing body of power, but by the individualism and hatred of arbitrary restraint 
which are very strong in the Tibetans" (Ekvall 1939:69). Ekvall mentions another 
form of leadership, that of king (rgyal-po-the same term used in Kham), which 
referred to chiefs who had acquired great power through the consolidation of tribes 
and the skillful exercise of patronage, diplomacy and military prowess (Samuel 
1993:93). Hermanns offers another possibility too: that of an elected chief. Both 
Ekvall and Hermanns stress, however, that the authority of these various rulers 
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depended on the support of the genpo, or elders, and the population as a whole. 
Ekvall (1952, 1968) has written extensively about the tradition of "feuding" 
in Amdo, which Samuel argues is similar to the fighting patterns found in the 
highlands of West Asia or the Balkans, or of African pastoralists such as the Nuer 
(1993:94). Hostility between long-term enemies was dealt with by mediation, 
since there was not an encompassing authority capable of imposing settlements. 
Famous lamas, chiefs, and well-known orators would gather to mediate a dispute, 
a process which could take a long time, as they were "in no hurry to go home for 
they have oratorical reputations to maintain" (Ekvall 1968:79). Formal oratory 
was considered an important an; in fact Ekvall devoted much of his scholarly 
attention to speech, formal oratory and negotiation in Amdowa pastoralist 
communities (1952, 1964). 
As members of decentralized and nonhierarchical communities, Tibetan 
pastoralists negotiated for any services required from the outside world on a 
contractual basis (Samuel 1993:94). No regular taxes were paid to Lhasa 
government officials, although some nomadic communities paid "tribute" in the 
form of yaks, goats, sheep, salt and butter to the gompa estates to which they were 
attached. This appears to be the case more for nomads in the Changt'ang (Byang-
thang) (Western Tibet) than for those in Amdo or Kham (see D. Norbu 1987; 
Goldstein and Beall 1990). 
At the same time, gompa played an important role in nomadic ( 'brog-pa) 
life. Nomads economically supported the monastery in exchange for protection 
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from malevolent forces and other religious services. The gompa provided 
nonreligious services as well. including "mediation of disputes. storage and trading 
of produce, and protection in times of conflict or external danger" (Samuel 
1993:95). It is not clear to what extent gompa exerted administrative control over 
local groups. Samuel characterizes the relationship between the two as less one of 
permanent domination than "a series of alliances between secular and rdigous 
centers of power for mutual support" (1993:96). This kind of political style, he 
points out, was typical of Central Tibetan politics in a pre- and early Gelugpa 
period, and is a recurrent theme in exile political culture. 
The other traditionally Tibetan areas included Ngari, in Western Tibet, 
which was and continues to be sparsely populated by pastoralists; Lho, a province 
bordering Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh; and Lahul, Spiti, Ladakh and Zanskar 
which are located in present-day India. Of course, the Himalayan region is home 
to many culturally Tibetan groups and is where most anthropological research on 
Tibetan populations has been done. The bulk of the studies have been of Sherpa 
society (see Adams 1989, 1992, 1996; Fisher 1986; 1990; Furer-Haimendorf 1964, 
1984; Oppitz 1968, 1974; Ortner 1978, 1989; Paul 1982). At some time most of 
these areas formed part of central and western Tibetan polities, but by the early 
twentieth centry they had, with a few exceptions, been politically independent of 
Tibet for hundreds of years (Samuel 1993: 100). 
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Some conclusions 
fn light of the fact that practically all significant anthropological research on 
Tibetan populations has been on communities in Nepal and Ladakh. we must ask 
how representative of Tibetan society is this material as a whole? Samuel 
addresses the issue in the following way: 
Ethnic Tibet. despite the unifying effects of Buddhism. trade. and a 
common written language. has never been a particularly 
homogeneous region. The major provinces of Kham. Amdo. 
Central Tibet. and western Tibet have different histories and have 
been shaped in many ways by those histories. It requires 
considerable effort for Khampas, Amdowas. Lhasa people and 
Ladahkis to understand each others' spoken languages. Within each 
of those regions. there are numerous communities with different 
dialects. social structures. kinship systems. and ritual practices. The 
area of folk-religious practices is probably particularly variable. but 
Tibetan communities generally seem to have welcomed diversity and 
accepted local variation as natural. and the difficulties of 
communication. along with the lack of an effective centralized state 
through most of Tibetan history. would have done nothing to reduce 
this diversity. From this point of view, no one part of Tibet is 
going to be representative or typical. (1993: 112-113) 
Samuel summarizes the dangers of assuming that the Central Tibetan state was 
representative of Tibet as a whole: it privileges a single state when there were 
actually several in the region; it reinforces a view that state power was a given. 
rather than fragile and limited; it privileges the stratified and hierarchical segment 
of Tibetan society over the groups who lived in relatively egalitarian and stateless 
societies (e.g., Amdo pastoralists); and finally, it privileges a region of Tibet that 
was much more isolated than other areas and so perpetuates a myth of Tibetan 
society as existing in isolation. rather than in constant contact with surrounding 
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societies through trade (1993:145). 37 It is this vision of heterogeneity. diversity 
and equality which ultimately distinguishes Samuel's portrayal of Tibet from that 
of Goldstein and others. 
Samuel concludes that premodem Tibet had more in common with stateless 
societies than states and that equality within the village (or at least particular 
categories of villagers) and pastoral communities was as important a theme of 
Tibetan politics as hierarchy outside the village (1982:226). He suggests that it 
may be more productive to see Tibetan structures of authority "less in terms of a 
command structure in which all power derives from the ultimate power of the 
ruler, and more in terms of the negotiation of power between more or less equal 
partners" (1993: 151). Citing Aziz's work on the mural aid relationship (ganye) in 
Ding-ri (1978: 189-197), in which individuals become formally obligated to suppon 
one another in times of need, and the existence of other formalized friendship 
relationships based on equality (see also Corlin 1975, Miller 1956, and Onner 
1978:61-90), Samuel backs up his argument that "horizontal" relationships were of 
great importance in Tibetan communities and that even the stratified society of 
Central Tibet "should not be seen simply in terms of relationships between the 
Dalai Lama and estate lord or between estate lord and peasant (or "serf")" 
( 1993: 124). 38 
Samuel's observations about hierarchy and equality in Tibet echo Onner's 
claim about another ethnically Tibetan group, the Sherpas: "there is a fundamental 
contradiction in the Sherpa social and cultural order between an assumption of the 
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naturalness and desirability of (male) equality, and an assumption of the 
naturalness and desireability of hierarchy" (1989: 19)? What bearing do they have 
on our understanding of the contradictions embedded in Tibetan efforts to 
transform the old hierarchical social order in exile through the embrace of 
discourses of democracy and human rights which assume the equality of 
individuals? And given Tibetans' heightened sensitivity to portrayals of their 
former system as feudalistic, what significance can we read into Samuel's emphasis 
on Tibetan equality? ln this dissertation, l argue that the tension between equality 
and hierarchy is a central problematic in Tibetan societies, an irresolvable dilemma 
made more visible in the diasporic context and further heightened by the presence 
of non-Tibetan social actors whose assumptions and ideas challenge Tibetan 
formulations of order in exile. 
By focusing on the tension between equality and hierarchy, Samuel lays the 
groundwork for his broader argument about religion in Tibet, whose development, 
he writes, must be understood in the context of Tibetan politics, and more 
specifically, in light of Tibet's fragility as a centralized state. 
Had the population of Tibet been integrated into a state as effectively 
centralized as, for example, those of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia or 
Sri Lanka over the last few centuries, Tantric Buddhism would never 
have developed and maintained its dominant role within Tibetan 
society. An effectively centralized state in Tibet would never have 
tolerated the kind of free-ranging and autonomous power that Tantric 
lamas and gompa exercised over the centuries. Indeed ... state 
powers in Tibet generally did their best to "domesticate" and restrict 
lamas. That they failed was an indication precisely of the limits of 
state power within Tibet, and of the inaccuracy of the Lhasa-centric 
view of Tibet (1993: 142). 
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As suggested earlier, Samuel's conclusions have implications not only for the 
emergence of Tantric Buddhism in Tibet but also for understanding the project of 
constructing a unified "'national" Tibetan identity in exile. They help us to 
understand the origins of regional and sectarian identifications and the persistent 
factionalism which has come to define exile politics. Together, Samuel's and 
Goldstein's work paint a portrait of pre-1951 Tibet which undermines its popular 
image as an isolated Shangri-La--an image created by Western fantasy but which. 
as I argue in this dissertation, is perpetuated by Tibetans themselves and their non-
Tibetan supporters for political purposes. Their depictions of old Tibet also 
challenge the dominant exile version of history--that of a unified Tibet under Lhasa 
leadership. In so doing, these scholars touch on one of the most contested issues 
within the refugee community: the legitimacy of the exile government's claim to 
speak for all Tibetans, inside Tibet and across the diaspora. 
The production, circulation, and contestation of representations of Tibetan 
history by Tibetans and scholars are central processes through which "Tibetanness" 
is mediated and mobilized in the diaspora. As Goldstein's and Samuel's 
scholarship suggests, Tibetans' primary loyalty was to Buddhism rather than to any 
-. 
nationalistic entity called Tibet. In the next chapter, I continue my brief sketch of 
Tibet's religio-political system, focusing on Tibetan Buddhism and its role in 
political life before 1951. 
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Notes 
l. As Graham Clarke points out. "There have been no field-studies of the stature of 
Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer or Leach's Political Systems of Highland Burma in the 
anthropological study of Tibet. The ethnographic method of Malinowski developed 
from the second decade of this century onwards. a period when Tibet was largely 
closed to foreigners. first by the Tibetans themselves. and then. after 1959. by the 
Chinese" (1983:50). 
2. See Stoddard's essay "Tibetan publications and national identity" in Barnett and 
Akiner (eds.) Resistance and Reform in Tibet. 1994: pp. 121-156. Stoddard and 
other scholars (e.g .• Dargyay 1982. Schwartz 1994a) have noted that almost all 
literature in pre-195 l Tibet was religious and did not focus on "worldly" concerns. 
This has changed under Chinese rule. though it was not until the 1980s that a new 
generation of writers emerged and began publishing novels and shon stories which 
deal with modern or secular concerns. 
Interestingly enough. the "First National Conference of Tibetan Writers" was 
recently held in Dharamsala (March 15-17. 1995). It was the first time such a 
gathering had been organized. Sponsored by the Amnye Machen Institute, the 
conference's aim was to discuss "the role of Tibetan writers in initiating change and 
progress in Tibetan society and taking a lead in the freedom struggle" (Lungta 
1995:30-33). Organizers invited writers from Tibet as well as writers from across 
the diaspora. 62 people participated. ranging from an elderly lama scholar living in 
Switzerland to a Nepalese editor of a Tibetan language paper. AMI introduced 
participants to the Institutes' facilities for research and publication and discussed its 
translation program of "great books of the world into Tibetan." Participants elected 
to join P.E.N. International and to form a Tibetan chapter with the hope of being 
able to "view their profession and ideals in a more global context." "Tibet's best-
selling author" the Dalai Lama. was awarded the first Gedun Choephel Award. 
3. Scholarly work on Tibet that deploys an historical or anthropological perspective can 
be grouped according to ten interrelated themes: 
1) The monastic-political system in Central Tibet (Goldstein 1968, 
1989; Goldstein and Tsarong 1985; Carrasco 1959; Cassinelli and 
Ekvall 1969; Michael 1982; Samuel 1982, 1993; Shakabpa 1967; 
Wiley 1986) 
2) The institution of the Dalai Lama (Bell 1946; Klieger 1991; Mullin 
1988; Thurman 1983) 
3) Tibetan Buddhism (Brentano n.d., 1993; Ekvall 1964; Mumford 
1989; Ortner 1978, 1989; Paul 1982; Samuel 1982. 1985. 1993, 
1994b; Stein 1972; Thurman 1984; Tucci 1980) 
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4) Kinship (Aziz 1978. 1988; Goldstein 1971. 1987) and polyandry 
(culturally Tibetan groups in Himalayas: Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964: 
Levine 1988) 
5) Central Tibetan village life (Aziz 1978; Dargyay 1982. Goldstein 
1968; Miller 1956) 
6) Amdo and Kham/pastoralism (Ekvall 1939. 1952. 1964. 1968: 
Goldstein and Beall 1990; Peissel 1972, Stoddard 1985) 
7) The Tibetan diaspora: Nepal and India (Calkowski 1986. 1991: 
Corlin 1975. 1995; Devoe 1981. 1983, 1985, 1987; Forbes 1989: 
Goldstein 1975; Gombo 1985; Klieger 1992; Nowak 1984; N. Paljor 
1986; Saklani 1978); Switzerland (Brauen and Kantowsky 1982; 
Marazzi 1975; Ott-Marti 1976; Sander 1984); North America 
(Mclellan 1986; Mclagan 1996, in press: Messerschmidt 1976) 
8) Exile institutions and politics (Avedon 1984; Dixit 1991; French 
1991; Monnier 1989; J. Norbu 1989: D. Norbu 1991, 1992; Nowak 
1984) 
9) Tibetan nationalism since 1959 (Barnett 1994; Klieger 1992; D. 
Norbu 1982; Schwartz 1989. 1994a. 1994b; Smith 1994; Sperling 
1994; Stoddard 1994) 
10) Historical relations between Tibet and China (Beckwith 1987; 
Goldstein 1989. 199la. 1994a; Grunfeld 1987; Shakabpa 1967; 
Smith 1994; Sperling 1980). 
In a recent article on Tibetan Studies in the 1990s. Samuel (1994a) points out that 
Tibetanists (as he calls scholars who work on Tibet-related topics) tend to "treat 
Tibet as an isolate and to avoid relating it to larger regional discourses" (697). 
thereby constructing Tibet as an autonomous and largely isolated cultural and 
historical region. He argues that this tendency has an obvious relation to the 
political situation in Tibet and scholars' desires to not undermine Tibetans' claims to 
autonomy and liberation from Chinese rule. Samuel also suggests that Buddhist 
discourse tends to dominate Tibetan studies. which results in the neglect of other 
important topics (698). He argues that scholars need to consider Tibet in the 
context of research on the Southeast Asian highlands. research conducted mainly by 
anthropologists (e.g., Leach 1970; Tambiah 1984. 1985). 
4. Some of this literature is excellent and provides the only information available on 
certain communities. particularly those in Amdo and Kham (for concise summaries, 
see Samuel 1993, chapters 4 and 5; Goldstein 1994a). 
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5. Although the use of scholarship to legitimize one side's claim over the other's is 
relatively recent. the conflict between Tibet and China over Tibet's political status 
predates the creation of the PRC and its rule in Tibet. ln fact. the roots of the 
conflict date back more than two hundred years (see Goldstein 1994b). 
6. For an analysis of China's public relations strategy (from the Tibetan point of view). 
see the International Campaign for Tibet's repon: China's Public Relations Strategy 
on Tibet: Classified Documents from the Beijing Propaganda Conference (1993). 
7. See Samuel ( l 994a:697) on how the nature of the political dispute between Tibet and 
China affects Tibetan studies. 
8. lndeed, until 1968, no academic had ever made a study of Tibetan political 
institutions that was based on fieldwork in Tibet or intensive interviewing among 
refugees in lndia. Since then. only a few scholars, including Melvyn Goldstein 
(1968, 1989) and Barbara Aziz (1978). have published material based on primary 
research. 
9. See "Women in Tibetan Society and Tibetology" by Barbara Nimri Aziz in Tibetan 
Studies: Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan 
Studies, edited by Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung, 1988. 
10. As far as academic studies are concerned, Barbara Nimri Aziz. an anthropologist. 
has written one of the only books which offers a glimpse into what daily life must 
have been like for Tibetan women (and men) in old Tibet (Tibetan Frontier 
Families, 1978). She has also published a number of articles relating to Tibetan 
women (see Aziz 1985; 1987). Tibet Journal published a special issue on Women 
and Tibet in 1987 (Winter. Vol. 12. no. 4). 
For studies of famous women Buddhist practitioners, see Tsultrim Allione's Women 
of Wisdom (1984); Keith Dowman's Sky Dancer (1984). See also Servants of the 
Buddha by Anna Grimshaw (1992); Feminine Ground: Essays on Women in Tibet. 
(1989) edited by Janice Willis; Women in Buddhism by Diana Paul (1979); Anne 
Carolyn Klein's Meeting the Great Bliss Queen (1995); and Hanna Havnevik's 
Tibetan Buddhist Nuns: History. Cultural Norms and Social Reality (1989). 
There are also a few popular autobiographies written by elite laywomen, including 
Princess in the Land of Snows (1990) by Jamyang Sakya. House of the Turquoise 
Roof (1990) by Dorje Yudon Yuthok. and Rinchen Dolma Taring's Daughter of 
Tibet (1970), which offer insight into the everyday lives of aristocrat women. More 
recently. David Patt profiled a Tibetan woman. Arna Adhe, in Strange Liberation: 
Tibetan lives in Chinese Hands (1992). 
Since 1987. nuns in Tibet have played a leading role in demonstrations for 
independence. Several authors have written about this phenomena. including Carole 
Devine (1993). Hanna Havnevik (1994). and Ron Schwartz (1994a). but as yet no 
study has been done of the emergence of political activism by young nuns from rural 
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backgrounds in Tibet. 
11. See Dung-dkar Bio bzaog 'phrim-las (1991) for a discussion of chos-srid zung- 'brel. 
12. Out of 200 families. 30 were higher status Depon Mirra (sde-dpon mi-drag) families 
who bad multiple estates. The other 120-170 lower or "common" aristocratic 
families usually held single estates (Goldstein 1989:6). 
13. In his dissertation (1968) Goldstein notes that aristocratic families perceived their 
obligation to government service as a right. 
14. Many writers on pre-1951 Tibet have assened that traditionally 253 of the male 
population were monks. Samuel disputes this figure. arguing that while there were 
undoubtedly areas in premodern Tibet with high local concentrations of celibate 
monks. for the country as a whole. the percentage was closer to 10-12 3 in the 
centralized areas and lower in outlying regions (1993: 582). 
15. See Goldstein (1989: Chapter 3) for a discussion of attempts to modernize Tibet in 
the early twentieth century. 
16. Perhaps the most interesting example of a group who sought change in Tibet was the 
"Tibetan Improvement Party"-a group of Khampa and Amdowa intellectuals and 
nationalists who were followers of Sun Yat-Sen and who took the ideals and theories 
of the Kuomintang as models for a future restructured Tibet (see Goldstein 
1989:449-463). This group. which included the famed monk Gedun Choephel. was 
largely based in the Indian border towns of Kalimpong and Darjeeling. Goldstein 
describes him in the following way: 
When he was about thirty he went to India for a stay of twelve years 
during which he learned English and Sanskrit and translated and 
composed a wide variety of texts. While in India. he became 
enamored of Marxist-Leninist political philosophy and anti-colonialist 
ideology and came to believe that major reforms or a revolution in 
Tibet was necessary. He favored giving the monks salaries instead of 
estates and requiring them to study instead of engaging in business. 
He is also said to have favored land and legal reforms. and 
democracy. For all his brilliance. however. Gedun Choephel was 
hopelessly degenerate for a monk. He was a womanizer. a chain 
smoker. a user of opium and liquor. and physically unkempt. 
(1989:453) 
In the end. the British caught wind of the TIP's revolutionary. pro-Chinese activities 
in India. and alened the Tibetan government of its members desire or intentions to 
overthrow the Tibetan government. Several of them were sent to China. including 
the Khampa layman Ranga Pangdatsang. and the Gelugpa teacher Geshe Sherab 
Gyatso. from Amdo. who was to become. for many years. Chairman of the All 
China Buddhist Association of the PRC. Indeed. when the Chinese arrived in Lhasa 
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in 1951. a number of progressivist Tibetan intellectuals were already prepared to set 
up translation committees in order to translate Marx. Engels. Lenin and Mao Tse-
tung into Tibetan. For an interesting discussion of these individuals and this period 
of Tibetan history. see Heather Stoddard· s doctoral thesis (1985). Le Mendiant 
d. Amdo. This strain of Tibetan political life has been largely written out of the 
historical record by exile Tibetans. However. a few Tibetan progessives have 
played important roles in post-1959 Tibet; I will address this issue in chapter 3. 
For an interesting interview with one of Choephel's students currently living in 
Switzerland. see "Gedun Choephel or the loss of a sage: Interview with Rakra 
Tethong." published in the Swiss magazine Lungta. 1992. pp. 19-23. 
17. Indeed. during the course of my research. I met only a few Tibetans who had 
actually read the text and formed an opinion about Goldstein's argument. 
Unsurprisingly. they were almost without exception intellectuals and laypersons who 
agreed with the author• s conclusions and lamented the fact that most Tibetans are 
"uninterested in learning about their own history." 
18. The personal nature of some of the attacks has been frustrating for the author. who 
in fact was married to a Tibetan at one time and with whom he had a child, and who 
claims to have a great deal of sympathy for Tibetans. both inside and outside of 
Tibet (personal communication). 
19. The most well-known exception to this was Gendun Choepers incomplete history of 
Tibet known as The White Annals (1978). 
20. Recent Chinese estimates are that "manorial estates" accounted for 62 3 of the total 
arable land. 373 of which were religious estates. 253 of which were aristocratic 
estates (Epstein 1983:406). 
21. Goldstein suggests that Tibet "did differ markedly from European serfdom in the 
absence of a class of "free peasants." in the tremendous number of "derived" 
landless serfs. and in the fact that Tibetan serfs had legal identities" (1986: 108). 
This doesn't. however. "mitigate the essential isomorphism that existed between 
serfdom as a system of economic production in medieval Western Europe ... and that 
which existed in Tibetn Goldstein concludes (1986:108). 
22. In fact. Goldstein estimates that in 1951 there were only 400 to 500 lay and monk 
officials administering a country that contained at least one million inhabitants in an 
area almost the size of Western Europe (1989:6). 
23. E.g. unlike Goldstein. who translates mi-ser as "serf." Aziz's translation is 
"commoner." 
24. This was not the case in pastoral and remote agricultural communities. where 
kinship was lineage-based (Samuel 1993: 115). 
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25. Dargyay disagrees with Aziz on this point. She argues that an individual would 
usually only seek independence from an estate to which he or she was attached if 
he/she had lost almost every family member and was unable to meet tax obligations. 
For Dargyay's informants, voluntarily seeking to change social status was 
unimaginable, for independence meant the loss of protection by one's patron. the 
estate lord. as well as the loss of what little rights one had as a taxpayin!! farmer 
(Dargyay 1982:23). 
Those rare few who did seek independence from their estate had several options: 
they could "petition the landlord, run away, request a suspension to go on a 
pilgrimage or commercial venture, or join a monastery" (Dargyay 1982:21). 
Goldstein takes issue with use of the word "choice" in describing decisions by mi-ser 
to leave their estate (see Miller 1987). He points out that the granting of requests 
for release from attachment to a lord/estate on a permanent or temporary basis was 
entirely the prerogative of the lord, (1986:95) reiterating that for an individual. 
social mobility was dependent on the good will of his or her superior. 
26. lnheritance was unilateral: "sons of a father tied to landlord A would belong as 
tenants to A; daughters followed their mother's dependency; thus among members of 
each family, theoretically, the male and female members belonged to different 
landlords" (Dargyay 1982: 19). 
One of the most well-known instances of social mobility involves a man named 
Jensey Namgang, who was born into a peasant family but who ran away from home 
at an early age. He was taken on as a servant of a monk official who accompanied 
the 13th Dalai Lama to Mongolia. Later his military skill made him a favorite of 
the Dalai Lama, who ennobled him in 1913 and gave him the title of dza-sag. He 
married into an aristocratic family and took their last name-Tsarong. This practice 
of having a man move into his wife's household and adopt the wife's family name is 
known as mag-pa. See Taring (1970) for a lively account of her father's dramatic 
rise to power and fame. 
Goldstein notes that if monks were originally serfs, they were freed from all 
obligations to their lord upon entering the monastery. ff they left the monastery. 
however, they "reverted to the status of mi-ser of their original lord" (1986: 110). 
27. For example, in 1992-93, one thousand Tibetans emigrated to the United States 
through the U.S. Tibet Resettlement Program. 
28. Tibetans living in Switzerland or North America are considered to be highly 
desirable marriage partners for obvious economic reasons. 
29. See Tsering Wangyal's essay "Sino-Tibetan negotiations since 1959" in Barnett and 
Akiner (eds.). Resistance and Reform in Tibet (1994: 197-206); see also "China's 
Dialogue with the Dalai Lama 1978-90: Prenegotiation stage or dead end?" by Daw a 
Norbu. Pacific Affairs, 64(3):351-371, 1991. 
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30. See Goldstein (1989) for a description of the events which immediately followed the 
fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. including the Simla Convention of 1913 and a 
discussion of the complex negotiations between Britain. China and Tibet. 
31. One scholar credits the ambiguity of mchod-yon for the long-standing conflict between 
Tibetans and Chinese which he describes as a "differential misunderstanding of the 
traditional patron/client framework" (Klieger 1992: 18). 
32. This aspect came up during my fieldwork in discussions with Tibetan intellectuals 
who pointed out the "vagueness" and tendency toward ambiguity in Tibetan political 
behavior. both on the individual and state level. To what extent this behavior. 
which at times frustrates Western supporters of Tibet. derives from a a legacy of 
patron-client relations in the past is uncertain. However. Goldstein· s (1989) 
examination of Tibetan diplomacy vis a vis the British and the Chinese in the 1940s 
reveals quite clearly Tibetan ambiguity in action. 
33. See the late Tsepon W.D. Sbakabpa·s Tibet: A Political History (1967) New Haven: 
Yale University Press. This text. written by the former Minister of Finance from 
1930-1950. is essentially the official Tibetan exile version of history-a history. 
Klieger (1992) notes. "that is utilized to present Tibetan national claims to the 
world" (24). 
34. For a fascinating summary of the history of Christian evangelism in Tibet. see Tibet 
lnformation Network·s Background Papers on Tibet. September 1992: part 1: 
"Evangelicals in Central Tibet." 
35. One of my informants in New York came from a family of traders in Eastern Tibet 
who travelled to China in order to buy bricks of tea. which they would then take to 
Lhasa to sell. From there. the traders would travel to lndia where they would use 
the money from the tea to purchase clothing. utensils and other items which were 
too expensive to buy in China or Tibet. Returning to Tibet. they would sell these 
items to Tibetans and return home. Like many other families in this part of Tibet. 
my informant's family was polyandrous-be had three fathers and one mother-a 
form of household organization which obviously suited the needs of those engaged in 
seasonal trading (e.g. at least one male could stay behind with the family). 
36. Since 1959. the Drichu CBri-chu) has remained the boundary between what is 
currently known as the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) on the western side and 
the province of Sichuan on the eastern side. 
37. Samuel stresses the importance of trade over and over in his book. arguing that 
Tibetan societies owed much of their viability to the trade routes to and from 
China. lndia. Nepal and Kashmir. Trading was "an intrinsic part of the Tibetan 
ecological adaptation and it brought Tibetans into constant contact with surrounding 
populations. Lhasa has substantial populations of Newaris. Kashmir and Chinese 
Muslims and the trading centers of Kham and Amdo had an equally heterogeneous 
character" (1993: 145). 
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38. Very little has been written on mutual aid relationships because there is almost no 
documentation of them. Miller ( 1956) has published several anicles on the subject 
in which she describes the practices of ganye. These formalized friendships were 
entered into by the formal presentation of a kata (kha-btags), white ceremonial scarf. 
and money during the observation of a life crisis. usually a death or a marriage. 
An individual's ganye must appear during the celebration of the 
important events and must make a presentation of a scarf and money 
at the time ... a written record is kept of all sums received from each 
ganye for each event. Then when the ganye in turn has a crisis in 
his family, the amount he has given, plus an additional sum. must be 
contributed. (1956: 158) 
According to Miller, the sole purpose of acquiring a large number of ganye "is to 
have lots of people at one's family's important occasions and who can also help bear 
the brunt of the expenses involved" (1956: 160). 
Another relation set up by a formal initiation ceremony is called mitra, a mutual 
friendship for trade purposes. The third form of mutual aid relationships arc kidu -
- organizations designed to function as a source of aid during life crises. Typically. 
the kidu contributed as a unit toward the expenses incurred by its members (Miller 
1956: 160). The kidu studied by Miller in India had names, but were not based on 
region or kinship. There was no restriction on membership, but members were 
expected to render labor services on a rotating basis and new members paid 
initiation fees. Miller suggests that kidu existed only among the middle and lower 
classes, and were particularly strong in urban areas where kinship ties were 
weakened. 
67 
Chapter 3 Tibetan Buddhism and rule by incarnation 
Introduction 
In order to fully grasp the nature of Tibet's political system before the Chinese 
occupation, it is necessary to put the development of Tibet's unique form of 
Buddhism into context. To do this, I begin by outlining the three vehicles of 
Buddhism. Then, following Samuel's argument, I briefly discuss the indigenous 
religious practices which existed in Tibet before Buddhism's arrival, and the 
subsequent encounter between the two. After outlining the development of some of 
the basic concepts and practices of Tibetan Buddhism-which is essential if we are 
to make sense of Western fascination with Tibet and with cultural production in the 
diaspora--1 explore the emergence of rule by incarnation and the institution of the 
Dalai Lama. Due to the constraints on fieldwork in old Tibet described in Chapter 
2, this account is more of an historical narrative than an account of everyday life. 
Yet its focus on the intertwined nature of Tibetan religious and political structures 
will serve as a useful framework for locating contemporary political and cultural 
processes in the diaspora described throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
The three vehicles of Buddhism 
Samuel's Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies (1993) is the most 
authoritative account to date of the evolution of religion in Tibet from the ninth 
century up to the Chinese occupation in 1951. It is especially useful because the 
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author writes from an anthropological perspective, something which is missing 
from most of the English-language literature on Tibetan Buddhism (for notable 
exceptions, see Mumford 1989; Ortner 1978, 1989; and Paul 1982). 
As one of the world's major spiritual traditions, Buddhism centers on the 
pursuit of Enlightenment, or bodhi (Skt.), a goal of liberation from suffering. It 
originated with a historical figure who lived in what is now northern India 
sometime around fifth century B.C.E. Siddhartha Gautama. a member of the 
Sakya clan. left the comfort of his aristocratic household when he was twenty-nine 
and became a wandering ascetic. After six years of life as a hermit. during which 
time he underwent yogic austerities and studied doctrines, Gautama gave up the 
ascetic practices for normal life. He then spent seven weeks in the shade of a tree 
near the town of Bodh Gaya. in the Ganges River Valley, until finally one dawn he 
became "awakened." The Buddha ("enlightened one," Skt.) then began to preach; 
soon he had a large following. 
The cornerstone of Buddha's teaching is impermanence--the absence of 
intrinsic self nature. lt was his key insight and led to the crux of his teaching. 
that all trouble comes from ignorance or misknowledge (avidya, Skt.). from a 
belief that things exist in and of themselves-independently, autonomously, 
possessed of some intrinsic nature, some inherent existence (Lopez 1991: l 04). 
This belief is the source of suffering, according to the Buddha. The antidote to 
ignorance and suffering is wisdom--the realization that all things, including 
persons, are devoid of intrinsic nature, and are. in reality, empty (Lopez 
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1991: 104). To achieve wisdom, one must follow the Buddhist path (dharma) 
(Skt.). 
Buddha taught that selflessness means relativity. interconnectedness and that 
realization of this leads to freedom from suffering. These principles are 
summarized by the Four Noble Truths: l) reality is permeated by suffering. 2) 
desire is the cause of such suffering, 3) cessation of suffering is a possibility. and 
4) the Buddhist path leads to the cessation of suffering. A great emphasis was 
therefore put on causality which in Buddhist theory is known as the doctrine of 
dependent origination. lt can be summarized in the following way: everything we 
regard as "the self" is conditioned or compounded; everything conditioned depends 
on causes and conditions. Nothing exists in and of itself without relation to 
anything else; therefore there is no absolute, permanent self-substantial thing; 
things only have a conventional existence. 
Another way of looking at the question of causality is through the concept 
of karma or action. Karma was presented by the Buddha as a biological and 
ethical law which dictated that you become what you do. ln other words, karma is 
the "cumulative force of previous actions, which determines present experience and 
will determine future existences" (Thurman 1976: 140). ln fact, Buddhists theorize 
that karmic action is the only thing that reincarnates, since there is no soul or self 
with intrinsic identity. The theory of karma stresses the importance of individual 
responsibility in determining one's future births-it is both an empowering and 
constraining concept in that it creates a space for change in the system and yet it 
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dictates that one must live the results of one·s actions. 1 
The Buddha's teachings, passed down orally for several centuries after his 
death, were codified in the satras (Skt.}, texts that narrate his instructions to his 
disciples on various specified occasions. For the Theravadin (Hinayana) school of 
Buddhism, which dominates modern Sri Lanka, Thailand, Laos, Burma and 
Cambodia, these early siitras form the only authentic teaching of the Buddha. For 
Tibetans and other Mahayana Buddhists, they represent only the first of several 
"turnings of the wheel of the Dharma"; later "turnings" revealed supplemental 
siitras and the tantras (see below). 
The Hinayana ("small vehicle"} was the first to become widespread. 
Adherents to the Hinayana path pursue liberation for their own sake. In other 
words, they seek to become arhats (Skt.}, beings liberated from suffering, its 
causes, and repeated rebirth into samsaric existence. The Mahayana ("universal 
vehicle") derives from Hinayana teachings and thus the two have many basic 
principles and concepts in common. Yet there are large and important differences 
between them. Mahayana goes a step beyond the Hinayana ideal of individual 
liberation, urging, as part of an individual practice towards liberation and 
enlightenment, that he/she assume responsibility for all other beings. The 
Mahayana innovation was to put forth a new form of ideal being, the bodhisattva. 
who resolves to transform not just him/herself but to seek enlightenment for all 
sentient beings. The career of a bodhisattva is conceived as open to any and all 
persons who undertake with the right resolve to become Buddhas. By rejecting the 
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Hinayana belief that only as a monk was one able to achieve liberation, Mahayana 
endorsed the legitimacy of lay life as a field of religious action. 
Mahayana is the Buddhism of multiple buddhas and bodhisattvas who reside 
in multiple realms, where they assist numberless beings on their way to awakening. 
According to its doctrines, Buddhas and bodhisattvas, through their long eons of 
spiritual practice, accumulate vast funds of religious merit that they can transfer ro 
others in order to help them to salvation. They can assume a form at will in any 
of the realms of being and in so doing exen a beneficial effect on the inhabitants of 
that realm. Through its altruistic commitment to helping others and to life in the 
samsaric world, Mahayana Buddhism has a much more social orientation than 
Hinayana. 
Mahayanists believe that one must not only realize selflessness of his or her 
own person, but also the selflessness of all phenomena, which is a necessary 
prerequisite for omniscience, one of the main qualities of a buddha. Using critical 
analytical wisdom to examine the universe, they ask whether it has intrinsic 
substantiality. They suggest that there is an "objective selflessness" of all 
phenomena; when one realizes that all objects themselves are aggregates, one 
realizes objective selflessness. They apply this logic to their own concepts as well. 
claiming that even nirvana (Skt., cessation of suffering) has no intrinsic essence. 
With this wisdom of selflessness comes the simultaneous recognition of the 
relativity and relationality of all things. This concept of non-duality is a critique of 
the Hinayana conception of liberation as a religious goal outside the world of 
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impermanence and suffering. 
The third vehicle of Buddhism is known as Vajrayana or the "diamond 
vehicle." a name which suggests the indivisible union of wisdom and method. rhe 
two main categories of study and practice that must be mastered in order to 
become an enlightened being. Vajrayana. a nonmonastic, noncelibate form of 
Buddhism. emerged in India around 500 CE. It consisted of a series of funher 
"revelations" that became codified in texts known as tantras. A tantra is defined. 
however, "not by the text bearing its name but by the living tradition(s) of practice 
relating to the central deities and symbolic forms of that tantra" (Samuel 
1993:204). These spiritual practices are distinctive. encompassing a wide range of 
things, from magic to subtle metaphysics. In other words, tantras are essentially 
lineages of practice. One of the key aspects of tantra involves interaction, and in 
more advanced stages, identification with various tantric deities (yi-dam) through 
visualization. Known as "deity yoga," these practices form the heart of tantra. 
The transformation brought about in deity yoga also involves the manipulation of 
subtle energy within the body. As Samuel points out, these practices "are similar 
to Hindu yogic practices and to some Daoist practices where the corresponding 
energy is referred to as qi" (1993:204). 
Tantric methods of the Vajrayana offer the possibility for practitioners to 
attain enlightenment in a single lifetime. As a result, the practices are thought to 
be quite powerful and even dangerous, especially if undertaken without proper 
guidance of a guru (Skt.) or teacher. Most ordinary Tibetans do not pursue tantra 
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in their spiritual lives but those who do are highly revered and protected by others 
(Brentano 1993:23). 
Great importance is placed on the I ineage (rgyud) of the teachings and on 
legitimate transmission from one "generation" of practitioners to the next. Unlike 
Christianity, spiritual knowledge is passed on through a direct personal physical 
connection between lama and student. This relationship is a central aspect of 
tantra because before students can perform tantric practice, they must receive the 
appropriate empowerments from their lama. As Samuel explains it, 
The life of Tantric practitioners in Tibet involves a series of such 
empowerments, in each of which they acquire the ability to practice 
the sadhana of a particular deity or assemblage of deities. These 
empowerments are normally accompanied by the textual transmission 
of the sadhana and often also by a formal teaching or explanation of 
the practice, in which the sadhana text, which is usually in verse 
and often quite condensed, is explained in detail. (1993:245) 
The lama's role in these empowerments is the "paradigmatic" situation for their 
central role in all tantric practice, and in Tibetan religion as a whole (Samuel 
1993:245). Tibetans are encouraged to adopt a devotional and affectionate attitude 
towards their tsewa lama ("root" or "heart guru"), whose personal authority 
derives from being a tantric master. Thus, along with the three major tantric 
deities, Avalokitesvara, Tara, and Guru Rinpoche, the living lama is the chief 
object of devotion in Tibetan culture. 
Until 1959, when thousands of lamas and monks fled Tibet, little was 
known about Tibetan Buddhism in the West except that which derived from 
accounts by "lay ethnographers" described in chapter 2, some of whom claimed to 
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have witnessed unusual, if not fantastic, practices by tantric adepts. For instance. 
the French pilgrim-traveller Alexandra David-Neel wrote many books about her 
experiences in Tibet which included vivid descriptions of the various tantric 
practices she witnessed over the years, such as speedwalking (rlung-gom) and the 
use of body heat to warm oneself (thu-mo). 2 These sorts of stories captured the 
imagination of Western readers, for whom they were written, and contributed to 
Western fascination with the esoteric practices of Tibetan Buddhism, and by 
extension, Tibetans themselves. Tantra continues to attract Westerners to Tibetan 
Buddhism, and to be one of the defining aspects of Tibetan religious culture as we 
shall see in chapter 9. 
Pre-Buddhist religion in Tibet 
The Buddhism which finally arrived in Tibet in the eighth century CE represents 
Indian Buddhism in its late Mahayana and Vajrayana form. A flexible and 
adaptable tradition, it quickly developed uniquely Tibetan characteristics through its 
encounter with the indigenous religious ideas and practices which flourished in 
Tibet at the time. These customs have been misleadingly labelled "Bon" by some 
Tibetan and Western scholars (e.g., Hoffman 1979). By most accounts, Bon was 
only one of many religious traditions in Tibet before the arrival of Buddhism and 
bonpos were only one of a variety of priests (Stein 1972:229). Samuel suggests 
that it may be more appropriate to use the term "Bon" to refer to the religious 
order of Bon and its adherents (bonpos) which is similiar in form to the orders of 
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Tibetan Buddhism but claims to derive from the teachings of the pre-Buddhist 
master Shenrab Mibo rather than from the historical Buddha Sa.kyamuni. 3 Due to 
space limitations I will not explore this issue further here. The point is that 
Tibetan Buddhism emerged as a result of a long process of incorporation. 
"dialogue" (see Mumford 1989), and even outright struggle between followers of 
these preexisting traditions and converts to the new religion. This process was 
made easier by the similarities between indigenous religious elements and tantrism. 
The resulting amalgam 
is a whole world, embracing many aspects: a rich and subtle 
philosophy, with its own dialectics and metaphysics; a very 
advanced depth-psychology linked to techniques of meditation and 
the control of psycho-physiological functions (yoga); an enormous 
pantheon; rituals, popular practices, cosmological speculations, 
systems of divination. (Stein 1972: 164) 
To understand Tibet's unique form of Buddhism, then, an examination of a few 
key pre-Buddhist religious concepts is in order. 
Local gods are at the center of Tibet's "folk religion" (Tucci 1980: 163-
212), the most important of which are the gods and goddesses of the mountains 
(see also Stein 1972). Tibetans believe that it is necessary to stay on good terms 
with these gods to secure good fortune in daily life. Although they may be 
benevolent, local gods can be easily offended and become dangerous. Through 
ritual action, they can be "induced to be helpful and to prevent misfonune" 
(Samuel 1993: 161). This is a major function of Tibetan ritual, both folk religious 
and Buddhist, and corresponds to the first of three spheres of Tibetan religious 
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activity, identified by Samuel as the "pragmatic orientation" (1993:31). This 
orientation involves a focus on this-world concerns, conceived of in terms of 
interactions with local gods and spirits and belief that skillful management of these 
forces can ensure success within this world. 
Anthropologists (e.g. Ekvall l %8~ Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964) have 
documented ritual practices carried out by lay people in non-Buddhist settings. 
These include the burning of incense, especially juniper wood, and the offering of 
prayer flags, known as the sang ritual. Sang, as Samuel points out, "is not merely 
a protective practice, but an auspicious ritual, whose performance may be hoped to 
create positive influences for the good fortune of the participants" (1993: 183). 
Much ritual activity is also directed to protection against malevolent spirits. For 
this, one needs to stay on good terms with local deities. who can protect 
individuals, families and villages against such malevolent spirits. The gods. 
however, can also choose to unleash the spirits on someone with whom they are 
displeased (the spirits form part of their retinue) or simply withhold their 
protection. 
Samuel writes that "local deities were undoubtedly more important in the 
pre-Buddhist period, when they would have been the most powerful beings in the 
Tibetan scale of values. By premodern times. they had become in theory totally 
subject to the tanrric ritual power of the lamas" (1993:190). Despite the fact that 
Buddhist teachings belittle local gods and spirits as not being worthy objects in 
whom to take refuge or seek protection. most Tibetans still believe that in the 
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context of this life, the gods can be helpful or harmful and relations with them 
must be negotiated properly. And while lamas and the tantric deities are viewed as 
ultimately more powerful than local gods and spirits, "that power does not perhaps 
have the direct and intimate relationship with the contingencies of ordinary life that 
the local deities themselves have" (Samuel 1993: 191). 
Tibetans also believe in omens, practice divination, and have a highly 
developed tradition of astrology. ln some cases, the reading of signs. tendrel and 
divination can be performed by anyone. ln other cases, Tibetans tum to their 
lamas for such services. The most well-studied mode of divination is through the 
use of spirit-mediums or "oracle-priests" as they are called in the Tibetanist 
literature (e.g., Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964; Ekvall 1964; Prince Peter 1978, 1979; 
Day 1989). Although spirit-mediums are very likely part of the pre-Buddhist folk 
religion, they have been well integrated into the Buddhist system in Tibet, and 
some reside in monastic gompa and are ordained monks (Samuel 1993: 194). 
These oracles are possessed by major protective deities of the monasteries. The 
most famous of them is the Nechung oracle, who currently resides in Dharamsala, 
lndia and who is regularly consulted by the Dalai Lama and his administration. 4 
Spirit-mediums are also lay men and women and can be found in villages 
throughout the Tibetan region (see Brentano n.d. for a description of her encounter 
with one such spirit-medium in Central Tibet in 1987). Samuel suggests that spirit 
possession is interesting because of its similarity to the Tibetan system of incarnate 
lamas: 
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Incarnate lamas are frequencly "emanations" of particular bodhisattva 
(Buddhist tantric deities) and as Barbara Aziz suggests they can be 
regarded as having been in a sense permanencly possessed by those 
bodhisattva (Aziz 1976). Tantric ricual also involves what could be 
described as a temporary "possession" by the tantric deity, although 
in tantric theory ... one would speak rather of the deliberate and 
conscious assumption of the nature of that deity. ( 1993: 196) 
Despite the similarities between spirit possession and incarnation, tantric deities 
operate on a different plane of reality than local gods and spirits; they represent a 
source of transcendent power that can only be tapped by the lamas to intervene in 
the ordinary world. 
The relation between "folk-religion" and Buddhism 
Anthropological studies of lama-shaman relations in the Himalayas, where 
shamanist practices co-exist with Tibetan Buddhist practices in some areas, offer a 
potential model for understanding the encounter between indigenous religious 
beliefs and Buddhism in Tibet. Mumford (1989) characterizes the encounter as a 
process of "interillumination," which he describes as "emerging historically 
through unfinished dialogue between older and newer layers of culture" (ibid., 23). 
He bases his argument on fieldwork with Gurung shamans and Tibetan lamas in a 
remote Nepalese village called Gyesumdo. 5 Shamans in this region "still seek to 
live out what Bakhtin calls the ancient matrix, an identity embedded within 
relationships of the community and the cosmos and signified in local landmarks" 
(ibid., 23). They offer no extrication from this world, he suggests, and no 
religious "truth," but rather seek to restore "a balance, or harmony, within society 
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and between the upper and lower worlds of their cosmos" (ibid., 23). 
Tibetan Buddhist lamas. by contrast, "thrust the theme of harmony into the 
background and draw to the foreground a highly individuating religious destiny" 
(ibid., 23). Though Tibetan rituals involve a this-world concern. as suggested in 
the previous section, the lamas "also use their rites as an opportunity to introduce a 
Buddhist path of extrication from the world matrix" (ibid., 23). Yet certain 
aspects of Vajrayana (Tantric) Buddhism as practiced in Tibet "may be described 
as shamanic, in that they are centered around communication with an alternative 
mode of reality (that of the tantric deities) via the alternate modes of consciousness 
of tantric yoga" (Samuel 1993:8). Samuel argues that it is precisely this 
communication which forms the basis for much of the Tibetan lama's role in 
relation to Tibetan society: 
Lamas in Tibet function as shamans, and they do so through the 
techniques and practices of Vajrayana Buddhism. The specific form 
that Buddhism has taken in Tibet is bound up with this nexus 
between the pursuit of Enlightenment by a minority and the desire 
for shamanic services by the majority. (1993:9) 
The relation between folk religious beliefs and practices and Buddhism in Tibet is a 
complex one that cannot be easily summarized. While defeat and subordination of 
the early shamans and their gods remain a central theme of Tibetan Buddhist myth 
and ritual, Samuel argues it has actt.!ally appropriated shamanic forms. He outlines 
three distinct "orientations," the first of which (pragmatic) was discussed above. 
The second, the "karma orientation," relates to the sphere of death and rebirth, and 
past and future lives, all of which are important in Tibetan life and in Tibetan 
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Buddhism (1993:30). Efforts to accumulate merit and act vinuously characterize 
this orientation. They include "giving donations to gompa. lamas, and monks. 
building and repairing gompa. chorten, and mani-walls, and other religious objects: 
becoming a monk oneself, sponsoring the recitation of the scriptures ... and 
observing the lay precepts" (Samuel 1993:209). SOdnam. translated as virtuous 
action, which means proper treatment of all living beings. also forms an important 
aspect of Tibetan thought (e.g., see Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964). The third oriention. 
the "bodhi orientation," centers on the pursuit of Enlightenment. which in the 
Mahayana context is seen as having a strongly social or altruistic component, and 
which is carried out through tantric practice (Samuel 1993:30). 
Buddhism's success in Tibet, Samuel concludes. derives from the fact that it 
offered a more "effective control over the order of the universe than was available 
from the older cults" (1993:450). This control was achieved in two ways: by the 
lama's ability to control local deities and demons through tantric ritual and through 
the moral teachings on vinuous and nonvinuous actions. 
The development of Buddhism in Tibet 
According to Samuel. the development of Buddhism in Tibet makes sense only in 
relation to the relatively "stateless" nature of most Tibetan societies up to the 
premodern period (1993:39). As suggested in chapter 2, the Tibetan population 
was not integrated into a centralized state as were populations in Thailand. Burma, 
Sri Lanka or Cambodia. This lack of centralized state power in Tibet enabled the 
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effluorescence of a type of Buddhism characterized by "shamanic" practices (which 
derive from pre-Buddhist traditions and from tantra). a form which by definition 
meant the existence of alternative sources of power and authority. As Samuel 
explains: 
the Samgha [the monastic community] in Tibetan societies is far less 
"domesticated." in Tambiah's phrase. than in contemporary 
Theravadin countries .. .Instead of being a centralized organization of 
monks under state control. the Samgha consists of a number of 
autonomous religious orders, only partly composed of celibate 
monks, and based around various large teaching centers and their 
associated lamas. (1993;32) 
Lamas and other advanced tantric practitioners had direct access to power through 
their ability to contact the tantric deities and other gods and spirits. This 
unmediated contact with power legitimated a social role for lamas that often 
translated into a political one. 
In Tibetan society, most of the lamas who achieve this combination of 
other-worldly and temporal power are known as tulkus or "emanation bodies." 
These individuals are thought to be emanations of divine beings or bodhisattvas--
beings who have reached a state of enlightenment but who voluntarily choose to be 
reborn in order to assist (out of compassion) in the liberation of all sentient beings. 
At the same time, tulkus are believed to be rebirths of previous lamas. Individuals 
who are recognized as tulkus are called Rinpoche in Tibetan; it is respectful term 
used to indicate their spiritual status. Samuel summarizes the system of 
recognizing tulkus: 
When a lama who is the head of a monastery or occupies an 
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important monastic office is about to die he is normally expected to 
predict his rebirth and give some details of where it is to take place 
and in what family. On the basis of these indications and various 
divinatory procedures, the officials of the monastery go to find the 
child two or three years after the lama's death. The child is 
supposed to show certain signs, such as partial memory of his 
previous life. (1993:493) 
The tulku concept, which dates back to the thirteenth century and is unique to 
Tibetan Buddhism, was an innovation which had important implications for the 
development of Tibet's religio-political structure, some of which are explored 
below. 
Early Tibetan kings embraced Buddhism when it was introduced as part of 
their effort to centralize their authority and to create a larger political and social 
order. As we have seen, pre-eighth century Tibet had no religious organization 
and no organized system of religious belief. Samuel describes this period as still 
largely "shamanic" in its mode of operation, but suggests that the Tibetan kings. 
initially "shamanic-type leaders of a tribal confederacy," were attempting to "move 
towards a more hierarchical, politically centralized system" (1993:440). Between 
625 C.E., when King Songsten Gampo of the Yarlung dynasty came co power, and 
842 C.E. when the anti-Buddhist king Langdarma was assassinated (Sha.kabpa 
1967:54), military alliances between the kings and autonomous "tribal" groups led 
to a geographic expansion of the Tibetan empire. During this period, conflicts 
between supporters of the bon and shen6 priests and supporters of the new 
Buddhist religion erupted in royal circles (Samuel 1993:443; see also Beckwith 
1987). With Langdarma's murder, the long line of Tibetan kings came to an end 
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and the united Tibetan kingdom collapsed. 
Turrell Wylie (1963) has characterized the era which followed (842 C.E. -
1247 C.E.) as the "local hegemonic period." During this time Tibet was dominated 
by various warring factions who competed for influence and power and who 
functioned as patrons to the Buddhist and Bon religious centers. It is in this 
general context of political fragmentation and continuous rivalry between local 
aristocratic families that local gompa, headed by hereditary lamas. got involved in 
the struggle for power and influence, eventually becoming an integral part of the 
political process in Tibet (Samuel 1993:443). 
As suggested in chapter 2, by the thirteenth century, the mchod-yon or 
lama/patron relationship had emerged as a new cultural pattern and the principle of 
a lama as head of state had been established in Tibetan political theory (Samuel 
1993:490). Although Sakya lamas nominally ruled all of Tibet as representatives 
of the Mongol empire, they were never able co suppress the persistence of local 
centers of power. By 1350, their power had largely disintegrated. For the next 
three hundred years, no regime was able to govern more than one of the two 
provinces in central Tibet, U and Tsang, and the other region became the center of 
opposition to the ruling regime (Samuel 1993:501). 
In the meantime, five distinct religious "lineages" or "sects" had evolved. 
Tibetans are usually affiliated with one or another of these orders which can be 
distinguished according to the importance of celibate monasticism, the role of 
tantric practice, and what Samuel calls "a greater or lesser commitment to 
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hierarchy and structure" (1993:272). The Gelugpa lineage, founded by 
Tsongkhapa in the early fifteenth century, is the most hierarchical and clerical. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the largest Tibetan monasteries are Gelugpa, and celibate 
monasticism is most important in this tradition. Sera, Ganden and Drepung, big 
Gelugpa monasteries near Lhasa. furnished monk officials for the Lhasa 
administration before the Chinese occupation and, as has already been suggested. 
played a crucial role in twentieth century Tibetan history. 7 
Each of the other major orders, Sakyapa. Nyingmapa, Kagyudpa, and 
Bonpo, are composed of independent suborders which have a set of teaching 
lineages in common. While all the orders have monastic traditions and large 
monasteries with monks like the Gelugpa, they also emphasize lay yogic practice. 
Nyingmapa and Bonpo are the earliest (tenth to twelfth century), the least 
hierarchical and most "shamanic." Sa.lcya and Kagyudpa date back to the tenth and 
eleventh century, and at different times have had political power in Tibet. Since 
the nineteenth century ris-med movement, there has been much overlap between 
the non-Gelugpa orders. This movement brought together the numerous diverse 
traditions of tantric yogic practice that had developed in Tibet over ten centuries 
and transmitted them as a whole. As a result, non-Gelugpa Buddhists today are 
presented with a wide range of methods for spiritual attainment that draw from 
these different lineages. 8 
The Kagyudpa order developed the system of reincarnation in the thirteenth 
century. This innovation spread to other lineages and by the fifteenth century. 
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monasteries headed by reincarnate lamas outnumbered those headed by hereditary 
lamas. Although they did not invent it themselves. the Gelugpas adopted the tulku 
system and used it as a means to institute their power under a structure of 
governance known in the literature as "rule by incarnation" (Michael 1982). 
Rule by incarnation 
In 1642, the Gelugpas. who dominated U province. defeated the Tsang Karrnapas 
(a suborder of the Kagyu lineage). with Mongol military backing. This allowed 
them to unify Central Tibet under the rule of the 5th Dalai Lama, a Gelugpa 
reincarnate lama. 9 As described in chapter 2, the Gelugpa regime transformed the 
religious landscape in Tibet upon coming to power. It attempted to create the 
perfect environment for the practice of Tibetan Buddhism and especially for the 
practice of its form of Buddhism, which emphasized scholasticism and celibacy 
over the "instantaneous" (advanced tantric) practices to achieve enlightenment 
advocated by the Kagyupa and Nyingma orders. The Gelugpa endowed new 
monasteries with estates and established subsidies for those without large land 
holdings. Their belief in the principle of chos-srid-zung- 'brel (religious and 
political affairs joined together) found expression in the government structure 
which took shape in Lhasa between 1642 and l95l. 
In his book Rule by incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and its role in society 
and state (l982), Michael describes the origin of Tibet's religio-political system as 
part of the struggle between the aristocrats and the Buddhist sects. When the 
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Kagyupa first developed the principle of incarnation. it was in the context of 
efforts to institutionalize their power and authority over competing clans and 
families. Michael argues that its genius lay in the accomplishment of several 
things at once. all under the auspices of religion. First. it solved the problem of 
legitimacy in the absence of reproducing actors (e.g., celibate monks). Second, 
the metaphysical transmission of authority from one incarnation to another 
eliminated sibling rivalry inherent to the biological lineage practiced by the 
aristocracy. Third, an incarnate lama devoted to monastic vows of poveny and 
free of family ties was not concerned with accumulating political and economic 
power from which he might be tempted to foment a rebellion. 10 This may be true 
in theory, but each incarnate lama had a labrang, which was a private, profit-
making enterprise attached to his residence and which in essence was the 
corporation of his line of incarnations. Sometimes these labran~4 were quite 
wealthy and formed a local power base from which to resist the authority of the 
Lhasa government, particularly over its right to levy taxes. In a few instances, 
open conflict broke out between these forces (see Goldstein 1989). 
One of the major weaknesses of rule by incarnation appeared after the 
office of the Dalai Lama was created. During the years between the death of a 
Dalai Lama and the enthronement of his reincarnation (usually at eighteen years of 
age), power is held by a regent who is usually a reincarnate lama himself but who 
is often subject to struggles, rivalries, and intrigues. The troubles experienced 
during the Reting regency (1934-1941), which Goldstein describes in his history of 
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premodem Tibet. epitomize the flaws in the religio-political system. Guided by 
the inexperienced. acquisitive and vindictive Reting. the interregnum period saw 
the 
vitality of the Tibetan government decline and its development lag. 
The state of the Tibetan military deteriorated. the economic 
surpluses vanished. and the full grain-storage bins of the 1920s 
emptied. Led by the excesses and abuses of Reting and his labrang 
officials, national and government interests took second place to 
personal gain and aggrandizement. (1989:364) 
ln fact. as discussed in chapter 2, Tibet lost many opportunities to shore up its 
military and to modernize its institutions during the Reting and Taktra regencies 
( 1934-1950) due to internal power struggles between the monastic segment and the 
government. This left the country totally unprepared for the confrontation with 
China in 1950 which resulted in Tibet's loss of independence. 
The institution of the Dalai Lama 
Despite its inherent weaknesses, the Gelugpa system of rule by incarnation 
succeeded in unifying central Tibet to an extent not achieved before. With the 
creation of the office of Dalai Lama, the Gelugpa created an unassailable figure of 
spiritual and temporal power. ln part, the Dalai Lama's power derives from the 
fact that he is considered to be an emanation (an incarnation) of Chenrezig, 
(Avalokite5vara, Skt.), the great bodhisattva "who fathered the Tibetan people, 
introduced agriculture, returned as several of the Tibetan emperors, and takes 
human form as the Dalai Lama and other high lamas" (Samuel 1993: 19). At the 
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same time. the Dalai Lama is also a direct reincarnation of his immediate 
predecessor. (For a description of the lives of historical Dalai Lamas. see 
Shakabpa 1967; Mullin 1988; Snellgrove and Richardson 1968; Stein 1972). 
The institutionalized charisma of each Dalai Lama was guaranteed once he 
had been properly identified and legitimated as the true reincarnation (Goldstein 
1968; Nowak 1984:26). The discovery process was an elaborated version of the 
one used to find tulkus: 
Mere humans could not by themselves properly determine 
reincarnation, and the institutionalization depended on supplying the 
selection process with supernatural supports. The speeches and 
comments of a late Dalai Lama would be examined for any possible 
clues as to where he would be reborn. Other unusual occurrences. 
such as strange cloud formations or the shifting of the position of the 
corpse of the late Dalai Lama toward a particular direction, were 
analyzed by high lamas. oracles, the Regent. and high-ranking 
officials. The Regent and other high dignitaries also visited a holy 
lake in which visions were traditionally seen concerning the Dalai 
Lama's rebirth. All of these preliminary examinations of cryptic, 
supernatural signs ended in the sending out by the Regent of one or 
more search parties composed of government officials and high 
lamas to areas deemed probable places where the Dalai Lama would 
return to Tibet. In these areas the parties would examine the stories 
of wondrous or strange births of children in the proper age category 
and finally would administer a series of tests to the prospective 
candidates, the children and their parents not being forewarned that 
they were considering the boy for the Dalai Lama. These tests 
consisted of showing the candidates several pairs of articles, e.g. 
rosaries or walking sticks. one of which had been the personal 
possession of the late Dalai Lama. The child was expected to 
choose the late Dalai Lama's things, thereby proving that he had 
residual knowledge of his past life, the ability to recall the events of 
one's past life being a characteristic of bodhisattvas and buddhas. 
On the basis of the reports sent by the one or more search parties. 
the Regent, after consulting with high lamas and government 
officials, would inform the Assembly of the situation and guided by 
the Regent they would accept the candidate as Dalai Lama. 
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(Goldstein 1968: 162-163) 
The institution of the Dalai Lama and the discovery process are some of the most 
fascinating aspects of Tibetan culture for non-Tibetans. 11 I explore this issue in a 
subsequent chapter. 
As the embodiment of the central formula of Tibetan politics: "religion and 
politics combined" (chos-srid-zung- 'bre[). the Dalai Lama is a mediating symbol 
of Tibetanness (Devoe 1983; Klieger 1992; Nowak 1984; Saklani 1978). He 
encompasses many meanings: he is both a human and a bodhisattva. mortal and 
immortal, a world-renouncing monk and a political leader. To most Tibetans 
today. the current Dalai Lama is a divine living symbol of their history and their 
aspirations for the future. As will become evident throughout the course of this 
dissertation. his ability to unify Tibetans through his own personal charisma makes 
him an invaluable asset to the exile community and the Tibet Movement. 
Traditionally, Tibetans believe that as an emanation of Avalokitesvara. 
whose essence is compassion. the Dalai Lama is immune from criticism. In the 
same vein. in old Tibet to criticize his government or introduce new ideas was 
considered a refutation of the dharma (see Goldstein 1989). Yet since 1959 the 
Dalai Lama has sought to reform and democratize exile society. This in and of 
itself is not unheard of; the 13th Dalai Lama was interested in modernizing Tibet 
when he was alive, as mentioned in chapter 2. But his successor, the 14th Dalai 
Lama. has ironically insisted that Tibetans learn to be "democratic." He openly 
encourages criticism of exile government institutions and practices by Tibetans and 
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their Western friends as part of an attempt to foster the growth of a Tibetan public 
sphere. 12 More important, he frequently suggests that he would prefer to step 
down from his role as temporal leader in order to facilitate the democratization 
process and would be happy pursuing spiritual practice full-time. He has pledged 
that if and when Tibet regains its independence, he "will willingly and completely 
relinquish the power and prerogatives of a Dalai Lama to a popularly elected 
leader" (Nowak 1984:29). 
In theory, polities are usually inscribed in some order of being higher than 
themselves. In the case of the Tibetans, as we have seen in this chapter, that order 
is Buddhism. To accomplish his goal of democratization, the Tibetan leader must 
pull away the polity from its inscription in the Buddhist realm, which in turn 
requires a transformation of his authority. For most Tibetans, the Dalai Lama is 
an absolute source of authority; no secular official or even lesser incarnate lama 
could ever claim even a tiny portion of that authority (Klieger 1992:80). Thus the 
Dalai Lama finds himself in the unique (and contradictory) position of having to 
assert his authority in order ultimately to relinquish it. 
Tibetan attitudes towards the Dalai Lama's power will likely not change in 
the near future, but attitudes towards other authorities in the exile government have 
slowly changed from acquiescence to inquiry, facilitated by the introduction of 
democratic processes of enfranchisement, representation, and accountability 
(French 1991). These processes signify attempts to create new codes of conduct, 
e.g., "democratic" behavior, based on a radically different notion of authority; as 
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such, they entail a reframing of Tibetan identities. I explore this issue in chapter 
5. 
The Dalai Lama's efforts to democratize the hierarchical religio-political 
system in exile are in conflict with efforts to ensure the survival of religious and 
cultural traditions which are embedded in the older structures, and which. 
paradoxically, form the basis of Western fascination with Tibet. During the course 
of my research, I became fascinated with how diasporic Tibetans negotiate this 
contradiction. I also became interested in tracing the simultaneously conservative 
and progressive role Westerners play in Tibetan exile politics. 
Before concluding, I briefly sketch the government bureaucracy headed by 
the Dalai Lama. After having gone back in time to the origins of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and forward in time to the diasporic years, I return to the ethnographic 
present of pre-1950 Tibet and to a delicately balanced polity on the brink of 
disaster. 
The government bureaucracy 
As described in chapter 2, the Dalai Lama stood at the apex of the Gelugpa 
government bureaucracy in Lhasa which was composed of half monk and half lay 
aristocratic officials. 13 Directly beneath the Dalai Lama was the prime minister 
(lonchen). The cabinet (Kashag) was the next highest office and it usually was 
shared by four officials, three lay and one monk, called shapes. New shapes were 
appointed by the ruler on the cabinet's recommendation. Decision making was by 
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consensus and all had equal authority. The cabinet's power derived from its 
position as "gatekeeper" --no secular matter reached the ruler without going through 
it. Goldstein points out, however. that the cabinet's power was "counterbalanced" 
by its lack of authority over the monk officials and over the monastic system. 
which were controlled by the ranking monk official (chigyab khembo) and the 
Yigtsang (1989: 16). The Yigtsang was headed by four monk officials 
(trunyichemmo) and its function was similar to that of the cabinet, except that it 
dealt with religious and monastic'affairs. The most powerful lay office below the 
cabinet was the Tsigang, which was responsible for overseeing the collection of 
raxes and was considered a stepping stone to promotion to the cabinet. 
As far as specialization goes, Goldstein notes that 
no position in the government required special training, even that of 
army commander. Promotions were theoretically based on ability, 
but it was common for hopefuls to attempt to recruit support among 
those controlling the appointment process by giving gifts. (1989: 13) 
This obviously put candidates from wealthier families in a better position to win 
promotions. 
In addition to the offices described above, there was the national assembly 
(Tshogs- 'du) which met at the request of the cabinet to consider and give opinions 
on specific questions or issues put to it by the cabinet. There were several levels 
of assembly. The smallest included only the four Yigtsang officials (the four 
trunyichemmo) and the four Tsigang officials or tsipon. It was called Trungtsigye. 
The largest assembly was not really national at all. It consisted of all the abbotts 
93 
and ex-abbotts of the three major Gelugpa monasteries (Sera, Drepung and 
Ganden), members of the Trungtsigye, all lay and monk officials in Lhasa at the 
time. representatives from important incarnations and monasteries, all army leaders 
who were stationed in Lhasa. minor tax collecting officials, and and thirty clerks 
(Goldstein 1989: 19). None of the assemblies could initiate action; they were 
consultative bodies which primarily represented the views of the three big 
monasteries and the mass of monk officials (Goldstein 1989:20). 
The Tibetan political structure was delicately balanced between the 
monasteries, the ruler (either Dalai Lama or regent), and the bureaucracy described 
above. All saw religion as the top priority of the state, but, as Goldstein so 
convincingly argues, the definition of what benefitted Buddhism was often 
contested. 
Religion, then, though a homogeneous force in Tibetan politics in 
one sense, was also a fragmenting and conflicting force. 
Competition among the various religious entities to increase their 
influence and prestige and the lack of consensus regarding which 
policies were in the interests of religion plagued twentieth-century 
Tibetan history. ( 1989:37) 
Struggles over policies were not resolved through force. Instead, the monasteries 
could simply refuse to comply with the demands of the state, disrupting the state's 
organizational balance and hence its legitimacy. 
In the late 1940s, as China was preparing to bring all of its "territory" 
under Chinese rule, Tibet was "hopelessly divided into pro-Reting and pro-Taktra 
factions" (Goldstein 1989). Nevertheless, this inward factionalism did not prevent 
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the Taktra admininistration from trying to improve Tibet's international status and 
from taking certain immediate steps to strengthen its internal capabilities 
(1989: 821). These steps included attempts to enlist the suppon of Britain and the 
United States in securing international recognition of its de facto independent 
status. In a heartbreaking narrative, Goldstein describes Tibet's numerous near-
misses with diplomatic recognition (see especially Chapter 16) which. had it 
succeeded. probably would have forced China to deal with Tibet quite differently 
than it ultimately did. Taktra's failed effort to establish an English language 
school (it was blocked by the monasteries-reminiscent of the failed effon in the 
1920s) which would have provided Tibet with an English-speaking infrastructure 
and his foiled attempt to purchase weapons abroad, left Tibet completely 
unprepared for a military confrontation with China. In the end, when the Tibetan 
army, which was "poorly trained, poorly equipped, and pathetically led" (Goldstein 
1989:822), finally faced the People's Liberation Army in Kham in 1950. it was 
handily defeated. 
Some conclusions 
Scholars dispute the applicability of the term "theocratic" to the religio-political 
system described above in much the same manner as they debate the 
characterization of Tibet as "feudal." Theocracy, defined as "government of a 
state by immediate divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely 
guided," is applicable to Tibet insofar as the Lhasa government was headed by an 
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incarnation-the Dalai Lama-considered by his followers to be an emanation of the 
Buddha Avalokite5vara. However, according to Samuel and other scholars (e.g., 
Sperling 1994:280), Tibet's political system was far more ambiguous than the term 
theocratic would suggest. Both these debates over terminology reflect the 
heightened sensitivity to representations of old Tibet in academic and exile 
communities, and their role in the contemporary discursive contestation over Tibet 
between exile Tibetan and Chinese officials. 14 
In sketching out the basic principles of Tibetan Buddhism and outlining its 
development in Tibet, this chapter underscores the central role religion plays in 
Tibetan definitions of themselves as a people and a polity. lt is not surprising that 
Buddhism is one of the main sites of cultural production in the diaspora. This is 
true in at least two senses. First, enormous resources and energy have been 
devoted to rebuilding monastic institutions in India as well as to establishing 
Buddhist centers in the West. Second, Vajrayana (tantric) Buddhist practices such 
as ritual dance, creation of sand mandalas, and empowerments (initiations) have 
been performed or presented in the West to rapt audiences as part of Tibetans' 
efforts to mobilize suppon for their struggle. The process through which religious 
practices have become a field for political action by diasporic Tibetans and their 
supponers in the West is explored further in chapter 8. 
Religion is also a site for cultural invention in Tibet itself, particularly in 
the realm of political protest (see Schwartz 1994a and Barnett 1994). From 1987 
through 1992, there were some 140 demonstrations in Lhasa and other areas. Led 
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by monks and nuns, these non-violent demonstrations have initiated a new phase of 
protest against Chinese rule in Tibet that continues today. Interestingly. Tibetans 
have come to see political protest as religiously-sanctioned action, though it is the 
ethical aspects of Tibetan Buddhism rather than its magical elements that 
predominate in the current protests (Schwartz l 994a:22): 
The demonstrations draw on traditional forms of Buddhist religious 
practice that ordinary Tibetans understand and value. Buddhism 
offers Tibetans assurance about ultimate religious ends as well as 
effective means to realize those ends through individual behavior. 
Religious discourse is one area where Tibetans retain confidence 
after decades of assault on their society and culture. It is not 
surprising, then. that political protest has come to be framed in 
religious idiom. 
Schwartz gives one example of this process: nearly all demonstrations in Lhasa 
since 1987 have involved a small group of monks or nuns who assemble near the 
Barkhor, the traditional Tibetan market area, and then circumambulate the Jokhang 
temple (located in the center of the Barkhor) carrying Tibetan flags and shouting 
independence slogans. This continues until protesters are stopped by security 
forces. Circumambulation (ko"a) has a central place in Tibetan Buddhism. lt is 
"practised universally around temples and other holy sites and is for lay Tibetans a 
common means of accumulating merit .. . kho"a provides Tibetans with visible and 
obvious evidence of practice of religion" (Schwartz l994a:27). By doing khorra 
around the Jokhang, which has symbolic status going back a thousand years before 
Chinese arrived in Tibet and by combining it with symbols of Tibetan nationhood, 
protesters have made a powerful link between Buddhist ritual and Tibetan 
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nationalist aspirations (Barnett 1994:245; see also Schwartz 1994b:228). ln this 
sense. Tibetan protest reflects the traditional Tibetan theory of state-"religion and 
politics joined together" (chos-srid-zung- 'bre[). [ come back to the subject of 
protest in Tibet in chapter 7. Here r underscore the huge significance and vitality 
of Tibetan Buddhism as a symbolic resource in the struggle against Chinese rule in 
Tibet. 
The Tibetan government on the eve of the Chinese invasion was in disarray. 
What happened after the occupation in 1951 and before the Dalai Lama· s final 
escape to India in 1959 remains highly contested in the Tibetan exile community. 
For sc-'lle. the period is an ignoble one. a time when political principles were 
compromised (e.g .• the "Seventeen Point" agreement, see Goldstein 1989) and 
personal expediency prevailed over collective interests. For others. the period 
represents a moment of heroic resistance and an awakening of nationalist 
consciousness (e.g., see J. Norbu 1994). 
After the events of 1959, which are discussed in the next chapter. China 
imposed ne•.:v forms of social, political and economic organization in Tibet. 
changing life irrevocably for all strata of the population. Those who remained 
behind after the mass exodus endured periods of extreme hardship, especially 
during the Cultural Revolution which lasted from 1966 to 1976. The Chinese 
imprisoned and killed many perceived enemies of the new society in Tibet (see 
Choedon 1978; D. Norbu 1974; and K. Paljor 1977 for personal accounts of life in 
Tibet after 1959); high lamas and monks were frequent targets, as were those from 
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aristocratic and wealthy merchant backgrounds. 
Meanwhile. the Dalai Lama set about creating an exile administration made 
up of former government officials which would guide the resettlement of thousands 
of newly-destitute refugees in Nepal and India. Without a monastic system. the 
balance of power which had existed in Tibet for hundreds of years shifted in favor 
of the lay aristocracy as refugee lamas and monks dedicated themselves to 
reconstructing Buddhist institutions. 
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Notes 
1. Tibetan Buddhism's appeal to Westerners will be discussed in chapter 9. Very little 
scholarly work (let alone anthropology) has been done on Tibetan Buddhism in the 
West (for exceptions, see Bishop 1992; Brentano 1993; and Klein 1995). 
2. One of the most intriguing stories David-Neel tells in Magic and Mystery in Tibet 
( 1929 in French; 1932 in English; reprinted in 1971) involves the sighting of a 
rlung-gom-pa, a sort of tantric speedwalker, whom she claimed to have encountered 
in the Changthang region of Tibet (an immense grassy region in northern Tibet 
sparsely inhabited by nomads). I quote from her account at length: 
Towards the end of the afternoon, Y ongden, our servants and I were 
riding leisurely across a wide tableland and [noticed, far away in 
front of us, a moving black spot which my field-glasses showed to 
be a man. [ felt astonished. Meetings are not frequent in that 
region, for the last ten days we bad not seen a human being. 
Moreover, men on foot and alone do not, as a rule, wander in these 
immense solitudes. Who could this strange traveller be? ... 
As I continued to observe him through the glasses, [ noticed that the 
man proceeded at an unusual gait and, especially, with an 
extraordinary swiftness. Though, with the naked eyes, my men 
could hardly see anything but a black speck moving over the grassy 
ground, they too were not long in remarking the quickness of its 
advance. [ handed them the glasses and one of them, having 
observed the traveller for a while, muttered "Lama lung-gom-pa chig 
da" (It looks like a lama lung-gom-pa). 
These words "lama lung-gom-pa" at once awakened my interest. I 
bad heard a great deal about the feats performed by such men and 
was acquainted with the theory of the training. I bad, even, a 
certain experience of the practice. but I had never seen an adept of 
lung-gom actually accomplishing one of these prodigious tramps 
which are so much talked about in Tibet ... 
The man continued to advance towards us and his curious speed 
became more and more evident. What was to be done if be really 
was a lung-gom-pa? [ wanted to observe him at close quarters, [ 
also wished to have a talk with him, to put him some questions, to 
photograph bim .. .I wanted many things. But at the very first words 
[ said about it. the man who bad recognized him as a lama lung-
gom-pa exclaimed: "Your reverence will not stop the lama. nor 
speak to him. This would certainly kill him. These lamas when 
travelling must not break their meditation. The god who is in them 
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escapes if they cease to repeat the ngags. and when thus leaving 
them before the proper time. he shakes them so hard that they 
die." ... 
By that time he had nearly reached us; I could clearly see his 
perfectly calm impassive face and wide-open eyes with their gaze 
fixed on some invisible far-distant object situated somewhere high up 
in space. The man did not run. He seemed to lift himself from the 
ground. proceeding by leaps. It looked as if he had been endowed 
with the elasticity of a ball and rebounded each time his feet touched 
the ground. His steps had the regularity of a pendulum. He wore 
the usual monastic robe and toga. both rather ragged. His left hand 
gripped a fold of the toga and was half hidden under the cloth. The 
right held a phurba ("magic dagger"). His right arm moved slightly 
at each step as if leaning on a stick. just as though the phurba. 
whose pointed extremity was far above the ground. had touched it 
and were actually a support. 
My servants dismounted and bowed their heads to the ground as the 
lama passed before us. but he went his way apparently unaware of 
our presence (200-203). 
These sorts of practices are what Tibet is renowned for in the popular imagination; 
lung-gom may actually be where the myth of levitating lamas comes from. 
3. For more on this perspective. see Samuel 1993, Chapter 23. See also Karmay 1975 
and Snellgrove 1961. 
4. While in Dharamsala in March 1990. I attended a session at Nechung Monastery 
where the Nechung oracle went into trance. The monastery temple where the event 
took place was packed full of monks and eager lay Tibetans and Westerners 
(including actor/Buddhist Richard Gere). A group of monks beat drums and chanted 
until the oracle came out in front of the group and went into trance. A large conical 
hat was placed on the oracle's head. It was so heavy that it took two monks to 
carry it. The oracle threw down the sword be was carrying and jumped off the alter 
area which was elevated a few feet above the rest of the room. He then jumped 
back up, groaning loudly, his chest heaving. At this point the air was electric with 
tension. All of a sudden. people surged forward. and the Tibetans in the crowd 
started throwing kata. or prayer scarves, at the oracle. I later was told they believe 
getting a kata near the oracle brings great blessings. 
Then several questions were put to the oracle. including one related to the future of 
Tibet and another to the future of Drepung monastery. which had initially requested 
the session. The questions were in Tibetan and his response, in a high pitched. 
squeaky voice, was incomprehensible. Everyone in the room strained forward to 
hear the answers, even though they couldn't understand them. Two specially trained 
monks listened and acted as "translators" for the oracle. Their translation was not 
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made publically but passed on first co His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Drepung 
Monastery abbott. Upon answering the questions. the oracle began to come out of 
his trance and soon collapsed. He then was carried out of the room by his 
attendants. 
This particular Nechung oracle was new to his job in 1990. He was discovered in 
1987. two years after the death of his predecessor. I noted that he looked scared 
and nervous before going into trance. One Tibetan informant told me later that this 
young monk has a tendency to get nervous because he feels his responsibility is so 
great. In the recent past. Nechung oracles have played a critical role in Tibetan 
politics (see Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956; Prince Peter 1978; Chime 1981; Rock 1935: 
and Goldstein 1989:704-707). 
One of the things which most interested me about this oracular performance was the 
crowd's behavior. Having never been to an event such as this. and because I was 
holding a video cacnera, I was doubly sensitive to the movement and attitude of the 
audience. The aggressive pushing and shoving which started once the oracle went 
into trance took me completely by surprise; up to that point, I had only observed 
formal Buddhist initiations and teachings. which entail a certain degree of passivity 
on the part of the audience (in a physical sense). It was not until later. after I 
learned more about Buddhism and its incorporation of older pre-Buddhist practices 
such as spirit-possession. that I was able to make sense of my experience. As one 
of my lama friends explained it to me: "the performance has no doctrinal or 
philosophical significance in Buddhist terms, it's more like the President is coming 
and everyone crowds around trying to see him." 
5. Gurungs are believed to be people of Tibetan stock who penetrated the Himalayas in 
pre-Buddhist times. They are of particular interest for thus having preserved some 
"shamanic" religious beliefs and practices which predate Tibetan Buddhism. 
While "shamanism" in the anthropological literature frequently refers to the 
"animist-shamanist" religion which bad once been widespread throughout inner Asia, 
including Siberia, Turkestan, Mongolia, China and Tibet, the "shamanist" practices 
described by Mumford and other Tibet scholars extends beyond this "Siberian 
shamanic complex" to include spirit-mediumship and spirit-possession. 
Samuel defines shamanism as "the regulation and transformation of human life and 
human society through the use (or purported use) of alternate states of consciousness 
by means of which specialist practitioners are held to communicate with a mode of 
reality alternative to, and more fundamental than, the world of everyday experience" 
(1993:364). 
6. Hoffman (1979) defines shen priests as practitioners of the Old Bon religion who 
were "shamans ... very similar to their colleagues of north and central Asia" (25). 
According to Samuel, it is believed that they practiced soul-flight in a state of trance 
and undertook elaborate funerary rituals for the Tibetan kings ( 1993: 11). 
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7. The intenwined nature of Tibetan religion and politics (and lineage and regional 
affiliation), was made evident in 1994 in a dispute over recognition of the 17th 
incarnation of the Karmapa (Kagyu lineage). In this dispute, a lama known as 
Shamar Rinpoche presented a child he claimed to be the successor to the 16th 
Karmapa who died in 1981. Violent protest broke out over this claim as another 
child had already been selected and recognized by Kagyu leaders and the Dalai 
Lama two years prior. Observers noted that Shamar Rinpoche 's claims represent a 
potential challenge to the Dalai Lama's authority and might be meant to undermine 
his standing. They also suggested that some element of the Indian government and 
possibly China's government appear to have supported Shamar Rinpoche in his 
claim (see TIN News Review 26. April 1994:52-56). 
The conflict demonstrates how historical conflicts between lineages in Tibet continue 
to manifest themselves in new forms in exile. There is a long history of conflict 
between the Sbamar Rimpoches and the Dalai Lama. as well as with other lineages 
such as the Situs. In 1792, after the 9th Shamar had been instrumental in events 
which led to the Nepali invasion of Tibet. his estates were confiscated and a law 
passed by the then Dalai Lama malcing it a crime for the Shamars to reincarnate (see 
Shakabpa 1967: 169). 
8. Lineage "refers to continuity from teacher to student of a particular practice; each 
order may have hundreds of individual lineages connected with specific practices" 
(Samuel 1993:601) 
The openness of the system to multiple interpretation is what distinguishes Tibetan 
Buddhism from Theravadin Buddhism. Different practices are considered 
appropriate to different persons at different stages of the path. depending on one's 
motivation and level of understanding. 
9. The title of Dalai Lama was given to Sonam Gyatso in the fifteenth-century by the 
Mongol chief Altan Khan. Although Sonam Gyatso was the first Dalai Lama to be 
recognized as an incarnation, be is known as the third Dalai Lama because two 
previous Gelugpa masters were posthumously declared Dalai Lamas. Before he 
acquired political power. the Dalai Lama's incarnation series was known in Drepung 
monastery as Simkangwaw (Goldstein 1989:2). 
10. Rohen Paul argues that since the reincarnated lama is "cut off in every respect from 
the bonds of kinship, exchange, alliance, and obligation which characterizes the rest 
of society, he is able to achieve a level of autonomy which truly differentiates him 
from ordinary monals and raises him to a sacred royal status" (1982:41). He 
funher argues that this "self-generating" status has political and social benefits on 
the temporal level-e.g. there are not squabbles between factions in the royal family. 
Incarnation thus functions as an "antikinship institution, which, by undercutting 
traditional authority patterns based on blood, serves the interest of a centralizing 
bureaucratized government" (1982:41). 
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11. As suggested earlier. Tibetan Buddhism·s magical side appeals to many in the West. 
including film directors such as Bernardo Benolucci (The Little Buddha. 1994). and 
Hollywood writers such as Melissa Mathison (screenwriter for E.T .• married to 
actor Harrison Ford} whose script based on the story of the 14th Dalai Lama·s 
discovery and early years in Tibet is currently in production. 
12. I was present at one such instance in Dharamsala. India when the Dalai Lama spoke 
in English and then Tibetan to an audience of activists. See Chapter 5 for a 
description and analysis of the incident. 
13. When the Gelugpas came to power. the role of the aristocracy changed. Their 
previous power. based on territorial authority and their own military forces. was 
transferred to the religious state. ln the process. aristocrats became servants of the 
state (Michael 1982:45). 
14. Extremely negative representations of Tibetans and their religious leaders have been 
part of Chinese government propaganda for a long time. Jigme Ngapo. a Tibetan 
raised in China. describes the image of Tibet in Chinese literary works as one of 
backwardness and brutality: 
ln these works about Tibet. children are buried alive. bands and feet 
are chopped off. daughters and nieces are raped or assaulted by their 
fathers and uncles, people are skinned and their eyes dug out. 
Ngapo argues that mainland Chinese are indoctrinated with this distoned image: 
when asked about Tibet, be points out, most Chinese will say Tibetans are "savage 
and backward" (1992: 16). 
More recently, in a newspaper article attacking the Dalai Lama published in China. 
the author depicts the Dalai Lama as the "representative of the ruthless. feudalist. 
serf-owning class who, prior to 1959. still used human skulls and thighbones as 
ritual instruments" (WTN News 95/3/28 GMT 10:55). 
104 
Chapter 4 Flight from Tibet: Diaspora narratives 
Diasporas always leave a trail of collective memory about another 
place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment 
(Appadurai and Breckenridge 1989:i). 
Collective histories flourish where they have a meaningful, 
signifying use in the present. (Malkki 1989:90) 
Contestation surrounds every effort to create, define, or impose a 
common memory. (Tilly 1994:243) 
Introduction 
In chapter 2, I observed that Tibetan refugees evince a deep and vigorous 
engagement with their own history (and historiography), and that debates over 
representations of Tibetan history and culture are part of an extended discursive 
space in which the Tibet issue and contemporary Tibetan identities are negotiated. 
This chapter explores the production and performance of what I call "diaspora 
narratives" by Tibet-born refugees, focusing on the role these stories about leaving 
Tibet play in the construction of a diasporic nationalism in exile. 
l first got the idea to look at diaspora narratives after attending a film 
screening and panel discussion on Tibet held at a trendy East Village cinema in 
December 1990. During the discussion, I was struck by the fact that each of the 
three Tibetans on the panel was presented in the program solely in terms of his or 
her relationship to Tibet, unlike the two American colleagues who were introduced 
in terms of their occupation as well as their involvement with the Tibet issue: 
Losang Gyatso (moderator): Born in Lhasa, Tibet in 1951. Escaped 
105 
to India with family members during the refugee exodus of 1959. 
John Ackerly: Attorney. lnternational lawyers for Tibet. Witnessed 
demonstrations in Tibet in 1987. Co-authcred "Forbidden 
Freedoms" and "Suppression of a People." 
Champa Chonzom: Currently active in Tibetan Women's Association 
of New York (headquartered in Dharamsala). Escaped from Tibet 
as a child in 1958; has worked in the Tibetan settlements of 
Dharamsala and Bylakuppe, India; including the Tibetan Children's 
Village. 
Joel McCleary: Former deputy assistant to the President, Carter 
Administration. Currently works as an international political 
consultant; extensive background in Asian affairs. 
Tenzin Norbu: Imprisoned in solitary confinement for 3 years (from 
the age of 13-16). Recognized by the Dalai Lama as a reincarnate 
lama. Currently lives in New York after leaving Tibet in 1985. 
During the panel discussion itself, each of the Tibetan speakers described the 
reasons they left Tibet and commented on current conditions in their homeland. Ac 
the time of this event, I had been working with the Tibetan community in New 
York City for several months and had noticed the tendency for refugees to 
constantly reiterate the story of the 1959 uprising and the Dalai Lama's flight from 
Tibet and the subsequent exodus of thousands of Tibetans after him. l had also 
become very much aware of refugees' tendency to locate themselves vis a vis this 
narrative at every possible opportunity, and often with great emotion. In designing 
this study of Tibet activism, l decided to explore this phenomena further by 
eliciting diaspora narratives from Tibetans in the U.S. and Switzerland during 
interviews, and to explore similar narratives embedded in autobiographies written 
by refugees (including the Dalai Lama), and those performed for Western 
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audiences at Tibet Movement meetings and public events. 
Not surprisingly, for most Tibetans born in Tibet, fleeing their country has 
been the dominant event of their lives. Most of the narratives I analyze follow a 
similar pattern, emphasizing the physical hardships endured while crossing into 
exile and the profound sense of dislocation and loss experienced upon arrival in 
India, Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan. In this regard, they resemble the "flight 
narratives" elicited from Hutu refugees in Tanzania by Liisa Malkki (1995a). in 
which survivors stress the physical act of fleeing and the subsequent 
"transformation of a recognizable, familiar social landscape into an unintelligible 
chaos" ( l 995a: 109). 
Most diaspora narrators attribute their (or their parents') decision to flee to 
the unsuccessful uprising which cook place in Lhasa in March 1959 and to the 
Dalai Lama's escape. These events have taken on a kind of epic status, so 
frequently are they told and re-told by Tibetans. They are pan of the ur-narrative 
which forms the basis of collective remembering in exile. As such, the events of 
1959 are the originating moment of the production of a "national" history of Tibet, 
and their retelling is a collective discursive practice, a form of social action which 
informs daily life in communities across the diaspora. By examining "diaspora 
narratives" we are able to explore the production of a national narrative in exi1e, 
and the production of self in relation to this narrative. 
Anthropologists have fruitfully applied Anderson's (1983) notion of 
"imagined community" to the processes through which national-cultural narratives, 
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and thus identities, are constructed, such as the deployment of rituals and symbols. 
cultural forms and idioms that work to create a shared sense of belonging in a 
heterogeneous population (Fox 1990; Malkki 1990; see also Boyarin 1994). 
However, as the quote from Tilly in the beginning of this chapter implies, 
producing a national narrative is a contested process because competing interests 
and groups rarely agree on how best to remember the past. Competition over how 
to represent the "nation" is also competition over how current collective identities 
should be conceived (Srebemy-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994:38). The 
Tibetan case is no exception. It is not clear to what extent Tibetans shared a sense 
of "national" belonging before the Chinese occupation.' As Heather Stoddard 
writes: 
The Tibetan people at large were aware essentially of two types of 
identity: religious and regional affiliation. People belonged to a 
particular school or monastery, looked up to a particular religious 
leader, and owed allegiance, often of life or death, to their own 
regional group, be it a valley, a confederation, or a region. At the 
outside they considered themselves as members of one of the three 
chol-ka or provinces, as khamps-pa (Khamba}, or A-mdo-ba 
(Amdowa), or Central Tibetan, within the latter region as dBus-pa 
(U-pa}, gTsang-pa (Tsangpa) or sDod-pa (Do-pa--those from the 
south-western regions) ... all, however, spoke a dialect of 
Tibetan ... and those who were literate wrote in the common language 
of literary Tibetan. (1994: 125) 
Given the lack of ethnographic research on Tibet before the Chinese occupation, it 
is hard to know to what extent Tibetans in the three provinces shared a larger 
sense of "nationness." Sperling (1994), Stoddard and other Western scholars 
suggest there was an awakening interest in nationalism and some knowledge of the 
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idea, particularly in intellectual circles, before 1951 (see Stoddard 1994: 124- I 29). 1 
Nevertheless. it appears that the Lhasa government made no effort to transmit a 
sense of a shared genealogy and history to Tibetans living in Central Tibet. Kham 
or Amdo. While Tibetans may have identified with each other as members of the 
same "ethnic" group (as opposed to the Chinese. for instance). this identification 
was not operationalized, as it were. or mobilized by the Lhasa government with the 
arrival of Chinese forces. In fact. class and other interests appear to have 
determined the government's response (see discussion below of "Seventeen Point 
Agreement"). 
In any event, once in exile, Tibetans were confronted with the political 
realities of a world of nation-states in which having a "national" identity was 
central to the refugees' political project of proving Tibet's independence (and thus 
mobilizing support against the Chinese). In the first part of this chapter I explore 
several key events and issues from the period of 1950-1959 in Tibet which 
continue to spark debates in the exile community. I argue that these debates 
provide insight into the contested processes of constructing what Sperling 
(1994:268) calls a "diaspora nationalism," and reveal deep fissures based on region 
and social strata which continue to be negotiated in exile. 3 Having framed some 
of the central issues and points of contestation relating to official exile versions of 
Tibetan history between 1950-1959, I turn to an analysis of diaspora narratives and 
their role in the mediation and mobilization of this contesced iiistory. 
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Reform, resistance, and the "Seventeen Point Agreement" 
There are a number of competing versions of what happened between 1950. when 
Chinese forces entered Lhasa. and 1959, when thousands of Tibetans fought 
unsuccessfully against Chinese troops in the streets of the capital. 4 Differences 
between accounts tend to center on interpretations of several things. most 
important, the "Seventeen Point Agreement" and the resistance movement. While 
there is not space here to explore them in detail, I briefly discuss the two issues in 
the context of contemporary debates in exile society. I do this not to probe 
sensitive topics but rather to emphasize a larger point about the contested nature of 
the past and its continued relevance for social actors in the present. 
In the last chapter, I mentioned the Tibetan army's defeat by the People·s 
Liberation Army in Kham in 1950 (see Goldstein 1989, chapter 18). The first step 
China took upon its victory in Kham was to divide the country into "inner" and 
"outer" Tibet, inner referring to Kham and Amdo, and outer referring to 
"political" Tibet, the area governed continuously by the Lhasa government. 5 By 
taking advantage of the pre-existing internal regional divisions, the Chinese were 
able to dilute and deflect nascent nationalist sentiment aroused by their presence on 
the Tibetan plateau (Stoddard 1994: 125). China assumed that because Kham and 
Amdo were not directly ruled by Lhasa, they could be more easily incorporated 
into the People's Republic of China (PRC) (D. Norbu 1982). This, as we shall 
see, proved not to be the case. 
After assuming control of Kham and Amdo in 1951, the Chinese began to 
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implement a "peaceful liberation policy." This policy, which was in effect 
between 1951 and 1959, entailed the implementation of new social and economic 
policies, known as "democratic reforms," though there was no direct attempt (at 
least at the beginning) to indoctrinate the Khampa or Amdowa population. 6 These 
reforms included a "loan and help" campaign whereby local people were expected 
to give surplus grain and other foodstuffs to Chinese workers who were building 
roads in the area (P. Wangyal 1974). As a result of rampant inflation and shortage 
of essential commodities created by the reforms, local Tibetan guerrillas began to 
organize and resist the policies. By 1953, ordinary Tibetans had joined with 
guerrillas co strike at military units and Chinese convoys carrying food and 
ammunition for the PLA (P. Wangyal 1974). A year later, guerrilla activity 
sprang up all across eastern and northeastern Tibet. 
Attempts at land reform and socialist collectivization further inflamed the 
local populace, and resistance strengthened. Some of the leaders were rounded up 
by the Chinese and executed publicly. 7 The Chinese then ordered the Khampas co 
lay down their weapons, something which went against Khampa tradition and was 
ignored. For a number of reasons, including poor communication networks, lack 
of experience in political organization, and traditional prejudices between Khampas 
and the Lhasa government, the resistance movement in Kham did not immediately 
spread co U-Tsang. Central Tibet experienced its own hostilities as early as 1952, 
led by the underground resistance movement known as "Mi-mang Tshogs- 'dus" 
(People's Assembly) (P. Wangyal 1974; see also D. Norbu 1982 and Avedon 
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1984:38). 
The first big offensive which united all of eastern Tibet. what the Chinese 
call the "Kangding Rebellion." took place in the winter of l 955-56. At this point. 
the U.S. and nationalists in Taiwan began to take an interest in the situation.~ 
American aid began to flow via Taiwan; modern equipment was air-dropped in the 
area. including wireless operators who could help facilitate and coordinate 
resistance against the Chinese (P. Wangyal 1974:25).9 American involvement in 
the Tibetan resistance during this period is not well-documented in the Western 
literature. 10 While there are Tibetans living in the U.S. who were involved in 
some way with the CIA. most of them do not speak openly about their 
participation. (For an interesting account of CIA training of Tibetan guerrillas 
several years later. see Avedon 1984: l 18-125). 
Another perhaps more important reason why resistance did not immediately 
spread to Central Tibet is that the Lhasa government had already agreed to the 
"Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet." With this 
agreement. reluctantly signed by a delegation of government officials in Beijing on 
May 23, 1951. Tibet: 
formally acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in exchange 
for Chinese agreement to maintain the Dalai Lama and the 
traditional politico-economic system intact until Tibetans themselves 
wanted change. Chinese troops moved into Lhasa in the autumn of 
1951, and have not left. 
Although 1951 marked the end of what was then a de facto 
independent Tibetan polity, the Dalai Lama and his government 
remained in place as did the traditional Tibetan political economy. 
(Goldstein 1994a:92) 
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ln other words, China treated "ethnographic" Tibet (Richardson 1984:1-2) very 
differently from "political" Tibet during the 1951-59 period because Kham and 
Amdo were not covered by the terms laid down in the Seventeen Point Agreement. 
which applied only to political Tibet (Goldstein l 994a:88). Many scholars have 
pointed out that Mao and other leaders were careful to stick co the terms outlined 
in the agreement, at least initially. This was pan of Mao's larger plan to divide 
and coopt the Tibetan aristocracy by offering to protect their privileges and those 
of the monastic elite by deferring "democratic reforms" until the people of U-
Tsang were ready for them. By approaching the occupation of Tibet in this 
manner. Mao hoped to avoid open revolt, bloodshed, and the international 
condemnation which would inevitably ensue. 
The signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement continues to be the subject of 
endless speculation among exiles. During the early phase of my fieldwork. a 
member of the Tibetan delegation to Beijing in 1951 (the only one who is still 
alive), visited New York City, and [ was invited to his "Special Address on the So-
called 17 Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" at the Office of 
Tibet. "So-called" is the operative word here, as members of the delegation 
claimed to have been forced to sign under duress the agreement which some 
Tibetans today say constitutes the "selling-out of Tibet." [ wrote the following 
when [ got home that night: 
[ was invited to a talk by a member of the delegation to Beijing in 
1951 where the so-called "17 Point Agreement" was signed with the 
Chinese. It was a select crowd of Tibet supporters and Tibetans 
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who attended ... X translated. Y. introduced the speaker .. .I caped the 
talk which started after a thirty minute reception on the veranda. 
One person kept shaking his head during the talk. After the talk, 
which I only half-followed, a western supporter asked about the 
possibility of there being a conspiracy. The speaker said yes, it was 
possible. He also admitted to the fact that mistakes were made by 
the Tibetan government in the 40s and 50s in that they remained 
isolated and didn't seek outside support. 
Afterwards, in a taxi ride home, some Tibetan friends 
indicated that there is a bitterness about the fact that the aristocrats 
and monastic hierarchy failed the Tibetan masses by signing away 
the nation. One said "it is better to be kept in chains by your own 
people than by outsiders." The other agreed, and both 
acknowledged that there were problems with Tibetan society before 
1950, and that many young Tibetans feel that way. 
The event was interesting in that this man represents an older 
generation's way of doing things in Tibet-why was he given a 
hearing? Who is responsible for arranging his speaking tour in 
North America? (5/30/91) 
I never found out the answers to my questions, though given that this event took 
place one week after the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the agreement11 • it 
is possible that the former government official was touring North America in order 
to counter efforts by China to publicize the anniversary of the "liberation," efforts 
which included a screening of a film called "Tibet: Past and Present" at the 
Chinese consular office on 12th Avenue and 42nd Street in New York City to 
which the diplomatic community was invited. 12 
One of the reasons the "Seventeen Point Agreement" remains such a 
delicate subject in exile, more than forty years after the fact, is that it reveals the 
extent to which the Lhasa government was prepared to go in order to preserve the 
status quo. 13 In effect, the delegates signed away Tibetan sovereignty in 
exchange for a promise that Central Tibet would be given a reprieve from 
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communist reform, and, moreover, chat it could maintain its religious government 
and monastic system together with the estate system on which it was based 
{Goldstein 1989:812). This was and continues to be an especially sensitive issue 
for chose from Kham and Amdo for whom no such dispensation was given. 
Debates about the "Seventeen Point Agreement" and the delegation's 
motivation for signing it {e.g., a "conspiracy") reveal an ambivalence about certain 
aspects of the political system in old Tibet and suggest an ongoing awareness of the 
"profound regional separation" which contributed to Tibet's fall. These debates 
function as vehicles through which Tibetans criticize their own society. This is no 
small matter, given the strong sense of social control Tibetans appear to feel with 
regard to criticizing the exile government and its policies as well as the traditional 
social hierarchies which continue to operate in the Tibetan diaspora. Discussions 
of the past provide an outlet for the frustration and dissatisfaction some Tibetans 
feel today about contemporary exile politics and policies but dare not express 
openly. 
The resistance movement, another issue which continues to be debated in 
the exile community, has been poorly documented and little understood by either 
Tibetans or non-Tibetans. In a recent article, Tibetan intellectual Jamyang Norbu 
argues that although a few published accounts exist, most of which were written by 
non-Tibetans and are vague about names, dates, and places, "there has been a 
singular lack of inquiry into the resistance movement on the part of the exile 
Tibetan government" (1994: 186). He offers two reasons for this: first, the 
115 
resistance movement's popularity highlighted the government's failed policy of 
cooperation with the Chinese, and second, the traditional antagonism between 
Khampa leaders and the central government mitigated government officials' desire 
to give too much credit to their former adversaries (1994: 186). Norbu admits that 
the resistance itself did not document its own activities very carefully, and was 
especially prone to secrecy once it established connections with the CIA 
(1994: 187). 14 
Although the Khampa and the Amdowa may not have always seen eye to 
eye with the Lhasa government, in the latter half of the 1950s, Tibetans from all 
areas increasingly perceived the reforms implemented by the Chinese threats to 
Buddhism and to its associated traditional values, practices, and institutions. This 
perception facilitated the spread of protests, initiated by the "Kangding Rebellion." 
from Kham to Amdo in 1958 and finally to Lhasa in 1959. As Jamyang Norbu 
writes, 
The traditional ideology on which the revolt was based gave it 
sufficient popular appeal to transcend the borders of Eastern Tibet 
and to ignite passions and violence even in the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region, where the Chinese had caused no disruption in the social 
system, and where the aristocracy and clergy were being actively 
courted by the Chinese authorities. Hence many Tibetans have 
considered the revolt to be national one, in the sense that the 
sentiment of the majority of the Tibetan people was involved. Yet 
the leaders and members of the resistance movement, mainly 
composed of Khampas and Amdowas, were too often unable to 
transcend narrow tribal loyalties for the movement to take on a fully 
national and dynamic character. (1994: 194) 
Norbu argues that the lack of hard information on the resistance enabled the 
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Tibetan exile leadership to "rewrite history, playing down the role of the armed 
revolt and fostering the fiction that the popular resistance was non-violent" 
(1994: 188). Though "unhesitatingly subscribed to by many friends of Tibet, this 
story is patently untrue" (ibid., 188). All of the demonstrations against the 
Chinese between 1951 and 1959 were violent, Norbu asserts, and were a signal to 
the Chinese "that Tibetans were prepared to act violently to protect their leader and 
their religion" (ibid., 188). 
According to Norbu, the non-violent interpretation of modern Tibetan 
history "has accorded only a minor role to the resistance movement" (ibid., 188). 
Such neglect by exile officials, Western supporters and intellectuals, and Buddhist 
followers has promoted the "preferred peace-loving image of Tibet as Shangri-la" 
and allowed the fact that the resistance took weapons from the CIA to be swept 
under the proverbial rug (ibid., 188). In this instance, Western expectations of 
Tibetans as non-violent and helpless victims, in conjunction with the exile 
government's desire to suppress information about official complicity (or inaction). 
conspire to produce a narrative in which these aspects of Tibetan experience are 
erased. 
The Lhasa uprising and the Dalai Lama's escape 
By 1957-58, fierce fighting in Kham produced many refugees who fled to Lhasa 
and other parts of nearby Central Tibet. There Khampa fighters regrouped. 
Under the leadership of Lithangwa merchant Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang, the loose-
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knit guerrilla bands came together to form a single resistance army. 15 An 
organization was created called the National Volunteer Defense Army or Chushi 
Gangdruk ("Four Rivers, Six Ranges" -an old name for Eastern Tibet) whose 
membership, in addition to Khampa rebels, included a few well-placed Lhasa 
government officials. Unlike most of their aristocratic colleagues, these ministers 
were sympathetic to the movement's aims and objectives. With their help, the 
resistance retrieved arms and ammunition from secret government arsenals which 
enabled them to take virtual control of the area south of Lhasa (J. Norbu 
1994: l 94). 16 
The uprising in Lhasa which took place in March 1959 represents the 
culm!nation of an eight-year process of resistance to Chinese rule. It is important 
to remember that there was a significant Chinese presence in Central Tibet by this 
time and the Dalai Lama and his government were still trying to work out some 
sort of peaceful accommodation with them. Although accounts of the period vary 
and are not well-documented, most agree that by 1959, the situation in the Lhasa 
area had deteriorated. 
As the Khampas moved their theater of operations nearer Lhasa. the 
simmering discontent of the local people in Central Tibet grew into 
open resentment and hostility against the Chinese. Under such a 
tense situation, the Dalai Lama and his government, whom the 
Chinese had so far used as an unconscious agent of their designs in 
Tibet, were under increasing pressures from all sides. They were in 
an acute dilemma. By 1957 the traditional ruling elite in Lhasa was 
split between those who sided with Ngapo Ngawang Jigme and the 
Dalai Lama, both of whom realistically thought that Tibet's future 
lay in collaborating with China, and those who felt, on the contrary, 
that Communist China and Buddhist Tibet had irreconcilable ideals. 
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(D. Norbu 1982: 13) 
An invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend a play hosted by the Chinese at 
one of their military camps sparked a sequence of events leading to the final 
confrontation in March 1959 and the Tibetan leader's flight to India. According to 
Shakabpa (1967). the Chinese wanted the Dalai Lama to attend the show 
unaccompanied by his usual entourage of bodyguards and Tibetan troops. 
something which was highly unusual and immediately made Tibetans suspicious of 
Chinese intentions. Officials also wanted the Dalai Lama's visit to the camp kept 
secret. Word spread quickly that such a request had been made and Lhasa people 
"feared that he might be kidnapped by the Communists" (318). The visit was 
scheduled for March 10. On that day. Shakabpa writes. 
some 30.000 Tibetans from Lhasa surrounded the Norbulingka in an 
attempt to protect the Dalai Lama from the Chinese. The Tibetan 
people protested angrily and demonstrated against the Chinese ... wild 
confusion and uncertainty reigned everywhere in Lhasa." (319) 17 
Later in the day a group of government officials joined with the popular leaders 
and members of the Dalai Lama's bodyguard in denouncing the Seventeen Point 
Agreement. The next morning crowd leaders posted guards around the Kashag 
office which was in the Norbulingka compound for fear that Tibetan officials 
would be forced into a compromise by the Chinese authorities. 
On March 12. several thousand Tibetan women demonstrated in Lhasa 
against the Chinese. led by both elite laywomen and nuns. Very little 
documentation exists of this event. but it continues to serve as a source of 
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inspiration for contemporary nuns in Tibet who, along with monks, have been rhe 
principal actors involved in protests against Chinese rule since 1987 (see Havnevik 
1994 and 1989: for brief mentions see also Taring 1970:226 and Sakya and Emery 
1990:276-277). 
After this second demonstration, Chinese authorities pressured the Dalai 
Lama to bring the angry crowds under control. In his second book (Gyatso 1990) 
(see discussion below), the Dalai Lama describes the dizzying pace of events and 
his anxiety. Hoping co avoid a calamity, and unsure of what co do co protect 
himself, the Dalai Lama consulted the Nechung oracle 
Should I stay or should I try to escape? What was I to do? The 
oracle made it clear that I should stay and keep open the dialogue 
with the Chinese. For once, I was unsure of whether this really was 
the best course of action .. .I spent the afternoon performing Mo, 
another form of divination. The result was identical (Gyatso 
1990: 135). 
After a few days, the Chinese made their intention to shell the Norbulingka clear 
in a letter, sent with an enclosure from Jigme Ngawang Ngapo confirming the 
message. The Dalai Lama replied, trying to buy rime, and then consulted the 
oracle again. The oracle urged him to leave immediately. Having received this 
answer. the Dalai Lama began to prepare for his depanure. He fled Lhasa late in 
the evening of March 17, 1959. The Tibetan leader's entourage included nearly 
one hundred officials and family members, as well as bodyguards. A force of 
three hundred and fifty soldiers accompanied the escape party. In his account, the 
Dalai Lama notes the presence of two "CIA operatives" in the group. 
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Almost everyone but myself was heavily armed, including even the 
man appointed as my personal cook, who carried an enormous 
bazooka and wore a belt hung with its deadly shells. He was one of 
the young men trained by the CIA ... There was another of these CIA 
operatives amongst the party. a radio operator who was apparently 
in touch with his headquarters throughout the journey. Exactly who 
he was in contact with, I do not know to this day (Gyatso 
1990: 140). 
One of the Tibetans I met while in Switzerland was a member of the Dalai Lama·s 
escape party in 1959 and his account also suggests American awareness of the 
entourage's movements. A former monk from Eastern Tibet ([ will call him 
Tenzin) 18, he was chosen by the abbot of his monastery (Sera) to accompany the 
Dalai Lama and remembers being given very old, British-made weapons which he 
and the other guards did not know how to operate. Tenzin recounted feeling 
frightened when the entourage slipped out of Norbulingka which was surrounded 
by Chinese troops and remembers being assisted by members of Chushi Gangdruk 
once the party reached the nearby river, the Kyichu. He mentioned seeing planes 
flying overhead when the entourage reached the Lhoka area. Fires were set up in 
a semi-circle, illuminating a space in which the planes dropped supplies. When 
asked if the planes were operated by the CIA, Tenzin said yes. At night, when the 
party stopped to rest, the Dalai Lama's tent was in the center surrounded by 
bodyguards, who in turn were encircled by resistance fighters. 19 
The presence of individuals in the Dalai Lama's entourage with American 
ties and reports of air-dropping of supplies has created a lot of speculation and 
intrigue on the part of Tibetans as well as Western scholars and activists. Some 
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take it as evidence of the CIA 's deep involvement in the planning and execution of 
the escape (see Grunfeld 1987; C. Mullin 1975; see also the flurry of 
correspondence to the Tibetan Review in March 1974: 13-19). Many others, 
including the Dalai Lama, deny that the CIA engineered his escape, though as the 
stories above suggest, the Americans were informed of the escape plan and of the 
Dalai Lama's movements via radio. Jamyang Norbu argues that "accounts of the 
CIA engineering the Dalai Lama's escape and escorting him seem to be mostly the 
result of creative journalism" (1994: 195). Based on discussions with one of two 
Tibetan CIA agents in Lhasa in 1959, Norbu argues these two individuals (via 
radio transmitter) merely kept "the Americans informed of developments in the 
escape plan, and later during the actual escape itself" (195). 
Supposed CIA involvement in the Tibetan leader's escape, together with 
American support of the guerrillas in Mustang, Nepal in the 1960s and early 1970s 
has led many in the West to assume the Tibetans were reactionary anti-communists 
(or naive cold war pawns). 20 For Tibetans, the struggle between Tibet and Mao's 
forces was seen mainly as a struggle to preserve a way of life and to resist what 
they viewed as foreign intrusion. During the 1970s, one Tibetan intellectual 
complained that instead of framing the issue of Tibet in terms of colonialism, 
critics had represented it as an anti-communist struggle (D. Norbu 1974; see also 
Peissel 1973). He argued that the Tibet struggle "is neither anti-Chinese nor anti-
Communist, but as His Holiness the Dalai Lama says, it is a national liberation 
movement for self-determination" (D. Norbu 1974: 1). As this quote suggests, 
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after 1959 the issue for Tibetans was how to frame their struggle. One of the 
primary aims of this study is to elucidate the various strategies used by Tibetans to 
represent their struggle and the role played by non-Tibetans in these processes. I 
come back co this discussion later in the chapter. but here I highlight the disparity 
between how Tibetans have perceived their situation and how it has been 
interpreted by some in the West. 21 As we will see, understandings of the Tibet 
issue have shifted over time as a new generation of refugees has come of age in 
exile and a new cohort of Westerner supporters have become involved, many of 
whom view Tibetans as victims of human rights abuses rather than as cold war 
proxies. 
Back in Lhasa, the Chinese began shelling Norbulingka on March 20, a few 
days after the Dalai Lama's escape. Fighting broke out in and around the city and 
many Tibetans and Chinese were killed. The PLA soon consolidated its control 
over the city and the remaining pockets of Tibetan resistance were forced to 
surrender. 
The Dalai Lama crossed into Indian territory on March 31, 1959. Over the 
next few days and months, as word spread of the Dalai Lama's successful escape. 
thousands of Tibetans followed their leader into exile. Sources disagree over the 
actual number who fled, which is not surprising given that there were several 
waves of exodus and Tibetans escaped through a variety of routes over a period of 
many months. Avedon asserts that by June 1959, 20,000 Tibetans had fled their 
homeland (1984:72); a few years later, an estimated 80,000 refugees had crossed 
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into Nepal, Bhutan and India (Gombo 1985:67). The initial wave from Tibet 
included those most likely to be imprisoned by the Chinese: the families of the 
present and past Dalai Lamas, former government officials and their families. large 
estate holders. important religious leaders, and resistance commanders and troops. 
Most of these early refugees brought with them wealth in the form of jewelry and 
family heirlooms which they sold when they needed money. They senled in 
traditional trading centers such as Kalimpong and Darjeeling. in northeastern India. 
although a small number with substantial resources migrated to the U.S. or Europe 
(e.g., Sakya and Emery 1990). Subsequent waves of refugees included mostly 
ordinary lay Tibetans (e.g., farmers. nomads, artisans). many from Central and 
Western Tibet. the regions nearest to the border from which it was easier to 
escape. Many crossed into Assam and Bhutan wearing their traditional Tibetan 
garb of heavy boots and long wool robes which were totally unsuitable for the 
subtropical temperatures characteristic of the region. Accustomed to the dry. high-
altitude conditions of the Himalayas. they suffered severe physical effects from the 
new climate and became extremely susceptible to tuberculosis and other illnesses. 
At first. refugees were housed in two transit camps, one in Missamari near Tezpur 
in Assam, the other. Bwca Duar, near the Bhutanese border in West Bengal. By 
the summer of 1959, the Dalai Lama and the Indian government agreed on a plan 
to disperse the lay refugees to the cooler regions of northern India. where they 
would be put to work on road gangs (Avedon 1984:73). 22 Thus the Tibetan 
diaspora was born. 
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Diaspora discourse and the work of narrative 
In his essay. "A Revolt Long Ago." written in 1984 (and reprinted in 1989), 
Jamyang Norbu observes: 
In his history of California. Clavigaro. a Jesuit explorer of the 
eighteenth century, describes a practise of some of the Lower 
California Indians. They were always hungry. always partly 
starving. When they had meat, which was a rare thing. they tied 
pieces of string to every mouthful, then ate it. pulled it up and ate it 
again, often passing it from hand to hand. Clavigaro found this a 
disgusting practice. 
Disgusting or not, we Tibetans have been performing a 
similar regurgitory exercise once every year for the last twenty-five 
years. A definite moral and political commitment is as rare to the 
Tibetans as meat was to the California Indians, and it is therefore no 
wonder that we have. for so many years. been living off the one 
memorable event of our history. (1989:56) 
Norbu's analogy between a Native American group's supposed meat-eating 
practices and the exile community's practice of regurgitating the events of 1959 
over and over again underscores the paradigmatic significance of those events in 
the construction of a master or ur-narrative of Tibetanness in exile. Although his 
cynical comments are made specifically in reference to the annual Tenth March 
ritual (a public commemoration of the day Tibetans rose up against Chinese forces 
in Lhasa in 1959),23 Norbu's observations also encompass the way Tibetans retell 
the past in diaspora narratives. 
In this chapter, I focus on three "genre" of diaspora narrative: oral accounts 
elicited in face to face encounters such as interviews; written autobiographies; and 
what I call "testimonials" that are performed in public and semi-public fora, such 
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as governmental hearings or Tibet Movement meetings. One of the points I make 
in this chapter is that these narratives are an exile innovation--telling stories about 
oneself in the way described here was not a common mode of expression in Tibet 
before 1959. After becoming refugees and becoming unhinged from a locatable 
source of self and social identity, Tibetans entered a situation in which they had to 
define themselves or explain themselves in relation to an interlocutor, an "other." 
In the process, the "self' became the thread that held their experience together. 
Individuals became indexical of this process of dislocation, of a shared history. and 
began to use their own experience to speak on behalf of the broader Tibetan 
experience. All of the diaspora narratives discussed in this chapter are produced in 
relation to an interlocutor. l have divided my discussion by "genre" of narrative. 
by whether the interlocutor is an anthropologist, a member of the English-speaking 
reading public, or, in the most dramatic cases, a live audience at a UN conference 
or Senate Foreign Relations hearing or Tibet support group meeting. In making 
this distinction, I want to make clear that the processes at work are the same in all 
three contexts. Before turning to the first set of narratives, I briefly explore 
contemporary arguments about diaspora discourse and the function of narrative. 
In a recent article. Jim Clifford observed that "for better or worse. diaspora 
discourse is being widely appropriated. It is loose in the world. for reasons having 
co do with decoloniz.ation. increased immigration. global communications, and 
transport--a whole range oi phenomena that encourage multi-locale attachments. 
dwelling and travelling within and across nations" (1994:306). I have chosen to 
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join the crowd and frame the accounts I discuss in this chapter as "diaspora 
narratives" for several reasons, not least of which is the fact that exile Tibetans 
themselves have increasingly referred to themselves as ·diasporic.' I also use the 
term in order to distinguish them from an emergent genre of Tibetan-language 
"escape narratives" which are written by Tibetans living in Tibet (see discussion 
below). 
As Clifford points out. the appropriation of "diasporist discourse" is a 
recent and increasingly widespread phenomenon, reaching even the academy where 
there has been a burgeoning interest in "diaspora studies" in the 1990s. The 
growing use of the term has been accompanied by an expansion of its meaning, as 
Khachig Tololyan observes in the inaugural issue of a new publication called 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies: "although diaspora once described 
Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersion, it now shares meanings with a larger 
semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, 
guestworker. exile community, overseas community. ethnic community" (1991:3). 
Tololyan argues that the expansion of the meaning of diaspora to encompass these 
various terms reflects the fact that diasporas are "exemplary communities of the 
transnational moment" (1991:5). a moment defined by an unprecedented degree of 
movement of people. capital. ideas, and images across the globe (see Appadurai 
1990). 
The popularity of the term diaspora in contemporary theorizing represents a 
growing sensitivity to the need to revise "old localizing strategies" (Clifford 
127 
1994:303) that traditionally focused on bounded communities, cultures. or regions 
in order to take into account the proliferation of people who refuse to "stay put." 
who can be said to live at the margins of the nation-state and may have loyalties co 
more chan one place.24 Indeed, Clifford argues that the language of diaspora "is 
increasingly invoked by displaced peoples who feel (maintain, revive. invent) a 
connection with a prior home" (1994:310). Diaspora cultures, he suggests. "thus 
mediate, in lived tension. the experiences of separation and entanglement. of living 
here and remembering/desiring another place" (311). 
In a recent essay, Malkki observes that a new awareness has emerged of the 
"global social fact" that now, perhaps more than ever before 
people are chronically mobile and routinely displaced, and invent 
homes and homelands in the absence of territorial, national bases--
not in situ but through memories of, and claims on, places that chey 
can or will no longer corporeally inhabit. (1992:24) 
Homelands lie at the symbolic center of all transnational national communities and 
serve as particularly powerful unifying symbols for displaced peoples (see Malkki 
1992). As Gupta and Ferguson ( 1992) have pointed out, the construction of 
homelands play a crucial role in collective political mobiliz.ation (see Danforth 
1995 for an interesting description of this process by diasporic Macedonians). In 
this chapter l argue that one of the primary ways in which Tibetan refugees 
construct Tibet as a homeland is through a retelling of the past, especially the 
events of 1959. By telling stories about fleeing, Tibetans not only constitute Tibet 
as a homeland, they also constitute themselves in relation to that homeland. 
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Many scholars have recognized the universal need by individuals to 
narratize their experience (e.g .• Ochs and Capps 1996) and the fact that narratives 
affect and structure the way we understand the world. As J. Bruner puts it: 
The heart of my argument is this--eventually the culturally shaped 
cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life 
narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience. to 
organize memory, to segment and purpose-build the very "events" of 
a life. ( 1986: 15) 
According to Ochs and Capps, narratives "give rise to the selves that apprehend 
them" (1996:21) That is. they create coherence out of lived experience and "every 
telling provides narrators ... with an opportunity for fragmented self-understanding" 
(20). 
At the same time. narratives provide the link between the individual and the 
wider social structure as they are never created in isolation, but in relation to a 
listener/reader. Citing Bakhtin's dialogic model (1981), Ochs and Capps suggest 
that all narratives are co-constructed, that their meaning is jointly produced by 
those doing the telling and those listening/reading the stories. In this way. they 
argue. "if we develop our selves through the stories we tell and if we tell them 
with others, then we are a complex, fluid matrix of co-authored selves" (1996:43). 
l explore this point below in my discussion of the relation of Tibetan narratives to 
Western audiences. 
Finally. narratives are framings, ways of encompassing a situation. ln her 
work on abortion activists, Ginsburg (1987; 1989) argues that narratives emerge 
around a crisis and reflect efforts of social actors to constitute order and cultural 
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transformations at "disjunctive" historical moments (1989:142). Myerhoff. in her 
discussion of elderly Jews in California, suggests that their practices of storytelling 
were efforts at ordering, sorting, explaining-rendering coherent 
their long life, finding integrating ideas and characteristics that 
helped them know themselves as the same person over time, despite 
great ruptures and shifts. No doubt their emigrant experience and 
the loss of their original culture made them even more prone to seek 
continuity and coherence. Survivors it is often noted, are strongly 
impelled to serve as witnesses to what has been lost. (1978: 34) 
Just as leaving their Eastern European homelands shaped Myerhoff's informants· 
desire to render coherence to their lives, so fleeing Tibet provides a central 
narrative turning point in the life course of the Tibetan refugees with whom I 
worked. The stories discussed in this chapter represent ways in which refugees 
attempt to make sense of the traumatic experience of becoming diasporic. 
Y esbe and Pema 
The first "genre" of narratives I discuss is that elicited in interviews. I interviewed 
Tibetans living in New York City, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and in 
several locales in Switzerland, including Horgen, Zurich, Geneva, Flawil, Jona, 
Trogen, Winterthur, Rikon, and Heitzingen. I made every effort to include 
individuals from a wide range of social backgrounds and different regions in Tibet 
and the diaspora. Due to limited space, I focus only on the stories of three 
individuals in this section, beginning with Yeshe and Perna. 
Y eshe and Perna fled Tibet as boys. Despite the fact that both speak 
English relatively well, the narratives I elicited were somewhat disjointed at times. 
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For this reason, I decided to paraphrase sections when necessary. Yeshe is from a 
region near the Nepalese border. In many ways his experience represents the large 
number of ordinary Tibetan families from Central Tibet who left their farms and 
herds co make the relatively short journey to Nepal. 
In 1959, before the uprising in Lhasa, when the resistance movement 
was gaining control in southern Tibet, meetings were convened in 
my town. My father and his friend led these meetings. They 
discussed where to collect arms and send a group of people to join 
the movement. 
We had many people from Kham and Central Tibet who kept 
arms. We sent two representatives to Lhoka to ask Chushi 
Gangdruk where people from our town could join. Unforrunately at 
Tingri, they couldn't get through and the Chinese arrested one of the 
representatives. Immediately all the people who'd collected arms 
fled, leaving their family behind. Somehow my father didn't flee. 
There was a rumor that the Chinese were harsher on Kham pas, so 
they all left. 
After three months my father and I fled too. I was twelve 
years old. Every six months the local monastery had a festival of 
ritual dances. I was told my father was going to attend the dances 
and I was going with him. I was so excited! There was not so 
much restriction of movement at the time. My mother took me to 
the altar and was crying and praying. I felt uncomfortable. She put 
the scarf around my head and touched my forehead. I took off the 
scarf and said I didn't need it. Still I was excited to see the dances. 
We headed towards the monastery but didn't go there. My father let 
the horses out of the barn and said we had to sleep here. It was 
June and warm. A family friend came at dawn and woke us up. 
That morning I was cold we were going to Nepal. Nepal was only 
two days walk but instead it took one week. We lived in Nepal, 
near the border, for eight months. My mother sent us meat and 
dried cheese. 
After one year, my four sisters and mother and grandmother 
came out. There was a lack of medical facilities ... My mother had a 
problem with her breast, her stomach, and she died. I was founeen 
at the time. 
Perna came from a different kind of community than Y eshe. He was from 
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Eastern Tibet and grew up in a relatively affluent. polyandrous family (he had 
three fathers and one mother). One of Pema's fathers took him to Lhasa in 1957 
where he was put into a school for two years. Part of the growing number of 
Khampa and Amdowa refugees in Lhasa. Perna and his father were there when 
violent confrontation between Chinese forces and Tibetans broke out in March 
1959. Perna. who was just eleven years old at the time. was actually at the 
Norbulingka with his father where the first fighting took place: 
My father was in the uprising in Norbulingka. he stayed there for 
ten days. something like that. When the fighting started. it was 
March 18th I think. I woke up at 4 o'clock in the morning in the 
dark. I went back to sleep and woke up again at 10 o'clock. It 
looked something like this [draws on paper]. I saw sunshine. my tent 
had SO many bullet holes. I slept through the whole thing! I also 
saw-people said he was the very first person injured in 
Norbulingka-1 saw that person. But I'm not sure, of course, you 
cannot really establish if it was the real first person ... 
Once it became clear they were oumumbered and outarmed. many of those 
involved in the fighting, including Khampa and Amdowa refugees, fled. 
Perna remembers running away with his father, heading north out of Lhasa. He 
saw thousands of Tibetans along the way. also fleeing. After running to the north 
for three days, Perna and his father curved around and headed south towards the 
Indian border. He remembers there were fifteen or twenty people in his escape 
party and that they crossed the Kyichu (River) near the famous Gelugpa monastery, 
Ganden. and evaded Chinese soliders in the Tsedang and Lhoka areas south of 
Lhasa. After more than a week. they reached their destination. Perna recalls not 
knowing he was leaving Tibet until he saw the Indian police officers stationed at 
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the border. At that moment. Perna says. "I realized we had lost Tibet." Like 
many of their compatriots who followed the Dalai Lama out of loyalty and 
devotion as well as fear of Chinese repercussions. Perna and his father simply 
"landed in India rather than planned to leave." 
Contrary to official exile representations of the events of 1959, which. as 
described in the first part of this chapter. tend to omit or play down the existence 
of organized Tibetan resistance to Chinese forces and violence on the part of 
Tibetans. Yeshe's and Pema's narratives reveal the presence of a strong resistance 
movement and Tibetan participation in fighting the PLA in Lhasa. They also 
highlight the central role ordinary Tibetans from outside Lhasa, i.e. non-
aristocratic. non-monastic Tibetans, played in resisting Chinese forces. 
Almost every Tibetan I interviewed talked about losing or being separated 
from family members and relatives and how hard life was in exile. Yeshe and 
Perna were no exception. A few months before his mother died, Yeshe told me. 
two representatives from the newly-formed government-in-exile visited his family 
in Nepal. The men told the family that if they went to India, his grandmother, 
who was now blind, would be taken care of. They also said there were free 
schools for the children and jobs for the parents. At the time of the visit, Y eshe 's 
family had been living just over the border from Tibet for nearly two years. 
Y eshe remembers life being "quite hard" then. He often had to climb down the 
steep hillside to get water at the bottom of the valley every day; he remembers 
scraping his arms collecting firewood. Reluctantly, Yeshe recalls, his family 
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decided to follow the represenr.atives' advice, go to India and separate from one 
another. Three of Yeshe's sisters went to the Tiber.an Children's Village (TCV) in 
Dharamsala, a school for orphans and young children of parents working on road 
gangs that was founded by the Dalai Lama's elder sister. Yeshe, along with two 
other siblings, joined the newly-created Tiber.an school in Simla. 25 
As for Perna, after fleeing Tibet, he and his father were separated. His 
father was sent to Sikkim and Perna was sent to Kalimpong where he enrolled in a 
refugee school. After a year and a half, Perna left, eventually ending up in New 
Delhi, where he got a job at a noodle factory and went to school at night. In 
December 1964, Perna moved again, this time enrolling in an adult education 
school run by American fundamenr.alist missionaries. Perna, a Buddhist like most 
other Tiber.ans, joked with me about having to study math, English, and the Bible. 
Three years later, the Indian government closed down the school and the American 
administrators arranged for eight Tiber.ans, including Perna, to continue their 
education in the United Sr.ates. 26 
Although their diasporic trajectories were somewhat different, Yeshe and 
Perna both experienced the fracturing of their families and the wrenching 
separation from their parents. In Pema's case, he recalls feeling "totally lost" for 
many years before finally settling down in New York City. Indeed, suffering and 
loss were things that nearly every refugee shared. I explore this point further 
through the narrative of a refugee from Switzerland named Sonam. 
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Sonam 
I met Sonam during a trip in 1992 to a small town in Switzerland where a number 
of Tibetans had been resettled. I was accompanying my Tibetan translator (whom 
I will call Karma) who wanted to visit a close friend with whom he had attended 
school in India. Karma's friend was married and had two small children. While 
staying with this family, we met an older woman who had recently retired from 
her factory job and who looked after the children while their parents worked. She 
grew up in Central Tibet and was married to a man from the same area whom we 
also met. On the day of our interview, Sonam had just completed saying prayers 
at another Tibetan family's house along with eleven other women. Karma 
explained to me that every year these retired women go from house to house. 
saying prayers for the benefit of the household and for themselves. rr Compared 
to the relatively young and middle-aged Tibetan activists I knew in New York and 
had met thus far in Switzerland, Sonam was from a very different stratum-she was 
from a poor background, was uneducated and spoke only Tibetan. Sonam's story 
was even more fragmented and disjointed than Pema's and Yeshe's narratives. 
Like the Hutu women Malkki interviewed (1995a), Sonam spoke hesitantly, "in 
short sentences, in the give and take of dialogue, and not in longer, more sustained 
narrative form" (50). I have not been able to include a transcription of her 
narrative and instead have paraphrased her story (as translated by Karma). 
We sat on mats in the back garden in the late afternoon sun. As I began to 
ask Sonam about how she left Tibet, Karma interrupted, telling me that she spoke 
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very simple Tibetan (Sonam understood no English). At the time I was not sure 
what he meant by this. It was not until later that I realized what Karma was trying 
to communicate. 
Sonam's narrative centered around the suffering she and others travelling 
with her experienced upon fleeing Tibet. She started by saying that she was born 
in southern Tibet in 1922 and that her family were farmers. She gave me her 
family name. Karma had a great deal of trouble figuring it out and seemed 
perplexed. It was at this point Sonam 's husband sat down to join us. Sonam said 
she fled when she was 39 years old, which would have been in 1961. Carrying 
only five kilos of tsampa (roasted barley, a Tibetan staple), and a few clothes. 
Sonam and a friend hid in a forest for a week and then joined a larger group of 
Tibetans who were also leaving. As Sonam told her story, her husband began co 
interrupt, making lengthy interjections (in Tibetan). Soon the interview switched 
from a three-person discussion to a four-person interaction. 
Sonam described running into Chushi Gangdruk guerrillas who told her they 
were "fighting for the cause of Tibet" and asked her why she was leaving. She 
told them the Chinese were threatening her life, but their question made her feel 
guilty; she felt she was "in a difficult position." Soon after this encounter, Sonam 
crossed over into Bhutan along with forty-five others. Many in her party died 
from diarrhea and other health problems. 
Sonam was eventually sent to neighboring Assam, where she stayed for 
about two months. When asked what she remembers feeling or thinking at that 
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time. she replied she felt confused. Her next stop was Ladakh, a place where all 
the refugees wanted to go, she said. because it is like Tibet-high altitude. dry. 
they eat tsampa. and speak a dialect of Tibetan. 
At this point Sonam's narrative got very confusing. Upon arriving in 
Ladakh, she joined many other refugees working on road gangs. At that time (in 
1962) China was fighting a border war with India, and Sonam reported her friends 
telling her that bombs were exploding near where they were (Indian-controlled 
Ladakh shares a border with Tibet). So she and her husband. with many others. 
decided to flee to another part of India. According to Sonam, along the way the 
group did not have enough to eat, so they ate shoe leather. 28 She also said they 
ate their tsampa bags. Their route took them through Lahaul-Spiti, a very remote 
part of India. 
Eventually the couple settled in Kulu-Manali, an area in Himachal Pradesh 
where many of the poorest Tibetans worked as road laborers and lived in tents. 19 
Sonam and her husband stayed there for twelve years before going to Switzerland. 
She vividly recalled her encounter with one of the Dalai Lama's brothers, Lobsang 
Samten, who came to see them in their tent in Kulu. He was sent there, she told 
me, to choose people to be part of a resettlement project sponsored by the Swiss 
Red Cross (see chapter 6; see also Marazzi 1975). He was explicitly looking for 
those who were poor and "living in a wretched condition," Sonam recalled, and 
thus who deserved to be relocated to Switzerland. 
After being selected for resettlement, Sonam said she felt uneasy leaving for 
137 
a place about which they knew nothing and leaving her husband's relatives behind 
in the camp (all of Sonam's family were still in Tibet). In response to my question 
about who came with her to Switzerland, Sonam replied that the group consisted of 
Tibetans from different strata. The couple found work in a factory and remained 
childless. 
Karma seemed genuinely stumped by the couple's (Sonam and her husband 
were now telling the story together) account and his translating reflected this 
confusion; it seemed to me to "break up" or to become increasingly 
fragmentary. 30 Toward the end of the interview, when I asked her how she I iked 
Switzerland, Sonam started to cry and said that she was materially happy, she had 
lots of food and clothes, but she just wanted to go back to Tibet. At this point my 
translator scolded me. "Don't ask those questions, can't you see she's going to 
cry?" I changed the subject and we soon finished the interview. 
I took a walk with Karma later that evening. We discussed the interview. 
and I asked him why his translating had seemed so patchy. He explained that he 
felt uncomfortable translating because some of her story had not made sense to 
him. Based on his experience (he grew up in India and had worked for the 
government-in-exile in Dharamsala for a number of years), he said he had never 
heard of any Tibetans going from Ladakh to Manali via Lahaul-Spiti, and that she 
seemed to be making it up. He said he wasn't sure, but he felt strange because her 
husband was telling her what to say. Karma revealed that her husband kept 
muttering things under his breath, "tell her this, tell her that. .. " He also said he 
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doubted whether they had actually eaten shoe leather or their tsampa bags. le was 
very rare, Karma said, that Tibetans starved in India. Stories of eating shoe 
leather had circulated in Tibet, where there is much less vegetation and the 
availability of food is more limited in general. and Karma surmised that maybe 
Sonam was confusing the two. 
Karma then suggested that my presence as an inji (the Tibetan term which 
originally was used to describe the English but is now used to refer to any 
Westerner) played an important role in the way Sonam told her story. He 
suggested that Sonam's husband repeatedly suggested ways to embellish her 
narrative; by way of explanation Karma reminded me that they were "simple" 
people who did not necessarily understand my purpose in asking questions. 
Sonam's story and Karma's reaction to it reveal a number of important 
issues that are worth unpacking, most important of which is the role l played in the 
way Sonam (and her husband) constructed her narrative. My first reaction co 
Karma's suggestion that Sonam was embellishing her story to suit my expectations 
was to assume that Sonam was puzzled by my presence as an outsider from another 
country, who asked a lot of questions, and that unlike the activists with whom I 
had been working in the U.S. for some time, she had no idea how to place me. lf 
she had known me better, I told myself, she would not have made things up. 
Upon further reflection, I realized that it did not matter whether what she claimed 
happened to her actually did (see discussion below), but that I had to think more 
critically about what role I played as an interested "Westerner" in the story she 
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told. 
This fact was brought home to me more clearly on another occasion during 
my stay in Switzerland. ln this instance, a man whom I had finished interviewing 
(l will call him Dechen) told another Tibetan in our presence that l had flown in 
from the U.S. specifically to interview him. I never found out how this 
misunderstanding came about, but afterwards. when [ thought about how Dechen 
had presented his story, which was a dramatic one, [ realized how important 
(mis)perception was in shaping his narrative. Compared to almost every other 
Tibetan with whom [ spoke, Dechen told his personal story effortlessly. He began 
our discussion by making a formal statement about his work on behalf of Tibet, 
which, he noted, was miniscule compared to that of the Dalai Lama. He then 
launched into a long story about his experience in Tibet. The ease and fluidity 
with which he spoke convinced me that Dechen had done this many times before, 
that he had a "rap" so to speak. I knew he had recently escaped Tibet after having 
been wounded in a demonstration (at one point he pulled up his shirt to show me 
the scar where a bullet had entered his body). ln fact, he had recently been in the 
spotlight, touring Europe and testifying in front of international human rights 
bodies as part of the exile government's effort to highlight political unrest and 
ongoing abuses in Tibet. In light of Dechen's participation in these international 
meetings, it is not surprising that he would assume I wanted to hear the same story 
for which he was getting so much attention. I discuss the practice of "testifying" 
later on in this chapter. 
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My encounters with Sonam and Dechen underscore the fact that 
listeners/readers play a crucial role in the production of diaspora narratives. 
Instead of focusing on the narrative's "truth value" (Bauman 1986). as Karma 
appeared to do. it is more interesting to consider the processes by which the 
narratives emerged through my interaction with Sonam and Dechen. 31 Vincent 
Crapanzano stresses this point in his discussion of life history and the ethnographic 
encounter in Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (1980). He explores Tuhami's 
"rhetorical play with truth" and with his own personal history, arguing that 
the Moroccan will often appear to the outsider to contradict--even to 
lie-as he describes a sequence of events or his goals to different 
interlocutors or even to the same interlocutor on different occasions. 
He does not seem particularly concerned about contradictions of this 
kind. and he does not dwell upon them with guilt or remorse. Truth 
is seen, rather, in a relationally determined contextual framework. 
Up to a certain point. a greater value is placed on the relationship 
that is sought than on the circumstances that surround it or even its 
ostensible goal. (1980:81) 
In an article on an Ilongot storyteller named Tukbaw. Rosaldo ( 1976; 1986) points 
out that Tukbaw's autobiography. which Rosaldo elicited. did not emerge as a 
single narrative nor was it told chronologically; rather. the relationship between the 
two men determined the shape of the narrative. Similarly. Klieger's description of 
how Tibetans in Dharamsala. India. interpreted anthropological interviews and 
requests for life narratives as opportunities to transform the ethnographer into a 
patron (sbyin-bdag) highlights the primacy of the relational dimension of such 
encounters in determining narrative form: 
... as direct solicitation is considered improper. Tibetans will often 
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cell foreigners their entire life history. They will express their 
wishes and desires, and speak of the hardships in their life in such a 
manner that it becomes evident that they are in fact requesting one's 
patronage ... As an anthropologist collecting life histories and 
accounts of daily life, I naturally had many occasions wherein the 
"interview" I thought I had been collecting was in fact a patronage 
solicitation. This practice seems especially prevalent among the 
younger Tibetan refugees. With their basic needs for food, shelter, 
education, and medical care largely provided by the Tibetan 
government, the securing of individual patrons is a means to acquire 
additional material comfon, career advancement, or enhanced 
standing in the community. A times, the competition for securing 
patrons of this nature seems to be a game among young Tibetans 
(1992: 105). 
Unlike Klieger, who conducted fieldwork in Dharamsala, Kathmandu and Tibet, 
my interviews were conducted with Tibetans in the West where patronage 
solicitation is not practiced in the same way (though see section on testimonials 
below for a discussion of how it is used to solicit material and political suppon for 
the Movement). 
Crapanzano's observation about Tuhami, Rosaldo's point about Tukbaw, 
and my own experience with Sonam and Dechen suggest that it is important to 
remember that life histories are not necessarily universal narrative forms. 32 And, 
as I explore below, they remind us that we should problematize the notion of the 
"self" of life narratives/histories (see Battaglia 1995; Briggs 1986; Lynch 1996; 
Myers 1979, 1986; M. Rosaldo 1980; see also Langness and Frank 1981). 
Another anecdote illustrates the complicated nature of intercultural 
interactions between Westerners and Tibetan would-be narrators. A Tibetan living 
in Nepal who had been hired to work on a European-produced documentary film 
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about Tibet told me about an incident where he was translating interviews with cwo 
recent arrivals from Tibet. Before the interview got underway, the producers 
informed the Tibetans that, depending on what they had to say, they might later be 
asked to come to Europe to testify. During the interview, the two Tibetans told 
stories which the translator thought were a little exaggerated. When he shared his 
opinion with the European producers, they got angry with him and said they did 
not agree. In recounting the anecdote to me, the translator pointed out, "Of course 
they exaggerated, they wanted to go to Europe!" 
The issue of exaggerating or embellishing accounts of escape comes up 
regularly for the exile administration, which often finds itself having to act as 
mediator, translating stories of recently-arrived refugees into "facts" to be 
consumed by the Western media {see Mclagan 1996). As one official told me. 
many escapees, particularly those from rural areas, "exaggerate their stories," 
perhaps knowing that the more harrowing their tale, the greater the chance they 
will have an audience with the Dalai Lama who uses meetings with new arrivals co 
keep abreast of developments in Tibet. Also, recent arrivals quickly learn that 
Western journalists are especially interested in stories involving physical torture 
and deprivation; over time, a premium has come to be placed on accounts which 
include details of this sort. I come back to this in my discussion of public 
narrative, or "testimonials" below. 
The second point I want to make involves the translator. Many 
anthropologists have written about the role of assistants or translators in 
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ethnographic fieldwork. For instance. Crapanzano ( 1980) describes his assistant 
Lhacen as mediating the relationship between himself and Tuhami in a very 
complex manner (144). Gerald Berreman (1972) also discusses the crucial role 
played by assistant-interpreters in the fieldwork process. He rightly draws our 
attention to the effect such assistants have on the sort of data collected. His 
discussion of how his assistants' statuses affected his access to certain villagers is 
important and is certainly applicable to research with Tibetan communities. 
In many ways. the interview with Sonam reveals as much about my 
relationship with Karma as it does about her. Karma repeatedly told me it 
bothered him to have to question his fellow Tibetans. yet at the same time. he felt 
frustrated when they exaggerated ("Everyone always adds and subtracts"). In fact. 
after the interview with Sonam. Karma told me that everyone I had interviewed 
upon arriving in Switzerland had added and subtracted things and that it made him 
so angry sometimes that he had to excuse himself and take a walk if his translating 
services were not needed (e.g .• if the interview was being done in English or 
French). Scolding me. he added that even if I spoke perfect Tibetan. I would not 
necessarily be able to catch people's lies and exaggerations: "You must cross-
examine if you are to find out the truth about what a Tibetan tells you." At the 
time. I assumed these embellishments offended Karma's sense of journalistic 
standards (he had some training in this area); later I was not so sure. In some 
cases I learned almost as much from Karma's reactions as I did from the individual 
being interviewed. It is clear that Karma functioned as a cultural mediator or 
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broker between the interviewees "emic" knowledge and my outsider status. That 
is, he took me into the "back-region" of Tibetan exile life (see Berreman 1972 on 
his Goffmanesque notion of "front-region/back-region"). As a friend of mine (a 
veteran British activist) observed, by doing this, Karma "broke a code" of what 
Tibetans usually talk to "injis" about and in so doing risked disapproval from 
fellow Tibetans if they ever found out. 
Sharing suffering/sharing history 
As I suggested above, the "truth value" (Bauman 1986) of narrative is only one 
dimension, and not an especially important one at that, of the accounts I elicited 
from Tibetan refugees. In the case of Sonam's story, it is more interesting, and 
relevant for my purposes, co consider what function it plays in the larger 
construction of Tibetan identity in exile. That is, Karma's assertion that Sonam 
could not have suffered in the way she claimed provoked me into paying more 
attention to the relationship between individuals' stories and the production of a 
master or ur-narrative (and the role of non-Tibetans in this process). What did it 
mean for Sonam to claim to have been starving in India and to have been forced to 
eat shoe leather and tsampa bags to survive? I wondered whether it might be 
possible that Sonam was "sharing history" -i.e., that she was borrowing from 
stories of suffering and hardship which have circulated in the exile community 
since 1959, and, in so doing, participating in the wider narrative of fleeing and 
suffering which has become one of the major tropes through which Tibetans 
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construct their past and present? Barbara Myerhoff describes a similar 
phenomenon within an elderly Jewish community in southern California. Although 
the individuals with whom she worked were not strictly speaking survivors of the 
Holocaust. "still they participated in the Holocaust with an intensity and depth and 
most spoke of it as though it had been their own experience as well as that of the 
families and peers they left behind" (1978:23). 33 
Like Tibetans. the Hutu refugees about whom Malkki writes in her 
dissertation and recent book (1990; 1995a) frequently make references to a shared 
body of knowledge and belief about their past. While conducting her research in 
Tanzania. Malkki noticed that Hutu refugees as a collectivity are "intensively and 
continually engaged in a kind of historical ordering and reordering of their past" 
(1990:37). This "historicity" is not a form of specialized knowledge. but rather 
something to which every Hutu has access and is capable of invoking and 
discussing in great detail. 
When asked to talk about their lives, the refugees slipped from the 
domain of personal life history into the wider field of the collective 
history. The wider, more collective domain seemed to help them 
express and interpret facts about their individual lives both in 
Burundi in the past and at present in the camp. The personal and 
collective fused into one dynamic discourse that was recorded 
from different persons and in varying contexts. [my emphasis] 
(1990:37) 
This engagement with the past entails a "subversive recasting and reinterpretation 
of it in fundamentally moral, categorical terms" (1990:37). Thus the construction 
of a Hutu "mythico-historical" narrative, she argues. is essentially concerned with 
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the "reconstitution of a moral. categorical order of the world" (1990:37). 
l argue that Tibetans engage in a somewhat analagous process of historical 
and moral ordering through the constant retelling of the suffering they have 
endured as a result of the events of 1959. ln a sense. the Tibetan exile collectivity 
is located in the stories of shared suffering, that narratives entail/enable the 
construction of shared identity through suffering. ln other words, narratives of 
suffering play an important role in constructing Tibetans as a moral community and 
as a people. 34 
Malkki 's ( l 995a: 198) claim that the refugee camp in Tanzania. known as 
Mishamo, enabled a striking self-conscious historicity among its Hutu inhabitants. 
and that this new consciousness entailed a tremendous emphasis on the moral 
significance of being in exile, is equally applicable to Tibetans living in 
"settlements" in India. Tibetans who have spent long periods living in such 
enclaves exhibit similar belief in the moral purity of their displaced, refugee status. 
Not taking Indian citizenship and thus not allowing oneself to be incorporated into 
the Indian state, and holding onto one's Tibetan "identity card" (issued by the 
lndian government) have emerged as signs of patriotism and a major test of one's 
true "Tibetanness" over the years in refugee settlements across India (see Devoe 
1987). At the same time, settlement life in India has contributed to a 
consciousness of their identity not just as Tibetans, but also as "refugees" who, 
because of their status, are worthy of international aid and sponsorship. 
To understand the ways in which Tibetans "share history" and the processes 
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through which stories become both personal and collective, it is useful to examine 
what it means to elicit personal narratives in Tibetan culture. As suggested above. 
life history is not a universal narrative form. So what does it mean to tell a story 
about oneself in the Tibetan context? According to Devoe ( 1987:96). in Tibetan 
society. it is considered shameful to boast or to draw anention to oneself; modesty 
is a highly prized cultural value. Jamyang Norbu notes the traditional reticence of 
Tibetans when it comes to talking about their personal experiences: 
When a Tibetan refugee makes his statement. he is usually prevented 
by his native reticence and lack of sophistication from satisfactorily 
putting into words a large amount of the horrors he has experienced. 
He further piously passes off his own tribulations with a few words 
and insists on relating endless instances of religious persecution, 
destruction of monasteries, and desecration of sacred images, books. 
and relics, to an audience whose religious sentiments may not be so 
sensitive. ( 1989: 19) 
According to Venturino (1995), Tibetans' reticence and lack of sophistication have 
been mitigated in recent years as Tibetans have become more willing and able to 
tell their stories to the international press. Jamyang Norbu's Warriors of Tibet 
(1986), an "autobiography" of a man from Kham told by Norbu, was one of the 
first English language books to detail the personal aspects of the Tibetan struggle. 
Since then, Venturino points out, "Tibetan periodical publications in English and 
French regularly feature eyewitness accounts of the trouble in and around Tibet" 
(l 995: 164). 
Like Venturino, Heather Stoddard also has observed a change in traditional 
Tibetan reticence, noting the emergence of a written "genre" of diaspora narrative 
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in which ordinary Tibetans tell their stories: 
An interesting development in the diaspora is that in the 1960s. for 
the very first time, ordinary lay men and women, as opposed to 
teachers and incarnate lamas. began to write their life stories. often 
at the behest of sympathetic Western friends. These writers give 
detailed personal descriptions of Tibet before and during the Chinese 
takeover with the aim of letting the world know the plight of the 
Tibetans. (1994: 152-53) 
Prior to this development, Stoddard writes, the closest thing to what could be 
construed as Tibetan biography or autobiography was the rnam-thar, or life-story. 
that was used to relate the lives of enlightened beings. With the emergence of 
written narratives by ordinary Tibetans, Stoddard argues, "the traditional function 
of the rnam-thar or life-story has been altered radically from describing the 
journey of a holy being towards enlightenment, where it serves as a model for 
others" (ibid., 152-153). 
Stoddard's contention that autobiography and biography were not forms 
commonly used by Tibetans in the past except to tell the story of enlightened 
beings is interesting. What can we conclude about the emergence of such narrative 
forms in exile? Does it mean that whereas only the lives of great Buddhist 
practitioners were deemed worthy of recording in old Tibet, in exile even ordinary 
Tibetan lives are seen as valuable? Do these new forms represent, as Stoddard 
claims. "a new kind of awareness concerning Tibetan identity?" (1994: 154) I 
argue that these new literary efforts demonstrate that the experiences of ordinary 
Tibetans have come to provide the basis for both the production and popular 
participation in Tibetan nationness or diaspora nationalism. 
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Interestingly. the growth of diaspora autobiographies and biographies 
coincides with the emergence of "escape narratives" (Moon 1992) written by 
Tibetans living in Tibet. These "escape narratives" have appeared regularly in 
Tibet since 1959 and 
they stand either as narratives in their own right or as part of a 
longer life story. Often. the journey ends in the joy of meeting with 
the Dalai Lama. tempered by the memory of relatives and friends 
who have died or been left behind. (Moon l 992:59) 
Barnett notes that these narratives are written in contemporary Tibetan literary 
style which differs considerably from classical Tibetan and. co some extent. from 
that of the Tibetan exile community. 35 
"A Monk's Story," a modern Tibetan novella written in 1990. exemplifies 
this new genre. Written by a former monk from Amdo four months after his 
arrival in India. the story describes in vivid detail the monk's journey through 
Tibet. The narrative includes everything from warnings from those along the way 
of what co expect in India-exiles who look down on "new arrivals" (gsar- 'byor-ba) 
and who are more interested in their petty rivalries than in working for 
independence-to negotiations with Nepalese guides to bring him across the 
Himalayas. These narratives are interesting as much for their critiques of exile 
society as for their descriptions of the physical hardships of escape. 36 In this 
sense. they are very much in keeping with political and social satire in old Tibet 
which took the form of street songs in Lhasa (see Goldstein 1982).37 
What distinguishes these escape narratives from the narratives discussed 
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above is that they are written in Tibetan and thus are aimed at a Tibetan audience. 
The diaspora narratives described by Stoddard and Venturino have been written in 
English or French and often with help or encouragement from Western friends. 
and are thus aimed largely at a non-Tibetan audience. In the next section. I 
discuss the most widely-read example of this new genre of diaspora narrative. the 
Dalai Lama's Freedom in Exile. 
Narratives of escape: Freedom in Exile 
The Dalai Lama was one of the first Tibetans to write what could be construed as 
an "autobiography" upon coming into exile (see discussion below). His first book. 
My Land and My People, was published in 1962 (and was written with the 
assistance of David Howarth). The second book, Freedom in Exile, created with 
help from journalist Alexander Norman, was published in the U.S. in 1990 by 
Harper Collins. In between the publication of these two books, a number of other 
Tibetans have published their life stories. Interestingly, although most of these 
authors are what Stoddard refers to as "ordinary" (meaning lay men and women as 
opposed to incarnate lamas and teachers), many (though not all) come from 
prominent families. 38 Perhaps the best known is Rinchen Dolma Taring, also 
known as Mary Taring, whose Dau&hter of Tibet (1970) was the first book written 
by a Tibetan woman in exile. Two other women have recently followed in 
Taring's footsteps, including Jamyang Sakya, whose Princess in the Land of 
Snows: the Life of Jamyan& Sakya in Tibet was written with help from Julie 
151 
Emery in 1990, and Dorje Yudon Yuthok, whose House of the Turquoise Roof 
came out the same year. In addition to these, cwo of the resistance stories cited 
earlier in this chapter qualify as autobiographies that tell the story of prominent 
Khampas: Warriors of Tibet: The story of Aten and the Khampas' Fight for the 
Freedom of their Country by Jamyang Norbu (1986) and Four Rivers. Six Ranges 
by Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang (1973). 
ln the accounts by Taring, Yuthok, and Sakya, emphasis is placed on 
reconstructing Tibetan society through memories of their youth and early 
adulthood. lt is somewhat paradoxical that these texts have been framed as 
representative accounts of life in old Tibet. given the fact that as members of the 
aristocracy, their authors' lives were far from representative of those of the 
majority of Tibet's population. Though each of these three writers tled Tibet in 
1959, most travelled with servants and stayed at their own or their friends' estates 
along the way. Thus their experience of leaving, while no doubt frightening and 
difficult at times, was far different from that of Sonam, Yeshe, Perna, and 
countless other Tibetans. ln addition, as mentioned earlier, Tibetans from this 
stratum brought out valuable heirlooms and jewelry; some even managed to ship 
out many possessions before they left. Thus they were well equipped to re-
establish themselves with some degree of comfort in Kalimpong and Darjeeling, 
communities with longstanding Tibetan aristocratic populations. 
Dawa Norbu's Red Star over Tibet (1987) is one of the most interesting and 
important diaspora narratives to be written by a lay person from a non-aristocratic 
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background. In his preface to the second edition, Norbu notes that "as all the 
reviews of the first edition testified, Red Star over Tibet is not an autobiography in 
che strict sense of the term. Who would be interested in an autobiography of an 
unknown person. and that coo before the author had reached the age of cwency-
five?" (1987:7). Norbu claims that the fact that he was "neither a lama nor an 
aristocrat" helped him to write what "really went on in Tibet" in 1959 (10). 
Although like other writers, Norbu tells the story of Tibet's fall through his 
family's eyes (he relied on his mother's recollections as Norbu himself was only 
ten when he fled in November 1959), unlike the aristocratic writers referred to 
above, Norbu's family actually lived through the arrival of Chinese "reformers" in 
his village and witnessed the destruction of the "old society." In the process of 
recounting this experience, Norbu strongly criticizes some aspects of Tibetan life 
prior to the Chinese takeover, at times appearing to agree with Chinese 
critiques. 39 These criticisms did not endear Norbu to the Tibetan government-in-
exile nor to most other refugees. He was viewed as a critic of the Dalai Lama and 
as a result faced strong public censure.40 Norbu's experience with Red Star over 
Tibet and refugees' intolerance of his account suggests the importance of a 
standardized history of what happened in Tibet to the exile collectivity. 
At this point I tum to a brief discussion of Freedom in Exile. There are 
several ways to go about analyzing the Dalai Lama's text. For example, like the 
other diaspora narratives described in this chapter, the book can be seen as part of 
the ongoing "confrontation of representations" (Goldstein 1994b) between Tibetans 
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and Chinese officials described in chapter 2. This is suggested by the Dalai 
Lama's claim that he decided to write the book "to counter Chinese claims and 
misinformation they spread about Tibet's history, culture. and religion" (Goleman 
1990:49). 
Freedom in Exile may also be seen as a response to growing Western 
interest in the Tibetan leader. This is implied in the book's opening paragraph 
where the Dalai Lama anempts to describe who he is for this Western audience: 
Dalai Lama means different things to different people. To some it 
means that I am a living Buddha, the earthly manifestation of 
A valokitesvara, Boddhisattva of Compassion. To others it means 
that I am a "god-king." During the late 1950s it meant that I was a 
Vice-President of the Steering Committee of the People's Republic 
of China. Then when I escaped into exile, I was called a 
counterrevolutionary and a parasite. But none of these are my ideas. 
To me "Dalai Lama" is a title that signifies the office I hold. I 
myself am just a human being, and incidentally a Tibetan, who 
chooses to be a Buddhist monk. It is as a simple monk that I offer 
this story of my life, though it is by no means a book about 
Buddhism. (Gyatso 1990:xiii) 
Freedom in Exile raises a number of interesting questions, such as what does it 
mean to narrate a self in relation to Western expectations? To what extent is the 
Dalai Lama's text emblematic of a kind of "witnessing" or "testimonial" produced 
in relation to the demands and structures of Western autobiographical discourse? 
Before answering these questions, it is necessary to summarize the chapter 
describing the Dalai Lama's escape from Tibet. 
The sequence of events precipitating the Dalai Lama's flight have already 
been described in the early part of this chapter. They include the invitation co visit 
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a Chinese military camp unaccompanied by his customary encourage of 
bodyguards. Tibetans' fear that such an invitation implied an intent to kidnap or do 
harm to the Tibetan leader. and the subsequent surrounding of Norbulingka by 
thousands of people. As I noted. prior to March 1959, the Dalai Lama had sought 
an accommodation with the Chinese. and had tried to persuade his compatriots to 
refrain from violence. For instance. after a successful attack by Chushi Gangdruk 
members on a major People's Liberation Army garrison at Tsedang in late 1958. 
the Dalai Lama feared the fighting would spread to nearby Lhasa and he did all he 
could to avoid such an eventuality, including revoking his two elder brothers' 
citizenship (who were out of the country at the time) at the request of Chinese 
officials. He writes that he acquiesced to this request in order to avoid open 
military confrontation with the PLA in Lhasa: "I wanted to avoid this by almost 
any means. I felt that if the people of Lhasa became involved in the fighting. there 
could be no hope of restoring peace" (ibid .• 128). 
Although the "freedom fighters," as the Dalai Lama describes them, sought 
his approval for their actions. he writes that "alas. l could not give it" (ibid .• 128). 
Not only did the Tibetan leader believe that the Tibetan people were no match for 
the PLA and thus open confrontation would be devastating, but such a 
confrontation went against his Buddhist principles. "1 This is made clear in the 
following description of the winter months of 1958-59 when the Dalai Lama was 
busy preparing for his final monastic exams. 
It was hard to concentrate on my work. Almost every day I heard 
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new reports of Chinese outrages against the non-combatant 
population. Sometimes the news was favourable to Tibet-but this 
gave me no comfort. Only the thought of my responsibility to the 
six million Tibetans kept me going. That and my faith. Early every 
morning, as I sat in prayer in my room before the ancient altar with 
its clutter of statuettes standing in silent benediction, I concentrated 
hard on developing compassion for all sentient beings. I reminded 
myself constantly of the Buddha's teaching that our enemy is in a 
sense our greatest teacher. And if this was sometimes hard to do, I 
never really doubted that it was so. (ibid., 129) 
The Dalai Lama's description of his anxiety and fear as tension mounted between 
the two sides reveals a very human side of the Tibetan leader. His uncertainty as 
to what to do and how to respond to the Chinese officials' mounting belligerence is 
poignant. The Dalai Lama writes that after being advised by the Nechung Oracle 
to stay and upon receiving word that the Chinese were planning to attack the 
crowds surrounding Norbulingka, he was at a total loss as to what to do next: 
The following day, I again sought the counsel of the oracle. To my 
astonishment, he shouted, "Go! Go! Tonight!" The medium, still in 
his trance, then staggered forward and, snatching up some paper and 
a pen, wrote down, quite clearly and explicitly, the route that I 
should take out of Norbulingka, down to the last Tibetan town on 
the Indian border. (ibid. , 136) 
To confirm the oracle's decision, the Dalai Lama performed another divination. 
The answer agreed with the oracle and the Tibetan leader began to make 
preparations to flee. 
One of the last things the Dalai Lama did before leaving the Norbulingka 
was to say some prayers: 
At nightfall, I went for the last time to the shrine dedicated to 
Mahilila, my personal protector divinity. As I entered the room 
through its heavy, creaking door, I paused for a moment to take in 
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what l saw before me. A number of monks sat chanting prayers at 
the base of a large statue of the Protector. There was no electric 
light in the room. only the glow of dozens of votive butter lamps set 
in rows of golden and silver dishes ... No one looked up. although l 
knew that my presence must have been noticed .. .I went forward and 
presented a kata. a length of white silk. to the divinity. This is the 
traditional Tibetan gesture on departure and signifies not only 
propitiation. but also implies the intention of return ... Before leaving 
the room, I sat down for a few minutes and read from the Buddha's 
satras, stopping at the one which talks of the need to "develop 
confidence and courage." (ibid., 138) 
After this. the Tibetan leader disguised himself. hoping to slip out through the 
crowds around the Norbulingka unrecognized. This portion of the Dalai Lama's 
narrative is the most dramatic and thus is the part most frequently referred to by 
Tibetans. 
At a few minutes before ten o'clock. now wearing unfamiliar 
trousers and a long, black coat. I threw a rifle over my right 
shoulder and, rolled up, an old thangka that had belonged to the 
Second Dalai Lama over my left. Then. slipping my glasses into 
my pocket, I stepped outside. I was very frightened. (ibid., 138) 
Led by two soldiers, he made his way through the gate where, the Tibetan leader 
recalls, "I could sense the presence of a great mass of humanity as l stumbled on, 
but they did not take any notice of us and, after a few minutes walk, we were once 
again alone" (ibid., 138). 
From there the Dalai Lama describes crossing the Kyichu (River), terrified 
that nearby PLA soldiers would hear them. The escape party eventually grew to 
one hundred people, who were escorted by another two hundred Tibetan soldiers. 
When the party reached Lhuntse Dzong, after nearly a week's travel, the Dalai 
Lama repudiated the Seventeen Point "Agreement" and announced the formation of 
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his own government. which he called "the only legally constituted authority in the 
land" (ibid., 141). Then the escape party set off again for the Indian border. On 
the way. the Tibetan leader remembers seeing a plane fly overhead; uncertain if it 
was a Chinese plane or not. he was now convinced that going into exile was his 
only option-"India was our only hope" (ibid .• 142). 
Not even the Dalai Lama was spared the miseries of flight. as his account 
of his last night in Tibet so eloquently illustrates: 
l spent my last night in Tibet at a tiny village called Mangmang. No 
sooner had we reached this final outpost of the Land of Snows than 
it began to rain. This was on top of a week of appalling weather. 
which threw blizzards and snow glare at us by turns as we straggled 
along. We were all exhausted and it was the last thing that we 
needed. but it continued torrentially throughout the night. To make 
matters worse. my tent leaked and no matter where I dragged my 
bedding l could not escape the water which ran in rivulets down the 
inside. The result was that the fever I had been fighting off for the 
past five days developed overnight into a case of full-blown 
dysentary. (ibid., 142) 
Freedom in Exile was very well received in the U.S. It was reviewed by all the 
major literary publications, including The New York Times Book Review, The 
New York Review of Books, as well as in daily newspapers such as Wall Street 
Journal. Although the coverage was extensive, most of the reviews reveal that 
despite the Dalai Lama's attempts to explain himself, people continue to not know 
what to make of him. One reviewer actually made this claim in her piece in the 
U.S. News and World Report. Describing a press conference given by the Dalai 
Lama in New York in September 1990. the reviewer wrote: 
What is odd is that he smiles all the time. It is shortly after 9 a.m. 
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at the Mayfair Regent Hotel in New York City. and he enters the 
room. beaming. palms clasped beneath his chin. He has a round 
face above his maroon and yellow robes and eyebrows that pop up 
and down. For a moment. Tom Brokaw, Connie Chung and the rest 
of the assembled reporters and cameramen, many of whom have 
been busy grumbling about seats and wolfing free doughnuts. fall 
silent. Nobody seems to know quite what to make of him. 
"Good morning." he says. sitting at a table arranged with 
microphones. Underneath the table. his matching maroon socks 
have fallen down around his clunky Dexter oxfords. "I hope 
everyone had a good sleep night. Me. too." He squeaks with 
laughter ... (Rosellini 1990:94) 
The reviewer continues, "You can tell by the frowns over the next 45 minutes that 
members of the New York press corps are having trouble grappling with the nature 
of this God-king. This is no author flogging a new book or politician peddling 
promises" (94).42 
The only reviewer of Freedom in Exile who appeared to know what to 
make of the Dalai Lama was Jonathan Mirsky. whose essay in The New York 
Review of Books revealed an obvious familiarity with modern Tibetan history and 
the exile leader. Mirsky depicts the Dalai Lama's persona in his text as "very 
much as he seems in person: unassuming but conscious of his special 
characteristics ("the simple monk" who is also spiritually connected to his thirteen 
predecessors and to the Buddha)" (1990:59). Mirsky comments that the Dalai 
Lama "can skate over difficult subjects." though he claims the problem is more 
one of "omission" than anything else (ibid .• 59). For instance. he notes that not 
only does the Tibetan leader fail to mention the Reting conspiracy (see chapter 3). 
he also neglects to say much about his notorious father who ignored Tibetan laws. 
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refused to pay taxes. and interfered in legal cases. In addition. although the Dalai 
Lama acknowledges the CIA's involvement in getting weapons and money co 
Tibetan guerrillas. he fails to include anything about the "network of CIA 
operations stretching from several small countries in the Himalayas co Okinawa and 
on to Colorado" (ibid., 59). Finally, Mirsky asserts that the Dalai Lama "repeats 
the familiar and wonderful story" of how he was discovered by a search party at 
the age of two. but does not say anything about the politics behind this choice. 
including the fact that he was hut one of several possible infant reincarnations on a 
list drawn up by the Panchen Lama (see Richardson 1984: 150 for a discussion of 
the implications of this face). 
Mirsky argues that the Dalai Lama's preference for simplicity is evident 
throughout Freedom in Exile. Citing the monk's description of his bedroom in the 
Potala Palace, Mirsky writes, 
... he recalls his tiny freezing bedroom, thick with dust, in the 
Potala, once the bedroom of the Great Fifth ... the first all-powerful 
Dalai Lama. Its little dishes of food offerings at the altar were 
"plundered by mice. I became very fond of these little 
creatures ... Sometimes they came over my bed ... [which] was 
surrounded by long. red curtains. The mice would clamber over 
these too, their urine dripping down as I snuggled under my blankets 
below." (1990:60) 
"All this is charming," Mirsky concludes, "and can easily disarm the reader into 
thinking that Tibet was a victim, guilty at worst of ... an exotic innocence" (ibid .. 
60). 43 The charm of Freedom in Exile obviously appealed to many readers in the 
U.S. who bought the book in large numbers. Although it was not on the 
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bestsellers' list. the book did panicularly well in cities on the East and West 
coasts. 
Freedom in Exile as testimonio 
At this point l want to return to the questions l posed earlier about the Dalai 
Lama's text. l suggest that it may be useful to think about Freedom in Exile in 
relation to a form of narrative text called testimonio (Sp.). In an essay in Modern 
Fiction Studies, John Beverley (1989) defines testimonio as 
a novel or novella-length narrative in book or pamphlet form. told in 
the first-person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist or 
witness of the events he or she recounts, and whose unit of narration 
is usually a "life" or a significant life experience. Testimonio may 
include, but is not subsumed under, any of the following textual 
categories, some of which are conventionally considered literature, 
others not: autobiography, autobiographical novel, oral history, 
memoir, confession, diary, interview, eyewitness repon, life history, 
novela-testimonio, nonfiction novel..." (1989: 12-13). 
Beverley argues that while testimonio-like texts "have been around for a long time 
at the margin of literature, representing in panicular those subjects-the child, the 
"native." the woman, the insane, the crimir.al, the proletarian--excluded from 
authorized representation" (ibid .• 13), testimonio really coalesced as a new 
narrative genre in the 1960s. As the word itself suggests, testimonio developed 
most richly in Latin American where it became a popular and vital part of literary 
production. Soon it emerged elsewhere in the so-called Third World in relation co 
the spread of armed struggle movements and the Vietnam War. 
Beverley observes that testimonio translates as testimony, "as in the act of 
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testifying or bearing witness in a legal or religious sense": 
That connotation is important because it distinguishes testimonio 
from simply recorded participant narrative. as in the case of "oral 
history" ... in testimonio. it is the intentionality of the narrator that is 
paramount. The situation of narration in testimonio has to involve 
an urgency to communicate, a problem of repression. poverty. 
subalternity. imprisonment. struggle for survival. and so on. 
implicated in the act of narration itself. The position of the reader 
of testimonio is akin to that of a jury member in a 
courtroom ... (ibid .• 15) 
Unlike novels. which tend to be concerned with the life of what Lukacs (1971) 
calls the "problematic hero." Beverley suggests that testimonio focuses on a 
"problematic collective social situation that the narrator lives with or alongside 
others" (1989: 15). Testimonio narrators speak for a community or group. 
"approximating in this way the symbolic function of the epic hero." he argues. 
"without at the same time assuming his hierarchical and patriarchical status" (ibid .. 
15). This metonymic function of the narrative voice is latent in the form itself. is 
part of its narrative convention: 
Testimonio is a fundamentally democratic and egalitarian form of 
narrative in the sense that it implies that any life so narrated can 
have a kind of representational value. Each individual testimonio 
evokes an absent polyphony of other voices. other possible lives and 
experiences. (ibid. , 16) 
Unlike autobiography, which is "built on the notion of a coherent. self-evident. 
self-conscious, commanding subject that appropriates literature precisely as a 
means of self-expression," the meaning of testimonio "lies not in its uniqueness but 
in its ability to stand for the experience of a community as a whole" (ibid., 23). 
Although testimonio represents an affirmation of the individual subject, it is in 
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connection with a collective situation "marked by marginalization, oppression. and 
struggle" (ibid., 23). Without this connection, Beverley observes. "it ceases to be 
testimonio and becomes autobiography" (ibid., 23). 
As texts. testimonio are highly mediated cultural productions. ln an essay 
on a testimonio by Guatemalan Indian activist (and Nobel Prize winner) Rigoberto 
Menchu, Kaplan writes that 
While appearing to be "authentic" oral accounts set directly into 
writing ... most of these texts are the product of complex, hybrid 
authorial strategies. Thus, the testimonio participates in the 
discourse of individual autobiography while utilizing a different 
technology from conventional first person Western accounts 
(1994: 147) 
Because often narrators are not literate or if they are, they are not professional 
writers, the production of testimonio generally involves tape recording, 
transcription, and editing of an oral account by an interlocutor who is an 
intellectual, often a journalist or writer (Beverley 1989: 15). According to 
Beverley, the nature of this intervention by an interlocutor is one of the most hotly 
debated aspects of the genre (e.g., see Kaplan 1994). 
Testimonios are hybrid intercultural productions not simply in that they are 
co-produced by "third world" individuals and "first world" writers, editors, and in 
some cases, anthropologists, but also in the sense that they address readers from a 
wide range of cultural, national, ethnic backgrounds (see Carr 1994). As 
anthropologist Lynn Stephen argues, readers consume testimonio because they want 
a version of history legitimized as authentic because it is told by, for instance, a 
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Latin American, or an African-American, or an Asian. She writes: 
A major pan of their appeal lies in the differences between the lives 
of those in the stories and the lives of those who read them. This is 
pan of what makes the testimonial genre different from traditions of 
oral history where the story is generally consumed by those who 
share a cultural and historical background with the teller. In 
testimonial literature, the communication from teller to reader is 
based primarily on difference. (1994:232) 
Although testimonial narratives are aimed at outsiders, they nevenheless "make 
possible a different kind of complicity ... between narrator and reader than is 
possible, say, in the novel" (Beverley 1989:18). By appealing to universal values 
of justice, for instance, testimonios bring people together across boundaries of 
difference into networks of solidarity: 
The complicity a testimonio establishes with its readers involves their 
identification--by engaging their sense of ethics and justice-with a 
popular cause normally distant, not to say alien, from their 
immediate experience. Testimonio in this sense has been important 
in maintaining and developing the practice of international human 
rights and solidarity movements. (ibid., 19) 
Freedom in Exile represents a form of testimonio. As we have already 
seen, it emerged as a result of the Dalai Lama's desire to "set the record straight" 
(Gyatso l 990:xiii) and combat Chinese misrepresentations of Tibetan history as 
opposed to his desire to tell his life story. Like other testimonio narrators, he 
speaks for his people whom he describes as having suffered greatly as a result of 
China's occupation. And similar to other testimonial narratives, Freedom in Exile 
was the product of an interaction with a journalist, in this case an Englishman 
named Alexander Norman "who taped the Dalai Lama for several hours at a time 
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and prepared a manuscript from the tapes. which they later rewrote together" 
(Goleman l 990:49). (In his review Mirsky suggests that the publisher should have 
added "as told to Alexander Norman" on the title page instead of tucking this fact 
away in the acknowledgments.) However, what makes the book a testimonio--an 
activist text--more than anything else is the fact that it represents an attempt to 
establish a connection or identification by Western readers with the predicament of 
Tibetan refugees and those still in Tibet, and to mobilize readers' sympathy and 
sense of responsibility on their behalf. 
I conclude this section by arguing that testimonial literature constitutes a 
viable frame through which personal suffering, collective history, and political 
claims are easily rendered comprehensible to cultural others and that Tibetan 
diaspora narratives, whether oral, written, or performed in public, can best be 
understood in relation to the recent availability of this discursive frame. I explore 
this point further below in my discussion of the third "genre" of diaspora 
narratives. 
The story of Palden Gyatso: "Performing" diaspora narratives 
Although the testimonio form described above is written, I suggest that we consider 
diaspora narratives performed in public and semi-public fora, such as governmental 
and non-governmental hearings (e.g., U.S. Congress; U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights) as well as Tibet Movement meetings, conferences and outreach 
events, as another form of testimonio. To do this, I focus on one "performance" 
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by a monk recently released from prison in Tibet."" Although these narratives 
generally are produced or performed by recent arrivals in exile, especially young 
monks and nuns who were not involved in the events of l 959, the case of Palden 
Gyatso is an exception. As a 64 year old man, Gyatso was in his thirties during 
the Lhasa uprising, the Dalai Lama's escape, and the subsequent exodus of 
thousands of refugees; after 1959, he spent 31 years in prison and labor camps. 
Because of his age and because of the fact that he was cut off from Tibet's 
changing society for so long, Gyatso speaks in the same way about China's 
occupation and the events of l 959 as the generation who fled at that time and 
whose narratives have been the focus of this chapter. 
[ first became aware of Palden Gyatso through a New York Times article 
on a resolution about China's record in Tibet at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva in February 1995 (see Figure 2). lt mentioned testimony 
given by a monk which included a demonstration of "tonure instruments" he had 
managed to procure before fleeing Tibet in l 992. A few weeks later, I received a 
flyer in the mail inviting me to an event sponsored by the Office of Tibet in New 
York City (this organization is the official representative of the interests of the 
Dalai Lama's government-in-exile in North America; see chapter 6). The flyer 
had a photograph of Gyatso demonstrating one of the tonure instruments in the 
British House of Commons, accompanied by Lord Weatherill looking on 
sympathetically (see Figure 3). The text beneath the photo read: "Palden Gyatso: 
A prisoner of China for 31 years tells his story. Will Display Torture lnstruments 
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Tibetan Torture Victim Testifies at U.N. 
~-·~ o~&1,1s1·:o~s . _ 
-~ ~011 GOU~Ullt[Yl~l!::~ 
Paldm Gyalso, a 64-ytt1T-old Tibetan mtmk, testifying befot2 the United Nations 
Commission on HIUMnRights in Fdmuzry. This tDtZS tM fiTst timl! that a Tibdlln witness 
from Tibet QI/dressed the Commission. "I sport 33 years of my life in ChiM:Se prisons and 
Tizbor azmps in Tibet • All those years I yearned for a moment such tl5 this, when I could 
spellk to the Unittd Nations,• S4id Ptllden. Ngawang Choephel (1.tft), from the Tibet 
Bw~, llCOJmprtnied Palden. 
Figure 2 Tibetan Torture Victim Testifies at U. N. 
Tibet Press Watch, March 1995 
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PALDEN GYATSO: A PRISONER OF CHINA 
FOR31YEARSTELLSHISSTORY 
Will Display Torture Instruments He Smuggled from Tibet 
NEW YORK. March 27 - Office oflibet will host a tillc by Yen. Pa.Iden Gyarso about his prison 
e.~pcriences in 1ibet on 7 April in New York.. 
P:lldcn Gyarso is 64 years old. 31 years of his &fe. he spent in prison in Tibet and endured co witless 
torture. including having an eJcctric shock baron rammed down his throat. being hung from a ceiling and a 
lire lit bcanth him and being beaten with a nail-studded piece of wood In 1992. PaJden Gyatso. a monk. 
was released from prison. W"uh money be managed to save. be bought many of the torture imtrmncnts from 
a Chinese prison official. 
P:llden Gyarso is now in the United States and will testify before the HC)use Sub-Committee on Intcm:l-
uonal Orgnaizatiom and Human Rights of the U.S. Congress in Washington. D.C. on 3 April 
He will be in New York from 5 to 9 April. At 6:30 P .M .• Palden Gyatso will give a ialk about his prison 
experiences in "libel Some of the things that happened were wtbclievable." Pakfen Gyatso said. "When a 
prisoner was executed. the family was sent an invoice for the bullets used. any rope and other costs incumd 
during the execution. "Where cl5e in the world could such a system exists?" 
Early in March. Palden Gyatso testified before the UN Commismn on Human Rights in Geneva. 
VENUE: NYANA Auditorium. 1 South 
17 Battery Place 
NEW YORK. NY 10004 
TIME: A reception at 6:30 P.M. will prcccdc the tallc 
DATE: Friday 7 APRIL 1995 RSVP: Office oflibct. tel: (212) 213-5010 
Figure 3 Palden Gyatso: A Prisoner of China for 31 Years 
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he Smuggled from Tibet. .. 
The event took place at the offices of NYANA, the New York Association 
of New Americans. on April 7. 1995. NYANA was best known for its support of 
the resettlement of Russian Jews in the U.S. As the exodus of Jews from the 
former Soviet Union began to slow in the early 1990s, NY ANA became involved 
with organizing the resettlement of 100 Tibetan refugees in New York who were 
pan of an emigration of l, 000 Tibetans in 1992. Later. NY AN A became the 
headquarters of the Tibetan U.S. Resettlement Project (TUSRP) and eventually 
employed a number of Tibetans. 
Tibetans have long been interested in the parallels between the Tibetan and 
Jewish experience and many admire Israel's triumphant reclaiming of their 
religious homeland which "appears to them as positive proof that a tiny but cough 
nation can ultimately defeat and hold its own against millions of hostile neighbors .. 
(Nowak 1984: 128).45 According to anthropologist Margaret Nowak, the one 
aspect of Jewish history that does draw unfavorable comment is the duration of the 
diaspora ("It shouldn't take us 2,000 years to get our country back") (1984: 128). 
In recent years, Tibetans have acted on their admiration of the Jews, cultivating 
connections with American Jewish leaders, both secular and religious (see 
Kamenetz 1994). These contacts have coincided with the recent emergence of 
Tibetans' self-conscious use of the term "diasporic" to define their condition in 
exile. 46 The link between NY ANA and the TUSRP can thus be viewed in the 
context of a growing interaction between the American Jews and Tibetan exile 
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community.47 
ln any event. when l arrived at NYANA. the room where the event was 
being held was packed. There were many Tibetans present. more than l usually 
saw at a Tibet-related event. As a narrative performance. Palden Gyatso's 
presentation was quite interesting. The Dalai Lama's New York-based 
representative began by introducing him and outlining the chronology of his 
imprisonment. When Gyatso. a small, bald, toothless man, took the floor. his 
account (in Tibetan) was organized around the various forms of torture and other 
indignities he and fellow political prisoners had been forced to endure. 48 The 
translator, a man from the Office of Tibet. appeared at first to have some trouble 
understanding Gyatso' s speech, perhaps because he was not used to the monk· s 
enunciation (since he had no teeth) or dialect. As Gyatso outlined his experience. 
the story became more and more harrowing. He began by telling us about the 
practice of attaching political prisoners to plows which were steered by prison 
guards who repeatedly struck them with metal whips. "They beat us if we fell 
down." Gyatso recalled. "this is something unheard of in the world." Whenever 
prisoners expressed their view that Tibet was not part of China, "they would start 
struggling us," he said. Inevitably, prison authorities would resort to torture for 
those who refused to say they were sorry and admit that Tibet was a part of China. 
Gyatso went on to describe an incident in October 1990 when he was tortured with 
a electric cattle prod. Using the prod he had managed to procure from corrupt 
prison guards after his release, Gyatso demonstrated what happened. He put the 
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prod in his mouth and then described fainting and waking up in a pool of blood 
and urine. surrounded by his teeth which had fallen out. As he spoke. many in the 
audience gasped and clucked their disapproval. When Gyatso recounted how 
Tibetan nuns regularly have their "private parts" poked by these prods-how they 
are raped with them by prison guards-the audience reacted even more audibly. 
According to Gyatso. over time. the Chinese introduced other forms of tonure as 
well. including forcing bamboo shoots under fingernails: "The degree and brutality 
of torture is endless." he told us; "the authorities even charge the family of those 
prisoners who are executed for the bullets used." Gyatso also recalled a time when 
condemned prisoners were forced to sing and dance before their execution while 
other prisoners were forced to look on. Despite their brutality, "the Chinese treat 
all Tibetan prisoners the same. they don't distinguish between if a Tibetan is from 
Eastern Tibet or Central Tibet or northeastern Tibet," Gyatso pointed out, "there is 
the same suffering for all Tibetans." This and another similar comment made later 
on in his talk49 underscore my point about Gyatso being caught in a kind of time 
capsule, for lack of a better term, a time when regionalism and sectarianism were 
still the most salient aspect of political life in Tibet and when people understood 
their identities in terms of these categories. Thus it is not surprising that a number 
of Tibetans, especially those representing the government-in-exile, squirmed or 
looked uncomfortable when Gyatso made this particular statement. The exile 
government has worked hard to create the appearance of unity in exile and to 
squelch references (at least in intercultural arenas) to the rampant factionalism in 
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Tibet prior to China's takeover. Gyatso's comment reminded them of what they 
had struggled to obscure, at least for potential Western supporters. He ended this 
section of his talk by saying, "This is briefly my personal experience: because of 
the brutality of the Chinese, many Tibetans have died. Right now remembering 
those who have died makes me sad." 
Gyatso then shifted gears somewhat, discussing the destruction of Tibetan 
culture and the exploitation of Tibet's minerals and timber. When he was finished. 
he turned to his four torture instruments which were spread out on the table before 
him. One by one, he demonstrated how each was used, starting with three cattle 
prods (one made in China, he noted, the other two in England). The next was a 
set of handcuffs with a jagged edge; "I have a lot of scars up my arms because of 
these" Gyatso said, "and some prisoners have had their hands amputated because 
handcuffs were kept on too long." The third instrument was a sort of leather 
thong sling which was used to tie prisoners arms behind their backs in an awkward 
position. Finally, Gyatso showed the audience two small knives which he claimed 
are carried by the police and soldiers. "Except for the knife, all these torture 
instruments were used on my body," Gyatso said, "I testified at the UN in Geneva. 
The Chinese delegate was present and I was able to prove to them what local 
Chinese authorities are doing to Tibetan prisoners." 
Gyatso's testimony and the materiality of the torture instruments appeared 
to be very effective in moving both Tibetans and Westerners in the audience. One 
Tibetan woman sitting next to me covered her ears and looked at her skin in order 
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to avoid hearing or seeing any more. Other Tibetans in the audience appeared 
spellbound during Gyatso's demonstration, some sniffling or struggling to hold 
back tears. others looking angry and shocked. These reactions reveal the 
important role testimonials by escapees play within the Tibetan community. By 
hearing of the ongoing suffering inside Tibet against their fellow countrymen and 
women, some of whom chose not to flee in 1959 but instead decided to remain and 
fight, exile Tibetans' commitment to the Tibetan struggle are renewed as they are 
reminded of their responsibility to those still suffering in their homeland. Palden 
Gyatso's concluding comments to the Tibetans in the room make this clear: 
So now I am a refugee and you are a refugee and I realize those 
Tibetans who came over years back had a much more difficult 
experience. Now refugees can rely on Tibetan government for 
support but earlier refugees had to work hard. You live with dignity 
in exile; I'd like to thank you for this. My hope and prayer is that 
Tibetan community members will work hard and support efforts of 
the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. 
Although Gyatso's performance on this occasion may have been directed 
toward Tibetans in the audience, his global tour, which took him from Switzerland 
to England, Italy, and Portugal and then to the U.S. and was organized by the 
Tibetan government-in-exile, was addressed to a largely Western audience (see 
Figures 4-6). Not only that, it took place or was framed in Western terms. By 
this I mean that Gyatso's testimonial, with its emphasis on bodily suffering and 
Chinese atrocities, fits into an existing frame that has deep historical roots in 
communities that have experienced persecution, including those of the African and 
Jewish diasporas. This frame has been used recently with greater and greater 
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Figure 5 Longest Serving Tibetan Political Prisoner Testifies Before 
Congress. Tibet Press Watch. May 1995 
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On My Mind 
A. K. ROSENTHAL 
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Figure 6 You Are Palden Gyatso. New York Times, April 11, 1995 
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success by human rights activists in various governmental and non-governmental 
contexts. The discourse of human rights, of which testimonials are now a central 
part, entails che construction of a moral universe of victims and victimizers. and 
the production of what I call a "narrative of victimization." These narratives of 
suffering, which often include demonstrations of physical torture (e.g., displaying 
scars and damaged body parts, torture instruments, etc.), are important because 
they demonstrate the worthiness of those doing the petitioning as credible witnesses 
and representatives of the larger community. As Jonathan Boyarin observes, 
"When the marks of torture on the bodies of its victims are displayed-for example 
by international human rights organizations-what was intended co terrorize the 
memory of the individual victim becomes a sign by which the "world" is made to 
remember the wrongs done chat victim" (1994:22).50 
The emergence in recent years of Tibetan awareness of the value of chis 
form of performed testimonial is reflected in the rise in number of appearances of 
Tibetan escapees at various fora like the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and 
before various committees on the Hill in Washington (see Figure 7; Gendun 
Rinchen is the latest escapee to make the Geneva-London-Washington-New York 
circuit). 51 The narrated experience of torture and suffering by chose who appear 
in these fora serves to challenge the politico-moral legitimacy of China's presence 
in Tibet and demonstrate the exile community's worthiness of financial and 
political support from the West. 52 
The testimonial frame is not new. Western audiences have found accounts 
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Figure 7 Escape from Tibet with Gendun Rinchen 
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of personal suffering and survival compelling for generations. Dawa Norbu's book 
provides evidence of mass media interest in such accounts in 1959: 
Our tents were pitched on some dry paddy-fields three or four miles 
from Gangtok. The area was crowded with Tibetan refugees, and 
newspaper reponers frequented it to gather so-called "atrocity 
stories." One afternoon our camp was visited by one of them. a 
hawk-featured man with heavy spectacles. Being unused to facing 
reponers, our elders were extremely suspicious and afraid to 
speak .. .It took the Sikkimese interpreter some time to convince us 
that the reporter wanted us to "tell the world your sufferings." 
Finally, Nyima Tsering, with characteristic Tibetan inaccuracy, told 
the interpreter that thousands of Tibetans had been tortured, hanged, 
strangled, drowned, burnt, buried alive, and the suchlike. This was 
too much for the interpreter, who demanded evidence of all that 
Nyima had naively accused the Chinese of doing. Nima was at last 
compelled to come down to brass tacks, and described our own 
personal experience in Sakya under the Chinese occupation. Then 
the reponer was pleased, and gave us big sympathetic grins. 
(1987:241) 
Over the years, the Western media's desire for "atrocity storiesn has not 
diminished; in fact, the demand has grown exponentially. lt is now commonplace 
to point out how images of mass suffering and atrocities are needed to mobilize 
governments and others into taking action in the case of political disasters (e.g., 
the recent genocide in Rwanda; the atrocities committed by all sides in Bosnia; see 
Malkki 1996). The transnational human rights movement, with which Tibetans 
recently have become involved, has made good use of the testimonial frame and 
the Western media's demand for dramatic stories of suffering and terror. 
In her book on the sanctuary movement, Susan Bibler Coutin (l 993) 
suggests that its genius was the use of testimony by Central American refugees 
who functioned as "ambassadors of the suffering people of Central America" and 
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who 
in sharing their stories. would teach congregants about their faith. 
their struggle, and their culture ... As bearers of truth, refugees were 
believed capable of transforming the congregations that assisted 
chem. (119) 
Like sanctuary activists. Tibetan exile officials believe in the power of testimonials 
by recent escapees co establish personal connections between audiences-regardless 
of whether they are exile Tibetans, Western officials, potential supporters. 
journalists. or others--and the ongoing suffering of individuals in Tibet under 
Chinese rule. Tibetan escapees themselves believe in the revelatory quality of their 
stories to transform audiences, as Palden Gyatso's claim to have "proved" co the 
Chinese representative at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights hearing that 
local authorities are violating Tibetan rights in Tibet. demonstrates. Gyatso· s 
decision to buy torture instruments from corrupt prison officials and his use of 
them in his public appearances reveal a recognition of the power of their (and his) 
physical presence to prick the conscience of listeners and provoke them into taking 
action. Indeed. for many years of his imprisonment. Gyatso dreamed of telling his 
story to a Western audience. especially the United Nations which Tibetans in Tibet 
tend to construct as an impartial moral authority (see Schwartz l 994a; see also 
Malkki 1993 and 1995: 146-152 for a discussion of this phenomenon): 
I spent 33 of my 64 year old life in Chinese prisons and labour 
camps in Tibet. All those years I yearned for a moment such as this 
when I could speak to the United Nations and tell the world what is 
happening in Tibet. 
As one of the few survivors of Chinese atrocities in Tibet ("I am only one of the 
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few lucky ones who survived and managed co escape"), Gyatso's desire co cell his 
story is not unusual. The need co recount one's experience of suffering is quite 
common, as Myerhoff suggests in her discussion of "survivor stories" (1992). She 
refers co concentration camp I iterature which: 
describes inmates determination to come back and tell the living 
their stories. This is seldom with the expectation of bringing about 
reform or repentence. It is to forge a link with the listener, to retain 
one's past, to find evidence of sense-above all it is an assertion of 
an unextinguished presence. (1992:240). 
Although I cannot necessarily claim, like Coutin does (1993:125-126), that many 
Tibet activists (Western and Tibetan) trace their involvement to hearing a refugee 
testify about the suffering in Tibet (though see chapter 7 for my discussion of those 
who travelled to Tibet and who were transformed by their experience into 
activists), I can claim that testimonials represent the emergence of a new form of 
Tibetan consciousness in exile, one which is sophisticatedly deployed in a number 
of intercultural arenas. 
Conclusion 
Narrative is not merely the reflection of culture ... but is constitutive 
of social life in the act of storytelling. (Bauman 1986: 113) 
In chapter 2, I argued that the production, circulation, and contestation of 
representations of Tibetan history are central processes through which 
"Tibetanness" is mediated and mobilized in the diaspora. The narratives discussed 
in this chapter exemplify this point. A new form of cultural production in exile, 
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diaspora narratives function simultaneously as interpretive devices through which 
refugees make sense of their individual predicament of displacement and come co 
understand themselves as refugees, as members of a diaspora, as subjects in a 
deterritorial ized national collectivity. That such narratives are produced in relation 
co an interlocutor, usually a Western one, is significant, revealing the degree to 
which diasporic Tibetan identity is constructed dialogically. This process is 
explored in greater detail in chapters 8, 9, and 10. 
ln the next chapter, l trace the growth of diasporic nationalism in the 
context of the construction of an alternative Tibetan polity in exile. This entails a 
discussion of how Tibetan political institutions have been reframed since 1959 and 
the challenges such reframing poses to the exile community's efforts to sustain 
itself through outside support. 
The various life trajectories narrated by Y eshe, Perna, Sonam, the Dalai 
Lama, and Palden Gyatso trace the contours of a diaspora which stretches from 
remote settlements in lndia to small villages in Switzerland to New York City. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will include a description of the formation of these communities 
and set the stage for my discussion of the emergence of the Tibet Movement in 
various "nodes" across the diaspora. 
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Notes 
l. In saying this. I want to acknowledge the need to be very careful in applying 
categories. such as "national" or "nationalism." to situations in which they may not 
be appropriate. To say that Tibet was not a "nation-state" or Tibetans were not 
"nationalistic" is not to say they did not share a sense of peoplehood as I suggest 
below. 
2. As Stoddard writes. 
Tibetan society on the eve of the Chinese invasion was not quite as 
homogeneously traditional as we sometimes might like to believe. 
The absence of any real occupying imperial power (compared to 
other countries of Asia) had retarded the formation of a new 
intelligentsia who might have been capable of formulating and 
imposing Tibetan national interests in the international arena. 
Nevenheless. the processes of change and adaptation to the twentieth 
century bad already quietly begun under the 13th DL. It is clear that 
when the Chinese arrived in Lhasa in 1951. a number of 
progressivist Tibetan intellectuals were already prepared to set up 
translation committees capable of putting into concise modem 
Tibetan the thoughts of Marx. Engels. Lenin and Mao Zedong. 
There is no doubt at all that these new Tibetans were inspired by the 
ideals of socialism and by the fundamental rights of nations as 
expressed in such publications as the Constitution of the PRC 
(Beijing 1954) and the Text of the Policy for the National Minorities 
(Beijing 1952). (1994:129) 
3. Sperling distinguishes between the "diaspora nationalism" which has been 
constructed in exile and the nationalism which has emerged in recent years inside 
Tibet. One of the reasons for this rise of internal nationalism relates to the Marxist-
oriented Chinese educational system which introduced for the first time and in a 
systematic manner European ideas about nations and nationalism to a Tibetan elite. 
Even before the growth of Chinese education in Tibet in the 1980s. 
official pronouncements and policy statements often contained a 
measure of rhetoric about such subjects as nationality distinctions 
and the inevitable course of history that bound the Tibetan and 
Chinese peoples. Systematic Marxist education and the concomitant 
circulation of Marxist ideas about nations inevitably raised the 
question of Tibetan identity in the minds of intellectuals. students 
and others in a new way ... In essence. then. China has consistently 
explained its presence in Tibet in the context of a theory of 
nationality. (Sperling 1994:270) 
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The ironic implication is that by introducing these ideas in Tibet on a wide scale. 
China has given Tibetans a set of theoretical tools with which to contest their 
occupation. See also Schwartz 1994a and l 994b and Barnett 1994 for interesting 
comments on this subject. 
4. No exhaustive history has been produced about the years 1951-59 in Tibet. Much of 
what we do know comes from work by Tibetan intellectuals. some of which is 
published in English. including Shakabpa 1967; D. Norbu 1982; J. Norbo 1994; 
Shakya 1994; and P. Wangyal 1974. Two scholars are currently working on 
manuscripts about the period- Tsering Shakya (MacMillan. forthcoming) and 
Melvyn Goldstein; their work will no doubt significantly advance our understanding 
of this tumultuous era in Tibetan history. 
5. The Chinese renamed "political" Tibet (see Richardson 1984: 1-2 and Goldstein 
1994:77 for discussion of the use of the term "political" versus "ethnographic" 
Tibet). that is the area under continuous control by the Lhasa government. "Tibetan 
Autonomous Region." "Ethnographic" Tibet (what Tibetans call Kham and Amdo) 
was carved up into separate "autonomous districts": 
The former domains of the Muslim warlord of Qinghai. Ma Pufang. 
were transformed into the Qinghai Autonomous Region. Tibetan 
regions in eastern Amdo became "autonomous districts" in Gansu. 
while those of southern Kham were included in Yunnan with the 
same status. The remaining area of Kham. which had been 
conquered by Zhao Erfeng between 1905 and 1910 and declared the 
•province• of Sikang by the Nationalist Government in 1939, but 
which never had actually been administered by the Chinese. 
remained a separated province until it was incorporated into Sichuan 
in 1955. (W. Smith 1994:64) 
See also Goldstein ( l 994a) for a discussion of the significance of these divisions in 
terms of debate in exile community today over Chinese policies in Tibet. 
6. In a recent article, Warren Smith emphasizes that in 1949. the Chinese "had an 
almost non-existent physical presence in any Tibetan cultural area. When the PLA 
vanguard units moved into the Kanze region of Kham in 1949. Chinese logistics. 
even in this area which China had claimed to have administered since 1900s. were 
so tenuous that supplies had to be air-dropped to the troops. Money in the form of 
silver dollars was lavishly distributed to the Tibetans, local Tibetan officials were 
awarded new titles and paid large salaries. and the PLA troops were paid for all 
transportation and food requirements; ·not even a single needle and thread· was 
taken from the people" (1994:63). 
Indeed, while in Kham troops were instructed by their leaders to "make friends and 
do good deeds" while spreading propaganda about the unity of nationalities against 
class exploiters and foreign imperialists via mass meetings, film, drama, and the 
"ubiquitous loudspeakers" (Smith 1994:63). Smith writes "Tibetans from all areas 
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repeat the same version of the message the Chinese gave in justification for having 
entered Tibet: they bad come to Tibet to help the Tibetans and they would leave 
when Tibet was ·improved'" (1994:63). 
Smith·s article. "The nationalities policy of the Chinese communist pany and the 
socialist transformation of Tibet." includes an extensive discussion of Chinese 
policies in Kham between 1951 and the 1980s. See Barnett and Akiner (eds.). 
Resistance and Reform in Tibet (1994). London: Hurst and Company. 
7. See the story of Arna Adhe. a Khampa woman who aided guerrillas during the 
1950s and spent twenty years in prison for her resistance activities in David Pan's A 
Strange Liberation: Tibetan Lives in Chinese Hands (1992). 
8. In some areas of Kham and Amdo. Chinese Nationalist forces had been stationed for 
several decades. One Khampa recalls the Nationalist army in his region of Nyarong 
as being addicted to opium and easily bribed by local Tibetan officials to not 
interfere in their affairs (see J. Norbu 1986). The history of Tibetan relations with 
the Nationalists. both in China and in Taiwan. remains to be written. It is clear that 
their presence in the area before 1949 contributes to the already complicated 
alliances and forces at work in Tibet at the time. 
9. Given the extreme ruggedness of Kham and Amdo and parts of Central Tibet, 
wireless equipment was essential to the guerrilla·s ability to communicate and 
coordinate their operations. Radio continues to play a key role in Tibet today via 
the Tibetan language VOA broadcasts which are produced in Washington. D.C. on a 
daily basis. Through these broadcasts. Tibetans are exposed to oppositional 
messages about the Chinese presence in Tibet and participation in protest is fostered. 
For a more detailed discussion of the role of small media in Tibet. see chapter 6. 
10. During discussions with Tibetan intellectuals. CIA involvement in Tibetan affairs 
inevitably came up. though none of those with whom I spoke have published full-
length analyses of the subject as of this writing (for exceptions. see D. Norbu 1982. 
J. Norbo 1994, and Shakya. forthcoming). The Central Intelligence Agency has not 
made complete records of its involvement with Tibet available to scholars or the 
general public, though Melvyn Goldstein has had some access to important 
documents and is using them in the history of Tibet from 1951-1959 he is currently 
preparing. 
11. Chinese and Tibetan officials in Tibet marked the fortieth anniversary on May 23, 
1991 with a celebration, though preparations were marred by a crackdown on 
Tibetan dissidents and the refusal of American. British and Italian governments to 
send representatives. In the end, unlike the nearly 100 members of the Chinese 
press brought in to cover the story, no foreign journalists were allowed into Lhasa 
during this period. 
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12. I joined a small group of Tibetans affiliated with the U.S. Tibet Committee in a 
demonstration in front of the consulate entrance on a rainy May evening when the 
film was being screened. None of those entering the consulate stopped to speak to 
us (most appeared to be Chinese). lo addition to a bit of shouting, we held signs 
and flashed them for passing motorists. some of whom honked and waved. 
According to press reports. many other Chinese consulates around the world staged 
similar events to mark China's nliberationn of Tibet (Tibet Press Watch. 3(3), July 
1991). 
13. lo his essay nThe 1959 Tibetan rebellion: Ao interpretationn (1982). Dawa Norbu 
argues that the Chinese were somewhat flexible and ndealt with elites carefully. so 
much so that they were attacked by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution" (9). 
14. One posthumous biography of the leader of the resistance, Gompo Tashi 
Andrugtsang, was published in India in 1973, but, according to J. Norbu. "it was 
sketchy and badly translatedn (1994:187). Interestingly, Andrugtsang's nephew lives 
in New York City where he has been both a restaurant owner and proprietor of a 
delicatessen. He is an example of someone whose connections to the CIA would 
have no doubt enabled him to settle in the United States and to be given a green card 
without the usual delay of several years faced by other immigrants. 
Norbu also notes that "Lhamo Tsering, a leader of the Mustang guerrilla force and 
long-time assistant to Gyalo Thondup, one of the Dalai Lama's elder brothers (who 
was a kind of overall leader of the resistance for some years) has also written his 
memoirs" (J. Norbu 1994:187). These are not published yet (when they are it will 
be in Tibetan). Lhamo Tsering is currently a member of the Kashag (Tibetan 
cabinet in exile). 
15. Interestingly, the majority of the Khampa leaders involved with Chushi Gangdruk 
were merchants 
who had made their fortune since 'liberation' as China kept pouring 
silver coins called dao-yuan into Tibet to pay the Tibetan ruling class 
and road workers. But instead of making more money or running 
away to India safely with their silver fortunes, Khampas spent the 
Chinese money for the purchase of arms and ammunition for revolt. 
(D. Norbu 1982:16) 
These merchants financed and coordinated the resistance, drawing on their wide 
social networks established through trading (for which Tibetans are renowned) in 
India and Central Tibet to purchase arms and mobilize support. 
16. Lhoka, just south of Lhasa, became the resistance movement's headquarters. While 
in India in 1990, I worked with a group of children who had recently escaped from 
Tibet, some of whom were from this area. Lhoka continues to be an active site of 
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opposition to Chinese rule. 
For a detailed description of Chushi Gangdruk's encounters with the PLA in the 
Lhoka area. see Gompo Tashi AndrugtSang's Four Rivers. Six Ranges (1973: 
chapters 7 -10). 
17. The Norbulingka was the Dalai Lama's summer residence. During the winter, he 
typically resided in the Potala Palace. a mile or two away. 
18. To protect the anonymity of my informants. I have given them pseudonyms. 
19. After crossing into India as part of the Dalai Lama's entourage, Tenzin was sent to 
the transit camp Buxa Duar in West Bengal. Buxa Duar was a former British 
prisoner-of-war camp situated near the Bhutanese border. By August of 1959, as 
guerrillas and other lay people were shipped out to road camps. Buxa Duar began 
receiving groups of refugee monks, which was soon renamed Buxa Lama Ashram. 
Most of the monks. like Tenzin, were from the Gelugpa sect (those of the other 
three lineages more often found refuge at monasteries in Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal). 
Within a year, the monks set about collecting scriptures and lithographing them with 
stone and ink. and examinations for the Gesbe degree (the highest attainment in 
monastic education; equivalent to a Ph.d.) continued (Avedon 1979:92). Due to the 
rampant spread of disease in the barracks, most often tuberculosis. many hundreds 
of monks died. It was not until 1968 that the large settlements such as Bylakuppe 
and Mundgod were ready to receive survivors. Once they were resettled in the 
south. the monks set about rebuilding monasteries which quickly became fully 
functional institutions. Over the years, these monasteries have flourished-many 
renamed and modelled on their home institutions in Tibet such as Sera, Drepung. 
and Ganden. In fact, enrollment has risen dramatically since 1987 as a result of the 
continous flow of monks fleeing imprisonment for their participation in 
demonstrations against Chinese rule in Tibet (see chapter 7). 
After spending several years in Buxa Duar, Tenzin told me he was relieved to go to 
Dalhousie to study at the newly-established Teachers Training Center. One of the 
problems faced by the new Tibetan schools was the lack of adequately trained 
Tibetan teachers. The first teachers were monks, who, while respected for their 
traditional learning, needed additional training in secular teaching methods to be 
fully effective in the exile educational context (see Nowak 1984:57-59). Tenzin 
remembers being taught by a Canadian woman known by her students as "Miss 
Judy." After a year, he graduated from the program but instead of teaching, he 
decided to go to South India to study for his Geshe degree in Sera monastery. It 
was not long before Tenzin got a letter requesting that he go to Nepal to teach 
children at a "Four Rivers, Six Ranges" school. Tenzin remembers turning down 
the offer because, as he put it. "I was too tired." 
After a few years in the South, Tenzin was asked to go to Dharamsala to teach at 
the Tibetan Childrens' Village (TCV). This time he agreed, however, and he taught 
at TCV for ten years. In 1977 he decided to take a vacation to Switzerland to visit 
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relatives. Once there. he managed to stay and joined the small Tibetan monastery in 
Rikon which had been established a few years earlier. When asked why he decided 
to give up his robes and stop being a monk. Tenzin described meeting a woman in 
1980 whose husband had sustained terrible injuries doing road work in Kulu-Manali. 
After being brought to Switzerland (much the same way Sonam and her husband 
were). the injured man died. leaving his wife with five young children. At that 
point. Tenzin recounts. he decided to move in with the woman to help her look after 
her family. The family currently lives in a resettled community in a town near 
Zurich. 
20. In the years immediately following the Dalai Lama's flight to India. as Chinese 
counter-insurgency measures became increasingly more effective. Khampa resistance 
fighters and others sympathetic to Chushi Gangdruk retreated into Nepalese 
territory. ostensibly as refugees but actually to regroup across the border in order to 
continue their guerrilla activities. They were supported in this effort with American 
money. arms. and training. Indeed. a number of Tibetans were secretly flown to 
U.S. air bases (including Camp Hale. in Colorado) for high altitude guerrilla 
warfare training (J. Norbu 1994; Avedon 1984; Long 1981: Wise 1973: see also D. 
Norbu 1982). Upon completing the training. the Tibetans were parachuted back into 
southeastern Tibet. 
CIA patronage of the Tibetan guerrillas ended abruptly prior to America's 
rapprochement with China in 1971. American support for Tibet bas never been 
publicly acknowledged by government officials, and no documentation of U.S. 
involvement is currently available to the public. See Long (1981) for an interesting 
account of his encounter with Tibetan guerrillas in a Nepalese prison. 
It must also be pointed out that while the Tibetans may have been used by the 
Americans for their own anti-communist purposes during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
they were also very much effected by the tensions between India. Nepal. and China 
at the time. For instance. the final destruction in 1974 of the Tibetan guerrillas who 
had retreated to Mustang. Nepal appears to have been due to concerted and pre-
meditated Sino-Nepalese effort (see D. Norbu 1975). The complex history of the 
Tibetan resistance suggests the inadequacy of simplistic and reductive explanations 
of behavior. It also reveals the need for more research on the effect of inter-Asian 
politics on the Khampa resistance effort. particularly lndia·s role. 
21. In an article called "Tibet and the Occident: the Myth of Shangri-la" Tsering Shakya 
makes reference to the tendency of some western intellectuals to view the Chinese 
occupation of Tibet as a good thing. 
For the left. Tibet was being transformed into a socialist paradise, 
and the Chinese actions were merely the irresistible progress of 
history towards modernity. ( 1992: 14) 
See Jamyang Norbu·s essay "Adding Insult to Injury" in his book Illusion and 
Reality (1989) for further discussion and critique of what he calls "leftist sinophilia" 
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and its effect on how the Tibetan situation was represented in the West in the 1960s 
and 1970s. I will come back to this point in chapter 6. 
22. Dawa Norbu describes the "feverish" activity going on in India in terms of 
roadbuilding in his book Red Star over Tibet: 
Feverish military activities were going on in India's northern 
borders, including the building of roads and military barracks. 
Peaceful, harmless Tibet was no longer India's neighbour; instead 
there was aggressive China. ready to spring and strike from the roof 
of the world. India had been slow to realize all this. Before 1950 a 
similar border relationship to that of the United States and Canada 
had existed between India and Tibet; but that situation was over. and 
now India was spending millions of rupees on defending the 
hundreds of miles of her northern border. (1987:240) 
23. One of the things N orbu argues in his essay "A Revolt Long Ago" is that the Tenth 
March commemoration represents the official exile version of the events of 1959: 
The Tenth March is a sad occasion. Despite the flag waving. the 
brave speeches. and truculent slogans. it was a day when an innocent 
and brave people. defenceless and disorganized, took on the might of 
the Red Chinese Army and were slaughtered for their presumptions. 
Contrary to Chinese propaganda and to some official Tibetan 
versions of the event. the uprising was not planned by insidious 
"Tibetan local government and the reactionary clique of the upper 
social strata and rebel bandits ... " but was rather the spontaneous 
outburst of an oppressed and harried people who feared for the life 
of their beloved ruler. Hag-ridden with defeatism. the Tibetan 
government was in no condition to organize any kind of 
uprising ... ( 1989:57) 
For descriptions of Tenth March celebrations in Dharamsala over the years. see J. 
Norbu 1989:57-59; Nowak 1984; Klieger 1992. 
24. See also Alvarez (1995) for a related discussion of the emergence of an 
anthropology of borderlands-of people who live on borders of nation-states. 
25. At fourteen. Yeshe was good in school and known for his excellent Tibetan. He 
remembers volunteering to help other children write letters to their parents. many of 
whom were working in northern India on road construction. Upon graduating. 
Y eshe recalls moving around a lot. translating at a road camp for a while. working 
in an office at a handicraft center in Simla. and eventually going to Nepal to work in 
a carpet factory. When he arrived. the factory had closed down and Y eshe found 
work as as temporary clerk in the Office of Tibet in Kathmandu. He quickly 
became a permanent employee of the government-in-exile and was appointed as 
acting representative of the Dalai Lama. Yeshe remembers it being a politically 
189 
difficult time for the Tibetans in Nepal because of the Nepalese government's 
imprisonment of Khampa guerrillas. He was later reassigned to the Office of Tibet 
in New York City. where he works today. 
26. One of the least documented aspects of the Tibetan refugee experience is the role 
missionary institutions have played in educating Tibetans in India. 
For bis first two years in the U.S., Perna recalls feeling "totally lost." Gradually 
regaining his bearings. he finished college in Arizona in 1974 and moved co the Ease 
Coast where he began work on a doctorate in education. In 1979. on his first visit 
to the United States. the Dalai Lama met Perna and upon bearing of Pema's plans to 
return to India to teach in a Tibetan school, the Tibetan leader asked Perna to stay 
another year in the U.S. Well-educated and competent Tibetans were needed to run 
the Office of Tibet in New York City, and upon completing his Ph.d .. Perna joined 
the office staff where he continues to work today. 
27. My translator informed me that this was an innovation in Switzerland. since in Tibet 
(and India) this function would have been fulfilled by monks whose main duties 
would have included travelling to various households to say prayers. Due co the 
lack of monks in Switzerland. these elderly women have taken on the responsibility 
themselves. Swiss Tibetan communities without a similarly active retired group 
usually request monks from the monasteries in South India to say prayers for them. 
In fact, much of the money which flows from Switzerland to lndia, [ learned. goes 
to the monasteries as payment for spiritual services rendered. 
28. Dawa Norbu, in his book Red Star Over Tibet, reports that Tibetan imprisoned by 
Chinese forces in Sakya in 1959 ate their shoe leather. 
29. Some of the poorest Tibetan refugees continue to do hard labor and live in tents in 
Kulu-Manali. more than three decades after the events described in this chapter. 
30. When [mentioned this incident with a Western activist who has worked closely with 
a number of Tibetans inside Tibet, he claimed that "Tibetans always paraphrase 
when they don't like what someone is saying ... " 
31. A number of scholars have analyzed how various groups construct narratives and 
interpret storytelling differently. For some, the point is to tell a good story. 
whereas for others the goal is to elicit the "facts." See Heath (1983). 
32. In her book on oral history. Elizabeth Tonkin (1992) reminds us that written 
autobiography is not universal and points out that the "comparative presence or 
absence of "spontaneous biography" has not been systematically examined; in 
Europe and the United States, its existence is presumed, although the articulacy and 
informativeness of tellers is found to vary ... " (133) 
In an essay on narrative, memory and the self, anthropologist Tom Maschio (1995) 
observes that autobiographical narrative "has seemed an expressive form particularly 
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suited to convey a unitary notion of the self. Both autobiography and the unitary 
concept of self have been viewed as consummately Western culture forms ... " (98). 
See Taylor (1989) for an analysis of bow autobiography came to be seen as an 
expression of the unity of the self. 
33. In an essay on cultural memory in the former Yugoslavia. Denich (1994) explores a 
related phenomenon in terms of how Serbian memories of trauma from World War 
n have been passed down to generations who embrace their parents. and 
grandparents' experiences of victimization as their own. She asks "Could the 
traumatic experiences of individuals be transformed into collective memory. shared 
by those who did not experience the actual trauma?" (381) 
34. In recent years, protesters in Tibet also have attempted to assen an alternative moral 
order based on human rights, Buddhism. and democracy (see Schwartz 1994a). 
This order also involves the discursive production of historicity. though it differs 
somewhat from that produced by Tibetan exiles. 
35. For a survey of modern Tibetan fiction. see A.A. Moon (199la. 199lb, and 199lc). 
See also Lungta, Winter 1995, special issue: "Two thousand years & more of 
Tibetan poetry." 
36. See also earlier narratives of life in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution such as 
Life in the Red Flag People's Commune by Dhondub Choedon (1978): Tibet: the 
Undying Flame by Kunsang Paljor (1970 in Tibetan. 1977 in English): and Tibet 
Under Chinese Communist Rule: A Compilation of Refugee Statements 1958-1975, 
published by the Information Office, Dharamsala (1976). These accounts tend to 
focus on how Tibet has been transformed by communism. 
37. Another genre of exile writing which I do not have space to cover in this chapter is 
what I call "return narratives," accounts written by exile Tibetans of their 
experiences in visiting Tibet. See. for example, Tsultrim Tersey's "One month in 
Tibet," and Jetsun Perna Gyalpo's "Three months in Tibet: A personal viewpoint." 
both of which were published in From Liberation to Liberalisation: Views on 
"Liberalised" Tibet (1982), published by Dharamsala's Information Office. 
38. One possible reason for this is that only wealthy or aristocratic individuals (in 
addition to monks and incarnate lamas) were educated in old Tibet and thus would 
have the means and confidence to express themselves in literary form. 
39. At one point. Norbu recalls moving with his family to Darjeeling. He makes a 
scathing comparison of the treatment of impoverished Tibetans by Western 
volunteers and by Tibetan aristocrats: 
The volunteers came to my rescue. These strangers, who had no 
racial, religious, or national affinities with us. only a common 
human bond, loved and cared for us when we most needed them. 
We children were skinny, pot-bellied, pale and yellow-complexioned 
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through malnutrition. We had sores all over our bodies. due to 
unhygenic conditions, and an inability to adapt quickly to our new 
environment. But the foreigners treated and nursed us like real 
parents, without a patronizing air or any sign of revulsion at our 
unhealthy state; whereas our own kin. the sons and daughters of 
Tibetan aristocrats and wealthy Tibetans, studying in colleges and 
working around Darjeeling, did not come to help us. Perhaps they 
were ashamed of us. (l 987 :246) 
40. As he was finishing his book. Norbu became editor of the Tibetan Review, an 
English-language monthly publication. After one panicularly "hard-hitting" 
editorial. Norbu recalls in his preface to the first edition of Red Star over Tibet, a 
huge controversy erupted over his perceived criticism of the Dalai Lama. 
What angered the Tibetans most was an obvious implication of 
"criticism" against His Holiness the Dalai Lama ... Even after the 
Dalai Lama's personal intervention in my favor, the controversy 
continued for four months, during which time I had literally to hide. 
Meanwhile rumors circulated freely that I was a Chinese spy (a 
favourite accusation made against Tibetan immigrants), a Christian 
conven, a Communist, an atheist, an iconoclast. and whatnot! The 
Tibetan inquisitors in Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama resides, 
accused me specifically of "criticizing" (with its Tibetan connotations 
of blasphemy) His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Buddha of Mercy. 
and of "sabotaging" Inda-Tibetan relations upon which "depended 
the future hope of Tibet." The innocent and wild Tibetans in India, 
Nepal, and Bhutan were, literally, after my blood. Mass meetings 
were held everywhere in Tibetan colonies to decide how to deal with 
me. The controversy nearly cost my life, and only the Dalai Lama's 
intervention saved me. (1987: 11) 
41. It is imponant to remember that at the time of invasion, the Dalai Lama was an 
inexperienced and politically untrained teenager (he was sixteen when the PLA 
entered Lhasa in 1950, twenty when he visited Beijing in 1954 and met Mao. and 
twenty five when he escaped in 1959). This might also have contributed to his fear 
of confrontation with the Chinese. 
42. For an extended discussion of the relationship between the Dalai Lama, and other 
Tibetans, to the U.S. press corps, see chapter 10. 
43. Mirsky's point is underscored by another reviewer who writes that the Dalai Lama 
"is confusing about his beliefs" and "a bit coy" at times (McGum 1990:5). 
44. By calling them performances, I do not wish to imply these diaspora narratives were 
somehow "fake" or "untrue." 
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45. At the first international Tibet support conference in Dharamsala (in March 1990). I 
remember hearing Tibetans toasting Western guests by saying "Next year in Lhasa" 
which I realized was a reference to the Jewish slogan "Next year in Jerusalem." ln 
her book. Margaret Nowak (1984:128) points out that during the 1970s, many 
Tibetan youth leaders read Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre's book 0 
Jerusalem!. 
46. Clifford's (1994) argument that there is a "strong entailment of Jewish history on the 
language of diaspora" seems to be borne out by the Tibetans' self-conscious decision 
to cultivate relationships with American Jewish religious leaders and community 
organizations such as NY ANA. (Though it should be pointed out that the initial 
idea for a meeting between the Dalai Lama and American rabbis was that of Marc 
Lieberman, an American Jew who practices Buddhism; see Karnenetz (1994) for a 
discussion of "Jubus"-Jewish Buddhists.) 
47. Addressing the Jews in audience, Palden Gyatso asserted the similarities between the 
Tibetan experience under Chinese rule and Jewish experience during World War ll 
in his talk: "Recently, a few days ago, l visited the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington, D.C. I see that what Jewish people suffered equals what we Tibetans 
have suffered fighting for Tibet." 
48. See Cutting off the ser.pent's head: Tightening control in Tibet. 1994-1995 (1996) by 
Tibet Information Network and Asia Watch for a description of current Chinese 
practices of political detention in Tibet. Political prisoners are defined as those 
arrested and in detention for opposing Chinese rule. Many are accused of 
advocating Tibet's independence from China either through demonstrations or other 
similarly illegally political activities. 
49. A little bit later on, Gyatso described how young monks and nuns have been staging 
protests on a regular basis in front of the Jokhang in Lhasa: "The Tibetan people in 
spirit are united, even if they don't participate in demonstrations, they will send 
their children to deliver food to the prisoners. They don't make any distinctions if 
the prisoner is from Eastern Tibet, Central Tibet, or another place." 
50. For recent work on violence, torture, and the state, see Feldman 1991, Taussig 
1986, 1987, and Schirmer 1991, 1995. 
51. Testimonials in Movement contexts (not in governnmental or U.N. contexts) usually 
take the same form. They begin with an introduction of the speaker, then the 
presentation of his or her narrative that moves from personal experience to 
statements about China's destruction of Tibetan culture, religion, environment, and 
so on. Such performances are generally followed by a question and answer session 
and occasionally an appeal for funds or discussion of how to get further involved in 
the Tibet Movement. 
52. See Malkki 1995a:92-94 for an analysis of the symbolic meaning of atrocity 
accounts by Hutu refugees. 
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Part Two 
Transnational Tibetans and the emergence of the Tibet Movement 
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Chapter S Tibetans in India: Reconstruction and 
democratization in exile 
Introduction 
On March 31. 1959. nearly three weeks after escaping from Lhasa, the Dalai 
Lama and his entourage crossed into India. physically and emotionally exhausted 
from their ordeal. The Tibetan leader was warmly received by Indian officials1 
and his flight was big news, as he quickly found out. 
As I left the building at Foothills [a road camp), and climbed into a 
big red car for the thirty-mile drive to the station. I noticed large 
numbers of cameramen. It was explained to me that these were 
representatives of the international press. They had come to report 
on the "story of the century." I should expect to see many more of 
them on arrival in the city. (Gyatso 1990: 145) 
With much more color and irony, John A vedon describes the international press 
corps frenzy to get the story on the Dalai Lama: 
Since the first word of fighting in Lhasa had appeared late in March, 
news of a revolt in remote Tibet had leaped into the world headlines. 
Over a hundred correspondents flew in from Paris, London, New 
York. Africa. and East Asia seeking what was already billed as the 
"story of the year." Choosing Kalimpong as the best spot to begin 
their search, they converged on the Himalayan Hotel, run by David 
MacDonald, a former British trade agent in Tibet and an 
acquaintance of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. While "Daddy" 
MacDonald took to his bed from worry on hearing of the Fourteenth 
Dalai Lama's flight, the press scoured the surrounding peaks with 
binoculars, accosted the town's more prominent Tibetan citizens, 
drove a hundred miles a day back and forth to Gangtok in search of 
leads and, under increasing pressure from their editors to provide 
front-page news on the whereabouts of the mysterious "God-King," 
began issuing fabricated reports over Kalimpong's antiquated Morse-
key telegraph ... With word of the Dalai Lama's crossing into the 
NEFA [North-East Frontier Agency], however, they could, just by 
looking at the map, infer that he would eventually emerge at Tezpur. 
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Thereupon the press corps decamped en masse, first co Shillong. the 
capital of Assam, and then co Tezpur itself. Sleeping on the couches 
and billiard tables of the local Planter's Club, they clogged the 
cown's tiny airstrip with single-engine planes hired co race exclusive 
photos of the "God-King's" arrival co Calcutta's Dum Dum Airpon 
and the presses of the world's periodicals beyond. (1984:67) 
Upon arriving in Tezpur, the Dalai Lama was given "many hundreds of messages. 
telegrams. and letters ... all sending greetings and good wishes from people the 
world over" (Gyatso 1990: 145). Throughout the train journey co Mussoorie--a hill 
station not far from Delhi where a house for the Dalai Lama had been arranged--
thousands of well-wishers greeted the leader. 
The incense international interest in the Tibetan "God-King" reveals che 
fascination Tiber held for non-Tibetans, especially those from the West. This 
fascination helped ease the suffering of thousands of Tibetans who followed the 
Dalai Lama inco exile, most of whom appeared co be facing a grim future upon 
their arrival, especially those who went to India. Not only were they entering a 
country "already overburdened with massive poverty and unemployment," they 
were doing so "without language facility, without knowledge or understanding of 
Indian social and cultural systems, and without any potentially useful occupation 
skills." 
With the exception of a handful (mainly aristocrats) who spoke some 
English and/or Hindi, the refugees spoke only Tibetan. Meat-eating 
Buddhists from the cold climate of the Tibetan plateau, they found 
themselves thrust into the sweltering heat of vegetarian Hindu India. 
The refugees were nomads, monks, farmers, and petty traders, none 
of which occupations, on the surface, offered any competitive 
advantages in India. Almost all had no familiarity with modem 
industrial technology. (Goldstein 1978:396) 
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Yee by all accounts Tibetans have done very well in India. overcoming these 
external obstacles as well as ones internal to the community, such as the face that 
the refugees came from "widely disparate regions in Tibet where they spoke 
mutually unintelligible dialects, operated under different sociopolitical systems. and 
were traditionally hostile" (ibid., 396). Indeed, compared to ocher refugees around 
the world, Tibetans have been unusually successful in reconstructing their society 
and institutions in exile. French suggests several factors which might account for 
this success: 
( 1) The role of the Dalai Lama as both a charismatic, unifying 
leader and a respected, international figure; (2) the Indian 
government's acceptance of the government-in-exile as an 
administrative unit and its willingness to work with the government-
in-exile in setting aside special lands and schools for the Tibetans; 
(3) the cohesion and flexibility of the government-in-exile as an 
administrative unit; (4) the cohesion of the Tibetan refugees as an 
ethnic group and their general willingness to maintain a unified 
profile internationally; (5) their ability to garner funds in India and 
abroad; (6) the development and implementation of a detailed 
cultural preservation plan; and (7) the tremendous staying power and 
resiliency of the Tibetan refugees themselves. (1991: 192) 
In Part One of this chapter, I explore some of the factors French outlines, 
focusing in particular on rehabilitation and the reconstruction of cultural and 
religious institutions in India. Part Two examines efforts by the Dalai Lama to 
create an alternative polity in exile, one more "democratic" than that which existed 
in old Tibet. The problem the Dalai Lama's authority poses to such a 
transformation is considered, as are attempts to create a Tibetan public sphere in 
diaspora. In chapter 3, I argued that efforts by Tibetans to democratize their 
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hierarchical religio-political system are in conflict with efforts to ensure the 
survival of religious and cultural traditions which are embedded in the older 
structures and which form the basis of Western fascination with Tibet. Part Two 
concludes with a discussion of this contradiction which, I argue, is central co 
understanding the Tibetan exile community as well as the internal dynamics of 
Tibet activism. 1 
Part One 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation 
About a year after his arrival in Mussoorie, the Dalai Lama moved to Dharamsala, 
a former British hill station located on the nonhern edge of the Punjab, in 
Himachal Pradesh, 300 miles nonhwest of New Delhi. There he established a 
government-in-exile, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, or CT A, with 
ten civil service ranks (scaled up from the seven in Tibet). At the same time. a 
bureau was established in New Delhi to serve as a link with the lndian government 
and the various international relief agencies that were coming to the refugees' aid, 
with other offices eventually being established in Geneva, New York, Tokyo to act 
as unofficial embassies for the new exile government (Avedon 1984:87). Goldstein 
suggests that the "ready availability of a core of highly experienced and competent 
governmental administrators" who fled Tibet with the Dalai Lama facilitated the 
establishment of the CT A and provided a "ready-made organization" through which 
to approach the daunting task of rehabilitating, monitoring and coordinating the 
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activities of the approximately 80,000 refugees who arrived in India between 1959 
and 1962 (ibid .. 408). 
Fortunately for the Tibetans. the government of India (GOl) decided from 
the outset co play an active role in rehabilitation efforts. Not only that. the 
ideological framework within which the GOI believed rehabilitation should occur 
was one that was not intended to discourage or destroy Tibetan cultural institutions 
or traditions, but rather was compatible with the Dalai Lama's and the CTA's goal 
of cultural preservation (Goldstein 1978:397). According to Goldstein. the most 
successful of the CT A's rehabilitation strategies called for the creation of a series 
of permanent agricultural settlements throughout India: 
The idea was to resettle Tibetans then living in transit camps or 
working on road repair gangs and provide them assistance and 
resources so that within a period of five years, they could become 
economically self-sufficient. This, if successful, would not only 
permanently take care of the refugee population, but would also help 
India's food needs by bringing unused land under cultivation. 
However, considering the immense difficulty governments and 
agencies normally encounter in resettling populations even 
intraculturally, this goal for Tibetans in India was certainly of 
Herculean proportions. (ibid., 398) 
The GOI viewed the settlement plan as a kind of compromise, as it did not wane to 
bring all the Tibetans together in one area, but also did not want to scatter them in 
too-small units. The envisioned size of 3,000 to 4,000 people was believed to be 
large enough to easily sustain Tibetan language and institutions (ibid., 398). 
Nehru began by soliciting offers of unsettled land from southern Indian 
states which the refugees could use. The first offer came from the state of 
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Karnataka which was willing to provide the Tibetans with three thousand acres of 
uninhabited land covered with dense jungle. ln December 1960, 666 Tibetans 
were driven to the site, located fifty-two miles west of Mysore, and left to build a 
settlement for themselves (Avedon 1984:87). Many refugees described feeling 
completely forlorn and desolate in such an alien environment so far away from the 
Tibetan plateau. ln the process of clearing the land, Tibetans regularly 
encountered enraged elephants and were sometimes trampled to death (ibid .. 89). 
After much effort, the first permanent agricultural settlement, known as 
Bylakuppe, was created. Over time it grew and prospered (see Goldstein 1975 and 
1978 for a description of his research in this settlement; see also T. Wangyal 
1977). 
Eventually other parcels of land were made available to the Tibetans and 
soon small settlements dotted the subcontinent (see Figure 8). According to Strom 
(in press), the CTA sought to counteract Tibetan communalism by putting people 
from different regions together into single settlements (see also Palakshappa 1978). 
However there were settlements established independently of the CTA which were 
formed on the basis of regional origin. The fact that some of the communities 
were uniformly "Khampa" or "Amdowa," for instance, is significant; it helps to 
explain the persistence of regionalism and factionalism within the exile community. 
l come back this point later in the chapter. 
Since 1959, a total of 54 refugee settlements have been established in lndia. 
Nepal, and Bhutan, 26 of which are agricultural, 17 are agro-industrial, and 11 are 
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Figures in brackets indicate more than one settlement in that area. 
1. Sataun 11. Bir (2) & Chauntra 21. Kathmandu (2) 
2. Kamrao 12. Sonamling 22. Chialsa 
3. Puruwala 13. Changthank 23. Watung 
4. Paonta 14. Pandoh 24. DatJeeling 
5. Herbertpur 15. Simla 25. Sonada 
6. Dehra Dun (3) 16. Dolanji 26. Lama Hatta 
7. Raipur 17. Dorpatan 27. Aawangla 
8. Dalhousie 18. Pokhara (4) 28. Tenzingang 
9. McLeod Gani 19. Chairok 29. Tezu 
10. TaShi Jong 20. Dunche 30. Miao 
Figure 8 Tibetan Settlements in India and Nepal 






35. Bytakuppe (2} 
36. Hunsur 
37. Kollegat 
handicraft-based (Tibetan Bulletin 1995). The CTA claims that of the 120.000 
refugees living in South Asia today, almost 70.000 live in these settlements while 
another 50,000 live in scanered communities in India and Nepal. and four and a 
half thousand live outside South Asia (ibid.).3 The report estimates that thirteen 
percent of the total population is dependent on handicrafts. mostly carpet weaving. 
which it notes provides a valuable source of secondary income for many more 
refugees; another twenty-nine percent of the population engages in sweater selling 
and other petty trading4 ; and the remaining thirty percent of the population is 
engaged in government service or work in hotels. restaurants. or shops (for a more 
detailed description of rehabilitation and reconstruction in exile. see Goldstein 1975 
and 1978; Avedon 1984: 83-104. See also Central Tibetan Administration 1994). 
One of the things Goldstein noted during the course of his doctoral 
fieldwork in the Bylakuppe settlement in the 1960s was the complete lack of 
tension between Tibetans and local Indians. Even after the settlement surpassed 
surrounding villages in economic vitality, incerethnic relations remained smooth. 
This tranquillity grew out of a concerted policy by the Tibetan leadership co avoid 
direct competition for resources with their Indian hosts and was applied 
consistently to all the resettlement communities (Goldstein 1975, 1978; Devoe 
1987). In many instances. the arrival of refugees transformed local economies. as 
new businesses sprang up to service the needs of the Tibetans and employment 
opportunities evolved for poor Indians to work for the refugees on a day-wage 
basis (Goldstein 1975 :26). 
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While the official policy has been to select carefully economic activity that 
does not compete with that of local Indians. not everyone follows the rules. as 
Devoe notes. 
Tibetans are characterized as shrewd businessmen and women who 
have been able to monopolize business in certain commodities by 
ignoring interstate laws limiting and taxing commodity transpon, and 
running black market goods into the country from Nepal. Their 
most well-known market activity is sweater-selling. Besides 
peddling these Indian-made sweaters from their lean-to "shops" or 
roadside blankets, Tibetans sell vast quantities of second-hand 
foreign goods, some of which they have received in donations and 
some of which they buy for re-sale. (1983: 18) 
In some instances. Tibetans seem to have become victims of their own economic 
success. This appears to be the case with the anti-Tibetan riots that broke out in 
Dharamsala in 1994 following the murder of a local Gaddi boy by a young Tibetan 
man. Upon hearing of the boy's death. local Indians rampaged through the 
Tibetan areas of Dharamsala, destroying shops and buildings and attacking 
Tibetans. One Tibetan commentator, K. Dhondup (1994), argued that growing 
economic disparities between Tibetans and local Indians created tension between 
the two communities and contributed to the riots. Despite this and other isolated 
incidents, Tibetans generally have managed to avoid serious confrontation with 
their Indian neighbors over the years. 
As I have already suggested, the rehabilitation process, while overseen and 
funded by the Indian government, was guided by the Tibetan government-in-exile 
which was given considerable autonomy in dealing with the refugees. Although 
the GOI recognized the CTA's internal authority over their affairs and dealt with it 
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as a de facto administrative unit within the Indian government, it did not recognize 
the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile nor its claim of sovereignty over Tibet. For 
this reason, the Tibetans were barred from conducting political activities on Indian 
soil. Yet the refugees were not compelled to become Indian citizens; instead. they 
were issued resident cards which served as quasi-passports. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, this policy, along with the fact that 
refugees were resettled in all-Tibetan enclaves, had profound implications on the 
emergence of a "refugee consciousness" in exile (Long 1993).5 Tibetans' 
awareness of themselves as being a collective body of "refugees," a categorical 
"we" standing apart from the "others," is linked to the production of diasporic 
Tibetan nationalism. As Malkki suggests in a recent essay: 
It is the interstitiality and liminality of refugees in the contemporary 
order of nation-states that pushes issues of nationality and national 
identity to the forefront among refugees. For refugees, as for 
stateless and other "displaced" categories of people, nation-ness is 
problematized. ( 1990:55) 
The link between their refugee status and Tibetans' perception of themselves as a 
collectivity is underscored by Devoe who argues that for the Tibetan, the yellow 
paper cenifying his or her stateless status is "expressive of a cultural, ethnic, and 
national identity, an allegiance to the past and a candid avowal of dedication co 
Tibet's future freedom" (1987:56). Thus 
Keeping refugee status is viewed as an action, an act of integrity in 
defense of the faith. A Tibetan who has kept refugee status is 
thought to have kept his Tibetan-ness, an ethos mutually understood 
by Tibetans around the world." (1987:63). 
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Over the years. the link between keeping refugee statuS and maintaining 
Tibetanness has been underscored by the Dalai Lama. who has repeatedly stated 
that "the purpose of refugee life is to rescue the nation. the people. and the cultural 
traditions of Tibet" (Devoe 1987:61). The next section explores some of the ways 
in which these goals have been realized in exile. 
Reconstructing Tibetan culture 
Other than devising strategies for the rehabilitation of refugees. the Dalai Lama's 
main concern upon coming into exile was cultural reconstruction. This process 
entailed a certain degree of self-consciousness which is evident in the Dalai Lama's 
description of his approach to the problem: 
We divided our culture into two types. In the first category we 
placed that which. we determined. needed to be retained only in 
books as past history. The second category included whatever could 
bring actual benefit in the present. These things. we resolved. must 
be kept alive. Therefore, many of our old ceremonial traditions we 
discarded-no matter, I decided. let them go. However. our 
performing arts. our literature. science and religion as well as those 
crafts from which we could earn a livelihood-painting, metalcraft. 
architecture, woodworking and carpetmaking-these, we took special 
pains to safeguard. (Avedon 1984:92) 
The Dalai Lama made religious preservation his highest priority. This decision 
reflects both the centrality of Buddhism in Tibetan life and the Dalai Lama's 
recognition that Buddhism formed a basis for reconstituting a collective Tibetan 
identity in exile. 6 
From the Dalai Lama's point of view, the small number of Tibet's 
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thousands of monks and lamas who managed to escape (somewhere between 5,000 
and 7,000, a tiny fraction of the monastic population in Tibet) provided the key to 
salvaging Buddhism in exile. As embodied representatives of Tibetan Buddhist 
practice. not to mention repositories of knowledge of astrology, medicine. logic. 
philosophy, divination. art, drama, and literature, these individuals' survival was 
viewed as essential to the reproduction of Tibetan culture in diaspora. ln the 
beginning, the CT A assembled monks and lamas (the majority of whom were from 
the Gelugpa sect) at Buxa Duar, a camp in Assam near the border of Bhutan. 
Though initially a transit camp for lay refugees, Buxa Duar became Buxa Duar 
Ashram, a kind of "lama camp," after the lay refugees were transferred to other 
camps and rehabilitation centers. 
Financed by the lndian government, Buxa was home to more than 1,500 
monks until 1968 when the first settlements in southern India were ready to begin 
receiving monks. 7 In 1974, resettled monks from Buxa reestablished the three 
great Gelugpa monasteries (Drepung, Sera, and Ganden) amidst the refugee 
farming settlements in Karnataka. After six years, each monastery had temples. 
assembly halls, and quarters for approximately three hundred monks (Lopez 
1995b:264). Over the past ten years these monasteries have grown increasingly 
overcrowded as China has cracked down on religion in Tibet and large numbers of 
monks and nuns, many involved in pro-independence demonstrations, have sought 
refuge in lndia. 8 According to the Central Tibetan Administration, in 1994 there 
were 181 monasteries with a total population of 17,376 monks and 8 nunneries 
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housing 549 nuns. 9 
In addition to rebuilding monasteries in exile. Tibetan refugees created 
other cultural institutions such as the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives 
(Dharamsala). the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies (Sarnath), Tibet 
House (New Delhi). the Tibetan Medical Institute (Dharamsala). the Buddhist 
School of Dialectics (Dharamsala). and the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts 
(Dharamsala). These efforts were financially supported by the Dalai Lama and the 
CT A. In fact. according to Devoe. cultural preservation and practice were the the 
raison d'etre of the CT A for the first twenty years of its existence. so much so that 
over 30% of its annual budget was spent on institutions and training (1987:59). 
This figure has dropped slightly in recent years as the CT A has concentrated its 
resources on socio-economic development. education. and vocational training (see 
Central Tibetan Administration 1994 ). 
Meanwhile. a new source of financial support emerged in the 1970s after a 
number of high lamas went abroad and founded Buddhist centers. Their success 
was due largely to the coincidence of the diaspora with a period of intense interest 
in Eastern religions in the West. Within a few years. the lamas were able to 
engender a body of Westerners committed both to supporting the continuation of 
the Tibetan religion and to preserving Tibetan culture (French 1991: 196; for a 
history of Tibetan Buddhism in the West, see Fields 1986). A global network of 
dharma practitioners has evolved (what I call a transnational sangha (Skt.) or 
religious community) through which money is channeled back to India. Nepal and 
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Sikkim where it is used to help support Buddhist institutions. 10 
ln her work on long-term gift exchange between Tibetans and donors in 
lndia. Devoe identifies sponsorship. and specifically sponsorship by Western aid 
agencies and individuals. as the key to Tibetans' ability to survive refugee life and 
successfully maintain their cultural and religious institutions in exile. Sponsorship 
in old Tibet was an integral part of social, economic and religious life: lay 
offerings were essential for the monastic community to survive and thus served an 
important social function. ln exile, though religious patronage by lay Tibetans has 
continued, Western patrons have come to play a larger and larger role in cultural 
and religious reconstruction. 
To understand this development. it is important to remember that when 
Tibetans left their homeland in 1959, they entered a world in which representations 
of Tibet as a mystical, otherworldly place hidden behind the Himalayas and ruled 
by a "God-king" had been circulating widely since the 1930s and before. The 
positive expectations created by these images of Tibet shaped the encounter 
between Tibetans and those Westerners who sought to help them in the early years. 
Gombo argues that "because Tibetans were perceived as being an exotic people--in 
addition to being poor, non-Westernized-a large number of governments, 
voluntary and international aid agencies, and individuals took a keen humanitarian 
interest in their welfare" (1985:83) 11 
While doing fieldwork, Devoe (1983) explored how Western agencies and 
individuals constructed Tibetans as worthy recipients of donor aid. Many of those 
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she interviewed expressed a desire for "spiritual association with and understanding 
of Tibetan Buddhists" and described their experiences of working with Tibetans as 
"more rewarding" and "uplifting" (39) compared to work with other groups. She 
found evidence that most Westerners involved with Tibetans felt a strong personal 
and emotional commitment to the refugees. As a result, these donors have 
maintained a long-term involvement with Tibetans in India: 
Many of the international relief agencies involved with Tibetans in 
the early 1960s are still administering and allocating food-for-works 
programs, sponsoring children's education, financing repairs on old-
age homes they might have built years ago, or underwriting hospital 
equipment costs. (Devoe 1987:58)12 
According to Devoe, what most donors hoped for in exchange for their aid was 
continued association with Tibetans and perhaps an invitation to visit them someday 
in Tibet (1983:51).13 
The emergence of new patrons in exile 
At the same time sympathetic Western agencies and individuals constructed 
Tibetans as worthy recipients of donor aid, Tibetans applied their own cultural 
categories to their eager benefactors. As described in chapter 2, relations between 
Tibet and China were characterized by a form of patronage known as mchod-yon, a 
state-level expression of a general patron-client relationship, sbyin-bdag, in which 
spiritual guidance is exchanged for material suppon. 
In old Tibet, sponsorship was an integral part of Tibetan social, 
economic, and religious life. There were two main systems, feudal 
and patron-priest, in which giving and receiving, and returning took 
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place. Essentially, the Tibetan household and local economies relied 
on networks of exchange, "a web of interlocking claims and 
obligations between the giver and the recipient. (Devoe 1987:57) 
Since coming into exile, Tibetans have successfully reinterpreted this social 
relation. substituting Western patrons for traditional Tibetan and Central Asian 
ones. That is, they have interpreted Western donations as compatible with 
traditional sponsorship practices, despite the fact that a lot of the funding has been 
for non-religious projects. 
In exile, then, an unlikely alliance has developed between Tibetans 
hailing from a land long forbidden to all foreigners and literally 
thousands of Westerners who have in varying degrees committed 
themselves to help Tibetans sustain their culture and their religion 
while enduring the refugee context. The value of the support of 
Western donors extends beyond the economic: their donations have, 
from the Tibetan perspective, the quality of offerings sbyin-bdag 
make, given in the spirit of belief, compassion, and encouragement 
for all that Tibetans in their refugee circumstances represent of and 
for old Tibet. (Devoe 1987:59) 
To Tibetans, gift-giving by Western donors in India signified "allegiance to the 
Tibetan 'freedom' cause, moral support and care for the survival of the Dalai 
Lama, the Tibetan government, and, most important, Buddhism" (Devoe 1983:64). 
(This interpretation has been reinforced in recent years by the emergence of a 
transnational network of Western activists committed to the Tibet Movement. 
During the course of my research, I often observed Tibetans use the sbyin bdag 
framework to account for Western involvement with the Tibet issue.)14 
Over time a new meaning for the term sbyin-bdag has evolved: it now 
refers not only to Westerners who support religious projects or lamas (as is the 
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case with Western dharrna students). but has been extended to refer to all Western 
donors. regardless of whether they suppon the clergy or the laity. As Devoe 
points out. "in exile sbyin-bdag is most often used as a label identifying a 
\Vestemer who in any way aids or supports the ordinary Tibetan" (1987:58). 15 
Klieger (1992) argues that this reinterpretation of sybin-bdag to apply to 
sponsors of ordinary as well as to clerical Tibetans is a radical innovation which 
has a number of important implications. First. it means that the only qualification 
for aid is to be Tibetan: "As the monks of old Tibet became appropriate vessels for 
the bestowal of gifts by their old vows, the Tibetan laity qualify for suppon by 
their profession of Tibetanness" (Klieger 1992: 100). As we saw above. 
Tibetanness is demonstrated by remaining a stateless refugee. by not taking lndian 
citizenship. With the help of Western patrons who are committed to Tibetans as 
Tibetans (not just as monks and nuns). even lay Tibetans have had the advantage of 
not having to worry about economic survival which in turn has enabled them to 
"devote most of their time efforts to the great task of remaining Tibetan in culture 
and community, and as individuals" (Devoe 1987:53). 
The second implication of this innovation is that it has transformed the 
traditional relationship between the laity and the Buddhist hierarchy. 
ln refugee society, power and wealth are no longer the exclusive 
franchise of the clergy, but may now be acquired by any lay Tibetan 
individual (or organization) that successfully achieves foreign 
sponsorship. ln many cases, this capital has contributed to the 
success of individual enterprise and lay entrepreneurship. (Klieger 
1992:99) 
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This reorientation of status means that the laity is no longer politically dependent 
on the old structure of monastic bureaucracy. 
By reinterpreting the sbyin-bdag relation in exile, Tibetans have been able 
to cultivate a steady stream of benefactors over the years. 16 What is at stake for 
Tibetans in this process? Klieger suggests that to remain attractive recipients of 
Western aid requires 
a certain level of Goffmanesque impression management by the 
refugees. including the fortification of moral codes of loyalty and the 
necessity of Tibetans to be Tibetans according to Western 
expectations. To be a "good" recipient is a reinforcement to 
maintain the label "refugee" and not assimilate into the host society. 
The opposition between Tibetans and South Asians is thus 
maintained by Western agency. (1992: 104) 
Generally, Tibetans have a positive attitude toward the donor relationship and 
understand it in a Buddhist context. In recent years, however, Tibetan reliance on 
Western patronage has generated criticism within some segments of the exile 
community, especially among young, educated lay Tibetans. According to 
Jamyang Norbu, Western fascination with Tibetan Buddhism accounts for the 
disproportionate concentration of attention and resources on religion in the exile 
community. Their influence, he argues, is basically "obscurantist." Referring to 
early encounters in Dharamsala between Tibetans and Western travellers (in the 
1970s), Norbu claims that 
they patronized everything traditional; the more magical, 
superstitious and primitive, the better. The forces of reaction in 
Tibetan society-in-exile were given a new lease on life. (1990: 15). 
In saying this, Norbu expresses the widespread belief among lay Tibetans that 
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Western patronage has had a conservative, and thus ultimately detrimental. effect 
on exile society through its tendency to support religious institutions at the expense 
of lay organizations and traditions. 17 Western donors are viewed as reinforcing 
older structures of monastic dominance which have become increasingly contested 
in the exile community. 
Norbu's comments underscore the ongoing tension which exists between lay 
Tibetans and Western Tibet supporters, particularly those interested in Tibetan 
Buddhism (see chapter 9). For those who wish to see Tibetan exile society 
transformed along more democratic lines, the cost of accomodating Western 
fantasies about Tibetanness in order to engage Western sponsors is too high. 
Norbu's remarks also point toward the broader issue of what it means to 
incorporate Westerners so deeply into the struggle for Tibet, a question I address 
throughout this dissertation. 
Over the years, the Dalai Lama's and CT A's emphasis on cultural and 
religious reconstruction has contributed to the emergence of a self-consciousness 
about Tibetan culture as a potentially important resource in their struggle to regain 
their country (see chapter 8 for a discussion of this phenomenon). 
The refugee context has provided a chance for Tibetans to 
experience themselves as unique, and to observe how widely sought 
after are the products and precepts of their religion and cultural 
heritage. Not only from within their community but from without, 
from the non-Tibetan world, Tibetans have been encouraged to buiid 
institutions which communicate aspects of Tibetan culture. (Devoe 
1987:61) 
The presence of thousands of Western tourists, journalists, pilgrims, academics and 
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others who have made the trek to Dharamsala since the l 960s hoping to experience 
Tibetan culture firsthand has provided refugees numerous opportunities to 
"reconstruct. reenact. and teach" their culture (Devoe 1987:60). The exile 
government's commitment to teaching young Tibetans in exile about their cultural 
heritage has also contributed to the emergence of a heightened self-consciousness in 
exile. as we will see in the next section. 
Education and the cultivation of diaspora nationalism 
Once in exile, the Dalai Lama viewed education as one of the most important 
means of achieving his goal of "keeping Tibetan culture alive." Thus in l 959, he 
asked Jigme and Rinchen Dolma Taring, well-known aristocrats from Lhasa. to 
devise a program for the education of Tibetans in lndia. The couple opened the 
first Tibetan school in Mussoorie in 1960 (see Nowak 1984; Taring 1970). Soon 
the Council for Tibetan Education was established which facilitated the setting up 
of other schools, including one in Simla and another in Darjeeling. Through 
discussions with Nehru, who, the Dalai Lama recalls, was a keen supporter of 
Tibetan education efforts, another organization under Indian jurisdiction was 
created called the Central Committee on the Education of Tibetan Refugees 
(Nowak 1984:56). Renamed the "Tibetan Schools Society" in 1961 and again the 
"Central Tibetan Schools Administration" in 1969, this organization was (and still 
is) largely subsidized by the lndian government. 
One of the Tarings' innovations-a plan to place every young child in a 
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residential house watched over by a set of foster houseparents-was successfully 
implemented in all the new Tibetan boarding schools (French 1991:196). Whereas 
in the past, education had been limited to monks and aristocrats, for the first time 
in Tibetan history, secular education was made available to lay and monastic 
persons of both sexes from all social classes. Emphasis was placed on giving the 
students a "modem" education (something which, as we have seen. was 
vociferously resisted in old Tibet), but one which would nevertheless "keep their 
hearts as Tibetan as possible" (Jetsun Perna interview). 18 
Since their inception, these schools have played a critical role in creating a 
nationalist consciousness among a new generation of exile Tibetans, one that 
centers on the value of Tibetan culture. In her book Tibetan Refugees: Youth and 
the New Generation of Meaning (1984), Margaret Nowak examines some of the 
processes through which this consciousness is created, focusing on the transmission 
of key symbols of Tibetanness to Tibetan youth in the context of education. The 
most important of these symbols is the Dalai Lama, who embodies the central 
formula of Tibetan politics, chos-srid zung- 'brel, or "religion and politics 
combined" and whom most Tibetans see as a divine living symbol of their history 
and aspirations for the future. While belief in the Dalai Lama's status was given 
for those refugees who came to India as adults, belief in his "sanctity and 
extraordinariness" and his rightful role of leader had to be enculturated into the 
refugee youths" (Goldstein 1978:413), particularly if his reformulated government 
was going to be able to sustain its legitimacy in exile. Nowak argues that this has 
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been very successfully accomplished. For instance, all school children scan their 
day by singing, along with the national anthem, a prayer song composed by the 
Dalai Lama. The Tibetan leader's picture hangs in the front of every classroom. 
and children learn early on to attribute their successes to the .. grace of the Dalai 
Lama." 
Along with a belief in the Dalai Lama. Tibetan school children are caught 
the government-in-exile's version of Tibetan history. i.e., that Tibet was a unified. 
independent country before 1959; they are also taught about the universal value of 
Tibetan Buddhism. Through the tranmission of these ideas Tibet, which is a much 
emptier category for young refugees, becomes concretized as a lost homeland, one 
that is idealized as a spiritual Shangri-la in the past but which has become a land 
full of suffering and destruction since China's occupation. This pedagogical 
strategy, Nowak argues, has an important subjective corollary: 
When children are caught that their culture has such a unique 
potential for worldwide beneficial influence, they are also being 
given the most powerful reason of all to remain Tibetan: self-
esteem, meaningful identity. and even a sense of mission are all 
intrinsic to the self-definition so carefully fostered by the supportive 
Tibetan environment of these schools (1984: 103). 
As a result of the refugee school system, for the first time. a generation of 
Tibetans has been produced which is strongly nationalistic and dedicated to the 
struggle for Tibet's independence. 
As l have tried to suggest in the above discussion, the Tibetans• notable 
success in resettling in lndia has depended in part on Western largesse--from both 
216 
individuals and aid agencies-although the Indian government's policies and the 
resources it has made available to the refugees have also been of crucial 
importance. Tibetans have made sense of the keen Western interest in helping 
them by reinterpreting the traditional patron-client relationship and transforming 
these outsiders into sponsors. Western patronage has reinforced the Dalai Lama's 
goals of cultural reconstruction and bolstered the segment of society most affected 
by the transition to life in exile-the religious hierarchy and monastic community. 
In the next section, I explore efforts by the Dalai Lama to create an alternative 
polity in exile. These efforts entail the transformation of the religio-political 
system along more "democratic" lines and therefore are, by definition, in tension 
with attempts to ensure the survival of religious and cultural traditions that are 
embedded in these older structures and which form the basis of Western interest in 
(and thus suppon oO the exile community. I argue that the contradictions created 
by the divergent goals of cultural reconstruction and democratization permeate 
Tibetan refugee life and must constantly be negotiated and managed. 
Part Two 
After the revolt of 1959. it was driven home to any Tibetan with 
even a minimal appreciation of public affairs, that his old political 
system was clearly incapable of sustaining itself in a modern, and 
what is more relevant, hostile world. For those who escaped into 
exile in 1959, it was abundantly clear that we had to learn from the 
West-one of the most important lessons being democracy. (J. Norbu 
1990: 13) 
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Transforming the polity in exile 
As l discussed in chapter 3, since coming into exile the Dalai Lama has sought co 
reform and democratize Tibetan society. Like his predecessor the 13th Dalai 
Lama. who supported various attempts at modernization before his death in 1933. 
the 14th Dalai Lama recognized early on the need to transform Tibetan political 
institutions if Tibetan society was to survive. 19 However, events quickly overtook 
his intentions between l 950 and 1959 and it was not until after he fled to India that 
the Tibetan leader was able to begin the process of reform in earnest. The first 
step entailed eliminating much of the formal protocol which had so defined his 
office in Tibet. In this excerpt from Freedom in Exile (1990), the Dalai Lama's 
new no-nonsense attitude is apparent: 
... I had a strong feeling that we should not cling to old practices chat 
were no longer appropriate. As I often reminded people, we were 
now refugees. To this end, l insisted that all formality should be 
deliberately reduced and made clear that I no longer wanted people 
to perform the old courtesies. I felt this was especially important 
when dealing with foreigners. They would be much more likely to 
respond to genuine worth if they found it. lt is very easy to put 
others off by remaining aloof. So l was determined to be entirely 
open, to show everything and not to hide behind etiquette. In this 
way I hoped that people would relate to me as one human being to 
another. I also stipulated that whenever I received anybody, he or 
she should sit on a chair of equal height, rather than one lower than 
mine as was customary. At first. even I found this rather difficult as 
[ did not have much self-confidence, but it grew from then on. And 
despite the misgivings of some of my older advisors, I think the only 
people who were discomfited by these principles were occasional 
new arrivals from Tibet who did not know that the Dalai Lama no 
longer lived the way they used to. (Gyatso 1990: 152) 
This attempt to reduce formality was no small matter; it represented the beginning 
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of a process of transformation which continues to shape Tibetan communities 
across lndia and the rest of diaspora. Although this process is a worthy 
dissertation topic in its own right. [ limit my comments here to aspects relevant to 
developing my larger argument about Tibet activism. 
The government-in-exile 
As we saw in Part One, the Dalai Lama established a government-in-exile (the 
Central Tibetan Administration or CT A) soon after he arrived in lndia, dividing his 
former Cabinet ministers and workers into several portfolios, including Home 
Affairs, the Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs, the Council for Tibetan 
Education, the Security Office. Departments of Finance, Health, and Information 
and lnternational Relations were added later. ln 1963, he promulgated a draft 
constitution as part of his aim of introducing democracy to his followers. 
Among other provisions, the constitution provided for free elections of 
people's representatives to the Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD) 
(chitu), a Tibetan parliament-in-exile. The cabinet (Kashag), established at the 
same time, consisted of five cabinet ministers (kalons) who were initially appointed 
by the Dalai Lama but since 1990 have been elected by members of the ATPD. In 
addition, a National Working Committee (NWC) (Rgyun-las thog-chung), the 
highest decision making body of the administration, was created. It consisted of 
elected members of the ATPD, cabinet ministers and secretaries of the various 
portfolios. The NWC meets monthly while the General Body Meeting, which 
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reviews policy matters and decisions. brings together all government officials every 
two years (see N. Paljor 1986 for a more detailed discussion of their functions). 
ln addition. a Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission was established in l 992 and 
represents the judiciary wing of the CT A. Ct is responsible for the settlement of 
cases and controversies of a purely civil nature that are internal co the exile 
community. Still nascent, the Commission intends to create local justice 
commissions in each settlement and circuit justice commissions in six different 
zones. Led by the Dalai Lama. the Tibetan government-in-exile is thus a well-
defined and highly bureaucratized structure. 
Like most exile governments, the CTA's primary political goal is the 
reestablishment of sovereignty in the Tibetan homeland. ln pursuing this end, the 
administration has worked hard co reinforce a sense of historic responsibility 
toward those who were left behind in Tibet-to instill a sense of duty or feeling of 
guilt to impel refugees to work for the cause and compensate their freedom by 
speaking up for those silenced at home. As [ pointed out above, Tibetan schools in 
lndia are among the most important domains in which this process takes place, 
where pride in being Tibetan and commitment to Tibet as a nation are inculcated in 
the young. 
As Yossi Shain points out in his book The Frontier of Loyalty (1989), the 
binding power of exile governments and their leaders is very limited and 
conformity to their rule depends on genuine consent by followers. ln the case of 
the CTA, however, consent is easily obtained from Tibetans because of their 
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devotion to the Dalai Lama and the fact that his claim to represent Tibet is 
basically unquestioned and unchallenged. During the course of conducting 
fieldwork in India in the 1970s. one anthropologist. Antonio Marazzi (n.d.). was 
continually struck by how well Tibetan institutions "work" in exile. Most refugees 
in India live in settlements where juridical matters are settled by Tibetans 
themselves. This is tacitly agreed to by the Indian government. Marazzi found 
that with little possibility of enforcement by Indians or Tibetans of civil laws in 
refugee settlements. the fact that the Dalai Lama and his Private Office hold 
considerable sway over most settlements' internal conflicts plays a key role in 
maintaining the social order. He argues that this is possible because Tibetans share 
a commitment to a particular goal which is represented in these institutions and that 
although they exert indirect and unconscious control over people. they can only 
work if all aspects are undivided: if the political, religious, economic, social, and 
cultural are all perceived as being part of one system. Marazzi suggests the 
smooth operation of these institutions gives us an idea of how religion made the 
system work in old Tibet. 
In terms of unity and cohesion, Tibetans are fortunate to have the Dalai 
Lama and Buddhism as universal principles on which all refugees agree.20 
Having said that, the world of political exile is anything but united, as much time 
must be spent negotiating internal divisions among factions of the exile community. 
Shain ( 1989) suggests a link between the enormous frustration created by exiles' 
limited ability to affect the political situation in their homelands and hairsplitting 
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factionalism: "Denied the ability to engage in meaningful political activity. exiles 
sublimate their frustrations in arid debates about procedures. chaners. and 
constitutions" (44). This is cerr.ainly true in the case of the Tibetans, as the 
canoon by Losang Gyatso (see Figure 9) suggests. ln fact. of all the criticisms of 
Tibetans in exile [ heard while conducting my research, complaints about 
regionalism and sectarianism were the ones voiced most frequently by American 
activists. 
The tendency toward intense regionalism and sectarianism is one of the 
legacies of Tibet's marginally centralized state. Shakabpa (1967) has written that 
the transition to "democratic" exile government has been very difficult due to the 
persistence of older forms of political, religious, and social organization and a 
political style characterized by intertwined and cross-cutting religious and secular 
networks and alliances. At the root of Tibetan regionalism is the controversy over 
the Lhasa government's right to collect taxes from groups in Amdo and Kham. 
many of whom fought tax collectors dispatched to these regions before 1959 
(Devoe 1983: 10). 
One sign of political allegiance to the old Tibetan central 
government in Lhasa was the payment of the various taxes. 
Historically, groups of Tibetans from Amdo and Kham refused to 
pay those taxes, resulting in continuing disputes with Lhasan 
officials, a reputation for belligerance and dissidence, and a 
precarious political unity until the peak of the crisis in 1959, when 
the Khampa warriors of Chushi Gangdruk ... acted as bodyguards to 
escort the Dalai Lama and his entourage safely out of Tibet. (ibid., 
156) 
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1972 the government started collecting one rupee per refugee per month. Known 
as the green book tax or glfzan-sdeb, (which translates as "donations"}, this tax is 
supposedly voluntary but according to Devoe (ibid., 73). individuals and groups 
who do not pay it experience discrimination and a general "renegade" status in the 
Tibetan exile community. 
One of the ways in which the exile government attempts to gain loyalty is 
by mediating the distribution of donor aid. According to Devoe, aid is passed on 
to groups in exchange for their allegiance to the government and steered away 
from those who fail to suppon the CT A. For instance, a large proponion of 
Khampas involved with the resistance movement in Tibet live in settlements with 
their own schools and social services. This tendency for settlements to be 
organized along regional and religious lines has helped create, in microcosm, the 
divisions which characterized Tibetan society before 1959. Devoe argues that 
these settlements have been deprived of donor aid because that aid is controlled by 
CT A bureaucrats who view Khampas and Amdowa as politically suspect in terms 
of loyalty and allegiance. 21 
That is, because of their political dissension and minority status 
amongst the Tibetans in power, they were discriminated against by 
Tibetan offices which screened them, making them invisible to the 
aid agencies working with Tibetan refugees. Loyalty to the 
government became, essentially, an unwritten criteria for an aid 
recommendation. (1983: 10) 
Aid continues to be used as a negotiating tool and control mechanism by exile 
government officials in India and Nepal as Tibetans are "obliged as recipients or 
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potential recipients to show political deference to their own government before 
their needs as refugees will be addressed" (ibid., 161). 
Some Tibetans argue that the way in which voting for the Tibetan Assembly 
is organized has greatly exacerbated the problem of factionalism in exile. Both the 
electorate and the candidates are divided according to which of the three regions of 
Tibet and five religious sects they come from. At one point in the past, an 
experiment was tried whereby all Tibetans voted for candidates from all three 
regions. Khampas found this system unsatisfactory, as they constitute a minority 
in exile and felt that the election of their candidates would be too heavily 
influenced by the electorate of the other two regions (Tibetan Review September 
1984). In recent years, candidates have been fielded on the basis of three regions 
of Tibet and the five religious orders as was the practice before the experiment. 
Amdo, Kham, and U-Tsang regions each have ten seats in the Assembly while 
each of the five religious orders (Gelug, Kagyu, Nyingma, and Sakya lineages of 
Tibetan Buddhism, and Bon) have two seats. In addition, three seats are reserved 
for Tibetans abroad {two from Europe, one from North America) and two seats 
from each of the three regions are reserved for women. 22 See Figure 10 for a 
rendering of the "region and sect-wise profile of the electorate. "23 
The Dalai Lama's experiment with democracy 
To understand the Tibetan leader's decision to "reform" his society in exile, it is 
important to remember that Tibetans fled their homeland at a historical moment of 
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Figure 10 The New Democratic Set-Up 
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decolonization in which many newly independent societies were openly negotiating 
what form their political structure should talce. with many embracing democratic 
and nationalist ideas and discourses. Although for the Tibetan political elite. the 
idea of Tibet as a modern nation-state gained prominence after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911. as Goldstein's history (1989) suggests. the struggle to realize this 
new idea and to modernize Tibetan society faced formidable obstacles. most of 
them posed by conservative monastics. But once in exile. Tibetans encountered a 
world where their traditional style of politicking and alliance-making, such as the 
patron-lama relationship. was no longer viable and they had little choice but to 
adopt a new approach. Recognizing this, the need to challenge China's 
representation of Tibet as a feudalistic society. and the obvious necessity to engage 
the international community on its own terms, the Dalai Lama set about to create 
an alternative polity in exile. 24 
One of the greatest paradoxes of the exile community's experiment with 
democracy is that the desire for reform has come not from the people, but from 
their revered leader. This irony is not lost on Tibetans as Gyatso's other cartoon 
(see Figure 11) demonstrates. The cartoon, which contrasts a crowd in Eastern 
Europe demanding democracy from its somewhat baffled leader with a Tibetan 
crowd looking on questioningly as their leader advocates democracy, pointedly 
notes this irony. Although Tibetans view the introduction of democracy as 
reflection of their attempt to "understand the modern world and deal with it on its 
own terms" (Tibetan Bulletin 1991), most acknowledge that they did not have to 
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fight for their democracy, viewing it instead as a "gift" bestowed on them by the 
Dalai Lama. 
The perception of democracy as a "gift" reveals the persistence with which 
Tibetans continue to view the Dalai Lama as primarily a spiritual figure. We see 
evidence of this in the early years of exile when, instead of reading and trying to 
understand the constitution promulgated by the Dalai Lama in 1963 and distributed 
to each family, refugees put copies of the text on their altars and prayed before it 
every day (T. Wangyal 1982:3). Another anecdote, told by Lodi Gyari, further 
underscores this point and illustrates that many Tibetans, until relatively recently. 
found the notion of democracy and its related concepts such as popular voting, co 
be confusing and obscure: 
A lot of people go into the election cent and just pray co His 
Holiness: "I don't know any of these candidates, but please let me 
choose the right one to help the Dalai Lama and the people." Then 
they close their eyes, put their finger down and ask the election 
officer, "Would you see whose name is here." When they hear it 
they reply, "Oh, it's so-and-so. I'll vote for him." (Avedon 
1984: 108) 
In addition to not understanding popular voting, Tibetans also resisted one of the 
fundamental prerequisites of representative government-that individuals declare 
themselves as candidates. As Lodi Gyari told author John Avedon in 1979: 
"If I go and ask someone to vote for me," continued Lodi Gyari, "it 
would be considered an act of great shamelessness. It's very funny, 
you find this in many Oriental cultures, but we are raised to always 
say, "I am very unable and uneducated." If someone does not 
behave like this, it's considered a clear indication that he has 
personal motives and is not out for the common good. (1984: 108) 
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f n recent years. as a younger generation of f ndia-educated Tibetans have come of 
age. these attitudes toward standing for election appear to be changing somewhat. 
though Tibetan popular elections are still a far cry from those found in the West. 
Critics of exile society argue that most Tibetans still are ignorant about 
what actually constitutes democratic practice. This. some argue, is because 
although the Dalai Lama promulgated a draft constitution in 1963. the exile 
government itself does not follow democratic procedures. The Tibetan people are 
largely kept in the dark about governmental policies. most notably those toward 
China; critics frequently cite the secrecy surrounding negotiating strategies and 
visits by Tibetan delegations to Tibet and China as examples of how 
"undemocratic" the exile government remains (Tibetan Review l979a). As for the 
parliament-in-exile. until l 991. it had no legislative function and could not 
influence cabinet appointments or removals as they were made by the Dalai Lama. 
Since then. however. the ATPD has elected cabinet members and been given 
legislative responsibilities. including revising the constitution. Nonetheless, critics 
claim that Tibetans continue to view it as just another department of the 
government rather than as a body meant to hold the government accountable to the 
people. 
How does the Dalai Lama's insistence that Tibetans learn to be democratic 
play out on the ground? The following anecdote highlights some of the ironies and 
complexities entailed in the Tibetans' political experiment. fn March of 1990, r 
attended an international conference of Tibet supporters held in Dharamsala. fndia. 
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At the opening session, the Dalai Lama addressed the audience, speaking first in 
Tibetan and then in English. While I did not follow his remarks in Tibetan, I 
could tell his tone was impassioned. When he switched to English, he stated 
frankly that he is buffered by advisors who, out of fear of offending him. often 
hold things back or do not reveal criticisms made by outsiders of his government 
and its policies. Noting Westerners' reputation for directness, the Dalai Lama 
appealed to us non-Tibetans in the room to feel free to make an appointment to see 
him in order to share our ideas and criticisms about how the exile government 
could improve ics functioning as well as ics advocacy work for the Tibetan cause. 
According to one long-time Dharamsala resident and activist, making these 
comments in English for all to hear was the Dalai Lama's way of guaranteeing that 
his wishes be respected and insuring that his inner circle would honor his request. 
At it turned out, I videotaped the first part of the conference and thus 
managed to record both parts of the Dalai Lama's remarks on tape. During the 
coffee break, Tibetans discussed what he had said in hushed tones. Preoccupied 
with other matters, I paid little attention at the time to their comments. But upon 
my return to New York, I invited two Tibetan friends who had not been at the 
conference to view the tape with me. When I asked them to translate for me the 
Dalai Lama's Tibetan speech, they demurred, though they asked for a copy of the 
tape to show at an upcoming Tibetan community meeting which I gladly supplied. 
A few days later, one of the Tibetans called me at home and I asked him again 
about the speech. This time, my friend was more fonhcoming. He said the 
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Tibetan leader reiterated his desire to set up a democratic structure for Tibet. 
saying that independence would be hard to gain but that maintaining it would be 
even harder and that the future cannot depend on one person-Tibetans must be 
prepared to run their government without him. Using the metaphor of mother and 
~hild, the Tibetan leader scolded his compatriots, saying that for the last thirty 
years Tibetans had been spoiled and relied on their kind mother-e.g., the Dalai 
Lama-to do everything for them. Warning the audience that he would not be 
around forever, the Tibetan leader urged his followers to learn to stand on their 
own two feet. 25 ln addition, he emphasized that Tibetans should express their 
opinions and learn to speak out without fear of reprisal from people who believe 
such opinions contradict his own. When l asked my friend about the tone of his 
words, he confirmed my impression that the Dalai Lama was upset. l later asked 
another Tibetan friend about the tape and why my friends would have been 
reluctant to translate for me. He suggested they were probably embarrassed, 
though he noted that the Dalai Lama's behavior was not unusual as "lamas 
generally scold their students." 
Encoded in this anecdote are a number of interesting issues, the most 
obvious of which are the difficulty of transforming Tibetan political culture and the 
role non-Tibetans play in this process; they are explored below. 
Reinscribing the polity: The problem of the Dalai Lama's authority 
As I suggested in chapter 3, polities are usually inscribed in an order of being 
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higher than themselves: in the case of the Tibetan polity that order is Buddhism. 
To accomplish his goal of democratization, the Dalai Lama must pull away the 
polity from its inscription in the Buddhist realm. This has proved to be very 
difficult. given that the central legitimating formula of Tibetan politics is one in 
which religion and politics are intertwined, expressed in the phrase chos-srid zung-
'brel- "religion and politics joined together." If, as many anthropologists argue. 
political order and cosmology are inseparable. how can the Dalai Lama transform 
exile society without transforming the religious beliefs which underpin it? 
By the same token. just how culturally mobile are the ideas which constitute 
democracy?26 Assumptions made in democratic theory about the importance of 
the individual, notions of equality, and the kind of subjects needed for widespread 
political participation present a profound challenge to traditional Tibetan ideas and 
beliefs. For instance, how can all individuals be equal when Tibetans see their 
universe as populated by constantly reincarnating tu/kus (emanations bodies) or 
personages who have attained enlightenment but who are voluntarily reborn to 
assist other, less graced sentient beings? The embrace of democratic discourse 
entails accepting a highly un-Tibetan model of a bounded community--the nation-
internally undifferentiated by hierarchy, in which people relate to each other as 
members of a "deep horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 1991: 16) and are 
presumed to be autonomous, individualized, rights-bearing citizens. By contrast, 
pre-1959 Tibet, a "cosmic" or "galactic" polity like the South Asian polities 
described by Tambiah (1976), hierarchically organized diverse cultural and 
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political communities around a dominant center and thus was based on 
fundamentally different sociocultural concepts of political community or society. 
power. personhood. and representation. 28 
The transformation to democracy in exile involves the creation and 
representation of new codes of conduct based on a radically different notion of 
authority. As I suggested in chapter 3. Tibetans view authority as embodied in 
living Buddhas whose power is absolute and whose words have deep religious 
significance. This means the Dalai Lama. who is regarded as an emanation of 
Avalokitesvara (Skt.). the Buddha of compassion. and the protector deity of Tibet. 
has a higher ontological status than ordinary Tibetans. In addition. his actions are 
seen as being for the good of all Tibetans. whereas other Tibetan politicians are 
often perceived as doing things for themselves. their regional group (e.g .• Khampa. 
Amdowa. or U-tsang). or their sect. Thus far. the Tibetan leader has made linle 
headway in changing Tibetans' attitudes towards his authority. as this account of 
the atmosphere of Tibetan politics in the 1980s demonstrates: 
Any statement that in any way could be construed to be against the 
Dalai Lama was pounced upon and its author denounced. and, if 
available. physically attacked. Intellectuals were the prime target. 
A well-organized and extensive official hate-mail campaign was 
launched against a Tibetan academic in Japan, who was alleged to 
have criticized the Dalai Lama in one of his books. Hundreds of 
death threats were sent to him and letters to the Japanese 
government and to university to expel him. For a couple of my 
plays I was also assaulted by a large Dharamsala mob (with the 
inevitable contingent from the Women's Association) and subjected 
to a "struggle" complete with experienced denunciators and the 
rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. All these displays of 
embarrassingly excessive devotion to the Dalai Lama, of hysterical 
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patriotism, and of religious fanaticism was actively promoted by the 
Tibetan government and eagerly taken up by the lumpen element of 
the society, as a convenient means of gaining political prominence, 
and removing people more educated or more qualified who stood in 
their way. Dr. Johnson's observation about patriotism being the last 
refuge of the scoundrel. could, in the case of Tibetans, certainly be 
extended to areas of religious devotion and leader worship. (J. 
Norbu 1990:15-16) 
The son of atmosphere described above is hardly conducive to free and open 
expression of ideas and opinions. as the Dalai Lama himself recognizes. 29 
The Tibetan leader's power is not just linked to his being regarded as an 
emanation of a Buddha; it is also tied to the previous system in Tibet. As a Dalai 
Lama. he is an emanation of Tibet's past whose charisma never dies but is 
constantly reincarnated and legitimated. The incident at the DharamsaJa 
conference where he scolded Tibetans raises the important question of what 
happens when charisma gives away its charisma? What does it mean for the Dalai 
Lama to say that, after he dies, he might decide not to come back; or that he wants 
to step down and relinquish his power to a popularly elected leader once Tibet 
regains its freedom? Like the monarchy in Britain, the Dalai Lama sits ac the apex 
of a hierarchical structure; the ultimate source of prestige, he in fact holds it up 
(Klieger 1992:76-80; see also Hayden 1987). For him to step down is unthinkable 
to most Tibetans; without him the social-political system as it currently exists 
would not make sense. All of which leaves the Dalai Lama in the unique and 
contradictory position of having to assert his authority in order to relinquish it. 
Although the Dalai Lama's leadership within his own community is based 
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on reverence and worship rather than on identification (Aukatsang 1989)-this 
despite attempts to shed his office of some of its formality--his authority on the 
world stage is constructed differently. As Klieger argues, to the non-Tibetan 
public. che Dalai Lama presents contradictory images of himself: 
He often refers to himself as a simple Buddhist monk, yet he is the 
head of the Tibetan faith and presently comes closest to the image of 
a Buddhist pope by his visibility on the world stage. He is both 
human and a god ... a world-renouncing monk. yet a world-
encompassing king as well, as the Buddha was often considered. 
(1992:77) 
Whereas the Dalai Lama was practically invisible in Tibet-appearing only once or 
twice a year in public-he is visible to Tibetans and his supporters in exile (ibid .. 
79). Klieger suggests that this strategy has important ramifications for the Tibetan 
cause: "appearing as a simple monk deflates his opponents who would argue that 
the whole exile effort is nothing more than a vain-glorious attempt of a former elite 
to maintain its privileged position" (ibid., 79). At the same time. by making 
himself approachable and assuming the role of statesman. Klieger argues, the Dalai 
Lama "begins to chip away at the Western myth of Shangri-la, revealing to the 
world the reality of Tibet and Tibetan rights to self-determination" (ibid., 80). 
Furthermore, by reinforcing his humanity, "he reinforces the viability of his 
people--Tibetans exist in the modern world and they wish to exist as Tibetans" 
(ibid., 80). 
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Creating a public sphere in exile 
The notion of a public sphere is tied to that of "civil society" which Craig Calhoun 
describes as "the realm of organized activity outside immediate control of the state 
but not entirely contained within the private sphere of the family" (1994: 190). 
Ideally, civil society includes a public sphere "in which rational-critical discourse 
can take place about how interests of different groups are related to each other and 
to actions of the state." The presence of a public sphere forms the basis for a 
form of authority, Calhoun points out, "that ascends from citizens rather than 
descending from rulers and that presents a range of different identities, interests, 
values, and perspectives on public affairs" (ibid., 190). 
Following Calhoun's definition, it is clear that the creation of a public 
sphere in exile and the transformation of the Dalai Lama's authority are 
inextricably linked. But as Norbu's description of what happens to individuals 
whose opinions are construed to be critical of the Dalai Lama illustrates, these 
intertwined processes have been slow to take hold among refugees living in lndia 
and Nepal. The lack of institutions and mechanisms for political participation in 
old Tibet meant that there were very few fora for open discussion, expression of 
dissent, and evaluation of decision-making processes; public sentiment was 
expressed in communicative contexts other than those of a dialogic public sphere. 
such as rumor and street songs. 30 Street songs that parodied government officials 
in Lhasa are perhaps the closest thing to an outlet for the expression of political 
opinion which existed at that time (see Goldstein 1982). Therefore, since coming 
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into exile. a public sphere for political debate has had to be constructed out of 
whole cloth. The lack of a viable political party structure as well as the relative 
scarcity of secular ideologies circulating in the refugee community. as well as 
intelligentsia to articulate them. have made the creation of a space for open 
discussion and debate especially difficult.31 
Many critics of Dharamsala argue that the government itself actively 
discourages the expression of alternative points of view; for instance. they claim 
that it does not want a truly oppositional voice or political party to emerge and 
challenge its power. 32 It has also been accused of censoring books and writers 
whose views are different from its own. As Jamyang Norbu asserts: 
... it is no easy thing to be a writer in Tibetan society ... The chances 
are. if you are writing anything political in the Tibetan language. 
you will have to publish and distribute your own works. Even then. 
you will have to step wary of the Kashag censors who would not 
hesitate to ban your work for the most trivial of reasons. (1989: 12-
13) 
The government's excuse for censoring books written by intellectuals on Tibetan 
history. to give an example. is that it does so for the sake of maintaining unity in 
exile. 33 Yet as one Tibetan in New York pointed out. while such actions may 
create the semblance of unity, in reality most people do not agree but are afraid to 
say what they really think, a state of affairs reinforced by the government. 
Despite these problems, there are Tibetans, especially younger lay people 
educated in the diaspora, who recognize the need to change exile society if they are 
to fulfill the Dalai Lama's (and increasingly their own) vision of a democratic 
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future. Strides have been made to promote wider political participation in exile 
elections and a number of publications in English (e.g. Tibetan Review, Rangzen) 
and Tibetan (e.g. Man~tso) have become lively fora for political debate and 
discussion. 34 An examination of back issues of Tibetan Review. a monthly 
published out of Delhi. reveals that it has devoted a fair amount of space over the 
years to the issue of democratization in exile. through editorials, articles. and. 
most important, "Letters to the Editor." Since 1990-91, when the Dalai Lama 
expressed a renewed dedication and interest in pushing the democratization process 
forward. ordinary Tibetans appear to have begun to use the discourse of democracy 
more frequently. This in turn has led to an increased self-consciousness about 
internal problems of the refugee community which is expressed through debates 
about democracy. ln other words, the introduction of democratic ideas has given 
Tibetans the means or tools through which to legitimately critique their society 
without risking the censure they might otherwise have faced in the past. 
l suggest that Tibetan activism provides an arena in which Tibetans living in 
the diaspora learn and experiment with democratic ideas. ln Switzerland, for 
example. Tibetan community meetings are important contexts in which the tensions 
engendered by attempts to "be democratic" are negotiated (see next chapter). 
Similarly, Tibet Movement meetings in the United States offer Tibetan activists a 
chance to forego the usual Tibetan political rhetoric, characterized by indirectness 
and obliqueness, and engage their Western counterparts in quiet debate about 
Movement strategy and tactics. Exposure to Western activists no doubt has helped 
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Tibetans to see their own society more objectively and formulate their own 
critiques, even if they do not voice them publically. Indeed, in interviews Tibetan 
activists engaged in sophisticated discussions of the exile community's problems vis 
a vis democratization and reform, demonstrating impressive analytic skills that they 
rarely displayed in public fora. Contrary to my expectations, the majority of those 
with whom I spoke did not criticize Westerners' tendency to voice their opinions 
about the exile government frankly and frequently (e.g., on its factionalism or 
apparent vagueness about its policies). Instead, they claimed Western activists play 
an important role in that they are able to say things Tibetans cannot without risking 
ostracism or outright hostility. 
Conclusion 
l conclude this chapter by arguing that the two central processes in exile described 
thus far--cultural reconstruction and democratic reform-are basically contradictory. 
Efforts to transform the hierarchical religio-political system are in tension with 
attempts to ensure the survival of religious and cultural traditions that are 
embedded in this system and which, as I argued earlier, form the basis of Western 
fascination with, and support of, Tibetans in exile. Tibetans are in the position of 
having to balance the need to attract sponsors and mobilize support based on these 
older (dominant) religious structures with the need to transform political 
institutions according to the Dalai Lama's wishes. Exiles must constantly negotiate 
these contradictions, which run like a thread through exile society and the Tibet 
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Movement. In this dissertation I suggest that one of the ways in which Tibetan 
and Western activists deal with this irresolvable contradiction is by trying to create 
a coherent representation of Tibetanness upon which everyone can agree (see 
chapter 8 for a discussion of narratives of Tibetaness produced during the Year of 
Tibet), one that is broad (or ambiguous) enough to be empty and thus allows for 
agreement. 
As I mentioned earlier, the majority of Tibetan refugees live in India. The 
two largest Tibetan communities outside of Asia are in Switzerland and the United 
States. Though the number of individuals living in these two parts of the diaspora 
is relatively small, each group has made a significant contribution to the exile 
community back in India, both in terms of support for religious and cultural 
institutions and the CT A and in terms of mobilizing Western support for the 
Tibetan cause, making them key "nodes" in the transnational Tibet network. The 
Swiss Tibetan community is especially interesting in that it is actively engaged in 
trying to implement democratic practices advocated by the Dalai Lama. In the 




1. In his autobiography, the Dalai Lama includes the text of a telegram from the Prime 
Minister of India. 
My colleagues and I welcome you and send greetings on your safe 
arrival in India. We shall be happy to afford the necessary facilities 
to you, your family and entourage to reside in lndia. The people of 
India, who hold you in great veneration, will no doubt accord their 
traditional respect to your personage. Kind regards to you. Nehru 
(Gyatso 1990:144) 
See Avedon's summary of India's position on the Tibet issue in 1959 (1984:69-71). 
See also the Dalai Lama's description of meeting Nehru on April 24, 1959 at which 
time it he made it clear to the Tibetan leader that India would not support efforts to 
regain Tibet's independence (Gyatso 1990: 146-147). 
It is worth noting also that this was not the first time the Dalai Lama had met 
Nehru. In 1956-57 the Dalai Lama was invited to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary 
of the Buddha's birth in lndia and the Dalai Lama met the Indian leader on a 
number of occasions then. The Tibetan leader contemplated asking for political 
asylum at that point, but Nehru emphatically urged the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet 
to work with the Chinese under the terms of the Seventeen Point Agreement. Many 
other Tibetans associated with the Dalai Lama, including two of his elder brothers. 
Takster Rinpoche (Thubten Jigme Norbu) and Gyalo Thondup, tried to persuade the 
young leader to stay in India. Eventually the Dalai Lama decided to return to Tibet. 
The political consequences of this decision, and of Nehru's unwillingness to risk 
relations with China by offering the Dalai Lama refuge in 1957, have yet to be 
satisfactorily explored. Perhaps Shakya (forthcoming) includes such an analysis. 
2. This chapter attempts to build on the insights of four anthropologists who have 
conducted extensive fieldwork in lndia since the 1960s: Melvyn Goldstein. Dorsh 
Devoe, Margaret Nowak, and P. Christian Klieger. For descriptions of Tibetan 
refugees in Nepal, see Armstrong 1989, Corlin 1975, Holbum 1975, and Gombo 
1985. 
3. This number, 120,000, has not been confirmed; in fact, many scholars place the 
number of Tibetans living in exile closer to 100,000. 
4. The report estimates that due to a lack of employment opportunities, many Tibetans 
migrate regularly in search of income, largely derived from sweater selling. In 
some settlements, one out of every three adults leaves; in others, the proportion is 
four out of five adults (Tibetan Bulletin 1995). 
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5. For more on refugees from an anthropological perspective. see Daniel and Knudsen 
1995; Malkki 1995b, 1996. 
6. Avedon notes that unlike other Asian nations to which Buddhism had spread. 
Tibet alone contained the entire corpus of the Buddhist dharma; the 
full scope of sutras, tantras, their accompanying liturgy and most 
critically the guru-disciple lineages, founded on oral transmission, 
which served as unbroken links to the origins of the oldest of the 
three world faiths. (1984:92) 
See Lopez l 995b for a discussion of Western scholarly attitudes towards the 
preservation of Tibetan Buddhism after 1959. 
7. In a repon on Buxa Duar Ashram published in 1968 in the Tibetan Review (1(3): I0-
12), an unnamed author writes that 
It is estimated that there were 5,000 monks among the 50,000 
Tibetan refugees in India. Out of these the ones in Buxa represent 
those whose studies for the Geshe degree had been interrupted. 
Almost 753 of the monks at Buxa are below 30 years of age and 
most of the remaining monks are well-known scholars who act as 
tutors. 
Although all the sects and major monasteries in Tibet were represented in the camp. 
the author observes that the majority of the monks belonged to the "big Three," that 
is, Sera, Ganden, and Drepung monasteries. A number of monks from Nyingma. 
Kagyu and Sakya lineages were resettled by their followers in other locations in 
India, Bhutan and Nepal where they eventually built monasteries. 
8. For a recent repon on political and religious repression in Tibet, see Cutting off the 
Serpent's Head, Tibet Information Network/Asia Watch, 1996. 
In a fonhcoming essay, Axel Strom (in press) argues that many of the newcomer 
monks in south India intend to return to Tibet upon completing their religious 
education in exile. 
9. These figures are from the "Tibetan Refugee Community: Integrated Development 
Planll.1995-2000,"p.173. 
IO. Strom (in press) argues that the existence of a transnational sangha enriches the 
institutional context of monasteries in India and is viewed by monks as link and 
entrance to the modern world. One consequence of the emergence of this global 
network is a recognition of the growing imponance of English to monks' education 
as it enables them to connect to sponsors and religious counterparts in the West. 
This point is made clear in an oral history of a monk, Geshe Dakpa Topgyal, in 
Cayley 1994. Referring to changes in monastic education in exile. he says: 
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In these days also it is not sufficient just to have a proper knowledge 
of Tibetan Buddhism. We need to know English well for a 
comparative study of Tibetan Buddhism and Western philosophy as 
well as for learning about other religions, so that we can have closer 
contact between religions and religious leaders. ( 1994: 190) 
11. See Holburn ( 1975) for a description of the types of financial aid provideJ to 
Tibetans between 1960 and 1970. For example. the UN High Commission for 
Refugees donated approximately $700.000 over a period of six years, while the 
European Refugee Council. with assistance from the U.S., Canadian. and European 
governments and voluntary relief agencies. donated more than $3.5 million in 1966 
(739). 
12. Western voluntary relief agencies that came forward to help Tibetans in the 1960s 
include CARE. the International Red Cross. the YMCA, Catholic Relief. the Church 
World Service. the International Rescue Committee. and Save the Children Fund. 
In addition, the governments of Switzerland, Australia. Britain, the U.S., Denmark. 
the Netherlands. and Canada made contributions to the resettlement and 
rehabilitation process. 
13. Devoe (1983) suggests that the return of the westerner's gift is a tacit promise for a 
place in Shangri-la for the donor and for intimate participation in a colorful exotic 
culture. Klieger adds that "many individual donors indeed wish to become part of 
Tibetan society. Both intentions are readily gratified by lay recipients." 
(1992:104). 
14. This phenomenon is perhaps even more noticeable in Tibet itself where local 
Tibetans interpret the presence of Western tourists as evidence of their suppon for 
Tibetans' struggle against their Chinese occupiers; see Barnett ( 1994) and Schwartz 
(1994a) and Klieger (1992). 
15. See Adams (1996) for a discussion of a comparable dynamic between Sherpas and 
Western tourists in Nepal. See also Ortner's (1989) account of Sherpa's historical 
practice of recruiting outside patrons to suppon monasteries in Solo-Khumbu. 
16. For a description of how Western patronage of Tibetans works in the Indian context. 
see Devoe (1983) and Klieger (1992). 
17. Recently efforts have been made to remedy the situation with the founding of an 
organization called Amnye Machen Institute (the term refers to the major mountain 
range in Nonh-Eastem Tibet) is dedicated toward preserving aspects of secular 
Tibetan culture in exile. In its publicity. AMI is described as initiating 
systematic and scientific studies into the history. culture, society, and 
politics of Tibet. It is also initiating studies into the external 
cultures. ideologies, and nations that have influenced the course of 
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Tibetan history: but which have been insufficiently examined until 
now. 
Programs include the fortnightly publication of a Tibetan language magazine called 
Mangtso (Democracy); a translation project devoted to translating English language 
texts into Tibetan; the publication of a literary journal. Jang-zhon (Young Shoots). 
and a Women's Studies project. See Venturino (1995) for a discussion of AMrs 
translation project. 
18. ln a recent report on the exile community published by the CTA. an estimated 803 
of Tibetan refugee children currentl:r are enrolled in Tibetan schools (Tibetan 
Bulletin 1995). 
19. As soon as the 14th Dalai Lama took over his governmental responsibilities. he 
established a reform committee (Legs-bcos tshags-chung) with 50 members and a 
standing committee with 16 members. According to Dawa Norbu (1973). 
the immediate measures of the reform included the total abolition of 
debts with interest which were more than eight years old; and in the 
case of debts less than eight years old. only the original debts were 
to be paid without interest. Greater centralisation of administration 
and the centralised system of taxation were introduced in all Dzongs 
so that there would be no room for exploitation by individual 
officials. ( 13) 
Norbu notes that opposition to these reforms came not from Tibetans but from the 
Chinese who. he argues. felt that if Tibetans carried out reforms in the country by 
themselves. the Chinese communists would have had no ideological justification for 
their occupation of Tibet. 
20. Although the vast majority of Tibetans are Buddhist. there is a small minority who 
practice [slam. Constituting a prosperous merchant class in Tibet before China took 
over. the Kha-che. as they were known in Tibet. fled along with their Buddhist 
compatriots in 1959. Of the approximately 2.000 who escaped. half settled in 
Srinigar. Kashmir. The rest settled in other parts of India or emigrated to Saudia 
Arabia. Turkey. and Nepal. For an interesting description of the history of the Kha-
che. see "Tibetan Muslim Refugees in Kashmir: A special report" in Tibetan 
Review. May 1979: 15-17; "The Tibetan Muslims" by Ngawang Choephel. Tibetan 
Bulletin. October-November 1988: 12-13; "The Story of Tibetan Muslims." Tibetan 
Bulletin. May-June 1990a:28; "Muslims of Tibet" by Masood Butt. Tibetan Bulletin 
January-February 1994: 8-9. 16. 
21. Divisions between the Khampas and the Central Tibetan Administration continue to a 
problem in exile. One of the most recent incidents involved a flap over the signing 
of a controversial agreement with Taiwan's Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs 
Commission (MTAC) by an organization (Chushi Gangdruk. "Four Rivers. Six 
Ranges") which represents the nearly 12.000 Khampas in exile. 
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Chushi Gangdruk's agreement with the MTAC, signed in Bangalore, India in March 
1994 was presented to the Dalai Lama on May 31, 1994 by Athar Norbu. the 
organization's head and one of the most famous guerrilla fighters. In presenting it 
to the Tibetan leader, Norbu claimed it was a victory because it recognized the Dalai 
Lama as a political as well as religious leader. The exile government reacted 
swiftly, accusing Cbushi Gangdruk of acting unconstitutionally and negotiating 
power unto itself. pointing out that no foreign government has the right to confer 
recognition of the Dalai Lama's power on him except Tibetans themselves. The 
incident raised the possibility of Tibetans from different areas making separate 
agreements with Beijing as well as Taipei in the future. and led to small scale 
clashes amongst exiles in India (see Tibet Information Network 3 Sept. 1994). 
Many Tibetans viewed the incident as part of a long history of Taiwanese attempts 
to sow discord and conflict in the exile community. Many exiled lamas, particularly 
from Kham, have accepted Taiwan funds for construction of monasteries and 
temples, and hundreds of Tibetans. particularly in Nepal, have been lured by 
payments to take up educational courses in Taipei. usually involving some form of 
indoctrination into KMT views. The MT AC openly says it supports Tibetan 
settlements, schools, monasteries, and technical training as well as Chushi Gangdruk 
itself. 
22. In an interview in 1990 on the issue of reserving seats for women in the parliament. 
Perna Dechen, vice-president of the Tibetan Women's Association commented: 
Some say it is an insult for a particular group to be given special 
seats. We don't take it as an insult. If this is an insult then our 
whole democracy is also an insult since it was given to us without 
our having to fight for it. His Holiness bestowed democracy on us. 
His Holiness gave the women special seats because he wants to 
encourage women to participate more actively in our political life. 
(Tibetan Bulletin 1990b:3) 
23. In the 1996 election for the 12th Assembly, 102 candidates from across the diaspora 
competed for 43 seats (the Dalai Lama appoints three additional members based on 
scholarship). With the recent founding of the National Democratic Party of Tibet 
(NDPT), whose aim is to make the Parliament based on party-lines rather than 
regional-lines and whose candidates participated for the first time in the electoral 
process, the current system is likely to face its biggest challenge to date. 
24. For a discussion of the embrace of nationalist and democratic discourses in 
contemporary Tibet, see Sperling (1994) and Schwartz (1992; 1994a). 
25. This comment must also be understood against a backdrop of the Dalai Lama telling 
his followers on several occasions that he might not come back, e.g. he might decide 
not to reincarnate after he dies, and thus the institution of the Dalai Lama will come 
to an end. 
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26. For some interesting ethnographic examples of experimentation with democratic 
values and ideas in non-Western contexts, see Calhoun (1994); Comaroff (1994): 
and Mamdani (1992). See also Monshipouri (1995: 15-17) for a summary of various 
approaches to defining democracy and the process of democratization. 
27. Kapferer argues that in egalitarian societies, the individual is the fundamental unit of 
value whereas in hierarchical societies, the world is not constructed out of 
individuals so much as individuals are constructed in an encompassing cosmic 
process ( 1988). 
28. Citing Dumont's contrast between "hierarchical/holistic" and 
"egalitarian/individualistic" societies, Richard Handler has argued that both 
nationalism and individualism share the same epistemology of "entivity." the 
presupposition that groups can be 
bounded by attributes or characteristics that each of its members 
possess, just as an individual is bounded by uniquely possessed 
characteristics. Nationalism thus posits the nation as a collective 
individual-an individuated being rather than a differentiated 
constituent of some encompassing order-itself composed of 
individuated beings related to each other by their likeness" (cited in 
Foster 1991 :253). 
29. During my research, several Tibetan friends of mine on occasion observed that the 
Dalai Lama, while advocating democratization of exile society, nonetheless failed to 
condemn in the strongest of terms the sort of attacks on individuals described by 
Norbu. 
30. As Lomnitz has recently argued vis a vis Mexico: 
Wherever civic discussion and open argument is precluded by the 
asymmetries of power, alternative communicative relationships 
emerge and rumor predominates. (1995:36) 
The fact that rumor is still important in the refugee community in another indication 
of the relative lack of progress made in creating a public sphere in exile. 
31. A small minority of Tibetans did show a passing interest in communism in the 1970s 
after the Dalai Lama said that there were similarities between Marxism and 
Buddhism (see Tibetan Review 1980). And as the years go by, the tiny circle of 
Tibetan intellectuals, educated in exile, slowly expands. Nonetheless. progress in 
creating a more open political culture in exile is painstakingly slow. 
32. See Avedon (1984: 110-114) for an interesting discussion of the exile government's 
notably undemocratic behavior vis a vis the Tibetan Youth Congress in the late 
1970s. 
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33. The Tibetan government has a long history of suppressing intellectuals. Perhaps the 
most spectacular example is Gendun Choepel. the brilliant and iconoclastic historian. 
philosopher, and artist who was accused of treason and imprisoned for several years 
in Lhasa. ln recent years there has been an efflorescence of scholarship on Choepel: 
see Lopez 1995a; Stoddard 1985; H. Karmay 1985; Dhondup 1978. 
34. Margaret Nowak argues that letters and editorials "represent a new vehicle of 
communication" in the exile community. She claims they are a testament to the 
democratizing effects brought about by a "modem" education in that so long as 
Tibetans are functionally literate in English, they "can use this forum to express 
their opinions freely. forsaking the socially obligatory honorifics" of their mother 
tongue (1984:62). 
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Chapter 6 Tibetans in the West: Switzerland and the U.S. 
Introduction 
One of my original goals in designing the research program on which this 
dissertation is based was to trace the contours of the Tibetan diaspora and to 
explore how national context affects the local construction of a transnational 
Tibetan identity and political mobilization around that identity. l decided to focus 
on lndia, Switzerland, and the United States, whose particular political and 
economic characteristics shape Tibetan diasporic communities in distinctly different 
ways. This chapter focuses on resettlement in Switzerland and the United States. 
Approximately 2,400 Tibetan refugees are dispersed across Europe, 
including Norway (40); Sweden (27); Denmark (21); Germany (110); France (90); 
Britain (185); and Switzerland (2,000). By comparison, there are more than 2.500 
Tibetans currently living in Nonh America: more than 2,000 in the U.S. and 560 
in Canada. ln the summer of 1992, I conducted limited field research in 
Switzerland. My immediate aim was to gather comparative data on how the 
Tibetan community is organized and what form activism for Tibet takes in an 
European context; toward this end I visited a number of cities and towns where 
Tibetans live and work, including Zurich, Horgen, Winthenhur, Rikon, Flawil. 
Trogen, Jona, Heitzingen, and Geneva. I also spent time in Lausanne and Sargans 
to talk with Swiss supporters of Tibet, and in Bern, where I met with an official 
from the Swiss Red Cross. The following account of Tibetan migration to 
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Switzerland is by no means exhaustive~ the goal is simply to highlight the 
differences among two diasporic communities and to give a sense of how they have 
been shaped by their host societies. This in turn helps explain the different forms 
activism takes across the diaspora. 
Resettlement in Switzerland 
There have been three waves of migration to Switzerland, all to the eastern 
German-speaking region of the country. 1 The first consisted of a group of 156 
unaccompanied children, average age 6, who were brought to Switzerland between 
1961 and 1964 through the efforts of a wealthy philanthropist and entrepreneur 
named Charles Aeschimann2 (this group is referred henceforth as the "Aeschimann 
group") and adopted by Swiss families. Many were Tibetan orphans and children 
whose parents were not able to take care of them due to the difficult conditions in 
the refugee camps.3 Although their parents willingly left them in the care of the 
Tibetan government, most of the parents did not understand the concept of legal 
adoption and thought their children would come back to India after they finished 
school or their own economic situation improved. Unfortunately the Swiss parents 
thought otherwise, a fact which caused numerous problems. For the first ten years 
or so, the Aeschimann group had little contact with other Tibetan children in 
Switzerland. Raised in upper middle class Swiss families, they were encouraged co 
assimilate and learned to speak, read, and write German fluently. When the 
Tibetan Youth Association of Europe was founded in 1970, one of its goals was to 
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bring dispersed Tibetan youth together and co reach out to those raised in Swiss 
foster homes (see discussion below). 
Meanwhile. the second group to be resettled in Switzerland also consisted 
of children. About 72 of them were accommodated at the "Kinderdorf Pestalozzi" 
(Children's Village)4 in Trogen where they lived in two "Tibetan houses" and 
were looked after and educated by Tibetan "house parents." In addition to learning 
Western skills during the classes in primary and secondary school. the children 
were systematically instructed in the topics relevant to their cultural heritage: e.g .. 
religion. history, and language. During an interview, Rakra Tethong. who lived 
with and taught children at Pestalozzi for many years, recalled the importance he 
placed on teaching his charges to read and write Tibetan and to appreciate Tibetan 
culture. Such teaching was not available to Tibetans living in other parts of the 
country from 1964 until 1975. when language classes began to be taught twice a 
week by adult volunteers in various communities. 
The Swiss Red Cross sponsored the third group of Tibetans who resettled in 
Switzerland. Responding to a call by the International Red Cross to aid the 
neediest refugees still living in India. the SRC "recruited" whole families from 
Kulu-Manali, such as Sonam and her husband (see chapter 4), and transported 
them to Switzerland.s Most of the adults lived in worker's housing near factories 
where they worked doing unskilled labor. While this arrangement meant few 
learned to speak more than a few words of Swiss-German, the fact that they were 
resettled in Heimstiitten or group housing, facilitated the preservation of their own 
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language and culture. Each Heimstiitten had a representative of the Swiss Red 
Cross living nearby whose job was to look after the refugees' needs; usually the 
person was a woman and was referred to by Tibetans as ama-la (mother). The 
number of families varied in each settlement and changed constantly, with the 
arrival of new immigrants and the movement of Tibetans from out of the Tibeter 
Heim (Tibetan home) into their own quarters as they became financially 
independent. 
According to Brauen and Kantowsky (1982), privately organized groups 
collected remarkable amounts of money and influenced public opinion towards 
generous suppon of the Tibetans, culminating in the demand to resettle Tibetan 
refugees in Switzerland. What motivated individuals to panicipate in this venture? 
Some joined out of strong anti-communist feelings, while others identified with 
Tibetans as fellow mountain people or as spiritual beings; still others recall being 
motivated by a general commitment to humanitarianism: 
The "drama on the roof of the world," as the incidents were 
presented to the public in the Western hemisphere by the mass 
media, found, surprisingly, vast interest in Switzerland. Not only 
was the country alerted by this further example of communist 
expansion, as predicted by "cold war" propaganda in the late fifties, 
but the ideological reaction was surely reinforced by some affinity 
between two brave mountain peoples, both living in peace and 
justice, equally menaced in their independence and freedom by an 
atheist aggressor. Following closely upon this motivation, a vague 
enthusiasm for a "Shangri-La" culture of eternal peace and 
extraordinary spirituality may have had its impact on the 
mobilization for Tibet ... Last but not least, the ideal of humanity, 
regarded in Switzerland as a genuine national virtue, had an impact 
on the case of the Tibetans. (Sander 1984: 137) 
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One Swiss person I interviewed recalled that initially some sponsors, namely those 
"alpinists" who felt a "natural sympathy for another mountain people in need." 
wanted to resettle Tibetans in the Alps. import yaks. and have them farm and herd 
in their traditional manner. Not surprisingly, he said. the Tibetans themselves 
rejected this idea as they wanted to be in the valleys where the majority of Swiss 
people work and live. 
Who migrated to Switzerland? According to Robert Ekvall who conducted 
research there in the 1960s. 
they come from every part of Tibet: ranging from the far north to 
the far south and from the borders of China to Ladakh. They 
represent all levels of the social structure: servant sheep herders. 
peasants. nomads, soldiers, traders. headmen, chiefs, officials. 
monks, and high emanation-body lamas. Religiously, they represent 
all sects. (1967: 114) 
While this diversity may have been the case at the time, the number of individuals 
from the upper stratum of Tibetan society is proportionately higher in Switzerland 
than other refugee communities (see Gyaltag 1990). 
How did the refugees fare in their new host society? According to 
anthropologist Antonio Marazzi (1975), the positive stereotypes which many Swiss 
had about Tibet helped the refugees win acceptance when they first arrived. 
Despite their xenophobia, culture of isolation and neutrality, and conservative 
protestantism, the Swiss saw Tibetans as "fellow mountain people" who were 
simultaneously similar to themselves yet exotically different. But since the 1980s, 
the situation for Tibetans has changed as Switzerland has experienced increased 
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ethnic and racial tension with the influx of foreign workers and asylum-seekers 
(Bendix 1993: 16). Tibetans are no longer the only Asian presence: there are now 
thousands of Tamils, Cambodians, Vietnamese, and Laotians in the country as 
well. As a result, Tibetans told me in 1992, not only are they not greeted by their 
Swiss neighbors anymore. they increasingly have experienced incidents of overt 
discrimination and racism. On my first day in Switzerland, I witnessed one such 
incident. It took place at a fair in the town of Horgen, a suburb of Zurich where a 
large number of Tibetans live. As I sat with some Tibetans behind their stall 
where they were selling momos (steamed meat dumplings) and other traditional 
Tibetan food, a Swiss woman whose creperie stall stood next to the Tibetans' 
started making comments about a little Tibetan boy who was playing nearby with a 
plastic gun. The exchange quickly escalated in intensity, with the Swiss woman 
saying that the little boy was very bad and that all Tibetans play with guns and are 
bad people. Later my Tibetan hosts said that such behavior, which would never 
have happened in the 1960s or 1970s, reflected the increased rise in tension 
between "native" Swiss and foreigners which in turn is a direct result of the 
economic problems with which Switzerland has been confronted in recent years. 
Tibetan refugees' experience in Switzerland has also been profoundly 
shaped by the ways in which the Swiss nation-state is constructed. As a host 
society, Switzerland differs remarkably from the United States, for instance, in 
terms of its ideology of citizenship. There are two general principles for defining 
the state, the people, or the nation in legal terms: 
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Whereas the ius soli principle was based on residency within the 
state borders. the ius sanguinis principle was based on a particular 
descent ideology which referred only to those people who were 
defined by a common ethnic background and thus were included in 
the national collectivity. While the ius soli paradigm stresses an 
inclusionary self-understanding of membership. the other model 
exemplifies a notion of VOLK. i.e. a seemingly homogeneous belief 
of a nation or community based on ethnic. religious. linguistic. or 
other primordial exclusionary constructions. (cf. Habennas 1992) 
(DeSoto and Plett 1995: 109) 
Because Swiss citizenship is defined in terms of ius sanguinis. Tibetans and other 
immigrants are not regarded as legally Swiss until they apply for citizenship and 
are accepted by the local Swiss community in which they live. 6 Of course. the 
ideology of citizenship and multiculturalism in the United States is quite different. 
producing strikingly different experiences for immigrants and refugees. Over the 
years. these differences have affected Tibetans' economic opportunities in 
important and interesting ways. For instance, it is much more difficult to 
capitalize on ethnicity in Switzerland than it is in the United States. Emphasizing 
one's cultural and religious heritage, while commonplace in the U.S .• is not 
something ethnic groups benefit or profit from in the Swiss context. During my 
time in Switzerland, I heard many Tibetans complain about the difficulty they had 
in getting permission to open up Tibetan shops or restaurants, whereas in the 
United States, the process for starting your own business and trading on your 
ethnic identity, as it were, is much easier.7 This is especially true in New York 
City. as demonstrated by the fact that it supports four Tibetan restaurants and nine 
Tibetan clothing and handicraft stores (as of 1996). 
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Like all refugee and immigrant groups, Tibetans in Switzerland must 
confront the problem of how to maintain their cultural identity in a new 
environment. The degree to which each group of refugees has succeeded in 
preserving its Tibetanness has varied widely. Unsurprisingly, Swiss scholars have 
observed that loss of language and the "ability to act Tibetan" have been most 
notable with the Aeschimann group (Sander 1984:141; Ott Marci 1976). Although 
the Swiss families responsible for adopting the children were asked to sign a 
contract with the Dalai Lama committing themselves to provide education in 
Tibetan language, culture, and religion, such instruction did not take place (Sander 
1984: 139). As a result, by the rime the adopted Tibetans reached their teens (in 
the lace 1960s and early 70s), many felt deeply alienated from both Swiss and 
Tibetan society. Although they seemed assimilated co Swiss society, they were 
unable co conceal their roots (as Swiss reaction co their exotic appearance proved) 
and would thus never be seen as "Swiss." At the same time, unable to speak 
Tibetan, they did not really feel "Tibetan" either. Torn between two worlds, these 
individuals experienced the greatest conflicts in defining who they were. 8 
The children who grew up in the Pestalozzi Kinderdorf, on the other hand, 
received a bicultural education that imparted "the ability to cope successfully with 
the Swiss environment and a profound Tibetan education as well" (Sander 1984: 
146). When these individuals entered their late teens and early adulthood, they 
were much better able to cope with their hybrid status as Swiss Tibetans than the 
Aeschimann group. 
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For the Tibetans brought over by the Swiss Red Cross and resettled in 
communal homes. maintaining their language and cultural skills was not a problem. 
In fact, the problem was quite the opposite. Their lack of facility in Swiss-German 
combined with Swiss attitudes toward foreigners meant that they had little contact 
with Swiss people (see Ott-Marti 1976; see also Korom 1996). As for the children 
raised in these communities, Sander suggests that 
The Tibetan family provides a homogenous ethnic milieu and 
perpetuates the traditions of Tibet in many respects, but, in general 
gives less incentive for their offspring to adapt optimally to 
conditions of the Swiss way of life. (1984: 146) 
This point was brought home to me during a discussion with a 28 year old Tibetan 
woman who said that despite the fact that she had lived in Switzerland for more 
than 20 years, she did not speak Swiss-German well enough to be able to get a 
good job; instead she cleaned houses for a living. Tibetans raised in the kinderdorf 
and in foster homes, on the other hand, tend to be well-educated and thus have 
found employment as adults in banks and as nurses whereas their counterpans from 
the Heimstiitten tend to leave school earlier and thus have less prestigious jobs at a 
lower income. The young Tibetan woman also told me that her lack of fluency 
inhibited her ability to form friendships with Swiss people. Such isolation is 
particularly noticeable among the elder generation, such as Sonam and her 
husband, who never learned to speak Swiss-German at all. 
Well-educated young women who have good jobs and earn roughly the 
same amount of money as their male counterparts lead much more independent 
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lives than their counterparts in India do. This fact causes great problems. 
particularly in arranged marriages (still a common practice), when these women 
bring Tibetan husbands over from India, most of whom have a hard time accepting 
female independence. As one woman observed: "Those men want us co stay 
home, stay in the kitchen. and most of all. not talk about politics." I was told 
repeatedly that such marriages often do not work out and that it is better if the men 
are from Switzerland and the women from India. 9 
As I argued in chapter 5, the preservation of Tibetan Buddhism has been of 
paramount importance to the exile community. Although Tibetans living in the 
Children's Village at Pestalozzi received some training about Buddhism, they did 
not really have a chance to put any of the ideas they learned into practice. In the 
case of the families dispersed in settlements, while they built altars in their homes 
and continued with their usual rituals, their practice was hampered by the fact that 
there were no local lamas or monasteries. In 1967, however. a Swiss family that 
owned a local kitchenware factory built a monastery in the town of Rikon. 
Longtime Tibet supporters, the Kuhn family was among the first to house and 
employ Tibetan refugees in Switzerland. After construction of the monastery was 
completed, the government-in-exile selected five monks (four Gelugpa, one Sakya) 
from India to run it. Overjoyed to have a religious center in Switzerland, many 
Tibetans nonetheless were disappointed to discover that they would not be able to 
put their children in the monastery, a customary practice in Tibet. Due to lack of 
resources, absorbing and educating a growing body of novice monks was simply 
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not possible for the Rikon Institute. as the monastery was called. Eventually the 
Tibetan community in Rikon started a school to teach Tibetan language. culture 
and religion to their offspring which was taught by monks from the Institute. 
While visiting Rikon in 1992. I observed one such class and interviewed one of the 
monk-teachers. During classes. which are held on Wednesday and Friday 
afternoons. children are taught to speak Tibetan and recognize the various scripts; 
they also learn about Tibetan history and Buddhism. When asked whether any of 
his students (he has taught at Rikon for more than twenty years) had ever pursued 
their studies of Tibetan culture or religion further, the monk said no, but that two 
children from other settlements had tried to become monks. They studied in lndia 
for a few years but eventually returned to Switzerland. He lamented the loss of 
the revered role monks played in Tibetan society, noting that most of those who 
seek to become monks in Switzerland are Swiss, not Tibetan. Although Tibetans 
could not place their children under the monks' care in Rikon, the monks did 
recognize an adopted child (from the Aeschimann group) as a reincarnate lama. 
This was very important to refugees at the time (the late 1960s) as it was a sign 
that their religious culture was being reproduced in Switzerland (Marazzi n.d.). 
Organizing and democratizing the Swiss Tibetan community 
One of the things that struck me immediately upon my arrival in Switzerland was 
how well organized the Tibetan community is compared to the one in the United 
States. When the first Tibetans arrived in Switzerland, they were accompanied by 
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an aristocrat named Phala who was sent to represent the Dalai Lama in Europe. 
The former Secretary General (Drung-yig-chen-mo) in Tibet. Phala played an 
important role in Tibetan politics during the 1950s, acting as a confidential link 
between the Dalai Lama and the Khampa guerrilla forces. After being sent to 
Switzerland, Phala formed an Office of Tibet (OOn in Zurich which he headed 
until his death. 10 Today the Office coordinates activities in Switzerland as well as 
other countries in Western Europe. One of these activities is a monthly meeting of 
the heads of the main Tibet organizations in Switzerland; these include the Tibetan 
Community of Switzerland (TCoS), the Tibetan Youth Association (TYA), the 
Tibetan Women's Association (TWA), and the Swiss-Tibetan Friendship 
Association (STFA). There are also regional organizations (based on regions in 
Tibet, e.g. Amdo, Kham, U-Tsang, and Ngari) which are branches of ones based 
in lndia: U-Tsang Central Executive Committee; Toepa Welfare Association, 
Dorney Central Executive Committee, and Chushi Gangdrug. However, unlike in 
lndia, these organizations play no political role in Switzerland, serving mainly a 
social-cultural function. 
The organization, the Tibetan Community of Switzerland (TCoS), 
represents the largest community of Tibetans outside the lndian subcontinent. 
There are 1,800 official members and another 200 unofficial members. An 
umbrella organization, TCoS is composed of twenty-one sections which are located 
in various Tibetan settlements across Switzerland. Each section holds a meeting 
once a month for its own members and leaders are elected to represent their 
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communities at TCoS meetings. These representatives, together with the heads of 
the TWA. TYA. OOT. and the Swiss representative to the ATPD. constitute a 
comminee that organizes community-wide activities such as demonstrations and 
holiday celebrations. In an interview. the president of the TCoS stated that the 
organization's main aim is to "keep Tibetans together. keep the identity of Tibetan 
culture together." Toward this end "schools" have been started in eleven sections. 
taught by what he called the "new generation" (e.g., Tibetans who are 
approximately eighteen years old). The TCoS is supported through income earned 
at festivals, such as the Dalai Lama's birthday and Democracy Day (see discussion 
below). 
The other main organizations, such as the Tibetan Women's Association. 
the Tibetan Youth Association, and the Swiss-Tibetan Friendship Assocation serve 
specific constituencies. For example, membership in the Tibetan Women's 
Association, a branch of the main organization headquartered in Dharamsala, 
consists entirely of married women (younger single women join the Tibetan Youth 
Association). The Swiss-Tibetan Friendship Association, on the other hand. is a 
bicultural support group geared toward educating Swiss people about Tibetan 
refugees and the Tibet issue. 
The Tibetan Youth Association (Verein der tibeter Jugend) is by far the 
most visible and important organization in Switzerland in terms of Tibet activism. 
ln an article published in the Tibetan Review in 1985, Kelsang Gyaltsen wrote 
about the lack of drive on the part of Tibetans during the 1960s in Switzerland: 
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the overall picture of these years is marked by a striking lack of 
hope, aspiration. and organization. This situation lasted until the 
late 1960s when gradually a process of search for one's own origin 
and national identity took place among growing number of Tibetan 
youths in their late teens and early twenties. ( 15) 
The emergence of an interest in democracy and nationalism, facilitated by 
education and contacts with the outside world, inspired some enterprising young 
Tibetans to found a youth organization in 1970. With help from Mr. Phala and che 
Office of Tibet in Switzerland, Gyaltsen writes, all the groups in Switzerland and 
Europe were put in touch with one another and youth festival was held in April 
1970. At the festival, attended by a hundred young men and women from across 
Europe, the Tibetan Youth Association of Europe was founded. TYA 's initial 
goals were to raise funds to support the exile community in India, focusing on the 
Tibetan Youth Congress, which was headquartered in Dharamsala, and the elderly. 
During the 1970s, the Aeschimann group was very active in TYA. Over time their 
participation faded somewhat, so that by 1992 I was told only two individuals were 
still involved. One of the reasons the adopted Tibetans flocked to TY A was due to 
its language policy, which was to try to conduct meetings in Tibetan if possible. 
but if not, to use German. None of the other Tibet groups at the time shared this 
policy, ruling out participation by the non-Tibetan speaking Aeschimann youths. 
Over time, TYA 's agenda has evolved somewhat, with greater emphasis 
now placed on political activities such as organizing protesters to sit outside the 
U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities in Geneva 
in August every year. 11 Lately emphasis has been placed on teaching Swiss 
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Tibetans about the democratic process. For example, while I was in Switzerland 
in 1992, a weekend seminar on democracy was organized for TYA members. The 
President of the TYA board, a female lawyer who had been raised in Pestalozzi 
Village, told me that she proposed the seminar because Tibetans "don't really 
know what democracy is." Her goal was to help TY A members learn something 
about the structures and conditions which must be fulfilled in order to have a 
democratic set of institutions. At the seminar, it was decided that participants 
would visit every section on a rotating basis in order to share with other Tibetans 
what they had learned. 12 
This newfound self-consciousness reflects the Swiss Tibetans' response to 
the Dalai Lama's challenge to Tibetans to reform their society. It is interesting to 
note, however, that when the Dalai Lama visited Switzerland for the first time in 
1973, his attempt to put his ideas into practice shocked and dismayed his fellow 
refugees. In an effon to treat people less formally and more "democratically," he 
greeted Swiss Tibetans with handshakes and pats on the back. According to a 
Swiss informant, his strategy failed miserably. 
You see, when the Dalai Lama came here the first time he was 
formally instructed, obviously. There were all his countrymen, 
bowing deeply and respectfully, not looking directly in his eyes as 
they used to do, and then it was [whispers) horrible, he not only 
shook their hands but also patted them ... lt was like an assassin, you 
see, they hadn't expected it at all, and they didn't want it, it was like 
a cold shower, they suffered. He was told that everybody is equal, 
democratic, and your behavior, your Holiness, should be more 
democratic. Nevertheless it was wrong among his own people! By 
the second time he came to Switzerland it was gone, absolutely 
gone. 
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Despite their initial reception to the Dalai Lama's "democratic" overtures. as a 
group Swiss Tibetans have vigorously embraced democratic discourse in recent 
years and have sought to incorporate democratic procedures in the way their 
community functions. The task has been made much easier by the fact that many 
of the current leaders are products of the Swiss educational and political system. 
the latter of which is notable for its commitment to procedural democracy. 13 
During the course of my research, I collected numerous anecdotes about the 
obstacles Swiss Tibetans face in trying to implement democratic practices. Most of 
the stories center on issues that Swiss Tibetans believe signify how democratic they 
are-e.g., how "talk" is managed in meetings. 14 The notion that some Tibetans 
"do not know how to talk" in community meetings, especially members from the 
elder generation, came up repeatedly in informal conversations and interviews. As 
the president of the TCoS (I'll call him Thubten) lamented, "Meetings are hard to 
control, if someone wants to speak. they speak." The result, he observed. is tha! 
some meetings can be "endless." He cited an incident where an older man wanted 
to read a six-page prepared speech at a meeting devoted to debating the upcoming 
assembly elections in India. As president, Thubten's role was to move things 
along but when he tried to "wrest control away from this guy, he protested about 
his right to freedom of speech." Whenever Thubten, who is in his late thinies. 
cannot attend a meeting, the vice-president, who is much older, chairs it for him. 
"Afterwards," Thubten laughed, "I always hear that the meeting took much longer. 
So we have this problem with our older generation." 
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This fact became obvious to me during the annual Tibetan Community of 
Switzerland meeting which is held every August. The meeting lasted seven hours. 
with speeches by the Dalai Lama's representative, the Foreign Minister who 
happened to be visiting at the time, reports by the heads of all main organizations. 
a lunch break, and an hour and a half of questions and answers. During the q/a 
session, l noticed big differences between the way younger Tibetan men (all those 
who asked questions were male) and older Tibetan men held themselves and 
addressed the speakers onstage. The younger Tibetans stood with their hands on 
their hips whereas their elders acted quite deferentially. About half-way through 
the q/a session, a man who appeared to be about sixty years old stood up and 
asked a question. He spoke for quite some time, during which my translator. 
Karma, stopped making notes about what he was saying. Whispering, l asked him 
why he had stopped; exasperated, Karma exclaimed "because he doesn't know how 
to talk!" Apparently the man was complaining about having to pay Swiss taxes. an 
issue first raised in the 1970s but long since settled. Later I discussed the incident 
with a man who was president of the Tibetan Community for several years in the 
1980s. When I asked about the different speakers at meetings, he said: 
there are two kinds of older people speaking: some who are very 
religious and who believe all human beings are equal and deserve 
respect. We should keep this habit. Then there are those who 
express themselves so respectfully out of a habit of deference to 
aristocrats. This we should get rid of. Then there are the young 
people who copy stereotyped Western ways of expressing 
themselves. They are proud, and so on. This is good for the 
second group of people who are too deferential. Some people don't 
know how to express themselves properly, so they repeat 
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themselves. On the other hand. some people don't understand the 
agenda of the meeting. they calk outside the concrete agenda. This 
is a real problem. But if we interrupt them. they will feel they are 
being denied the right to speak. 
On another occasion. [attended a meeting to plan "Democracy Day." a Tibetan 
holiday marking the anniversary of the establishment of the Assembly of Tibetan 
People's Deputies and the problem of how to control or limit the length of 
speeches during the "open mike" session came up. One person. representing the 
Office of Tibet. assuming that speakers would go on too long. suggested having 
participants submit their texts beforehand for approval. This idea was immediately 
rejected by others at the meeting who said that this would be seen as an attempt co 
control people's right to speak. 
The issue of talk at meetings underscores the gap between different 
generations in Switzerland and is an example of the kind of intergenerational 
negotiating that takes place in contemporary Swiss Tibetan life. As Gyaltag (1990) 
points out in his study of Swiss Tibetan families. the hierarchical familial structure 
has changed in exile as younger children surpass their parents' language facility 
and understanding of the outside world. Unfamiliar with their parents' life 
experiences. children increasingly lose respect for their parents· status as elders. 
Taught to be critical and to question things, Tibetans educated in Swiss schools 
unsurprisingly have very different attitudes toward authority, a fact which is 
reflected in their comparatively undeferential behavior in public settings. 
As would be expected. activism on behalf of Tibet takes a particular shape 
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which reflects certain characteristics of Swiss society. For instance. due to an 
intense dislike of disorder and noise that usually accompanies demonstrations. 
Swiss people generally do not suppon or like to participate in demonstrations for 
Tibet. Police are frequently asked to intervene in order to quiet demonstrators 
down: neighbors of the Chinese consulate complained so much about Tibetan 
protests after 1987 that demonstrators were asked to move their protests to Bern 
instead, a fact that made it much more difficult for Swiss Tibetans {none of whom 
lives in Bern) to participate. Uncomfortable with American-style grassroots 
activism, Swiss sympathizers instead prefer to attend cultural events and to donate 
money to Tibetan organizations. 
Swiss Tibetans have adapted their strategies to the limitations and realities 
of Swiss political life in interesting and distinctive ways. For example, the 
community's receptivity to democratic discourse has enabled certain of its members 
to play an important role in Tibet activism that takes place in the global arena. By 
this I mean that as an emphasis on intervention in international political fora has 
emerged within the Tibet Movement, certain Swiss Tibetan activists, drawing on 
their knowledge and/or interest in democratic and related legal discourses such as 
that involving human rights, have become eager and skilled participants in Tibetan 
delegations. The fact that a number of United Nations Commission and 
Subcommission processes take place in Geneva (or other parts of Western Europe) 
has further enabled and enhanced such participation. I explore this point in the 
next chapter, which examines the emergence of the Tibet Movement after 1987 and 
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argues that the Swiss Tibetan community's size, organization, and resources have 
helped make Switzerland not only a key "node" in the Tibetan diaspora but in the 
Tibet Movement as well. 
The next section introduces the Tibetan community in the United States. 
another important "node" in the diaspora and the Tibet Movement. 
Tibetans in the United States15 
The history of Tibetans in the United States is very poorly documented. This is 
not surprising, given the community's extremely small size (until 1992 there were 
only 500-600 in the entire country) and the fact that it is dispersed into small 
groups and community leaders have seen little reason, until recently, to document 
it themselves. 16 However, with the arrival of one thousand new Tibetans and 
their families who have been allowed to emigrate to the U.S. under legislation 
passed by Congress, the size of the Tibetan community, and the amount of 
documentation, has increased dramatically (e.g., see The Tibetan U.S. 
Resettlement Project. Inc.: A selection of noteworthy anicles. 1990-1992 ( 1993)). 
The 500-600 Tibetans who arrived in the U.S. before 1992 were 
predominantly male and settled either in the New York-New Jersey area or on the 
West Coast. Many (though by no means all) were from high status backgrounds 
and well-educated. The fact that they came as refugees, largely through private 
means and connections, distinguishes them from the "second wave" of Tibetans 
who staned arriving in 1992 (and continue to do so) under the auspices of the 
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Tibetan-U.S. Resettlement Project (TUSRP). As members of an organized 
resettlement effort, these second wave Tibetans have a different status from the 
earlier generation of refugees in that they have entered as permanent resident 
"green card" holders with full work authorization and have had employment and 
housing arranged for them by American sponsors in a number of "cluster sites" 
around the country (see Figure 12). 
The first Tibetans to visit the U.S. were members of a Tibetan government 
trade delegation led by the late Tsepon Shakabpa in 1947 (see Goldstein 1989 for a 
discussion of the political implications of this visit; see also Shakabpa 1967). 
However, the first Tibetans to become permanent U.S. residents were Telopa 
Rinpoche, who was invited by Johns Hopkins University in 1948, and the Dalai 
Lama's elder brother Thubten Jigme Norbu, his friend Dhondup Gyaltsen, and 
Philip Ladenla, who emigrated in 1952 (Dharlo 1994:12; see Norbu's 
autobiography, Tibet is My Country, 1986). 17 In 1960, several members of the 
Sakya clan, including Sakya Dagchen Rinpoche and Dezhung Rinpoche, arrived in 
Seattle at the invitation of the University of Washington where they were asked to 
be informants for a research project. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, a 
project which produced a number of publications (see Tibet Studies Bulletin 
1976). 18 
The government-in-exile opened an "Office of Tibet" in 1964 in New York 
City for the sole purpose of lobbying for resolutions at the UN. It was staffed by 
several Tibetans, including the former Foreign Secretary of Tibet, Thubten 
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Tibetan Communities in North America 
No. Community Population (approx.) 
Canada (600 J 
l. Alberta 100 
2. British Columbia 100 
3. Ontario 300 
4. Quebec 75 
5. Winnipeg 25 
United States ( J ,970) 
l. Albuquerque, NM 40 
2. Amherst. MA 50 
3. Austin, TX 20 
4. Boise, ID 20 
5. Boston, MA 90 
6. Boulder/Denver, CO 35 
7. Burlington, VT 25 
8. Charlottesville, VA 20 
9. Chicago, IL 100 
IO. Connecticut 30 
I l. Ithaca, NY 30 
12 .. Los Angeles, CA 150 
13. Madison. WI 120 
14. MinneapoliS/St Paul, MN 200 
15. Missoula, l.VIT 20 
16. Ohito/Michigan 20 
17. New York/New Jersey 300 
18. Portland, OR\SW WA 150 
19. Salt Lake City, UT 80 
20. San Francisco, CA 150 
21. Santa Fe, NM 30 
22. Seattle, WA 100 
23. St Louis, MO 20 
24. Washington, DC 70 
Others (USA) 100 
Total: 2.570 
(Sour:e: TCAP) 
Figure 12 Tibetan Communities in North America 
Tibetan Review, October 1994 
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Liushar, who represented the Dalai Lama in Nonh America. At this time there 
were approximately 20 Tibetans in the country (Dharlo 1994: 12). Three years 
later. the number grew as a group of six Tibetans were brought over to work as 
woodcutters for che the Great Northern Paper Company in Portage, Maine (see 
Dale 1969:42). Their success led to the immigration of another 21 men in 1969. 
followed shortly by several wives. By 1971. the community in Maine consisced of 
20 bachelors. four married couples, and two infants, for a total of thirty 
(Messerschmidt 1976:49; see also Dharlo 1994:12). 
The Tibetan lumberjacks found the work difficult and Maine's climate coo 
cold, particularly in winter. Many were relieved when, in reaction to a business 
recession in 1971, Great Nonhern 
agreed to release from their employ any Tibetans who sought and 
found work elsewhere. The first to leave were those with English 
fluency and/or contacts in other states (primarily among other 
Tibetans and Mongolian immigrants on the East Coast). Some 
others called on their few American acquaintances for help. Within 
a few months, all of the Tibetan loggers had gone. Seventeen 
moved to the West Coast, fifteen of whom settled in Washington and 
Oregon. (Messerschmidt 1976:65)19 
Meanwhile, by the 1970s, Buddhism had caught on with Americans. Tibetan lamas 
started to come over to set up dharma centers, bringing with them translators and 
students, many of whom ended up becoming permanent residents. 20 Most of 
those Tibetans who emigrated during this period did not contact the Office of Tibet 
in New York; for this reason, and because they were scattered across the country. 
the Office did not have a proper headcount or record of addresses of Tibetans in 
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the U.S. until the mid-1980s (Dharlo 1994:13). By then, however, the Tibetan 
community became increasingly well-organized with the establishment of 
community organizations known as "Tibetan Associations" in New York and the 
Portland, Oregon area. Since 1992, with the arrival of so many new Tibetans. 
Tibetan social and cultural organizations have proliferated. There are now a total 
of twenty-four Tibetan Associations, one in each cluster site. as well as 
approximately fifty other Tibet-related organizations, ranging from dance troupes 
to NGOs dedicated to lobbying for the Tibet issue in Congress (see chapter 7). 
Prior to 1992, the community was so small, dispersed. and composed of so 
few families that the issue of maintaining Tibetan culture in an American context 
had little meaning; those who were here focused their attention on regaining their 
homeland or just surviving. 21 But with the influx of so many new people, 
including families, the community has numerically reached a critical mass such that 
cultural preservation has taken on much greater importance to the community at 
large. In fact, whereas the issue was rarely discussed in the past, there seems to 
be a much greater degree of self-consciousness about it today among both first 
wave and second wave Tibetans. In a recent paper, Marcia Calkowski (1995) 
points out that classical and traditional folk arts have received very little official 
recognition from Tibetan organizations or the exile government over the years (see 
discussion in chapter 8). But faced with American expectations about their being 
"representatives" of Tibetan culture, the new arrivals have demonstrated some 
anxiety about being able to perform their ethnicity appropriately. As a result, a 
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grant was recently given to a San Francisco-based Tibetan performing arts 
organization called Chaksampa that enabled its members to travel to each cluster 
site to teach the new immigrants Tibetan folk dances and music. 22 According to 
Calkowski, the new arrivals view these workshops as opponunities to learn dances 
and songs they never learned in India, skills they hope will help them communicate 
their Tibetanness to American hosts. The irony of this situation is perhaps only 
matched by the fact that in many proposed cluster sites, Americans clamored for 
the opponunity to be "sponsors." a role that involved helping the new immigrants 
find employment, housing, and anything else that would make their transition to 
life in the U.S. easier. ln some places there were more willing sponsors than 
Tibetans needing assistance. These two examples reveal how profoundly positive 
stereotypes and expectations attached to Tibetans have mediated their experience in 
the U.S. They also underscore how differently Tibetans have been received 
compared to other Asian refugee groups (see discussion below). 
The Tibetan community in New York 
ln this chapter, l describe the Tibetan community in New York as l experienced it 
during the course of my fieldwork (1990-1993). lt is important to note that with 
one or two exceptions, my contact was limited to Tibetan activists from the first 
wave of migration, the majority of whom were male. There are a number of 
reasons why I did not get to know many Tibetan women, not least of which is the 
fact that until very recently (e.g., 1994-95), there were only four or five from New 
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York who actively participated in the Tibet Movement. 23 Of course, many more 
Tibetan women attend community events such as parties. picnics, and the annual 
March lO demonstration in front of the United Nations, but without a regular 
context in which to get to know them, I found it hard to establish the same kind of 
relationships with them as l had with some of the male activists. 
A large proportion of Tibetans in New York (and the U.S. in general) 
speak English which they learned in school in lndia. Many speak other languages 
as well, including Hindi, Nepali, and in some cases, Chinese. The New York 
community can be divided into two groups: those here legally and those who have 
overstayed their tourist visas and are thus "illegal." Those who are here illegally 
tend to work in low wage jobs such in restaurants (e.g., bus boys, dishwashers). 
Those who are here legally work in a number of areas, including social services, 
hotels, banks, education. and health care. Some families have used their business 
acumen, for which Tibetans are famous, to start their own shops or restaurants. In 
addition, there are a number of lamas who survive by teaching the dharma to 
Western Buddhists and students, many of whom have come to the U.S. under the 
recently-established Fulbright program for Tibetan refugees. 
My first exposure to the Tibetan community in New York City took place 
in 1989 at a March 10th demonstration commemorating the 1959 uprising in 
Lhasa. Before that time I had met two Tibetans through friends but had never 
before attended a community event. As it so happened, I was enrolled in a 
documentary film production course that semester and decided to videotape the 
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protest. When I arrived with my crew. there were already between 250 and 300 
people gathered in Ralph Bunche Park across from the United Nations. People 
carried brightly colored Tibetan flags and posters and chanted "China out of Tibet" 
and "Long live Tibet." There were a few reporters sprinkled among the crowd of 
Tibetans and Americans as well as one celebrity-actor and Buddhist Richard Gere. 
At my cameraman's urging, I approached Gere and asked if I could interview him 
briefly. He agreed and I asked him a few questions about why he was there and 
what demonstrators hoped to achieve. Meanwhile, after chanting off and on for 
about two hours, demonstrators walked across Manhattan on 42nd Street and up 
Broadway to the Chinese consulate on 66th Street. They stood across the street 
from the large building for about half an hour (the most time NYPD would allow). 
shouting slogans at the top of their lungs. Many of the Tibetan women had tears 
streaming down their faces and some Tibetan men got dragged away for trying to 
burn a Chinese flag. The overall effect was one of intense emotion and 
frustration, made worse by the fact that Tibetans could see consulate employees 
peeking out from behind curtained windows, taking photographs of the crowd. 
Back in the editing room, as I looked at the footage, I thought about how motley 
the crowd was which had turned up for the demonstration. In addition to 
celebrities like Gere, there were long-haired hippie types rubbing shoulders with 
solemn-faced Tibetan monks wearing crimson robes (and hats to keep them warm). 
neatly combed Tibetan men in raincoats next to blond haired American women 
wearing traditional Tibetan hats lined with fur. This crew, which struck me as so 
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incongruous at first, became very familiar over the next three years. 
March 10th is one of the few days of the year which brings all New York 
Tibetans together. :?4 The other days on which the Tibetan community congregates 
include the Dalai Lama's birthday (July 6). Losar (Tibetan New Year). and 
December 31 (Christian New Year). Given the community's small size. there is 
no Tibetan enclave in the city, though journalists like to refer to the area around 
Third Avenue and 3 lst Street as "Little Tibet" because it is near a Tibetan 
restaurant and apartment building housing approximately twenty Tibetans. There 
are no monasteries in Manhattan (though there is one in Washington. New Jersey) 
and the small Tibetan Buddhist centers that do exist serve a Western rather than a 
Tibetan clientele. lf the Tibe~n community can be said to have a focus. it is a 
brownstone on East 32nd Street. 
With the purchase of the brownstone in 1991, the Tibetan community 
acquired a place where members could formally gather and hold small meetings, 
parties, even religious ceremonies. 25 Previously, the Tibetan government-in-exile 
had rented a single-floor office in a small, nondescript building which was shared 
by the Dalai Lama's representative, the Tibet Fund (a Tibetan NGO), and Potala 
Publications. This was known as the Office of Tibet. 26 Cramped, messy, and 
smoke-filled, it could not easily accomodate crowds of any size. By the late 
1980s, it was time to find more spacious quarters to suit the expanding local 
community. With help from the CT A and various Tibetan and American donors, 
Tibetans were eventually able to buy the recently renovated three-story building. 
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l became very familiar with the building, which actually served a dual 
purpose-as a working space for Tibet activists and representatives of the 
government-in-exile as well as a place for formal community gatherings. In 1991. 
the first floor contained a reception area/bookstore, a room suitable for meetings. 
receptions, or panies, a kitchen, and a veranda in the back. Office space on the 
second floor was shared by the Tibet Fund, the exile goverment's press officer. 
and the Dalai Lama's representative to Nonh America. Tibet House (see chapter 
8) occupied the third floor. At that time, basement offices were used by the U.S. 
Tibet Committee (USTC) and the U.S. Tibetan Resettlement Project. 
Compared to their Swiss Tibetan counterparts, Tibetans in the U.S. are 
much more loosely organized. There are three main Tibetan organizations in New 
York: the Tibetan Association (TA), the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA). 
and the Tibetan Youth Association (TYA). Every refugee is automatically a 
member of the Tibetan Association, whether or not he or she pay dues. In New 
York, the Association is responsible for organizing community events such as the 
annual Tibetan New Year party; it is entirely self-funded and charges admission 
fees at each of its events to cover its costs. Finding people to serve as president 
and vice-president is a perpetual problem, one Tibetan man told me, with the same 
individuals being nominated and elected over and over again. 
The Tibetan Women's Association, a branch of the main organization based 
in Dharamsala, faces similar problems due to the small number of Tibetan women 
in New York. Interestingly, the organization has much the same profile as it does 
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in Switzerland, meaning that it is viewed as something for older, married women 
to participate in. When I asked one young women about it she said: 
Because the Tibetan Women's Association in India, l always thought 
it was for older society types, especially in the town where I come 
from-Kalimpong and Darjeeling-all the wealthier society type 
Tibetan women are members of Tibetan Women's Association. 
Despite its reputation among younger women, the TWA has been in the forefront 
of Tibet activism in recent years through its efforts to establish links with other 
NGOs, namely women's organizations, in the U.S. and around the world. During 
the course of my research, TWA in New York co-sponsored several events with 
American women's groups, including NOW and New York Women in Film. In 
1994 and 1995, the organization, in coordination with TWA in India and 
Switzerland, played a key role in organizing and sending delegations to various 
preparatory ':onferences preceding the U .N. World Conference on Women which 
took place in Beijing in September 1995. ln fact, three Tibetan women from New 
York were on the delegation of exile women who attended the NGO forum held in 
Hairou, China. 
When I asked one member to define TWA's purpose, she said its main goal 
is to educate people about "what is happening to Tibetan women in Tibet." She 
went to great lengths to make clear, however, that TWA does not see itself as 
"feminist" organization: 
We have to be very careful to make it clear that we are not for equal 
rights, it's not a matter of fighting for equal rights for Tibetan 
women ... because women in Tibet have a lot of freedom. Like my 
mother, she earned a lot more than my father, she was the boss, she 
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wore the pants in the marriage ... she had some independence. 
Responding to a question about Western women's expectations of TWA, she 
continued, 
Western women always get excited when they see women from third 
world countries forming women's groups. I think it's a great way 
for Tibetans to reach out to groups like that, feminist groups, 
American women who are interested in women's rights, women's 
issues. But I think that at the same time, we have to sort of make it 
clear what we stand for is very different. I mean the same in certain 
ways but very different in that we are not fighting for women's 
rights, from men who are in power. 
My friend then described an incident which exemplifies the sort of tensions these 
expectations created among Tibetan and Western women activists. In 1993, a 
large Tibet support conference took place in Washington, D.C. When the 
conference was still in the planning stages, Western activists suggested that a 
workshop on women and youth be included in the schedule. TWA was the 
obvious group to organize the workshop. At first, Tibetan women did not want to 
do it, my friend recalled, because they felt they did not have "the right people co 
do the workshop." This "upset a lot of Western women who felt we were not 
being responsible." In the end, under "pressure," TWA members agreed to hold 
the workshop. See chapter 7 for a discussion of the role Western discourses play 
in framing the Tibet issue (see also Russo and Mohanty 1991). 
The Tibetan Youth Association was started in the late 1980s by a group of 
men who saw a need for an organization to serve the needs of high school and 
college age Tibetans, many of whom appeared quite isolated and alienated from the 
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larger Tibetan community. As one person told me: 
Reaching the youth is hard. that is where most guidance is needed 
because that's where you have the most peer pressure to 
conform .. .l've seen this trend when kids are in high school they're 
basically isolated from other Tibetans and they're trying to be 
completely American. [ mean they're combing their hair, they don't 
want their parents to come to school events, they're almost 
embarrassed because Tibet is so foreign. But when they go to 
college, from the very first year, you see a complete hundred and 
eighty degree cum around. Suddenly they appreciate Tibet, it's one 
of the most heartening experiences in New York, seeing kids grow 
up and go to college and become Tibetans for the first time in 
eighteen years. 
The fact that the need for this kind of organization emerged so much later than it 
did in Switzerland demonstrates the demographic differences between the Swiss 
Tibetan and American Tibetan communities. 
Early Tibet activism 
ln the previous chapter, [ explored the role Western representations and stereotypes 
about Tibetans played in mediating relations between Westerners and Tibetan 
refugees in the early years of exile. l suggested that the positive expectations 
created by images of Tibet as Shangri-la and of Tibetans as mystical, otherworldly 
spiritual beings profoundly shaped the encounter between refugees and Western aid 
agencies and individual sponsors in India. l argue that Tibetans in the U.S. have 
benefitted from these perceptions, and not just in terms of resettlement but, more 
important, in terms of political support. Tibetans can boast of an impressive list of 
supporters in political, entertainment, and media circles, including Daniel Patrick 
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Moynihan, Jesse Helms, Richard Gere. Harrison Ford, and Tom Brokaw (for a 
discussion of Tibetans and the media, see chapter 10). As this list illustrates. the 
Tibet issue attracts people from across the political spectrum-from rabid anti-
communists to liberals; I explore this phenomenon a bit funher in the next chapter. 
In any event, by having so many high profile friends and by having a charismatic 
leader, Tibetans in America have been able to draw attention to themselves in a 
way that is dramatically out of proportion to the actual size of the community. 
The Tibet issue has not always enjoyed the sort of visibility it has today in 
the U.S. Although Tibetans have received support from a very small but dedicated 
coterie of Americans since China's occupation in 1959, the issue remained a 
marginal one in this country until the mid-1980s. During the first two decades of 
exile, the belief persisted in diplomatic circles that Tibet was a dead issue. This 
despite efforts in the 1960s by exile Tibetans to convince various governments to 
raise the issue at the United Nations. As one former employee of the Office of 
Tibet in New York put it, "during the 1960s and 70s, nobody would touch us." A 
conjuncture of factors conspired to keep Tibet off the international community's--
and America's-political agenda, including China's application and acceptance into 
the U.N. and America's rapprochement with the PRC in 1974. Repeated denials 
of the Dalai Lama's request for a visa reflects the State Department's and 
Congress's lack of interest in the Tibet issue during this period. 
In an effort to explain why individual affinity with the Tibetan political 
cause has never been translated into institutional or governmental support, Tsering 
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Shakya suggests that the answer is both due to realpolitik regarding China but also 
to the way in which the issue is interpreted by the West: "The constant 
mythologization of Tibet has obscured and confused the real nature of the Tibetan 
political struggle" (1992: 13). 
Whereas issues like South Africa and the Palestinian problem are 
seen as real political concerns, Tibet is seen as a lost cause, which 
from time to time pricks one's conscience. The Tibetan problem is 
conflated with the myth of Shangri-la. Therefore issues about Tibet 
are often treated as a question of sentimentality versus political 
expediency. Tibet must be liberated from both the Western 
imagination and the myth of Shangri-la. (1992: 16) 
To understand why the Tibet issue might have been perceived this way. it is 
necessary to consider who supported Tibet at the time. American Tibet supporters 
prior to the 1980s were mainly academics, Buddhists, or individuals with an 
interest in Asian art, philosophy, and culture. Many came of age in the 1960s 
and first came into contact with Tibetans in Nepal or India. One American I 
interviewed (I'll call him "David"}, recalling his first visit to Dharamsala in 1972. 
describes meeting the Dalai Lama: 
The Dalai Lama did not speak, or wait for the translation of my 
question ... he looked directly at me and in broken English, in a deep 
baritone, answered my question. I don't even know what he said 
word for word. All I know is all of sudden I was in the presence of 
something that I've never felt before ... the sensation that I had was 
that the voice and the presence was originating from a place very far 
removed from the here and now, a sense of antiquity pervaded the 
moment ... It was a long time ago, twenty-one years ago, but I can 
feel it more than I can describe it to you. 
Like the majority of other American supporters in the 1970s, David had been 
attracted to Eastern mysticism since college, though he did not practice Buddhism 
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(see Roof 1993 for description of the spiritual journeys of the baby boom 
generation; see also Gita Mehra's Karma Cola: Marketin2 the Mystic East, 1979). 
While his involvement with the Tibet issue came as a result of a transformative 
encounter. it was a spiritual rather than a political one. That is. unlike the 
Western travellers caught up in the demonstrations of 1987 in Lhasa who 
subsequently became Tibet activists. David represents a cohon of Americans who 
sraned working for Tibet in the 1970s in response to personal, not political. 
experiences, as his following comment about the Tibet Movement underscores: 
I believe it's a movement but what it is. of course, is a collection, at 
best, of individuals who have had individual experiences on very 
deep and profound levels ... it's introspective and one's own spiritual 
quest, one's own vision even. 
I explore the contrast between two generations of Tibet supporters and their views 
of the Movement in chapter 7. The point I want to make here is that early Tibet 
activists, for the most pan, were neither professionals nor individuals with 
grassroots political skills, factors that no doubt contributed to the Tibet issue's 
relative obscurity. 
In interviews, many activists pointed out that the "real nature of the Tibetan 
struggle" was obscured not only by the aura of spirituality surrounding it but by 
the fact that it was perceived as an anti-communist, rather than an anti-colonial. 
issue. For every Western hippie interested in Eastern spirituality, there was a 
Western leftist fascinated by Maoism and the great socialist experiment in China 
(e.g., Neville Maxwell, Felix Greene, Chris Mullin). These individuals proved to 
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be effective publicists for China's claim to have transformed Tibet into a socialist 
paradise. Their opposition to any groups receiving aid from the CIA or involved 
with US adventurism abroad helped shape the terms in which the Tibet struggle 
was understood by the Western public. 
Tibetans in the U.S. continued to feel the political chill throughout the 
1970s. The Carter administration's decision in 1977 to reject Tibetan requests co 
have "Tibet" rather than "China" listed as their place of birth on their new 
American passports angered the tiny refugee community and led to the creation of 
a campaign to get the policy reversed (see Akar 1978a:26; Akar l978b:9-l2: 
Tibetan Review l 978a: 10-11; Tibetan Review l 978b:24). Spearheaded by the 
U.S. Tibet Committee, an organization created by several Tibetans and American 
volunteers (including David) in New York City in the mid-70s, the campaign 
succeeded with help from Congress and the policy was eventually reversed. It is 
important to note that other than the Office of Tibet, the USTC was the only 
organization in existence at the time that actively advocated on behalf of Tibet, 
although the Indiana-based Tibet Society, created by Thubten Jigme Norbu in 
1967, played an important role in the early years of exile as a disseminator of 
information about Tibet through its sporadic publication of the Tibet Society 
Bulletin. n 
The Dalai Lama's first visit to North America in the fall of 1979 (after the 
Carter administration finally agreed to grant him a visa), represents one of the few 
other highpoints in the Tibet issue's dismal decades of invisibility in the U.S. 
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Billed as a non-political visit by both the Tibetan leader and the State Department. 
the Dalai Lama's trip nonetheless played an important role in educating Americans 
about the Tibet issue and generating new supporters. He met with religious 
groups, university students and faculty, and fellow Tibetans and their supporters in 
various cities across the country and by all accounts was extremely well-received 
(for a detailed description of the visit, see Andersson (1980), Nashold (1980), and 
Walt van Praag (1973). In fact, several American activists I interviewed traced 
their involvement with Tibet back to 1979 when they heard the Dalai Lama speak 
in public. While it would be another twelve years before the Tibetan leader was 
finally received in the White House by a sitting American president, this and and 
subsequent trips to the States by the Tibetan leader were crucial in laying the 
groundwork for that significant moment and for the eventual emergence of the 
Tibet Movement. 
Conclusion 
Between the Dalai Lama's first visit to the U.S. in 1979, and his trip to Oslo in 
1989 to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, the Tibet issue underwent an amazing 
transformation-from the struggle of a tiny handful of exiles and their devoted 
friends to a transnational movement. How and why did such a transformation 
occur? As I argued in chapter 1, the change can be attributed to the convergence 
of a number of "local" and "global" processes, including the acceleration of 
globalization of capital, spread of computer mediated communications and small 
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media technologies. the proliferation of international organizations (NGOs) and 
their growing ability to make interventions in rite international arena. and the rise 
of ethnic and identity politics after the end of the cold war. These processes. 
along with the Dalai Lama·s increasing visibility and moral authority as a religious 
figure on the world stage and the outbreak of demonstrations against Chinese rule 
in Tibet in 1987. combined to create circumstances conducive to the emergence of 
a global activist network. 
In chapter 7, I continue to explore Tibet activism. focusing on how a series 
of events in Lhasa in the fall of 1987 contributed to the mobilization of Tibet 
supporters in the U.S. and elsewhere. I argue that China's violent suppression of 
Tibetan demonstrators. witnessed by Western tourists/travellers. produced a cohort 
of advocates who have play a key role in the formation of the transnational Tibet 
Movement. This process is examined through several "Tibet narratives" elicited or 
produced by three members of this cohort. 
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Notes 
1. The only exception to this was Samaden. where a small number of Tibetans were 
resettled and where Romansch is spoken. After only a short stay in this area. most 
of the Tibetans left seeking better employment opportunities and the chance to learn 
a more useful second language such as Swiss-German. 
2. See Brauen and Kantowsky 1982: 11-14. 
3. In an interview with a Swiss man who sponsored a number of children in this group. 
I was told that a small number of the Aeschimann children were not orphans or from 
poor families. but were actually the children of aristocrats who wanted their 
offspring to be educated in Switzerland. 
4. At the end of World War II. Pestalozzi Villages were established across Europe to 
take care of and educate orphan and refugee children. Construction began on 
Pestalozzi Village in Trogen in 1946. Its initial residents were children from 
France. Poland. Hungary. Germany. Italy. Finland. and Greece. By 1960, the 
European refugee problem had ended and the organization began to take in refugees 
from other parts of the world. Tibetan children were the first Asian group to reside 
in Trogen, a fact of which they were keenly aware. 
5. According to sources in Switzerland. the first migration sponsored by the SRC 
consisted almost entirely of poor Tibetans from the Kulu-Manali area. But four 
years later. when a second group prepared to come over. SRC officials discovered 
that many of those who had been chosen to emigrate were not from the neediest 
families but instead were from the better-off higher strata. The SRC thus refused to 
bring these Tibetans over and insisted that officials in India find other, more 
appropriate refugees. to take their places. 
6. For refugees. the process of applying for a Swiss passport must be initiated in the 
town or city where they live after the individual reaches age 18. The application is 
voted on by local residents after it has been vetted by the police and local leaders. 
7. According to one informant. the Swiss regulate the formation of small businesses 
much more strictly than they do in the United States. Those who want to open their 
restaurant or shop must apply for permission and wait an average of three years 
before a decision is made. 
8. While in Switzerland. I was told that at least two people from this group had 
committed suicide in recent years. 
9. As for polyandry. many researchers found that as of the 1970s, it was still being 
practiced in Switzerland. Apparently Swiss Red Cross officials chose to look the 
other way. simply warning Tibetans to designate one person as their husband for 
official purposes. 
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10. Interestingly. the person who headed the Office of Tibet in 1992 when I was there 
was among the first group of Tibetan children raised in the Pestalozzi Children· s 
Village. 
11. In an interview. the president of TY A stated the organization· s main goals are to: 
l) work for the independence of Tibet and inform the world about 
the situation there; 2) help Tibetans integrate better into the western 
world; 3) maintain Tibetan culture; and 4) help refugees in lndia. 
Nepal and Bhutan. 
12. One of the many ironies of this idea is the fact that many (though by no means all) 
of those individuals interested in democratizing Swiss Tibetan society are from very 
high status backgrounds but who have attended Swiss schools and thus have little 
interest in reproducing the social hierarchies from which they come. Despite the 
best of intentions. however, Tibetans in Switzerland continue to respect these 
hierarchies and the idea that they should feel free to stand up and challenge a high 
status Tibetan in public debate strikes many as impossible. if not ludicrous. 
13. In my interview with the lawyer who headed TY A. she told me that it seemed as 
though citizens in her canton voted all the time. on matters ranging from whether or 
not a road should be built to whether or not someone should be given a Swiss 
passport. 
14. See Myers 1986b; Brenneis and Myers 1986. and Schwartzman 1987 for 
anthropological analyses of meetings and talk in both Western and non-Western 
settings. 
15. There is also a well-established Tibetan community in Canada; see. for example, 
Mclellan 1986. 
16. Compare this figure with 1990 census figures for refugees from Southeast Asia in 
the U.S.: 614.547 Vietnamese, 149,014 Laotians. 147.411 Cambodians. and 90,082 
Hmong (Kitano and Daniels 1995:148). 
17. In an interview with Phil Ladenla at his home in San Francisco in late 1992. he 
described himself as coming from a family whose prominence in Tibetan terms was 
similar to that of the Rockefeller family in this country. 
18. It is worth noting that during this same period (the late 1950s and early 1960s). a 
number of Khampas and Amdowa were brought to Colorado and trained by the CIA 
in guerrilla warfare, and then air-dropped back into Tibet (see chapter 4; footnote 
20). 
19. After World War II. a small number of Buriat and Kalmuk Mongols emigrated to 
the United States, many of them settling in the New Jersey/Pennsylvania area. One 
of these individuals. Geshe Wangyal. established the first Tibetan Buddhist 
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monastery-Labsum Shedrub Ling-in the U.S. in Washington. New Jersey in 1958. 
Some of the first Americans to study with him have become active in the Tibet 
Movement. See McCleary 1991 for a personal account of his involvement with 
Wangyal. 
20. See Fields 1986. 1991; see also Watson 1974 for a description of the activities of 
the first Tibetan lamas io the United States. Tibetan Buddhism is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 8. 
21. In general Tibetans living in this country do not identify themselves as Asian 
American. Until very recently. they have been more imaginatively engaged with 
their Tibetan homeland than with putting down roots or assimilating. The 
resettlement project suggests that the exile community has reached a stage of 
acceptance. after more than thirty years. that the situation may not change and the 
present generation may not get the chance to return to a free Tibet. Despite this 
fact, Tibetans nonetheless still appear to see themselves as having more in common 
with exile East Turkestanis. Mongolians. members of the exiled Chinese democracy 
movement. and people from Taiwan and Hong Kong. all of whom are united by 
their opposition to China. than they do with Asians groups in the U.S. 
22. It is no small irony that Chaksampa bas been asked to take on this task. given that 
its members are former performers from India who have long complained about the 
exile government's lack of suppon for lay performing ans (see chapter 8). 
23. There are a number of possible reasons why Tibetan men have tended to outnumber 
women in the Movement. including the fact that traditionally men have been seen as 
the main political actors in Tibetan society. and for those families with small 
children. it is the women who stay home to take care of them while the men go to 
meetings and other events. When I asked one Tibetan man why there were not 
more Tibetan women activists. be suggested that unlike in Switzerland. there are 
very few younger Tibetan women who grew up in the U.S. and who thus are fully 
bicultural and capable of interacting comfonably in English with Americans. He 
added that the older women who came to the States as adults do not speak English 
very well and thus tend to shy away from intercultuntl situations. 
24. On occasion other demonstrations are held (e.g. to mark International Human Rights 
Day in December) and Tibetans are encouraged to attend, though turnout is usually 
much lower. 
25. The Office of Tibet regularly sponsors presentations by exile officials or other 
prominent Tibetans from India to which all community members are invited. 
Usually these events are held in the building, unless a large crowd is expected and 
then leaders usually rent a local church basement. During interviews with Tibetans 
living in New York, several remarked that they rarely "just dropped by" the Tibet 
building unless invited, viewing it as a more formal space where government-related 
business was conducted. Instead, they tended to meet at a local Tibetan store where 
they would share news and just hang out together. 
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26. Before this space on East 3 lst Street. the Office was located on Second Avenue. 
27. The Tibetan Studies Society at Columbia University. composed largely of graduate 
students. did some limited organizing in the 1970s. mostly around the granting of a 
visa to the Dalai Lama (see Tibetan Review April 1976:7). 
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Chapter 7 Political tourism and personal transformation: 
Western activms and the Tibet Movement 
Introduction 
fn chapters 5 and 6, r outlined three key nodes in the Tibetan diaspora: India, 
Switzerland, and the U.S. I suggested that although Tibetans have been well-
received in these host societies, very little organized political suppon existed in any 
of them for the Tibetan cause. All this changed when pro-independence 
demonstrations erupted in Lhasa, Tibet in September 1987. The protests, and 
China's violent response, witnessed and documented by Western travelers, 
galvanized the exile community and the latent network of Westerners who had 
never before actively campaigned for Tibet. Together they joined in publicizing 
the riots and in so doing attracted new recruits to the cause. Tibet support groups 
quickly sprang up in Switzerland, France, Germany. the Netherlands. England, 
Australia. the United States and Canada, many filled with young professionals who 
had no previous ties to the Tibet issue but who shared concerns about human 
rights, the environment. and ocher global issues. By the late 1980s. a transnational 
"Tibet Movement" had emerged. 
Part One of this chapter focuses on the narratives of Western travelers to 
Tibet whose experiences had a profound effect on their lives. transforming their 
consciousnesses and turning them into committed Tibet activists. The contrast 
between these "Tibet narratives" and the "diaspora narratives" produced by 
Tibetans is instructive. While Tibet serves as an important touchstone for both 
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Westerners and Tibetans, the narratives of each group have a different ontological 
status and function. As we saw in chapter 4, diaspora narratives are not a 
"natural" form but represent an exile innovation produced in relation to an 
interlocucer for a specific political purpose. The Tibet narratives. on the other 
hand, are more interesting in terms of their use of a cultural other to construct a 
social and political identity. Through an examination of these narratives. I anempt 
to shed light on this process. Part Two chronicles the emergence of the 
Movement, focusing on one organization, and concludes with a discussion of its 
global dimensions. 
I begin with a brief discussion of conditions inside and outside Tibet leading 
up to the events of 1987. My account of the protests in Tibet relies heavily on the 
work of Ronald Schwartz, a sociologist who has done extensive (and first rate) 
research on the demonstrations and China's response (1991; 1992; 1994a; 1994b: 
see also Barnett 1994). 
Part One 
Background to the demonstrations: 1959-1987 
As described in the previous chapter, the international community took little action 
on Tibet's behalf between 1959 and 1987, with the exception of the passage of 
three resolutions at the United Nations in 1959, 1961, and 1965 (see Avedon 
1984:80-82). In some ways this is not surprising, given that for many years 
virtually no information was available about actual conditions in Tibet. This state 
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of affairs lasted through the Cultural Revolution. which saw the wholesale 
destruction of Tibetan society and culture under the guise of "democratic reforms ... 
Indeed. after 1959: 
All of Tibet came under direct Chinese rule for the first time, and 
the same "revolutionary" methods prevalent in China were applied 
throughout Tibet. In the years following the uprising Tibetans were 
subjected to endless rounds of political education and "struggle 
sessions" in which "class enemies" and "reactionaries" were singled 
out for criticism and punishment. Participants in these meetings 
were required to beat, torture. and sometimes execute victims who 
were their neighbors, friends. and kin. (Schwartz l994a: 12) 
[n addition to being targets of intense ideological indoctrination. Tibetans were 
organized into communes and all individual propeny was confiscated. These 
changes produced poveny and famine that wracked the country throughout the 
1960s and 70s. Although the history of this dark period in Tibet is yet to be 
written, it is now well known that in 1969, armed revolt broke out in rural areas 
which was harshly put down by PLA troops. Underground groups sprang up. 
launching sporadic anacks on Chinese cadres and PLA soldiers. These lasted until 
well into the 1970s (Ngapo 1992; Schwartz 1994a: 14; see also Avedon 1984 for a 
description of this period). The situation in Tibet improved only after Mao's 
death, the arrest of the ultra-leftist Gang of Four, and the subsequent rise of 
reformers in the communist party under Deng Xiaoping. 
In the spirit of reform, China's government evolved a new strategy in 1977-
78 which included overtures to overseas Chinese, Taiwan, and the Dalai Lama. 
Eventually it invited the Tibetan leader to send a fact-finding delegation to Tibet to 
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ascertain whether claims that Tibetans were happy living under Chinese rule and 
had improved standards of living were true. To the surprise of Chinese communise 
party leaders, the first delegation, which included Lobsang Samten, one of the 
Dalai Lama's brothers, was besieged by Tibetans at every stop throughout its tour 
in 1979. many of whom wept uncontrollably with joy and sadness. "This 
unexpected demonstration of support for the Dalai Lama," Schwanz points ouc. 
"prompted the fact-finding visit in May L 980 by Party general secretary Hu 
Yaobang" (1994a: 15). What Hu found when he arrived in Tibet-extreme poverty 
and a crumbling infrastructure--shocked him and led to the initiation of further 
reform policies aimed at redressing some of the negative effects of two decades of 
communist rule in Tibet. 1 Meanwhile, Dharamsala's "delegation diplomacy" 
continued, with two more official delegations visiting Tibet in 1980. After further 
overwhelmingly enthusiastic receptions, which included spontaneous pro-
independence and pro-Dalai Lama statements by local Tibetans, the Chinese 
cancelled a fourth delegation scheduled for the summer of 1981. The fourth and 
final delegation visited Tibet in the summer of 1985 (see Avedon 1984, D. Norbu 
1991, and T. Wangyal 1994 on Sino-Tibetan negotiations since 1959). 
These visits took place in the context of a period of decollectivization and 
relaxation of religious and cultural policies between 1980 and 1986. Not only 
were Tibetans allowed to resume daily religious observations, they were also 
allowed to begin rebuilding some of the thousands of temples and monasteries 
destroyed by Chinese forces. 2 This spontaneous and voluntary process of 
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monastic revitalization was extraordinarily significant. as Schwanz argues: 
Though officially sanctioned, the Chinese administration has sought 
in a variety of ways to curtail and control this process of monastic 
revitalization. The monasteries represent the reappearance of a 
Tibetan civil society outside state control. that had lain submerged 
for two decades. The reforms opened a space in Tibetan society for 
the re-creation of the one cohesive institution that Tibetans are able 
co identify as their own. As such, the monasteries have come co 
signify Tibetan nationhood and survival, and thus have become the 
principal battleground for Tibetan resistance to the Chinese scare. 
( l 994a: 17)3 
As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, before 1959 the monastic elite went to great 
lengths to defend religious orthodoxy as well as its power and privileges. putting it 
at odds with the Dalai Lama's government, especially reform-minded aristocratic 
officials influenced by Western ideas. But in the Chinese-occupied Tiber of che 
1980s and 90s, protest has been led mostly by young monks and nuns from rurai 
areas and directed against the Chinese state. Such protest has had (and continues 
to have) an explicitly nationalist content, as Schwartz argues: 
Tibetan nationalism is very much a modern phenomenon; the 
thinking of the young monks today has been politicized in a way that 
would not have been possible in pre-1959 Tibet. The articulation of 
Tibetan independence as a political ideology is a response to the 
conditions of Chinese communist rule in Tibet, which has attempted 
to validate the reorganization of Tibetan society along Chinese lines 
through communist ideology. In this regard, monks see themselves 
as acting for the general interests of society in a specifically political 
sense, allied with ordinary Tibetans against foreign invaders. They 
do not see themselves as acting to protect special rights or 
privileges. (1994a:92)4 
ln addition to making efforts to restore Tibetan culture, religion, and language 
during this period, Chinese officials implemented a policy of economic reform chat 
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entailed opening Tibet up to foreign tourism, soliciting foreign aid and 
development funds, and actively encouraging the economic panicipation of exile 
Tibetans (Schwartz l994a: 18). Tibetan exiles were also invited to return to visit 
their relatives and encouraged to set up businesses. As we shall see, these new 
policies combined to create a unique political atmosphere that helped set the stage 
for pro-independence demonstrations in l 987 and thereafter. 
The role of tourism5 
Before liberalization. Tibetan society was so repressive that any political protest 
was labelled criminal and dealt with accordingly. At the same time, for Tibetans. 
no locus or conceptual framework existed with which to interpret such activities as 
pro-independence. Between 1980 and 1985, however, the situation changed 
dramatically. Monastic revitalization and the increased flow into Tibet of 
information into and out of Tibet via tourists and Tibetan exiles created new 
interpretive possibilities for Tibetans dissatisfied with Chinese rule. 
Between 1980 and 1984, only group tours were allowed into Tibet. The 
country was opened to individual travelers in l 985 and according to one statistic. 
the number of visitors jumped from an average of l ,500 a year to 15 ,000 in 1985. 
and 30,000 a year in 1986 (Beijing Review 1987).6 The opening of Tibet to 
individual travelers was seen as a quick way of "cashing in on 'ethnic tourism' --
bringing large amounts of cash into a capital-scarved local economy" (Schwartz 
1991:600). At the same time, Chinese officials emphasized tourism's potential co 
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transform Tibet. perceived to be a "backward region." by exposing it to new 
lifestyles and patterns of consumption. Their underlying assumption was that this 
would undermine traditional Tibetan values and encourage Tibetans to "satisfy their 
economic aspirations through greater integration into the Chinese market economy" 
(Schwartz 1991:600), which in turn would encourage Tibetans to accept the 
legitimacy of Chinese rule in Tibet. 
With the influx of individual travelers during 1985-87. Lhasa "assumed 
some of the characteristics of Kathmandu as a gathering-place for this kind of 
tourist in Asia" (Schwartz 1994a:39). 
Prices in Lhasa for food and lodging in the cheaper Tibetan-run 
cooperative hotels and restaurants were comparable to Kathmandu. 
The opening of the relatively inexpensive road travel from the 
Nepaliffibetan border made Tibet accessible to budget travelers. 
One of the attractions of the Tibetan-run cooperatives in Lhasa was 
the extent to which individual travelers were in control of tourist 
services-able to have panies and hold meetings, rent or borrow 
bicycles. make their own travel arrangements with bus and truck 
operators, and come and go as they pleased at all hours. (ibid .. 39) 
Unlike group tourists in Tibet. who follow a set itinerary. pay high rates for 
services, and rely on Chinese-approved guides, individual travelers make their own 
arrangements and "pride themselves on forming their own interpretations of what 
they see and experience (aided by reference books and the expenise of fellow 
travellers)" (Schwartz 1991:592). Self-confident and independent. individual 
travelers constitute a kind of subculture or "mobile community" throughout Asia. 
"They trade information on modes of travel, places to stay, and the local 
situation," Schwartz writes, often teaming up to travel together for shon periods of 
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time (ibid., 592). 
Not surprisingly. Chinese officials are extremely wary of individual 
travelers whose movements are hard to control and who tend to regard 
"bureaucratic obstacles to travel in China as so many challenges to be cleverly 
circumvented" (ibid., 592). Though tolerated because it brings in foreign 
exchange. this travel culture, with its interest in defining its own itinerary. is 
diametrically opposed to a government interested in maintaining security and 
limiting contact with foreigners. This point was made clear after the 
demonstrations in September-October 1987. 
One of the effects of opening up Tibet to tourism by foreigners and Tibetan 
exiles was a sharp rise in the flow of information into Tibet on democracy. human 
rights, and national struggles taking place elsewhere in the world. These ideas 
have provided Tibetans with an alternative vocabulary and meanings, which they 
have taken and aligned with concepts drawn from Buddhism (Schwartz 1994b:230). 
Circulation of these ideas was facilitated by an influx of small media brought in by 
Western tourists and Tibetan exiles in the 1980s. Among them were photographs, 
cassette capes, even videotapes of speeches by the Dalai Lama and pro-
independence literature produced by the exile community (written in both Tibetan 
and English). While I do not want to overstate the importance of these small 
media forms, they did play a key role in the dissemination of oppositional 
messages. As Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi point out in their book 
Small Media. Bi~ Revolution (1994), small media can create a political "public 
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sphere" in authoritarian societies where none existed before. They function as 
"channels of participation. extending preexisting cultural networks and 
communicative patterns" (l994:xx) and in this sense serve not simply as 
technologies of communication but as webs of solidarity. The introduction of these 
forms provided a "virtual space" connecting people and enabling them to share 
new or subversive ideas. At the same time. the rebuilding of monasteries 
produced a network of physical spaces not completely penetrated by the Chinese 
state (though see Schwartz 1994b). Taken together. the emergence of these virtual 
and actual spaces created a climate conducive to dissent and the formation of 
resistance. 
ln the fall of 1987. a new period of nonviolent protest erupted in Tibet. 
coinciding with a visit by the Dalai Lama to the United States.7 The violent 
suppression of the demonstrations by Chinese forces set off a cycle of protests that 
challenged Chinese authority. Although as we have seen protests are not new to 
Tibet, this was the first time they were witnessed by foreigners, specifically by 
Western tourists/travelers. As we will see, their presence had significant and long-
lasting ramifications. 
Demonstrations in Lhasa 
ln September 1987, the Dalai Lama traveled to the United States where he met 
with members of the Human Rights Caucus of the U.S. Congress. lmages from 
the visit were broadcast on television in Lhasa on September 25. The Chinese 
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government condemned the visit and local authorities in Tibet suggested that 
demonstrations in support of Chinese policy and against the Dalai 
Lama be staged. There was a great deal of discussion among 
ordinary Tibetans of Lhasa of the significance of the Dalai Lama's 
visit to the United States and speculation about whether a diplomatic 
breakthrough for Tibet was impending. Handprinted wall posters 
appeared around the Barkhor in support of the Dalai Lama. 
(Schwartz l 994a:22) 
Two days later, on September 27, a group of twenty-one monks from Drepung 
monastery staged a demonstration around the Barkhor, the central market area for 
Tibetans which encircles the Jokhang, Tibet's most holy Buddhist temple. They 
carried with them a homemade Tibetan flag and shouted "Tibet is Independent" 
and "May the Dalai Lama Live Ten Thousand Years." Clearly this was not what 
local authorities intended or expected by showing the Dalai Lama on television. 
The monks were joined by about 100 lay people and eventually confronted by 
police. Twenty-one monks and five lay Tibetans were beaten, arrested and 
imprisoned while the remainder of the crowd dispersed with no violence. 
On October 1 another demonstration took place, this time led by twenty-
three monks from Sera monastery, eight from the Jokhang temple, and three from 
Nechung monastery. 8 Like the previous protest, the monks were joined by a 
crowd of lay people. Together they circumambulated the Jokhang, carrying a 
Tibetan flag and shouting independence slogans. Police quickly broke the 
demonstration up, arrested all the monks along with thirty lay people, and cook 
them into a nearby police station on the edge of the Square. A crowd of 2,000 or 
3,000 Tibetans soon gathered around the compound. Stone throwing by women 
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and children forced the fifty police guarding the entrance to retreat into the 
building. 
The crowd then overturned and set on fire a number of abandoned 
police vehicles in front of the police station. As fire engines and 
armed police reinforcements arrived. they were driven back by the 
crowd throwing stones. Blankets and wooden stall-tables from the 
market were then placed next to the wooden door of the police 
station and set on fire with kerosene. (Schwartz 1994a:24) 
At one point. young monks from the Jokhang pushed their way through the blazing 
doorway and entered the station. As a result of the confusion. some of the monks 
held inside were able to escape through the doors and windows of the now burning 
building. Three were shot dead as they tried to escape. Eventually the police shot 
over the heads. and in somes cases into the crowd. from roof of the police 
compound. using 7- and 9- millimeter pistols as well as AK 47s. They killed eight 
people and wounded many more. After several hours the shooting stopped and the 
police left the area. Tibetans then looted the police station. destroying files. 
carrying off furniture. and searching for bodies. 
Over the next few days armed soldiers patrolled the srreets in the Tibetan 
section of Lhasa and many participants in the demonstrations were arrested. Phone 
and telex lines were cut and buses in and out of Tibet were cancelled. On October 
6, another group of monks from Drepung monastery protested in front of the 
building where the monks from the September 27 demonstration were being held. 
Shouting independence slogans, the monks were viciously beaten by police before 
being arrested. 
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W estemers as witnesses 
Approximately fifty foreigners witnessed the demonstration on October l and were 
present during the violent confrontation in front of the police station (Schwartz 
l 994a:38). Some stood in the middle of the crowd of Tibetans. while others 
watched from afar. A few took photographs. urged on by Tibetans who begged 
them co take the images and news of the protests to the Dalai Lama. 9 By the end 
of the day. police arrested five foreigners for taking photographs. confiscating their 
film and temporarily impounding their cameras. 
In an insightful essay, "Travelers under fire: Tourists in the Tibetan 
uprising" (1991), Schwartz describes the role these individuals played in the 
protests: 
Being present alongside Tibetans when the police opened fire in the 
square in front of the police station dramatically changed the 
relationship between Tibetans and foreigners. Foreigners were no 
longer just sightseers or customers for Tibetan handicrafts; Tibetans 
immediately perceived foreigners as international witnesses to 
"Chinese brutality" and potential political allies. The foreigners also 
saw the same ordinary Tibetans with whom they had been haggling 
in the market just hours before in new roles as angry demonstrators 
and victims of violence. As foreigners witnessed Tibetans, including 
children, being shot in the square in front of the police station. they 
began to discuss among themselves what to do. Some insisted on 
remaining within the Tibetan crowd on the assumption that this 
would deter the police from shooting ... others argued for a role as 
clearly visible "witnesses" watching from the other side (who could 
not be accused of participating). (1991:591) 
Before too long, a "runner system" was set up whereby individuals would carry 
exposed films back to hotels to hide from police. Others began to look for 
Western doctors willing to treat the wounded who for obvious reasons did not go 
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to government-run hospitals. By the end of day, foreigners began to organize 
themselves as a group. 
One of the travelers who played a key role in the organizing process is 
Robert Barnett, an Cambridge-educated journalist and actor. His "Tibet narrative" 
documents the intersection of an individual life and an historical event, in this case 
October 1, 1987: 
I walked into the square, a lot of people got shot in front of me, I 
got very frightened and thought the best thing to do is to watch, to 
be a witness, which a lot of us Westerners did at the time ... other 
Westerners wanted to get involved, to deter shooting by standing in 
the middle. I'm one of the ones who wanted to organize witnesses 
and set up chains of people transferring film canisters. We tried to 
cell those taking photographs that you mustn't be left with a 
canister ... in my case, it's a way of dealing with fear--to get bossy 
[laughs]. 
As the demonstration became more "bloody," Barnett adds, he recruited Western 
doctors to assist the wounded and dying. Later that night he organized one of 
many meetings at a Tibetan-run hotel frequented by Westerners to inform those 
travelers who had not witnessed the demonstration about the situation. 
The first meeting, which included 40-50 travelers, focused not just on 
problems facing the travelers themselves, but on constructing an account of events. 
Schwartz writes that 
Some of the eyewitnesses to the shooting suggested that they should 
get together to prepare an accurate account of the events on the 
square for Western journalists. Many travelers feared the Chinese 
would give a false account of what had happened (the official 
Chinese version of events released to the press the next morning 
asserted that no police had opened fire and that Tibetans had "shot at 
each other"). (1991:594) 
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Barnett remembers "imposing" his view that only first-hand accounts be collected 
in an effort co avoid reproducing unsubstantiated rumors. 
It was a good exercise for us and we were strict about it. .. we would 
go around a room. there's a cape of it somewhere. and just say 
exactly what we saw. You could piece together quite a lot from 
that. We wrote it up and actually smuggled that document out co the 
outside world. when we realized we'd been cut off. 
A few hours later. the travelers reconvened again and handed over some film and 
notes to a reporter from Reuters who had arrived in Lhasa a day after the first 
demonstration. The written account produced that evening by the group. which 
called itself "the Committee of 45 Westerners," was eventually widely distributed 
(e.g .• see Tibetan Bulletin 1987). 
Over the next few days the travelers evolved an information gathering 
process through which second hand accounts and rumors were checked out. a 
process. Barnett suggests, they came co see as essentially political: 
As I said. we realized that we'd been cue off. Nobody outside Tibet 
knew. Then we discovered that the Chinese had put out an account 
that we regarded as fabricated, that nobody had been killed by the 
Chinese, they had killed themselves. So it became political, if you 
like, it became a response to the Chinese government or the truth as 
opposed to the lie that was going on so there was a little bit more 
urgency attached. 
At some point a Swedish traveler who was a member of Amnesty Internacional 
suggested that the group begin co compile a list of prisoners. According co 
Barnett. this decision was "a turning point" in that it entailed a shift from the 
"Western witness experience" -tourists sitting around recounting what they saw--to 
relying on Tibetans as a source of knowledge: 
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This involved going to the Tibetans who we knew amongst us and 
asking "who has been imprisoned?" Here we have a switch from 
the Western witness experience to the Tibetans and their source of 
knowledge. This way Tibetans' knowledge became of value. 
Ironically, he notes, nobody thought to gather the names of those Tibetans who had 
actually been killed: "We had spent hours recounting who we'd seen killed and 
everybody in the room had said, 'I'm a Westerner, I saw a Tibetan killed.' but we 
didn't ever ask their names." Over the next few weeks, through interviews about 
the treatment and condition of prisoners and careful fact-checking, the group began 
to prepare the kind of information human rights organizations ordinarily use 
(Schwartz 1991 :596). 
In the meantime, Barnett and others also organized medical help for 
wounded Tibetans who remained untreated in hiding. Travelers were encouraged 
to gather medical supplies, which they did, and a team of foreign doctors was 
assembled. One of them was Blake Kerr, an American who had been in the 
Tibetan crowd during the demonstration and in fact had been one of four 
Westerners to throw some stones at the police (see discussion below). 10 In his 
book Sky Burial: An Eyewitness Account of China's Brutal Crackdown in Tibet 
(1993), Kerr describes a visit to the home of one of the wounded demonstrators: 
"Thank you for coming," the woman whispered before closing the 
wooden shutters. "I know how dangerous the streets are after 
dark." ... "My name is Perna. I am sorry that we have to be so 
secretive ... There are informers in every compound," Perna 
whispered, "One of the neighbors will report us if they see us 
coming in or out." (1993:99) 
Kerr and a traveler from England named "Andrew" (a thinly disguised Barnett) 
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were then led upstairs to the room where a wounded Tibetan named Tsering lay on 
a bed. He had been shot in the thigh. Without the right equipment. Kerr could 
not do much except clean and dress the wound and leave some antibiotics. 
[ cleaned the entrance and exit wounds with hydrogen peroxide. 
imagining the tunnel of flesh through the thickest part of Tsering's 
thigh. He needed intravenous antibiotics in a hospital. [fan 
infection set in he could die. or at least need to have his leg 
amputated. By adding a mere squeeze of antibacterial cream, [ was 
just putting a Band-Aid on an abyss. (1993: 101) 
Kerr and several other doctors continued to visit injured Tibetans for a week or so. 
Such close contact enabled them to gather a lot of important information. though as 
Kerr, Barnett, and others gradually realized, it put the Tibetans in grave danger. 
We didn't realize the risk at first. There was this whole area of 
specialized contact which got subverted very quickly in the medical 
work. We figured out, Christ. it isn't like being at home. It's not 
like meeting someone and them telling you. The idea was who do 
you find to tell you, who can speak a language or give instruction. 
It was that we were putting them in enormous danger each time we 
did it. It sounds silly but it took a few days before we realized that 
we'd been followed ... The police became much more effective and 
we had to give it up because we became too frightened, we didn't 
know how to operate without increasing the risk ... it was a rather 
brutalizing shock to realize that what we thought was helping might 
just be endangering! 
Although the medical work ended shortly after the team recognized the extent of 
risk to their Tibetan collaborators, the travelers continued to hold meetings every 
night for the first week, then every other night, at different hotels and at varying 
times. Over time the group shrank in size and became more discreet about its 
activities (Schwartz 1991:596). 11 
The issue of what the proper role of foreigners should be came up at the 
306 
initial meeting. Many felt that Westerners should not take sides but remain 
impartial. A majority of travelers present decided to "condemn" the Westerners 
who had thrown stones and exclude them from the group, believing the activity 
could be used by the Chinese for propaganda and give all travelers a bad image. 
"By condeming the stone throwers," Schwartz suggests, "the travelers in 
attendance further clarified what they understood to be the appropriate role of 
foreigners to be-to act as witnesses to the events and to transmit information to the 
outside world" (1991:596). Some travelers, namely Western Buddhists known in 
local traveler parlance as "dharma freaks," condemned not only the Westerners but 
also the monks for demonstrating and rock throwing. According to Schwartz. 
these individuals felt such political violence was "out-of-character behavior for 
Buddhists" who are supposed to be non-violent (1991:595). Others, such as the 
two "hippies" who threw stones, were not interested in participating in information 
gathering. "This kind of group activity," demanded discipline and commitment 
which "lay outside the scope of their travel culture": "For the hippies-as for the 
Dharma freaks-travel was essentially a personal quest that did not include playing 
a public role as representatives of their own society" (Schwartz 1991:596). 
What kind of traveler participated in the group? Schwartz observes that 
those who attended meetings and became involved in work with Tibetans were 
largely self-selecting (1991:597). Approximately twenty-four people participated in 
gathering information or dispensing medical care. 
The group was homogeneous in terms of social background: middle-
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class, university educated, working in the arts and skilled 
professions at home. They were mostly between the ages of 25 and 
35. at the beginning of careers, both men and women. They had 
made travel part of their lifestyle and organized their work lives to 
allow extended periods of travel...These individual travelers also 
lacked commitments to family and children, which meant they were 
relatively free to take risks. In terms of politics, the members of the 
group probably would all describe themselves as "left-liberal," 
committed to environmental issues, social justice, and human rights. 
Shared values and shared life experiences were taken for granted and 
contributed to the cohesion of the group. (ibid., 597) 
As professionals in medicine, law, journalism, photography and other skilled areas. 
individual travelers were accustomed to "exercise authority. autonomous decision 
making, and a sense of membership in an international community" (ibid .. 594). 
Although the events in Tibet forced them to improvise and perform 
as amateurs roles ordinarily reserved for qualified professionals, the 
roles these travelers played in Tibet are congruent with a 
generalized, rather than occupation-specific, professionalism. The 
confidence with which they were prepared to challenge the authority 
of the Chinese government, applying standards of justice and free 
expression learned in Western democratic societies, indicates a 
political dimension to this leisure culture as well. (Schwartz 
1991:595) 
English was the working language used by the group, enabling those travelers 
comfortable communicating in English, e.g. from England, the U.S .• Australia. 
Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands. and Israel, to participate. 12 
Those who could speak Tibetan were particularly valuable. 
Ultimately, the group understood its responsibility to be "mediators" 
between protesters and the outside world: 
providing accurate information on the one hand while protecting 
Tibetans on the other. This required maintaining a certain amount 
of professional distance from both, thereby reinforcing their special 
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status as travelers ... at the same time. it was important to be caken 
seriously by responsible agencies on the outside, which meant 
developing working relationships with diplomats, the press. and 
international organizations. (Schwartz 1991 :597) 
Motivated by the belief that high quality of information "is the only thing we can 
offer the Tibetans," Barnett attempted to apply Western journalistic standards of 
facticity co the material being passed, some of which was written in a rhetorical 
polemical style according co Tibetan tradition that failed to distinguish between 
information and commentary: 
[ was in a room in Lhasa and somebody brought in something that 
said, "Fifty babies had their hearts eaten out by Chinese for human 
sacrifice and were then thrown in the river." And I said, "This 
doesn't wash." [Laughs]. Okay, so maybe it's true, but what are the 
numbers and when and how do you know and who saw it? 
By making this distinction, Barnett and his colleagues opposed those travelers who 
argued that anything written by a Tibetan should be passed on. Their emphasis on 
discretion and impartiality represents an implicit critique of some of the well-
intentioned Westerners to see themselves as heroes, putting themselves between 
Chinese bullets and Tibetan bodies and perhaps enacting private fantasies of 
"saving Tibet." I shall come back to this point below. 
Individual travelers played important roles as political actors in Tibet from 
1987 onward. Once a clandestine network and information gathering routine were 
established, a core of committed foreigners continued to maintain contacts within 
Tibet. This network became a crucial channel through which information about 
conditions in Tibet could be disseminated abroad after the PRC restricted access to 
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Tibet for journalists. tourists. and human rights groups in late 1987. Although 
most of the original travelers had left Tibet (or been kicked out) by December 
1987. new ones were recruited if and when necessary to the network by the few 
who did remain. According to Schwartz and others. Tibetans were grateful for the 
presence of Western witnesses. As we shall see. their presence brought 
international attention to the Tibetan cause. and in some instances protected 
Tibetans from "the full force of Chinese repression and brutality." ·After you 
leave." one Tibetan warned a traveler in 1987. "they will kill us" (Schwartz 
1991:599). 
Travel and transformation: Tibet narratives 
The fact that foreigners witnessed China's violent suppression of unarmed 
demonstrators in the fall of 1987 had enormous consequences for Tibetans. the 
Chinese government, and the witnesses themselves. As news of the 
demonstrations spread, accompanied by dramatic images of wounded but defiant 
protesters, the Tibet issue. after many years, was catapulted again into the 
headlines. The unprecedented American media coverage included scores of 
newspaper editorials in favor of the Tibetan cause and critical of the Reagan 
Administration's pro-China stand as well as extensive reporting by the three major 
television networks and national and local radio stations. On October 6, the U.S. 
Senate voted unamimously to pass legislation adopted by the House of 
Representatives in June 1987 condemning China for its human rights violations in 
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Tibet and encouraging President Reagan to meet with the Dalai Lama "to express 
United States support for his efforts for world peace and particularly his effons to 
find a peaceful solution to the Tibetan problem" (Nyandak 1987: 14). Seizing the 
moment, Tibetan and their supporters also staged their own demonstrations in New 
York, Washington, D.C., Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Toronto. Ottawa. 
Vancouver, London, and elsewhere around the world. 
The experience of witnessing demonstrations in Tibet had a transformative 
effect on the lives of Western travelers. Upon their return home, many of the 
travelers involved in gathering information and treating wounded Tibetans became 
committed Tibet activists, founding or joining support organizations and bringing 
much needed energy, focus, and professional skills to the Tibet issue. This section 
explores these individuals' experiences, drawing on stories elicited in interviews as 
well as on published accounts. These "Tibet narratives" are an important context 
in which to examine the development of political consciousness and its translation 
into political action. They reveal how the Tibetan struggle became a contextual 
framework within which these individuals found direction and focus for their lives 
at a particular moment. 
ln her book The Culture of Protest: Religious Activism and the U.S. 
Sanctuary Movement (1993), Susan Coutin argues that social movement 
researchers have tended to "underestimate the significance of the personal 
transformations that occur in the process of protest" (65). 13 Her emphasis on the 
role of border crossings and face to face contact with suffering of Central 
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Americans in raising American sanctuary activists' consciousnesses is relevant for 
my discussion of travelers to Tibet. Although the white middle-class travelers in 
Tibet did not frame their experience in terms of a religious conversion the way 
sanctuary activists did. their encounter with Tibetan protesters produced a similar 
sense of solidarity and identification with a "cultural other." This identification 
with Tibetans is one of the defining characteristics of the fibet Movement. 
Rohen Barnett was one of the Westerners whose life was transformed by 
his experience in Tibet. As we have already seen. he played a crucial role in 
organizing information gathering and medical care for injured protesters after 
demonstrations broke out. When Barnett finally left Tibet several months later. he 
left behind a clandestine information network through which news could be 
smuggled out. One of the first things Barnett did upon his return to the West was 
visit Switzerland where he was invited by a Tibet supponer and U. N. -affiliated 
translator to hold a press conference and testify about his experience at an NGO-
forum at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Back home in London 
in the spring of 1988. he was asked to join a new organization called "Tibet 
Suppon Group U.K." and to describe what he witnessed in Tibet to its members. 
ln April the Dalai Lama arrived in London and people were very 
pissed off that the British government wouldn't allow him to make 
political statements. So they formed this embryonic thing called the 
Tibet Suppon Group and they asked me to come along and give 
speeches and say, "[ was one of these completely unimportant people 
who saw this event in Lhasa six months earlier." So l gave a speech 
and then helped set up this group. 14 
At the time, Barnett saw himself as the "voice of moderation and of standards" in 
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the group insofar as he insisted (as he had done in Tibet) that the group's value 
was directly proportionate to the quality of its information and presentation. He 
cautioned against the use of words and figures such as "genocide" and "one million 
killed in Tibet." arguing that supporters would lose credibility if their material 
were too emotional or inflammatory. 
Three months later. Barnett recalls. "I unexpectedly started to get material 
from the contacts in Tibet I had established and left behind and forgotten." After 
translating and cleaning up the information, he began printing reports on a 
typewriter, xeroxing them, and distributing them on Tibet Support Group 
letterhead. 
My supply of information. when it turned up the first time. I didn't 
know I was going to get anything else. It was only after three 
months on that I realized this stuff was beginning to flood in. and 
that we'd better set something up to deal with this. it was taking a 
lot of time ... it was this big moral pressure. this stuff is arriving. 
you're ninety nine percent certain that nobody else in the world 
outside Tibet knows about it, they've got it out somehow to you and 
you can't afford to pass it on to someone because that reveals the 
sources and methods. 
In the autumn of 1988, Barnett founded "Tibet Information Network" (TIN). an 
independent non-profit organization, to handle the flood of information he was 
receiving from Tibet. Working out of his East London flat, he soon began 
distributing information via fax and computer. as well as in print. to media outlets 
as well as human rights organization. TIN quickly gained respect for its careful 
reporting and detailed analysis, so much so that Barnett is now frequently asked by 
media such as BBC Radio to comment on current events in Tibet. 15 
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Barnett's work with TIN represents an ongoing extension of his efforts co 
help Tibetans in Tibet. He sees himself as a translator, facilitator, and 
communicator about information for media that like to listen to Western people 
"who clearly patently know less about the situation than Tibetans," a phenomenon 
he labels "deeply racist." Careful not to take too much credit for himself, he 
refers co the emergence of TIN "as an evolutionary process." 
There wasn't a pre-conscious attempt to set something up, there 
never was anything. This whole thing is a reaction to events, and 
the events are Tibetan events. Essentially TIN is a reaction to 
Tibetan initiatives which we are servicing. We are really no more 
than a channel--which we had to set up-for Tibetans who were 
trying to communicate material. 
Barnett views TIN as a corrective to the trend of representing Tibetans as victims; 
for him, Tibetans are active agents of their own history and TIN's purpose is to 
document this fact. When asked about an electronic archive he set up on GreenNet 
(the British branch of the global computer network funded by the San Francisco-
based Association for Progressive Communications), he explains: 
TIN is just creating a historical monument to the statements of these 
people in Tibet. I wanted to build a monument, like the monument 
in the middle of the square in Lhasa commemorating the eighth-
century Tibetan conquest of western China. I come from a 
monumental tradition of historians who dig up those things. I'm just 
marking down in stone what these Tibetans say has happened for 
people who want to know. 
Given his interest in creating a "monument," it might initially appear somewhat 
paradoxical that Barnett chose electronic communication, a medium characterized 
by its ephemerality. Yet TIN's founder disputes this assertion, arguing that his 
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TIN conference on GreenNet is analagous co stone: "These conferences stay there. 
The conference is probably still there from when I started it. All those postings on 
GreenNet. you could tap into now and read." 
Barnett's contribution to the Tibet Movement has been enormous. despite 
the fact that he does not identify himself as a Tibet activist: "I've generated a 
culture which is information. it is not editorial... we don't see ourselves as part of 
the activist thing, though we are aware that activists see us as part of their thing." 
Yet he concedes that 
journalists represent, by their existence. a pragmatic activist 
statement that information should be allowed to flow. So if you 
analyze it, we are being activist about saying information should be 
allowed to come out, but effectively, in political terms, we're not 
activists. 
When pushed to define his reasons for continuing co work on TIN. Barnett claims 
that what drives him is "the dishonesty of the Chinese, the British government. and 
Westerners who exaggerate ... I am interested in dismantling mythologies." By 
providing information on conditions in Tibet in a timely and accurate fashion, 
something never available before, Barnett and his colleagues at TIN have gone a 
long way toward changing Tibet's public image from a faraway Shangri-la to a 
country suffering human rights abuses at the hands of China. Though he remains 
stubbornly detached from supporters who make use of TIN in their activism. 
Barnett's work has helped to create a network that not only links Tibetans in Tibet 
to the outside world, but one which also links diasporic Tibetans and non-Tibetans 
together in a shared struggle. 
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Saving Tibet 
Barnett's reaction to the demonstrations in Lhasa was to become a dispassionate 
witness of Chinese violence against Tibetans. By contrast, Blake Kerr, the 
Dartmouth-educated American doctor quoted earlier, responded much more 
spontaneously and emotionally. This is evident in his narrative of the 1987 
demonstrations in Sky Burial: An Eyewitness Account of China's Brutal 
Crackdown in Tibet (1993). For example, caught in the middle of a Tibetan 
crowd throwing stones at Chinese soldiers in front of the Jokhang on October 1. 
Kerr decided to join in: 
A war cry rose from a line of soldiers at the far end of the square. 
Their cry continued as they ran toward the Jokhang. Tibetans in 
front of the temple raised their fists into the air. The thought of 
fleeing did not occur to me. I picked up rocks along with the 
hundreds of Tibetans all around me. In a desperate reaction co the 
killing I became part of the violence myself. "Motherfuckers," [ 
yelled at the oncoming soldiers, "Die. motherfuckers," I screamed 
with the first volley of rocks. (1993:98) 
As discussed earlier, those Westerners who threw stones were "condemned" by 
travelers who shared Barnett's view that they could be of greatest service to 
Tibetans by watching and documenting events rather than participating in protests. 
The fact that Kerr had thrown stones and that he and his traveling companion John 
Ackerly had been briefly arrested led some Westerners to believe that Kerr might 
be more of a liability than an asset to the medical team. Concerns along these 
lines mounted after Kerr's name was mentioned on Xinhua radio and he gave 
interviews to correspondents who arrived in Lhasa to report on the riots. 16 
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Unsurprisingly, Kerr puts himself at the center of his narrative. ln many 
respects, his behavior in Tibet underscores Schwartz's observation about American 
travelers: "Americans also have a somewhat distinct travel style; they are more 
individualistic and insular, less integrated into the international community of 
travelers, less likely to team up with other nationalities. Those who did get 
involved wanted to strike off on their own, sometimes creating problems for the 
group" (1991:598). 
Kerr's desire to act on his own is epitomized by a series of solo forays co 
Tibet in subsequent years to gather information on China's family planning 
policies. 17 On one of these trips, which took place in late 1991, Kerr visited 
hospitals in Kham, Amdo, and Lhasa. Posing as an obstetrician (Kerr is a general 
practitioner based on Long Island) Kerr tried to talk to doctors (both Chinese and 
Tibetan) about local birth control practices. He brought with him Ackerly's video 
camera which he hoped to use to document sterilization or abortion procedures. ln 
one Amdo hospital, he met a Chinese-trained Tibetan pediatrician: 
He did not realize that the video camera I had placed an arm's 
length away from him on his desk was filming him as he explained 
China's two-child policy for Tibetans. I realized that filming anyone 
without their consent could be seen as unethical. I also felt strongly 
that China's coercive family-planning policy, like its oppressive 
occupation of Tibet, had to be exposed before it could be stopped. 
(l993: 189) 
Another time, Kerr secretly videotaped an abortion. ln a graphic and somewhat 
strange passage, Kerr describes getting hot and sweaty during the procedure. 
Shooting from the hip allowed me to capture the scene in graphic 
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detail as Dr. Xian did a pelvic examination. The nurse handed 
instruments wrapped in a stained cloth co Dr. Xian. The patient 
moaned when Dr. Xian inserted the speculum and sounded the 
uterus with a metal wire. She pinched the cervix with forceps and 
pulled it up to insen the curene. I began co feel hoc. I had gotten 
so accustomed co cold weather that I now habitually wore silk 
underwear beneath a union suit. a wool shirt. and the jacket I wore 
to conceal the camera. I tried co unbutton my shirt and long 
underwear as discreetly as possible. Sweat beaded on my forehead 
as Dr. Xian scraped the inside of the uterus and the produces of 
conception sucked through the clear plastic tubing. 
When large droplets of sweat began cascading off my 
forehead and upper lip, I knew I was about co pass out. The 
woman's moaning made me think of all the women in Tibet and 
China, who were undergoing these mechanical, unsanitary, coerced 
abortions. With blood draining from my head, I staggered white 
and shaking out of the operating room. (1993: 191) 
The issue of whether or not individual travelers to Tibet should engage in the sort 
of activities Kerr describes is a controversial one in activist circles. On the one 
hand, it is often argued by people like Kerr that individual travelers can make (and 
have made) a difference by gathering news and images of current conditions in 
Tibet. On the other hand, Tibetan exiles and more cautious Westerners like 
Barnett claim that such activities put both Tibetans and the traveler at risk unless a 
very careful and systematic approach is used (such as the one used by TIN). 18 
This difference in opinion was underscored by an exchange at a workshop 
called "Networking in Tibet and China" during the "Tibet Conference of the 
Americas" in Washington, D.C. in early 1993. At the workshop, a number of 
Western activists who had recently been to Tibet were asked to share their 
experiences. When it was Kerr's turn to speak, he described his recent trips to 
Tibet, offering "tips" for those who might want to follow in his footsteps. He 
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suggested bringing in literature written in Chinese. short wave radios. maps with 
the locations of prisons on them; he also recommended traveling at night. finding a 
secure contact to arrange interviews with political prisoners who have been 
released, and asking officials for permission to bring food to political prisoners. 
During his presentation. I noticed a number of Tibetans in the audience shake their 
heads and murmur to one another. Near the end of the workshop. a Tibetan man 
stood up to voice his concerns: "I am worried about injis [Westerners) taking on 
responsibility; this is more of an internal Tibetan affair. It should be done in 
consultation with the CT A and government officials." The comment. greeted by a 
round of applause. seemed to sum up the feelings of many Tibetans in the 
audience. 
Shortly after the workshop in Washington. D.C .• Kerr gave a slide show on 
his most recent trip to Tibet at Washington Square Church in Greenwich Village. 
New York. During the presentation. which was attended by approximately seventy 
people (half of them Tibetan) and lasted an hour. I was struck by the bravado 
pervading his narrative. Referring to his trip as a "mission" and his female travel 
companion as his "decoy," Kerr spoke proudly of outsmarting his Chinese guide in 
order to photograph and videotape several restricted areas. When a slide of some 
buildings came up, Kerr described them as a prison complex in Lhasa Valley: 
I got up on this hill, crawled on my belly to the ridge, and just sat 
there with the video and camera ... You can see the prisoners lined up 
there. Actually there's a hundred of them ... This is road between the 
two complexes. I wimessed a torture session here of someone being 
staked to a post with the dogs and the equipment ... 
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Another slide was of a purported nuclear weapons site: "We didn't see any 
missiles," he told the audience, "just lots of buildings with no windows." Kerr 
concluded his talk with two blurry images of a room that he described as a "torture 
chamber": 
This is a monastery, right in the heart of Lhasa, that was converted 
to a torture chamber. This picture was taken with candles really. 
But there are bullet holes and the other one, the video actually 
picked up the light a little better, but we found robes that, with 
leather tongs, were suspended from the ceiling, with what I think 
might be blood stains. We took some samples, they're being 
analyzed. l took some samples of cords too. But this was used as 
recently as a few years ago. So it's not a thing of the past, we 're 
not talking about the Cultural Revolution. 
Kerr continued, saying how "stressful" it was to do this kind of collecting of 
material and how difficult and depressing it was to hear stories of people who were 
tortured whom he interviewed. He ended by urging the audience if they went to 
Tibet to "harass local officials, let them know you don't like what they are doing." 
Afterwards, l discussed the slide show with several American friends who 
had come at my invitation. One questioned Kerr's credibility because of his use of 
heroic language. Everyone agreed that the images of the "torture chamber" were 
too abstract to prove anything, with one person commenting that the slides' 
vagueness functioned as a kind of blank screen upon which the audience (and Kerr) 
could project their fantasies and fears. Not surprisingly, several people noticed 
Kerr's focus on torture, which they felt was "voyeuristic" and which made them 
feel somewhat uncomfortable. 
While the practice of "political tourism" -exemplified by Kerr's trips to 
320 
Tibet-is not new, and can promote meaningful solidarity, it is nonetheless riddled 
with contradiction and irony. 19 What does it mean for a "first world" traveler to 
go to another country, usually one that is "third world," to observe local political 
conditions? At what point do such trips become less about political work and more 
about the opportunity to have a real-I ife adventure-to become heroes of their own 
cravel stories? Kerr's book and his public performances (I have attended four) 
raise these and other unsettling questions. While most of the issues are too 
complex to be explored here, I do want to suggest that Kerr personifies the 
Western desire to "save Tibet," to borrow a slogan adopted by Tibet support 
groups in the 1990s (see chapter 8 for an exploration of the relationship between 
this desire and the "culture strategy" deployed in the Year of Tibet campaign). 
For some people, especially Tibetan intellectuals, Western fantasies about 
saving Tibet are deeply problematic. The following quote from Tsering Shakya, 
though it refers to journalists, could easily apply to individual travelers such as 
Kerr: 
Tibet has become a Disney World for the Western bourgeois. Tibet 
possesses all the thrills and adventures of a customised fantasy 
world: danger, romance, magic, and cuddly natives. Tibet has 
become the most dangerous place where aspiring journalists could 
play out their fantasies. Journalists will tell you that reporting from 
Tibet meant risking their lives, that being in Tibet is to experience 
the edge of death, the journalists play hide-and-seek with the 
Chinese police. The main thrust of their reporting is: "Look how 
brave I am in traversing the guarded land, dodging the wrathful 
Chinese police." (1992: 15)20 
At the same time that some Western journalists or travelers construct themselves as 
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heroes. they construct Tibetans as victims in need of their help. Shakya argues 
that this phenomenon is part of an all too familiar process whereby Westerners 
have "sought to define the Tibetan political struggle." 
Tibetans are merely seen as victims who are unable to speak for 
themselves and, as a Westerner wrote. "we have a duty to represent 
the Tibetan people." After decades of being reduced to the status of 
mere recipients of charity and sympathy, the process of reduction of 
Tibetans to an endangered species of the human family is nearly 
complete. (1992: 16) 
While there can be no question that Tibetans have suffered and continue to suffer 
grave human rights violations under Chinese rule, there is a fine line between 
representing them as victims and representing them as subjects--as agents who 
make choices. have a critical perspective of their own situations, and think and 
organize collectively against the Chinese-who happen to also be victims of 
Chinese oppression. In chapter 4, I discussed the use of testimonial by Tibetan 
refugees and its role in constructing a moral universe of victims and victimizers. 
Through narratives of suffering, which elicit sympathy and outrage, I suggested 
Tibetans are able to challenge the politico-moral legitimacy of China's presence in 
Tibet and demonstrate their worthiness of political and material suppon from the 
West. What role, if any, do Western representations of Tibetans as victims have 
in this process? Are they an inevitable component of any effective transnational 
symbolic political action? 
Kerr and Ackerly finally left Tibet in mid-October. On the flight from 
Lhasa to Kathmandu, Kerr recalls looking down at the Himalayas beneath him, 
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wondering 
how many Tibetans were trying to escape across the mountains at 
that moment. What would happen to the burned monk? How many 
wounded Tibetans would die in their homes? How many people 
were being corrured in prisons? I felt defeated thinking of the ten-
year-old boy who would die soon from infection. Up to now in my 
life. I had always thought that living would be better than dying. no 
matter what. I had never seen children slaughtered in the street. [ 
had never met monks tortured in prison and women sterilized against 
their will. In a moment of despair. I wondered if the Tibetan boy 
would be better off dying than living under Chinese military 
occupation. (1993: 129) 
Kerr·s narrative illustrates the kind of intense identification with Tibetan suffering 
created by personal encounters with Chinese brutality in Tibet. His mild case of 
what "post-traumatic stress disorder" reveals the cost of placing oneself in the 
position of those who are persecuted: 
I cried when I described the explicit violence I had witnessed in 
Tibet to my family and friends. Loud noises made me duck as 
though I were under fire. I continued to wake up crying in the 
night. With patience and help from my family--and with regaining 
the thirty pounds I had lost-I began to recover. More than 
anything. writing about my experiences helped me to cope. 
(1993: 149) 
By emphasizing the dangerous and stressful aspects of his experience. Kerr 
indicates the degree to which his trip brought him into a Tibetan reality. however 
temporarily and incompletely. and how profoundly it affected him. 
Upon their arrival in Kathmandu. Kerr and Ackerly were greeted by a 
reporter from A.P. who told them that they were "famous" and that "the whole 
world" was waiting for their story. A whirlwind of publicity quickly enveloped 
the two travelers: in his book Kerr mentions interviews with French and Dutch 
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television. CBS news. the BBC, and late night calls from National Public Radio. 
Before departing Nepal for an audience with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala and a 
press conference in New Delhi. the two sent a long telex about the riot and the 
individuals killed or wounded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
When they finally arrived back in the United States. Kerr and Ackerly were 
interviewed by CNN's Bernard Shaw as well as by reponers from the Christian 
Science Monitor, the Washin&ton Times, the Washin&ton Post, and the American 
Medical News. They also testified before the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus. The fact that Kerr and Ackerly were professionals as opposed to 
"hippies" or "Dharma freaks" appears to have opened many doors in terms of 
access to the media and to government officials. One Swiss activist complained to 
me that even though he wimessed (and photographed) demonstrations in Lhasa in 
March 1989, he was not taken seriously by the press when he tried to tell his 
story. He attributed this to having long hair, an earring, and being an artist rather 
than a doctor, lawyer, or journalist, like Kerr, Ackerly, or Barnett. [ explore the 
professionalization of Tibet activism below. 
Witnessing the riots and having contact with demonstrators in Tibet 
transformed Western travelers, giving them a new social identity. 
What John and l wimessed in Tibet changed our lives. John went to 
work for the lnternational Campaign for Tibet in Washington. [ 
postponed my residency to write a narrative account of our trip. 
Two years went by quickly. Devoting ourselves full-time to 
advocacy work, we wrote a dozen articles for magazines and 
newspapers. We presented testimony to several congressional 
committees and the German Parliament, and gave fifty talks to 
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university and human rights groups in North America. To help 
foster new Tibet support groups after our talks. we developed a 
pamphlet with useful information for fledging activists on 
fundraising, literature tables, sample letters to elected 
representatives, and civil disobedience. (1993: 157)21 
This process of politicization was mirrored in many places as travelers returned 
home and became active in existing Tibet organizations or started their own. 
As the narratives of Barnett and Kerr reveal, though many travelers· lives 
were changed in 1987, the changes were not uniformly experienced. Despite their 
diversity of reactions, however, Westerners in Lhasa were able to act together in 
contingent moments of unity. The Tibet Movement emerged out of these ad hoc 
responses to the riots. In saying this, it is important to remember that it was the 
actions of Tibetan protesters that mobilized travelers and galvanized the exile 
community and the latent network of Tibet supporters around the world. Yet 
without the presence of Western witnesses, it is unlikely China would have 
reported the events, leaving them to fade into memory as so many other protests 
and revolts by Tibetans over the last three decades have done. Instead, as I have 
illustrated, Western travelers succeeded in documenting and publicizing what 
transpired in the fall of 1987, and in so doing, helped initiate a political movement 
whose story continues to unfold. 
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Part Two 
Mobilizing for Tibet: 1987-1990 
As news of the protests spread across the Tibetan diaspora. refugee communities 
staged their own demonstrations in support of their brethren in Tibet. In the West. 
older groups, such as the U.S. Tibet Committee (USTC), joined in these efforts. as 
did many individuals who had been "friends of Tibet" for a long time but 
heretofore had not engaged in any concerted Tibet activism. Over the next few 
months. new organizations also began to spring up, most of them concentrated in 
the United States, Canada. Australia, England, Switzerland, Germany. and 
Scandinavia. These various organizations created structures within which old and 
new Tibet friends and supporters could work with Tibetan exiles on behalf of the 
cause. In so doing, they also formed the foundation or base of an evolving 
transnational Tibet network. 
As I suggested in chapters 5 and 6, the social and historical contexts of 
each "node" of the Tibetan diaspora are different. The same is true of the "nodes" 
of the transnational Tibet network, many of which overlap with key sites in the 
diaspora. Given that outlining each node is beyond the scope of this chapter, I 
focus on a few organizations in order to give a sense of how the network has taken 
shape and make some observations about its trajectory. As I have already noted. 
what eventually became known as the Tibet Movement began with the 
establishment of non-governmental support groups (or Tibet support groups, 
"tsgs"). The bulk of these groups were established between 1987 and 1990. One 
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such organization is the International Campaign for Tibet Oen. based in 
Washington. D.C. 
lCT was launched following the Dalai Lama's visit to Washington in 
September 1987. That trip, which as we have seen was one of the catalysts for 
riots in Lhasa. was also the context in which the Tibetan leader announced his 
"Five Point Peace Plan" for resolving the conflict with China. John Ackert y. the 
lawyer who accompanied Kerr to Tibet and on the lecture circuit upon their return 
co the U.S .• began volunteering at lCT in the spring of 1988. helping to 
incorporate the organization and assist its founders. Tenzin Tethong (then the Dalai 
Lama's representative to North America). and Michelle Bohana (an American 
Buddhist and activist). with their fundraising efforts. 22 Before long Ackerly 
joined the staff as a paid employee. 
Like Barnett and Kerr. Ackerly is representative of a new cohort of actors 
on the Tibetan scene. In addition to having traveled to Tibet. his professional 
skills and age distinguish him from the earlier cohort of Tibet supporters who got 
involved with the issue during the 1970s. As we have seen. these early activists 
came of age during the 1960s; many identified themselves in interviews as "ex-
hippies" with an interest in Eastern philosophy who first encountered Tibetan 
refugees while travelling in India. With their shared history of alternative 
lifestyles and anti-establishment attitudes, it is not surprising that on the whole 
these individuals have been more comfortable with direct action than with the more 
professionalized activism of organizations such as ICT. In trying to make sense of 
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this. one man (from the first cohort) explained that in the 1970s, "people were into 
Tibet for religious reasons. The difference between old timers and people involved 
with the Movement today is that older people have had their lives defined by it." 
The result of this long-term emotional investment for the older cohort produced 
either a reluctance, lack of interest, or inability to work within "the system" --e.g .. 
with representatives of the establishment. Ackerly's cohort, by contrast. with its 
professional skills, has proved itself to be far more interested in and able co work 
with the media. with Congressional staffers, with government officials. as well as 
with other NGOs. In the process of working within "the system," this post-1987 
cohort of Tibet activists has learned how co frame the Tibet issue in sophisticated 
new ways, using discourses of human rights, self-determination, environmentalism. 
and development, to make their case (see discussion of this phenomenon below). 13 
As a consequence these new actors have profoundly influenced the shape of the 
Tibet Movement and its strategies. 
The International Campaign for Tibet, with its staff of young professionals 
(American and Tibetan) and ambitious agenda, exemplifies this new energy and 
approach to Tibet activism. According to Ackerly, the initial plan behind the 
campaign was to create an organization that would provide international direction 
to Tibet activists around the world. In fact, founders Tethong and Bohana, along 
with Michael Van Walt, a Dutch lawyer who was instrumental in the planning 
stages, envisioned an NGO with 15-20 employees who would function as the 
political arm of the emerging Tibet Movement. Not surprisingly, they quickly 
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found out that European and Australian activists wanted to work independently on 
their own projects and campaigns; in addition. initial fundraising to get the then-
three person organization off the ground proved to be more than enough of a 
challenge. In its literature. ICT describes itself as a "non-partisan. public interest 
group dedicated to promoting human rights and democratic freedoms for the people 
of Tibet." Among other things. the organization monitors human rights conditions 
and works with organizations (e.g .• Asia Watch and Amnesty International) and 
government officials to publicize violations and bring pressure to bear on China: 
engages in various legislative activities. including responding to requests for 
information from members of Congress and their staff. and advocating passage of 
Tibet-related resolutions and legislation; conducts "fact finding" missions to Tibet. 
China. Nepal, and India; monitors environmental implications of development 
projects in Tibet; and networks with exiled Chinese "democracy" organizations and 
edits and translates material on Tibet into Chinese. ICT also publishes Tibet Press 
Watch and Tibetan Environment and Development News. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, prior to 1987. the main Tibet suppon 
organizations in the U.S. focused their attention either on humanitarian aid in India 
and Nepal (Tibet Fund) or on grassroots education (USTC). But with the creation 
of ICT, Tibetans established a presence in Washington, D.C. for the first time. 
After only a few short years, ICT's efforts began to yield impressive results. 
Since 1987, Congress has passed a number of resolutions and legislative items 
pertaining to Tibet and the exile community. The Dalai Lama has also met with 
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Presidents Bush and Clinton and been hosted at a reception by the Democratic and 
Republican leadership in the Capitol Rotunda. 24 How has the organization 
accomplished so much so quickly? ln an attempt to answer that question. Ackerly 
observed in an interview: 
We have always tried to get as much out of Congress as we could. 
the most visibility in different arenas as we could. a little 
opportunistically ... lf there's a group that's interested, we've 
provided them with information-human rights groups, refugee 
organizations, church groups, labor organizations, Congressional 
groups. 
lCT's "opportunism" is worth examining in closer detail. Compared to other Tibet 
suppon groups, the organization has been unusually responsive to shifts in 
international funding priorities and discourses as well as Western cultural trends. 
Ackerly admits to some ambivalence about this fact: 
l keep an ear to the ground in Washington ... we've been branching 
out into development and environment. l have mixed emotions 
about that because it's opportunistic, that's really the West 
determining an agenda for Tibet. Those issues aren't necessarily of 
the same imponance in Tibet. It's not just lCT but all support 
groups pushing the agenda onto Tibet and Dharamsala. Dharamsala 
is very open to influence, there is so much contact with the outside 
world and they need the outside world so they tend to adopt the 
trends of the outside world. Whether that's focusing on political 
prisoners like Amnesty does, that's a western agenda. In terms of 
foundations, money is driving the agenda, we have to use money for 
that purpose. 
Recasting the Tibet struggle as a development issue, or environmental issue, or 
human rights issue has not only generated resources for ICT but has also enabled 
the organization to gain some powerful new allies in and out of Washington. For 
instance, lCT now routinely works closely with a range of international and 
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national NGOs. most of which are not single-issue organizations like the 
Campaign. but rather address wider themes like human rights. By building bridges 
co other groups in this manner. ICT has helped broaden the Tibet issue and 
heighten ics visibility in a number of arenas. Such visibility is crucial in a political 
context where there are many other interest groups competing for funds. media 
coverage. and political space. 
Not all Tibet activists approve of the International Campaign· s practice of 
reframing the issue co suit the times. For those who are members of grassroots 
organizations the cost of doing business. as it were. with the U.S. government or 
with the United Nations can sometimes be too high in that is necessitates che use of 
discourses that appear to imply accommodation rather than commitment co 
Tibetans' original goal of independence. For instance. in its work with the U.S. 
State Depanment and in various U.N. fora. ICT uses the language of "self-
determination" instead of independence to describe the Movement's goal. This is 
because the U.S. government currently recognizes Tibet as a part of China and UN 
member nations no doubt find it easier to support the concept of self-determination 
than that of Tibetan independence, which would force a confrontation with China. 
During the course of my research, the decision to frame the Tibet issue by 
American-based organizations such as ICT and the International Committee of 
Lawyers for Tibet (ICL n in terms of self-determination came up at countless 
Movement meetings, dividing activists into two camps. The composition of the 
two sides reveals an interesting generational difference and sheds more light on the 
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issue of professionalism within the Movement. 
For those opposed to the use of self-determination. or what some activists 
call "UN language." the issue functions as a sort of I itmus test of loyalty to the 
Movement's original goals. One of the most aniculate spokespersons for 
independence is American activist Ed Lazar. Lazar. a longtime Tibet supporter. 
who has spent most of his life working for social change in the U.S. (e.g .. 
Committee for Non-Violent Action; American Friends Service Committee; 
Humanitas) and in India (he spent three years with the Gandhian movement in the 
1960s). After 1987. Lazar became concerned about the lack of a unified 
aniculated goal in the Movement due to the increased use of the language of "self-
determination." As a consequence. he created an organization called "The 
Committee of 100 for Tibet," a group comprised of one hundred prestigious 
individuals from around the world-Nobel Prize laureates, famous statespersons. 
well known personalities. human rights activists, etc. Lazar's idea was that these 
individuals would work within their own countries to get their government to 
recognize Tibet or support Tibet's independence. Lazar also began to raise the 
issue of independence in Tibet support meetings and to write editorials for 
newspapers and Tibet-related publications. In one support group newsletter. Lazar 
argues against the emphasis on self-determination: 
During some recent meetings of Tibet supporters I have heard it said 
that the goal of the Tibet Movement is self-determination. Self-
determination is the right of all peoples and is supported by the 
United Nations. and accordingly, self-determination is one of the 
rights of the Tibetan people ... [ suggest that the emphasis currently 
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given to self-determination is misplaced and actually may harm the 
independence struggle by clouding the issue. Strategically, avoiding 
the issue of independence by using the language of self-
determination contributes to Chinese control of the terms of the 
issue. The Chinese want the issue of Tibet to be anything but 
independence. ( 1992: 11) 
Lazar claims that "independence is the goal of the Tibetan struggle and acceptance 
of a lesser goal diminishes the independence struggle" (1992: 11). Citing 
conversations with Tibetans he has met, pro-independence demonstrations in 
Lhasa, and declarations by the Tibetan parliament in exile that "the goal is full 
independence," Lazar argues that to settle for less than this is to sell the 
Movement, and the Tibetan people, thousands of whom have died for 
independence, short. 
Lazar's perspective on the issue of independence is shaped by his years as a 
peace activist. His commitment to independence and his willingness to challenge 
those who disagree with him reflect his commitment to "struggle"--to risking much 
for an idea in which he believes. He observes that most Tibet activists "are very 
comfortable": 
They feel very good about themselves if they have a meeting about 
Tibet. That's doesn't do a damn thing ... you have to see it as part of 
a struggle. Most people are so comfortable and so happy with what 
they are doing, they don't realize that there's people in prison in 
Tibet now, that if you speak for independence for Tibet, you are 
going to have the hell beaten out of you ... so we have this large 
movement we need to infuse it with an intensity. 
Lazar adds that most Tibetans are fearful of "sticking their neck out" by voicing 
their opinion in public or more formal settings such as Movement meetings. Even 
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if they agree that independence is the goal of the Movement, they do not say so 
publicly (the only Tibetans that do consistently raise the issue in public are high 
status individuals whose backgrounds presumably protect them from criticism or 
ostracism). 
Many Tibetan and non-Tibetan activists agree with Lazar's point of view. 
Some of them (all Tibetan) recently published their opinions in a book edited by 
Lazar titled Tibet: The Issue is Independence (1994). Interestingly, most of the 
authors are from the older generation who were born in Tibet and fled to India 
after 1959. As Lazar points out in his afterword to the volume: 
There is no sure answer to how Tibet will achieve independence, but 
the Tibetan authors of this book point the way. Their essays 
represent more than words, they represent the integrity of the 
authors who, in several cases, have worked their entire adult lives 
for Tibet. One thing is certain-anything is possible if there is belief 
that Tibetan independence can be won, and little is possible without 
such belief. (1994:84) 
It is significant that the only contributor to Lazar's book to disagree with the need 
to frame the Tibetan cause as an independence struggle is a much younger Tibetan 
woman named Yoden Thonden, a Harvard and NYU-educated lawyer, who is 
much more comfortable with the legalistic discourses adopted by JCT. In her 
essay, "The indigenous route: A path not yet taken," Thonden argues "Yes, the 
issue is independence, but in pursuit of this goal we must explore all possible 
routes" (1994:55). She points out that since Tibet activists have begun adopting 
the language of human rights, they have garnered far more support than they did in 
two decades of advocating for independence: 
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This approach has allowed us access to international forums [sicl 
from which we otherwise would have been excluded; it has provided 
us a space in which we have developed a voice in the international 
community. (1994:56) 
Thonden goes on to suggest that activists must use all possible discourses. 
including independence, to push the Tibet issue forward in a number of arenas. 
arguing that one of the most productive routes could be the claim chat Tibetans are 
an indigenous people with the right to self-determination. 
Many post-1987 activists argue that negotiating a form of association with 
China under the auspices of "self-determination" is the only "realistic" approach co 
the Tibetan problem. They argue that claims for independence at this point are 
unrealistic because China will never willingly leave Tibet and to insist on 
independence only furthers the standoff between the Chinese government and the 
Dalai Lama, which in turn enables China to continue its destructive policy of 
population transfer into Tibet. In the long run. they argue. Tibetans will be vastly 
outnumbered in their own country and Tibet will be transformed into a Chinese 
province. Time is of the essence, in other words, and priority should be given to 
entering into negotiations with China as soon as possible. These "realpolitik" 
activists also argue that it is not up to outsiders-either Tibetan exiles or non-
Tibetans, to decide what Tibetans inside Tibet want or should strive for. They 
claim that self-determination can be a route to independence, but that it is up to 
Tibetans to make that decision when the time comes. 25 
The debate over independence versus self-determination which appears to 
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divide into generational groupings highlights Mannheim's observation of the 
"generational distinction" (1952:381) in political activism. He argues that the 
"moment of intersection of the individual life cycle and rapidly changing historical 
and social conditions" is critical in the formation of political consciousness and 
new social movements (Ginsburg 1989: 141). For those Tibetans who experienced 
the takeover of Tibet but reached adulthood in the diaspora, their lives (and hopes 
and fantasies) have been organized around the notion of returning to an 
independent Tibet. And for those non-Tibetans who came of age in the 1960s and 
became involved with the refugee community in the 1970s, the concept of a 
negotiated settlement signifies not just capitulation but a failure of will and 
commitment to an ideal. On the other hand, the travelers who witnessed 
demonstrations in Lhasa and for the post-1987 recruits to the Movement, most of 
whom came of age during the 1970s and early 80s are more comfortable with 
universal discourses of human rights, democracy, and environmentalism, than they 
are with the discourses of the previous generation. Instead of being steeped in left 
wing ideologies which are critical of CIA adventurism and American foreign 
policy, they are middle of the road liberals who do not distrust authority, 
especially U.S. governmental authority, in quite the same way. This generational 
difference provides important insight into the Movement's internal variation. 
Conflicts between different cohorts of activists and their respective 
organizations are not surprising, as Brosius points out. Like the environmental 
campaign to protect the rainforest in Malaysia, described in his "Voices for the 
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Borneo Rainforest: Writing the Biography of an Environmental Campaign" 
(1995b). the Tibet Movement consists of a spectrum of organizations ranging from 
mainstream groups to direct action groups. each end of the spectrum regarding the 
other with suspicion: 
Mainstream groups are considered by direct action groups to be 
overly accomodationist, hide-bound, bloated and more concerned 
about institutional survival than about creating change. Direct 
actions groups are considered by mainstream groups to have little 
appreciation for long term goals and little understanding of the need 
to establish working relationships with opponents in order to create 
realistic change. (Brosius 1995b: 15) 
As organizations such as the International Campaign for Tibet have succeeded in 
reformulating the Tibet issue in new ways, Tibet activism has become increasingly 
professionalized, moving from consciousness-raising through direct action and 
letter writing to institution building, network building. and negotiation. One of the 
unfortunate (but perhaps inevitable) consequences of this process in the U.S.-as 
the debate over independence illustrates--has been a rise in tension among various 
groups and the relative marginalization of the earlier generation of Tibet activists. 
While the International Campaign for Tibet has played a central role in 
getting the Tibet issue onto the U.S. government's agenda, the Tibet Movement is 
much larger than any single organization; indeed there are many groups that have 
emerged in recent years and made important contributions to the Movement's 
growing success. ln the next section [ briefly summarize four of them--Canada 
Tibet Committee (CTC), Tibet Support Group UK (now known as Free Tibet 
Campaign), the Australia Tibet Council, and Cornice de Soutien au Peuple 
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Tibetaine. I do so to underscore the fact that the Movement is not a discrete. 
narratable series of events with a single coherent history, but instead is formed 
around a series of spatially dispersed organizational nodes, each with its own 
background and priorities, and linked to one another by sophisticated 
communications technologies. 
Conclusion: the emergence of a global network 
The Canada Tibet Committee came into being around the same time that ICT was 
taking shape in Washington, D.C. In a recent article, activist Carole Samdup 
recalls how the Canada Tibet Committee or ere got its start: 
The ere was formed in 1987 in response to growing unrest inside 
Tibet and to create a structure within which Canadian friends and 
supponers could work with their Tibetan friends. Founding member 
Jim Sullivan had never been to Dharamsala or to Tibet, but still felt 
compelled to do something to help. "There were so many aspects of 
the issue which affected me; destruction of the environment, the 
violence against women, the right to self-determination. I felt that a 
suppon group in Canada would provide a venue for me to do 
something to help." (Samdup 1996:20) 
Headquartered in Montreal and with branches in Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary. and 
Vancouver, CTC is a voluntary organization sustained by donations, grants, 
fundraising events, and membership campaigns. While the organization works on 
grassroots projects in local and national contexts, it has been extremely involved in 
networking with other Tibet suppon groups around the world and participating in 
the international arena. 
With the growing trend towards globalization, and the increased 
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speed and accessibility of information, it is no longer possible for 
national NGOs co distance ourselves from the international 
community of NGOs and human rights mechanisms. In 1992. the 
CTC established a UN Working Group with the goal of demystifying 
the UN process and lobbying the UN Commission on Human Rights 
<CHR). (Samdup 1996:21) 
At the request of the Tibetan Women's Association in Dharamsala. the CTC 
agreed to be the regional coordinator for. and participate in, the UN Fourth World 
Conference on Women which was held in Beijing in September 1995. Most 
recently, CTC representives attended the Habitat II conference in June 1996 in 
Istanbul, Turkey. 
CTC's involvement in the international arena has been facilitated by two of 
its own projects-World Tibet Network (WfN)-an on-line Tibet information news 
service and multidirectional communication email system for Tibet support groups. 
and "Dharamsala on-line," a project which links the Tibetan administration in 
Dharamsala to various Tibetan offices and settlements across India and co refugee 
organizations and individuals abroad. The establishment of these networks has 
vastly improved international coordination of the Tibet Movement (see Mclagan 
1996; see also Frederich 1992). 
Across the Atlantic, the Free Tibet Campaign (formerly Tibet Support 
Group UK) has focused the bulk of its energies on advocating for Tibet in the 
British context. Unlike CTC, whose staff is made up of all volunteers, the FTC 
has three full-time, paid staff and a pool of volunteer administrators, researchers, 
campaigners, and fundraisers who work out of an office in Central London. The 
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organization grew out of outrage at the British government· s treatment of the Dalai 
Lama on a visit in l 988: 
In April l 988, the UK Foreign Office decided to abuse the freedom 
of expression of His Holiness the Dalai Lama by granting him a 
conditional visa for entry into the UK; conditional upon him not 
making any political statement during the visit. The outrage created 
by this decision led to meetings of activists and a resolve to create a 
continuous and strong campaign for Tibet. (Nunn 1996: l6) 
As mentioned earlier, Robbie Barnett was involved in the early stages of the 
formation of TSG UK before his decision to create Tibet Information Network. 
Free Tibet Campaign's stated goal is to "support the Tibetan people in their 
desire for freedom and the exercise of their right to independence." though the 
general secretary carefully stipulates that 
we do not represent the Tibetan people. It would be wrong for us to 
do so and there is no need; our whole argument is based on the 
premise that the Tibetan people should be representing themselves. 
We work to create the international platform which will allow the 
Tibetan people to exercise the rights they have from their cultural, 
historical, and national identity. We do not say Tibet should be 
independent because that is a goal to be set by Tibetans. However, 
we do believe that Tibetans have the right to independence and we 
will do everything in our power to enable the exercise of that right. 
(Nunn l996: 16) 
Though it recognizes the validity of the argument for an independent Tibet, FTC 
acknowledges the British government's position, which is similar to that of the 
U.S. government. Nevertheless, the organization has attempted to build public 
awareness through grassroots campaigns and to use that awareness to lobby British 
politicians to change their stand on the issue. In addition to trying to influence 
British policy, FTC has also been very active in pressuring China directly through 
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its "Urgent Campaign Scheme." This scheme is used mainly to appeal for the 
release of political prisoners in Tibet. 26 
The Australia Tibet Council (ATC). established in 1988. was Australia's 
first Tibet support organization. With a national office in Sydney and branch 
offices in every state, the ACT's stated aims include raising awareness of the 
situation in Tibet, encouraging the government to take action on behalf of Tibet. 
and supporting Australian and international initiatives. Like the Canada Tibet 
Committee and Free Tibet Campaign. the Australia Tibet Council publishes its own 
newsletter, Australia Tibet Council News, and Tibet Documents, a compilation of 
Australian and international media clippings relating to Tibet. One of ATC's most 
visible projects is Eco-Tibet Australia. which works with environmental 
organizations to raise awareness about environmental issues in Tibet. Other A TC 
projects include the "Aid Group," which provides relevant information to 
governmental and non-governmental organizations about the provision of Australian 
aid to Tibet, and the "Tibetan Library Project" which provides consignments of 
donated books on modern China to the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in 
Dharamsala. Finally, under the auspices of the ATC, a "Parliamentary Group for 
Tibet" was established in 1993; since that time a number of resolutions relating to 
Tibet have been passed by the Australian Parliament. As its various projects 
suggest. the Council has made a concerted effort to formulate the Tibet issue in 
terms of the environment, development, and human rights. The result has been 
impressive and has transformed Australia from a distant outpost with few Tibet 
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supporters to an important node in the transnational Tibet network in a relatively 
short period of time. 
The final Tibet support organization was started in Geneva by the same 
graphic artist mentioned who witnessed disturbances in Lhasa in March 1989. ln 
an interview in 1992. Christophe Besuchet shared a gripping story about caking 
photographs of protesters. including those who were wounded and hiding in private 
homes and attempting to hide the canisters of film from the police in his hotel 
room. Though he was able to hide one roll. the police entered his room before he 
had a chance to hide the other two. After searching his room and his person. they 
discovered the film in his socks and took it away. Upon his return to Switzerland. 
Besuchet decided to start a group called "Cornice de Soutien au Peuple Tibetaine" 
with several other Swiss Tibet supporters and Tibetan refugees living in Geneva. 
One of the main activities of the Cornice is Lungta, a glossy publication which 
Besuchet edits and designs. The Comite also focuses its attention on the UN and 
on lobbying the Swiss government. One of the Cornice's most innovative projects 
is Tibet Fax. a single page of information about events sponsored by various Tibet 
support groups in Europe that is collected and then distributed via fax to all active 
groups on the Continent every month. 
These four organizations are but a few of the many Tibet support groups 
created by activists in direct response to (or in the case of FfC. catalyzed by) the 
demonstrations in 1987. Just as the Westerners who witnessed the events 
responded in an improvisational manner while in Lhasa, so the emergence of Tibet 
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support groups across the globe was spontaneous. unplanned. and uncoordinated. 
This perspective of the Movement as a process and not afait accompli stands as a 
critique of social movement theory that looks at social movements in terms of goal 
orientation (see Coucin · s discussion of this point; see also McCarthy and laid 1987 
on resource mobilization theory). lt does so by viewing the Movement in terms of 
people responding to a window of opportunity. seizing the occasion to publicize the 
Tibet issue based on concrete and dramatic evidence of Chinese repression in 
Tibet. rather than acting in a rational, strategic fashion with a premeditated goal in 
mind. This perspective is perhaps best summed up by Brosius· observation that 
political movements are often creative adaptations to political possibilities of the 
moment ( l 994b). 
Between 1987 and 1990, a network or circuit of Tibet activists began co 
emerge, formed by Tibet support groups and Tibetan communities and 
organizations across the diaspora. Knit together by computer email, fax. and 
support group publications, and after 1990, by international conferences, the 
network, with its fluid ambiguous organization, took time to coalesce into an 
identifiable global political structure or formation. But by 1990. when the first 
international Tibet support conference was held in Dharamsala, lndia, activists 
began to refer to themselves as part of a "movement," and recognized themselves 
as sharing the same political goal (though not necessarily the same strategies). 
This new self-consciousness helped launch the Tibet Movement into a new phase, 
in which individual support groups began to work more closely together and to 
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coordinate their efforts. Between 1990 and 1993. activists collaborated on a set of 
campaigns that were characterized by their global dimensions. I examine one such 
campaign in Part Three of this dissertation-the "International Year of Tibet." 
Although my analysis focuses on events in the U.S .. it is important to remember 
that Year of Tibet events took place in a number of European and Asian countries 
and the program was conceived of as a global campaign. 
Throughout this dissertation I have suggested that in the course of 
mobilizing for Tibet. Tibetan and Western activists construct both "Tibetanness" 
and each other. The next three chapters explore this process further. I ask how 
the intercultural alliance plays out on the ground, how Tibetans engage with 
Western representations of Tibetanness and at the same time, panicipate in their 
own objectification. While the Tibet Movement is a notable example of 
intercultural collaboration, it is not without its problems and difficulties; these are 
examined in some detail in the context of the Year of Tibet. 
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Notes 
l. Barnett dates the process of liberalization in Tibet to the First Symposium on Work 
in Tibet which was held by the Central Government in March 1980. At the 
conference. it was decided that the priorities in Tibet 
were to correct the excesses of ultra-leftism and to use "practice as 
the only yardstick for truth." lo other words. it recognized both that 
the depradations of the Cultural Revolution had to be rolled back. as 
they had already begun to be in China. and that conditions in Tibet 
were different from those in China and required special, more 
conciliatory policies. (Barnett 1994:238) 
Hu Yaobang's trip to Tibet. two months later, dramatically increased the pace of 
reform. 
2. Schwartz notes that "state support for the rebuilding of monasteries has largely been 
limited to those perceived by the government to have high value as tourist 
attractions" (l 994a:58). 
This applies to historically important locations such as Samye and 
Sakya monasteries. Tashilunpo. and Drepung and Sera near Lhasa. 
Some other smaller monasteries have received limited funds. the 
extent of support varying considerably according to the attitude of 
local officials. ( l 994a:58) 
3. It is important to remember. as Schwartz points out, that 
the Chinese system is totalitarian. The state monopolizes every legal avenue 
of public expression. suppressing all dissent. while it manufactures through 
its own organs the official version of Tibetan reality. Whenever Tibetans 
question Chinese rule the whole apparatus of communist domination is 
brought down on them-political campaigns. arrests and torture. 
imprisonment and executions. intimidating displays of military force. 
Tibetans are subjected to endless harangues in political meetings and police 
interrogation sessions about foreign conspiracies and agents of subversion. 
In spite of overwhelming forces arrayed against them, Tibetans persist in 
attempting to communicate their discontent. ( l 994a:2 l) 
See Schwartz l 994a:56-65 for a description of Chinese attempts to control the 
monasteries after 1987. 
4. Schwartz explains the emergence of Tibetan nationalism in the following way: 
Ideology remains a central feature of Chinese rule in Tibet. The communist 
party/state, obsessed with threats to its power, needs to maintain a constant 
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hold over people·s thoughts-even more so when its authority is challenged. 
Thus Tibetans are locked in ideological struggle with the Chinese state. 
Nationalism has developed as the Tibetan response. giving form and 
constancy to Tibetan aspirations. Tibetan protest does not arise from a 
feeling of minority status. It is ovenly political. targeting the Chinese state 
and the apparacus of social control that maintains state power. As we have 
seen. protest is periodically renewed in direct response to efforts by the 
Chinese state to suppress dissent. These are the conditions under which 
Tibetans assen themselves to be a nation and define themselves in political 
terms. (l994a:218) 
See Schwartz l994a:l88-23l and l994b for a more detailed analysis of the 
contradictions of China·s reform policy and its response to the demonstrations 
between 1987-1992. 
5. See Klieger (1992. chapter 7) for a discussion of tourism as patronage in Tibet. 
6. I was one of the thousands of individual travellers who travelled in Tibet in 1986. 
While the majority of Western activists I interviewed had travelled to Tibet at some 
point between 1984 and 1993. most. like myself. witnessed political tensions but not 
actual demonstrations. 
7. During this visit. the Tibetan leader met with members of the Congressional Human 
Rights Caucus and proposed a "Five Point Peace Plan" for Tibet. The plan's five 
points are summarized below: 
l. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace (ahimsa. 
Skt.); 
2. Abandonment of China·s population transfer policy which threatens 
the very existence of the Tibetans as a people: 
3. Respect for Tibetan people·s fundamental human rights and 
democratic freedoms; 
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the 
abandonment of China·s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear 
weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste; 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet 
and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese people. 
8. It is important to note that October l is Chinese National Day. 
9. Barnett and Meysztowicz write that "for days afterwards. monks. children. and old 
men were coming up to Westerners in the Barkhor and returning the little plastic 
cylinders. begging us to smuggle them abroad" (1988: 14). 
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10. Kerr had actually been placed under house (hotel) arrest, along with his fellow 
American John Ackerly, after police discovered a Tibetan national flag on Ackerly's 
backpack, a few days after the first demonstration on September 27. For a vivid 
description of these events, see Kerr (1993:83-89). A condensed version of the 
events of October 1 from Kerr and Ackerly' s point of view can be found in 
"Reflections on a Riot," Cultural Survival Ouanerly, 1988, 12(1):45-48. 
11. Schwartz points out that the geographical division of Lhasa into Tibetan and Chinese 
communities facilitated clandestine relations between Tibetans and foreigners. all of 
whom stayed in Tibetan-run hotels in the Tibetan part of town. The hotels 
functioned as spaces where travelers could hold meetings free from Chinese 
interference (1991 :599). 
12. Schwartz notes that French, Spanish and Italian travelers frequently are not fluent in 
English. Thus their participation in the English-speaking international group of 
travelers is limited. Although non-European travelers (e.g. Japanese. Hong Kong. 
and Singapore Chinese) were in Lhasa and are often English-speakers. they are less 
likely to mix with those outside their own group ( 1991 :598). 
13. See also Calhoun 1994 who argues that Chinese activists were transformed through 
their involvement with the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement in 1989 and 
that therefore "we need to pay attention to shifting identities of participants" (21). 
14. See Nunn 1996 for a description of Tibet Support Group UK, recently renamed Free 
Tibet Campaign. 
15. Currently TIN reports are distributed around the globe to subscribers who pay to 
receive fax and email versions on a regular basis. Printed materials containing such 
things as analyses of Chinese policies in Tibet are mailed to paying subscribers as 
well. TIN subscribers include members of the media, print, radio, and wire services 
in Asia, Europe, and North America, governments, human rights organizations, 
Tibet support groups, and interested individuals. 
16. Kerr and Ackerly were mentioned in front page stories of the New York Times two 
days in a row-the result of Ackerly having given their names and passport numbers 
to someone leaving Tibet. 
Kerr recalls being interviewed in Lhasa by reporters from the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (1993:108). 
17. In between bis first trip to Tibet in 1987 and the next one in 1991, Kerr returned to 
India to gather information from recently escaped refugees about torture and prison 
conditions in Tibet. Together he and John Ackerly wrote a report published in 
November 1989 by Physicians for Human Rights titled "The Suppression of a 
People: Accounts of Torture and Imprisonment in Tibet." 
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18. Although Tibetan protestors face far worse consequences than foreign travelers when 
trouble occurs. in recent years Westerners have lost some of the protection or 
"diplomatic immunity" they felt as foreigners in 1987 as the cycle of protests have 
continued and tensions have risen in Tibet. Indeed. the danger to Westerners during 
the course of unrest is increasingly very real: 
One foreigner. a Dutchwoman. was hit by automatic weapon fire 
when security forces shot into a crowd of onlookers containing both 
foreigners and Tibetans during a demonstration in December 1988. 
Foreigners who photographed another demonstration 3 weeks later 
were beaten and arrested at gunpoint. (Schwartz 1991 :601) 
19. See Roger Lancaster·s unpublished paper, "With the lnternacionalistas in Nicaragua: 
Varieties of trans-cultural experience in a social revolution. " 
20. Barnett argues that "the history of journalism in Tibet is the history of Tibetans 
being put at risk by freelance journalists for a story." One of the most dramatic 
examples of this is a documentary produced by an Englishwoman named Vanya 
Kewley called "Tibet: A Case to Answer." Kewley secretly shot videotape of her 
trip to Tibet. interviewing monks. nuns. and a number of laypersons. While some 
of them covered their faces, others decided not co do so. When the documentary 
was broadcast in Britain. Kewley used video technology to protect the identities of 
those who had not covered themselves. But according to one source. the photos 
used to publicize the broadcast clearly showed the faces of several Tibetans. Kewley 
was roundly criticized for this by English human rights activists. Later it was said 
that back in Tibet Chinese officials had identified three of the nuns who participated 
in Kewley's documentary and taken action against them. 
21. I was present at a talk the two gave at Columbia University in late 1987. 
Accompanied and introduced by John A vedon. author of In Exile from the Land of 
Snows (1984), they showed slides of demonstrating and wounded monks and 
described what they had seen. 
22. ICT receives approximately half of its funding from large private foundations and 
donors such as Richard Gere; the rest is divided between money from Switzerland 
(which is channeled from the government-in-exile in Dharamsala); and from small 
donors who pay $25 a year to be members of ICT. 
The issue of whether or not ICT is an arm of the CT A is one that has come up from 
time to time in part because the bead of the organization is simultaneously the Dalai 
Lama's "special envoy to North America." According to Ackerly. however. 
Dbaramsala does not tell the Campaign what to do; if anything. the exile 
government does not give enough direction of what policies it wants the Campaign 
to pursue. 
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23. See also Brosius l 995b for a discussion of how embracing cenain discourses entails 
engaging panicular institutions that simultaneously create certain possibilities and 
preclude others. 
24. For example, the following legislative items were passed between 1987 and 1991: 
Tibet was declared to be an occupied country under international law (1990); a bill 
was passed providing visas for 1,000 Tibetan refugees to immigrate to the U.S. 
(1990); legislation authorized creation and funding of a Tibetan-language Voice of 
America broadcast into Tibet (1991); a Fulbright scholarship program for Tibetans 
was established ( 1989); and legislation providing humanitarian assistance to the 
Tibetan community in India became law (1989. 1990, 1991). 
25. See Michael van Walt van Praag 1987 on the status of Tibet and arguments about 
self-determination. 
26. In the summer of 1992, I had the opportunity to present a video documentary at a 
screening organized by the then-Tibet Support Group UK in London. I was very 
impressed both by the number of people who turned up for the event and by the fact 
that organizers had managed to get the screening listed in Time Out, a weekly 
publication with widely-read ans and entertainment listings. The day after the 
screening, the London office arranged for me to screen the tape for a local TSG in 
Swindon, an hour outside of London. Again the screening room was packed full of 
people and I spent more than an hour answering questions and discussing the Tibet 
issue with the audience. 
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Part Three 
Mobilizing "culture": The Year of Tibet 
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Chapter 8 Mystical visions in Manhattan 
Introduction 
Since 1959. Tibetan refugees have been engaged in an ongoing "confrontation of 
representations" (Goldstein 1994b: 15) with Chinese officials in which the two sides 
compete to legitimize their own representations of Tibetan history as well as 
current events in Tibet. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3. scholarly and popular 
accounts of Tibet's religio-political system have played an important part in this 
struggle. In recent years, a new dimension to the confrontation has emerged. with 
the display of culture becoming one of the most important means through which 
Tibetan and Chinese claims to political legitimacy are contested. This chapter 
examines one of the most spectacular examples of the deployment of Tibetan 
culture to mobilize political support-the "International Year of Tibet" (March 10. 
1991 - March 10, 1992). 
In many respects, the Year of Tibet was the apotheosis of representations of 
Tibet. It entailed a self-conscious objectification of Tibetan culture on a massive 
and sustained scale, involving Tibetans and their Western supporters collaborating 
on a series of events throughout the course of a year in some thirty-six countries. 1 
In a departure from previous public displays of Tibetan "culture," which had been 
limited to such things as the performing arts (Calkowski 1995)2 and 
demonstrations of sand mandala-making by Tibetan Buddhist monks, the Year of 
Tibet offered a coordinated and ambitious array of events, ranging from the 
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spectacular-a two week-long religious teaching and rantric initiation by the Dalai 
Lama in Madison Square Garden-to the mundane-such as local library exhibitions 
of photos from Tibet. The Year of Tibet reached its climax in New York City in 
October 1991: my focus here is on the events produced during that month. 
In the broadest sense, this chapter as well as chapters 9 and 10 are about 
the relationship between cultural representation and political action. As we shall 
see, my research on the Year of Tibet demonstrates in ethnographic terms the 
observation by Dirks et al that there has been "an extraordinary convergence 
between academic debates regarding culture and the political career of culture 
outside the academy" (Dirks, Eley, and Onner 1994:24). That is, culture 
increasingly has been not only appropriated by scholars in fields outside of 
anthropology, but by the groups anthropologists typically study. While Turner 
( 1993) and others have noted this fact, few ethnographic studies have been done of 
the self-conscious embrace of the concept and the processes of objectification 
entailed by its deployment in a political campaign. 
As I have repeated throughout this dissertation, it is impossible to talk about 
the representation of Tibetan culture without acknowledging the heavy semiotic 
load Tibetans carry in the Western imagination. Representations of Tibet as a non-
violent Shangri-la and of Tibetans as happy repositories of spiritual wisdom have 
mediated relations between Tibetans and the West since the early part of this 
century. Rather than look at how these representations construct Tibetans as 
"Others, "3 my interest is in how Tibetans work within the problematic categories 
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created about them. I have emphasized how TibetanS engage Western discourses 
about Tibetanness in the process of constituting themselves in exile (see chapters 5 
and 6). This chapter, based on the premise that the act of putting culture on 
display is a form of cultural production. expands my argument further by exploring 
the self-conscious participation of Tibetans in their own objectification. 
Specifically, it examines the intercultural social processes around the production of 
Tibetan culture by Tibetan and American activists. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Part One briefly outlines the 
theoretical developments which underpin my primary concern in this chapter--the 
strategic deployment of "Tibetan culture." Drawing on Clifford's metaphor of the 
"predicament of culture" (Clifford 1988) and recent literature on cultural 
production by indigenous peoples (e.g., Ginsburg 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c, 1995; Myers 1991, 1994a. 1994b; and T. Turner 1990a, 1990b. 
199la, l99lb, 1992, 1995), I suggest the ways in which my research builds on. 
and in some senses extends, this particular strand of contemporary cultural theory. 
As I argued in my introduction to this dissertation, each of the strategies 
deployed by Tibet activists entails the production and assertion of a panicular 
diasporic Tibetan identity.4 In the case of the Year of Tibet, the narrative was 
one of Tibetan culture as a locus of endangered spirituality and as a valuable 
resource for the world's future. Part Two explores the various intersecting 
interpretive frameworks through which this narrative of Tibetanness was produced 
and understood, including the traditional patron-client relationship and New Age 
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Orientalism. Focusing on four key actors--the Dalai Lama. Tibet House co-
founders Richard Gere and Robert Thurman, and the media consultant hired by 
Tibet House to handle Year of Tibet events in October--1 attempt to trace the 
emergence and implementation of this narrative of Tibetanness in the Year of 
Tibet. 
Part Three focuses on the "Wisdom and Compassion" an exhibition and 
accompanying sand mandala. ln my discussion. I attempt to show how the 
narrative of Tibetanness described in Part Two manifested itself through these 
"events" and those who were asked to "perform" them. I also explore some of the 
contradictions involved. including how, by privileging a Tibetan Buddhist 
definition of Tibetan "culture." these events and performances reinforced a certain 
Buddhist hegemony in exile. In the chapter's conclusion, I summarize my 
argument about the culture strategy and raise further questions to be examined in 
greater detail in chapter 9. 
Part One 
... once the representational challenge is seen to be the portrayal and 
understanding of local/global historical encounters, co-productions, 
dominations, and resistances, then one needs to focus on hybrid, 
cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted, native ones. 
(Clifford 1992: 101) 
Translation is the ethnographic object. (Myers 1994b:675) 
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The Predicament of Culture 
In the beginning of his book The Predicament of Culture (1988), James Clifford 
proposes a different historical vision from that which has tended to see the world 
as populated by endangered authenticities. "pure products always going crazy." 
He argues that we need to "make a space for specific paths through modernity." 
chat is, to rethink our narratives of culture in modernity and to view the production 
of culture as a "hybrid. often discontinuous inventive process" ( 10). The metaphor 
Clifford uses to characterize the current state of culture and its theorization-the 
"predicament of culture"--has been especially productive for anthropologists. many 
of whom recognize the inadequacy of their older models co account for the obvious 
fact of persistent cultural heterogeneity (or "off-centeredness," co borrow Clifford's 
phrase). s 
Clifford's interesting work on the "predicament of culture" is part of a large 
body of literature in the humanities and social sciences concerned with 
representation and cultural difference. This literature, which views cultural 
difference as an artifact of colonial practice, has opened up important terrain in 
recent years through its analysis of the politics of representing difference in various 
elite and popular cultural contexts, such as museum exhibitions, cinema, and 
television (e.g. see Clifford 1988; Said 1978, Torgovnick 1990). Nonetheless. one 
of the problems with this literature's analytic approach is that it often focuses on 
representations of cultural others in terms that reproduce the problem of cultural 
domination, even as it offers trenchant critiques. That is, by focusing on "texts" 
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and by using frameworks and terms which rely on unidirectional models of looking 
such as "surveillance" or "appropriation," these authors tend co reinforce the 
erasure of the "ocher's" perspective (and therefore their agency). They also tend to 
view the imercultural space in which these representations (or performances) of 
cultural difference are produced as necessarily hierarchical (and thus moral) rather 
than as potentially political. 
Recently anthropologists have used their skills to reframe this kind of work 
by examining how the so-called "natives" themselves are engaged in their own 
representation. For example, research on indigenous cultural production examines 
such encounters as arenas for collective self-fashioning, as sites where groups 
collaborate in their representation for a clear political purpose. The emphasis is 
not just on representations as texts, but as contested social processes which require 
an understanding of the consciousness of participants. In other words, this work 
focuses on the social practices around representation and how cultural production 
acquires meaning for producers, participants and various audiences. This turn in 
anthropology was presaged by the theoretical writing of anthropologist Arjun 
Appadurai (1990, 1991, 1993; see also Appadurai and Breckenridge 1988), who, 
since the lace 1980s, has argued that culture has become "an arena for conscious 
choice, justification, and representation, with representation often being made to 
multiple and spatially dislocated audiences" (1990: 18). Because of this. he asserts. 
anthropologists must focus on the complexities of representation and begin to pay 
attention to cosmopolitan cultural forms if they are to grasp the processes through 
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which lace twentieth century identities are mediated. One of the implications of 
Appadurai's argument is that culture has become a deterritorialized sign, one that 
is (or can be) self-consciously and strategically deployed. 
Appadurai's theoretical insights have been widely-cited (and institutionalized 
in the journal Public Culture, edited by Carol Breckenridge) and have contributed 
to a growing sensitivity in the discipline to such things as mass-mediated cultural 
forms. The ethnographic work on indigenous cultural production cited in this 
chapter provide grounded studies of some of the very processes theorized by 
Appadurai. 
In the next section, I explore in greater detail how this recent work on 
indigenous cultural production expands on the literature on representation and 
cultural difference. My aim is to show how these studies contribute to our 
understanding of the emergence of culture as a vehicle through which political 
claims are made and collective identities are mediated. 
Theorizing indigenous cultural production 
In her work on the production and circulation of indigenous media (which she 
defines as encompassing a range of film, video and televisual practices by "First 
Nations" or "Fourth World" peoples), Faye Ginsburg has argued for the need to 
move beyond a cultural studies approach which privileges media as texts: 
In order to open a new discursive space for indigenous media that 
respects and understands them on their own terms, it is important to 
attend to the processes of production and reception. Analysis needs 
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co focus less on the formal qualities of film and video as cext and 
more on the cultural mediations that occur through film and video 
works. (1995:259) 
She suggests a model that "stresses not only the cext but the activities and social 
organization of media work as arenas of cultural production" (l994c:378). 6 This 
model is particularly a propos in the context of Aboriginal societies where "people 
organize themselves around media production in cerms of the responsibilities of 
specific groups for knowledge and practices associated with certain geographic 
areas" (ibid., 371). 7 
Ginsburg's argument acknowledges the meaningfulness of representation for 
Aboriginal producers who "use a language of evaluation that stresses the activities 
of the production and circulation of [media] work ... as the basis for judging its 
value" (ibid., 367). That is, judgments are based on "notions of appropriate social 
and formal organizations of performance in ceremonial or ritual domains" (ibid .. 
367). Ginsburg defines this system of evaluation as one of "embedded aesthetics" 
in which textual production and circulation are not separated from Aboriginal 
media's "capacity to embody, sustain, and even revive or create certain social 
relations" (ibid., 368). To overlook these extratextual aspects of Aboriginal 
media, she argues, is to miss a crucial dimension of their function in contemporary 
Aboriginal society-as vehicles for mediating cultural revival, identity formation, 
and political assertion. 
As we shall see, in making this important link between media production 
(representation) and political consciousness, Ginsburg theoretically sets the stage 
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for Turner's argument about the relationship between video technology and the 
objectification of "culture." Before discussing Turner, however, I briefly examine 
Myers' work on Aboriginal acrylic painting. 
Like Ginsburg, Myers is interested in understanding Aboriginal cultural 
production as a form of social action. In a recent paper (l 99 l), he argues that the 
production. circulation. and consumption of acrylic paintings "constitutes an 
important dimension of self-production of Aboriginal people and of the processes 
of 'representing culture'" (28). By focusing on the discourses and practices (what 
he calls "intercultural accountings") through which the paintings are situated as 
"objects" by art critics. anthropologists, Aboriginal painters, and others. Myers 
explores the processes through which the paintings have come to stand for 
"Aboriginal culture." 
According to Myers. the insertion of these "objects" into the same space--
the international art market--as Western cultural forms "is of consider~ble 
theoretical significance for understanding the predicament of intercultural 
transaction" (1994a: 10). His discussion of the various accountings through which 
meaning is constructed around the paintings reveals the disjunctions that occur 
when the "appropriate sensibilities are not discursively elaborated and shared 
between producer and audience" (ibid .• 29). What is needed. Myers points out, 
are new discourses for considering these emerging forms (and performances) of 
cultural "difference." 
In his essay "Culture-making: Performing Aboriginality at the Asia Society 
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Gallery" (l994b). Myers attempts to demonstrate this need for new interpretive 
frameworks by analyzing the construction and performance of an Aboriginal 
sandpainting at the Asia Society in New York in 1988. The two day sandpainting 
"performance" accompanied a major exhibition of Aboriginal art called 
"Dreamings: The Arc of Aboriginal Australia." According to Myers. this event 
(and ones similar to it which are increasingly taking place in venues ranging from 
art galleries to clubs) represent an important form of cultural production and 
"constitute salient contexts for the contemporary negotiation and circulation of 
indigenous peoples' identities" (l994b: 675). In fact, Myers suggests, not only are 
these sorts of cultural performances in Western settings central to the circulation of 
a collective Aboriginal identity, they are "perhaps a central context of its very 
production and transformation" (ibid., 677). I will come back to Myers' essay in 
Part Three when I discuss the sand mandala "performance" at the IBM Gallery. 
Ginsburg's and Myers' work on Aboriginal cultural production reveals 
some of the innovative ways in which anthropologists have begun to approach the 
representation of culture across boundaries of difference. Stimulated by recent 
cultural studies theorizing on representation and identity (e.g., "nothing exists 
outside of representation," Hall 1990) and multiculturalist debates about 
"difference, .. these scholars have attempted to develop a discursive space or 
framework for the ethnographic appreciation of emergent forms of cultural 
difference. 
While Ginsburg and Myers have been studying Aboriginal film, video. and 
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acrylic paintings. Turner has been mapping out similar processes with another 
indigenous group-the Kayapo in Brazil-whom he argues have developed a social 
and political consciousness about their "culture" through exposure to outsiders and 
through the introduction of video equipment (for accounts of the Kayapo Video 
Project, see Turner 1990a and 1990b). 
Although they initially conceived of video as a means of representing their 
culture to themselves, the Kayapo quickly learned its value as a tool of imerethnic 
mediation and intercultural communication. "perceiving that the presentation of 
themselves as culturally different and independent increased their value ii\ the eyes 
of the world-value that translated into political support" (199la:71). Thus the 
ability to objectify themselves through the use of video equipment was 
accompanied by a "new self-conscious objectification of the nature of their own 
culture as an object of political value and struggle" (ibid., 70). About this new-
found self-consciousness Turner writes 
The idea that this collection of ethnographic particularities 
constituted a collective entity of a sui generis nature called a 
"culture" was a completely new and alien idea that the Kayapo had 
not had when I began to work with them in the early 1960s. That 
this "culture" was a thing possessing value for members of the very 
different, alien, and more powerful "culture" of Western capitalist 
society, and that this very cultural difference therefore constituted a 
political resource in the struggle to defend Kayapo communities 
against expropriation and assimilation by that same society, was an 
even newer and more unprecedented conception. (ibid., 70) 
Soon, Turner notes, the Kayapo were not merely using video to record their 
culture and represent it to themselves and others, they were staging events 
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specifically for the camera. ln other words, "video media" became not just the 
means but the ends of social action. Eventually he realized that 
these two alien and in many ways parallel modes of self-
objectification, the self-conscious presentation of themselves in 
political confrontations with a view to how they would appear 
through video media, and the concept of themselves as an "ethnic" 
group defined by a distinct "culture," were not merely formally 
convergent, but causally interrelated. (ibid., 70) 
By emphasizing the inextricability of representation and cultural objectification. 
Turner, like Ginsburg and Myers, is arguing for the theoretical necessity of 
creating culture not as a thing which people have but as a form of social action. 
ln an article on multiculturalism (1993), Turner attempts to extend his 
theorization of culture a bit further. Annoyed at anthropologists' feeble response 
co the challenge posed by multiculturalism 's cooptation of the concept of culture. 
Turner argues that the discipline has failed to recognize or at least to adequately 
theorize the current historical transformation of the meaning of culture. He 
suggests that the "contemporary conjuncture," which is characterized by global 
flows of capital and information and is accompanied by the rise of ethnic and 
identity politics, has created a context in which culture has taken on "new 
meanings and connotations" (423). Among the most significant of these, Turner 
argues, is the idea that "culture ... is a source or locus of collective rights to self-
determination." 
Culture, as such, becomes a source of values that can be convened 
into political assets, both internally as bases of group solidarity and 
mobilization, and externally as claims on the suppon of other social 
groups, movements, governments, and public opinion all over the 
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globe. Culture, in these new senses, as a universal category distinct 
from, but subsuming. specific cultures. can be understood as the 
culture form of the new global historical conjuncture: in effect, a 
metaculture. or "culture of cultures" (1993:423-24). 
Turner's argument about the emergence of a "metacultural" framework in which 
culture becomes the favored idiom of political mobilization reveals how far the 
once-standard anthropological notion of culture has come. Liberated from its 
theoretical confines, culture now circulates in the world in ever more complex and 
elusive ways. As the Year of Tibet and similar campaigns by indigenous, 
minority. and other marginalized groups illustrate, culture has come to be 
understood as a collective human right and the legitimate goal of political struggle. 
as well as the means through which that goal is pursued, making it thus both the 
means and the end of social action. 
Co-producing culture: The Tibetan example 
The literature on cultural production by indigenous peoples discussed above 
represents one of the most significant attempts in anthropology today to account for 
the performance of cultural difference. As such, it forms the main theoretical 
basis of my discussion of the Year of Tibet. At the same time that my work builds 
on this literature, it also attempts to extend it in ways I hope will become evident. 
For instance, while Ginsburg, Myers, and Turner are each interested in the 
intercultural dimensions of indigenous cultural production, and all are sensitive to 
the dialogical interplay between these communities and outsiders, including 
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anthropologists, the forms which they study are not co-produced in the same 
manner as the Year of Tibet events discussed in this chapter. Instead of looking 
exclusively at the ways in which indigenous cultural forms and innovations 
circulate in new (inter)cultural spaces, my work focuses on an earlier stage of the 
representational or productive process, as it were, by considering the intercultural 
social processes through which Tibetanness is constructed. 8 
By focusing on the production of Tibetanness as a dialogical process-as 
something chat emerges out of social relations between Tibetans and their Western 
supporters-my argument engages recent theories about the interpersonal generation 
of meaning by literary and postcolonial theorists, most notably Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Homi Bhabha. For instance, in his seminal work on discourse. Bakhtin argues for 
a relational "betweenness" which suggests that meaning is not contained within 
social groups, persons, or linguistic terms, but rather it emerges between chem: 
The word, directed towards its object, enters a dialogically agitated 
and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments, and 
accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges 
with some, recoils from ochers, intersects with yet a third group: and 
this may crucially shape discourse, leave a trace in all its semantic 
layers ... che living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a 
particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, 
cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, 
woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of 
an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social 
dialogue. ( 1981 :276) 
Following Bakhtin, "culture," like the "word," becomes a site of social struggle 
and cultural difference becomes a production (see also Bhaba 1990, 1995).9 
My interest in the co-production of Tibetan culture also intersects with 
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recent literature on tourism and performed culture (e.g., Bruner and Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett 1994; MacCannell 1976; see also Myers 1994b). This work asks what ic 
means to enact culture in contexts out of those where it was historically performed. 
a question particularly relevant to my discussion of the Kalachakra in chapter 9. It 
also raises important issues about how groups construct each other in the context of 
performing culture. For instance, Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's essay 
"Maasai on the Lawn: Tourist realism in East Africa," (l 994) examines a tourist 
site near Nairobi. focusing on how each side participates--"for their own reasons 
and with their own understandings" (456)--in the production of Maasai-ness for 
tourists. Such forms of "cultural tourism" bring tourists and the "natives" together 
into one performative frame, as D. Evans-Pritchard argues in an article on Native 
Americans and tourism in Santa Fe (1989). Within this frame. boundary lines 
between tourists and, for example, Indians. or the Maasai, are blurred ( 100). 
Vincanne Adams makes a similar argument about the blurring of boundaries 
between the Sherpa and Western tourists in Nepal in her book Tigers of the Snow 
and Other Vinual Sher.pas: An Ethnowwhy of Himalayan Encounters (1996). 
Although many of the processes described in the tourism literature seem 
pertinent to the Tibetan case, there are important temporal and social distinctions 
that need to be made. The fact that Tibetans and Western activists are engaged in 
a collective effort to transform society, and that they have a long-term commitment 
to one another, makes the Tibetan-Western relationship less one of "seduction"--in 
which Tibetans are seduced by a Western othering of themselves and at the same 
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time are seducers who capitalize on Western desires for "difference and 
vul nerablity." as Adams argues is the case for Sherpas (1996)-than one of 
collaboration. This is not t() deny that Tibetans. like other groups such as the 
Sherpas. Aborigines, and Native Americans. are the object of a kind of "New Age 
Oriencalism" (Lopez 1994:9) through which they are viewed as reservoirs of 
spiritual insight and knowledge by their Western "friends." But as this dissercacion 
attempts to demonstrate. compared to the other groups, Tibetans have been 
unusually effective in transforming these romantic fantasies into material and 
political support. 
The Tibetan patron-client framework is crucial to understanding this 
transformation of Western fantasy into support. As described in chapter 2. 
relations between Tibet and China prior to 1950 were characterized by a form of 
patronage known as mchod-yon, a state-level expression of a general patron-diem 
relationship, sbyin-bdag, in which spiritual guidance was exchanged for material 
support. 10 Upon coming into exile, Tibetans reinterpreted this social relation. 
substituting sympathetic Westerners for traditional Central Asian patrons. In so 
doing, as we saw in Chapter 5, displaced Tibetans (both lay and religiously-
trained) generated much needed financial aid from interested Westerners who 
sought contact with Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhist culture. Given the crucial role 
the patron-client relation continues to play in Tibetan exile society. it comes as no 
suprise that it is at the heart of Tibet activism. We can see this perhaps most 
clearly through the Year of Tibet campaign, though in this case the patrons were 
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neither Chinese or Mongol leaders (as was the case prior to 1950). nor Western aid 
organizations or individuals travelling in India or Nepal. but American audiences 
whose political support was sought in exchange for an encounter with Tibetan 
Buddhist culture. The Year of Tibet can be read as an attempt by activists to 
solicit an American public·s patronage based on its recognition of the value of 
Tibetan culture; I will explore this point further in Part Two. 
A word about methods 
In order to follow the social processes through which the Year of Tibet was co-
produced. I looked at arenas where "behind-the-scenes" interactions and conflicts 
between Tibetan and American producers, performers, and sponsors would be most 
visible. Year of Tibet organizers and performers were faced with a number of 
thorny issues chat had to be negotiated across boundaries of cultural difference. 
many of which centered on problems raised by the staging of religious 
performances in novel contexts. For instance, the propriety of the Dalai Lama 
giving a tantric initiation in Madison Square Garden came up repeatedly in 
discussions and interviews. As I discuss in the next chapter, this sort of internal 
debate highlights the different cultural frames each side brought to the production 
process. 
My decision to focus on contexts where I had access to internal discussions 
and debates reflects both my interest in the cultural processes involved in framing 
Tibetan culture for Western audiences, and the impossibility of physically being 
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able to attend all the events in October 1991. many of which were held 
simultaneously in dispersed sites across New York City. 
My participation took place at a number of levels. ln addition to attending 
as many of the events as possible and continuing my ongoing conversations with 
Tibetan friends about what was transpiring, l worked once a week for six months 
as a volunteer at Tibet House, the main sponsoring organization of the Year of 
Tibet. Because it gave me direct and regular access to the process of organizing 
the Year of Tibet, this work forms the backbone of my research for this chapter. 
ln addition, [ was unexpectedly asked by a Sakya monk friend to videotape a set of 
religious empowerments given by Sakya Trizin, who was one of the four lineage 
heads invited by organizers to New York in October 1991. This gave me the 
chance to observe interactions between the Sakya leader, his entourage of monk 
attendants, and his Western disciples. I was also asked to videotape an extensive 
interview with Sakya Trizin and help make a "home video" of New York City for 
him to take back to lndia. 
During October, when l was not at Tibet House or at various Sakya 
initiations, I was at other Tibet events, some of which are discussed below. l also 
collected press reviews and other clippings in order to gain a better sense of how 
these events were framed by the press and "read" by the general public. 
Afterwards, I interviewed key organizers and attended a "post-Year of Tibet" 
Movement meeting, the significance of which is discussed in chapter IO. 
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Part Two 
Earlier in this dissenion. I described the central role Buddhism plays in how 
Tibetans define themselves as a people and as a polity as well as how they engage 
outsiders (e.g .. exchange of the dharma for protection from powerful neighbors in 
pre-1950 Tibet). I suggested that the Dalai Lama·s continuing emphasis over the 
years on the need to "keep Tibetan religion and culture alive" has contributed to 
the emergence of a self-consciousness about Tibetan culture as an object of 
legitimate political struggle. an awareness funher reinforced by Western fascination 
with Tibetan Buddhism. This self-consciousness is clearly reflected in the 
narrative of Tibetan culture as a locus of endangered spirituality and as a valuable 
resource for the world's future which has come to dominate the way in which 
activists have represented the Tibet issue to the world in recent years. Part Two 
begins with a discussion of the intersecting frameworks-Tibetan and American--
through which this narrative was produced. 
A mystical vision 
I first heard about the Year of Tibet at a large Tibet Movement meeting in New 
York City in June 1990. At that time, three months after I attended the first 
international conference for Tibet supporters held in Dharamsala. India, activists 
were full of energy and enthusiasm. The New York conference, organized by the 
lnternational Campaign for Tibet (ICT) and held at the Grand Hyatt in Manhattan. 
attracted more than 200 people, including members of more than thirty Tibet 
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suppon organizations from the U.S .• Canada and Mexico. One of the speakers ac 
the opening plenary session was actor and Buddhist Richard Gere. An avid 
follower of the Dalai Lama and a committed Tibet supponer. Gere told the 
audience about plans to stage a series of cultural events and religious teachings 
around the world in 1991-1992: 
We want co create a context to make Tibet extraordinary news 
politically, culturally. and spiritually. We want to create a context 
co make a big splash, to make Tibet cross-over ... We are creating a 
context for focus, we want everybody to get involved, we want co 
bombard everyone on the planet. Almost all of us are dharma 
people. tantric people ... we are talking about a new universe. a new 
order. We plan to hold a Kalachakra in New York City in October. 
1991, and a museum show called Wisdom and Compassion ... we 
plan co bombard New York, which is the political and media capital 
of the world ... 
After the plenary session broke up into smaller project-oriented workshops. I 
decided to anend the one sponsored by Tibet House, intrigued by Gere's comments 
and by the opponunity to watch him pitch his ideas to a crowd of gawking 
activists. Not surprisingly, the conference room where the workshop was held was 
packed. After briefly introducing Tibet House-the organization co-founded by 
Gere in 1987-and its executive director, Gere launched into a rapid-fire 
description of his "vision" of the Year of Tibet. He described a series of proposed 
programs which would run throughout the year, stressing the "in your face" 
quality, as Gere put it, he was aiming for: "We are selling Tibet ... what is 
important about the Year of Tibet is its p.r. aspect, the awareness it raises. We 
want Tibet to become part of your consciousness. We want to have hundreds of 
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events dedicated to Tibet in this country and elsewhere." He told us excitedly char 
he wanted to "blitz" New York City with "Tibetan spiritual energy" by bringing 
over the Dalai Lama and heads of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the 
Bon tradition to have them give initiations and teachings. Gere encouraged dharma 
groups to get involved, saying that the Dalai Lama felt strongly about Western 
Buddhist participation in the Year of Tibet: "Dharma groups should be involved. 
politics is part of it, the whole package of what Tibet represents. [ have a mystical 
vision of this" (see Figure 13). 
Tentative programs and brochures were passed around as Gere fielded 
questions from workshop participants. One person asked if the Dalai Lama would 
engage in any non-religious activities while he was in New York during October 
1991. Gere replied, somewhat defensively, "[ don't want to back off. We are 
going to present him whole." As we will see in the next chapter, the question of 
whether or not having the Tibetan leader conduct tantric initiations in the heart of 
New York City was detrimental or beneficial to the Tibet Movement's larger 
political goals was a hotly contested one. 
Gere's "mystical vision" was more coherently articulated in the Tiber House 
brochure which set out the basic themes of the Year of Tibet campaign: 
The purpose of the International Year of Tibet is to promote 
understanding and appreciation of this beautiful yet endangered 
culture, and to create widespread awareness of the situation in Tibet. 
It is the first, and possibly the last, opportunity for all of us to work 
together in a global effon to save the Tibetan people before they and 







•Of course, thats just my opinion. Richard Geres 
views may be somewhat dflferent. • 
Canoon, The New Yorker, October 9, 1995 
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While Tibet House's embrace of the discourse of "culture" can be understood as a 
reflection of the contemporary global moment described by Turner (1993) in which 
"culture" becomes a viable frame for political claims, it can also be understood to 
be the result of the intersection of Tibetan self-consciousness in exile and an 
emergent New Age Orientalism (Lopez 1994) in the West. I explore this argument 
in the next two sections. 
Tibetan narratives of Tibetanness 
From the earliest years of diaspora, Tibetan refugees were aware of the need to 
preserve Tibetan Buddhism not only as a valued set of practices, but also as basis 
for reconstituting a collective Tibetan identity in exile. China's attempt to 
eradicate Buddhist institutions in Tibet after the communist takeover in 1959--a 
process which reached its destructive height during the Cultural Revolution--lent an 
added urgency to the refugees' task of cultural and religious preservation. During 
this period, the Dalai Lama constantly emphasized the need for refugees to 
maintain their traditions not only for their own sake but for the sake of Tibetans 
living in Tibet. u 
Early encounters with sympathetic aid workers in India and Nepal and with 
thousands of Western travellers who made the trek to the Himalayan foothills to 
learn about Tibetan medicine, language, religion, and art reinforced Tibetans· 
awareness of their culture as an asset and as a potentially important resource in 
their struggle to regain their country. 12 As one anthropologist observes, the 
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refugee context 
has provided a chance for Tibetans to experience themselves as 
unique, and to observe how widely sought after are the products and 
precepts of their religion and cultural heritage. (Devoe 1987:60) 
In recent years, this self-consciousness has been expressed in a narrative of 
Tibetanness which stresses the benefit of Tibetan Buddhist culture not only for 
Tibetan refugees or those living under Chinese rule, but for all people. The 
narrative is best articulated by the Dalai Lama: 
For more than a thousand years Tibetans have been custodians of the 
full range of the Buddha's teachings. These have been analyzed. 
refined and most important of all put into practice, becoming the 
mainstay of Tibetan culture. We have had a responsibility to 
preserve our living culture, not just to our brothers and sisters who 
remain in Tibet, but also to the world at large. (Gyatso 1991 :5) 
The only way to guarantee these practices, the Dalai Lama argues, is for Tibetans 
"to return to the freedom of their own land" (ibid., 5). 
Following this logic, the Dalai Lama has repeatedly claimed that for him. 
the Tibet issue is not a political matter but a spiritual struggle. For instance, when 
asked publicly whether or not he believes the Chinese should be punished for their 
actions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama has stated: 
I consider the struggle for the freedom of Tibet to be a struggle for 
our own right, not harming China. As a Buddhist monk, we always 
pray for all sentient beings ... [ don't consider the struggle for Tibet a 
political matter but a spiritual struggle. A free Tibet means more 
promotion of spiritual value, that can help millions of Chinese. 
(Cornell University, Ithaca. NY, 1991) 
Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche-the current head of the Assembly of Tibetan People's 
Deputies and also a monk-echoed the Dalai Lama's sentiments at a Tibet support 
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conference in Washington, D.C. in 1993: 
The Tibet issue is not a question of the people of Tibet, it is a 
question of the spiritual values which have been preserved by the 
people of Tibet, and whether they should have the right to survive 
for the benefit of humanity ... Our aim is to fulfill the basic aspiration 
of the people of Tibet. What is that? That they would be able co 
lead a life which would have dignity. Full freedom and opportunity 
to preserve and practice our religious tradition and cultural heritage. 
A heritage which is also for the well-being of humanity at large. 
The Dalai Lama's and Samdong Rinpoche's claims are based on a fundamental 
tenet of Mahayana Buddhism: that individual practitioners should strive for 
liberation not solely for their own sake but for the sake of all sentient beings. This 
principle of universality, expressed in the figure of the bodhisattva, is the principle 
upon which Tibetans, led by the Dalai Lama, have based their claims to relevance 
in the modem world. Indeed, the Tibetan leader's commitment to universality is a 
fundamental part of his appeal and forms the ground upon which he has gained 
legitimacy as a spiritual leader throughout the world. 
By equating the Tibet issue with the preservation of Tibet's spiritual 
heritage, a particular construction of Tibetan culture itself becomes the object of 
political action. 13 While this construction privileges a hegemonic Buddhist 
definition of Tibetanness, it nevertheless allows Tibetans to embed their 
nationalistic or ethnic claims within a more universalist framework. This in turn 
enables them to negotiate the political necessity of having to talk about the situation 
in Tibet without privileging Tibetan suffering at the expense of others, something 
which most of the religiously-trained Tibetan leaders are loathe to do. More 
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important. appeals based on Buddhism. with its enveloping rather than exclusive 
ideology. offer Tibetans the means through which to incorporate non-Tibetans into 
their struggle. 
As we saw in chapter 5. the historical use of Buddhism to secure the 
protection of outsiders was a central component of the processes through which the 
Tibetan state established and maintained relations with its more powerful neighbors 
between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. 14 This practice and Tibetans 
view of their place in the world is aptly summarized in a letter sent by the Tibetan 
Foreign Bureau to Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek in 1946. In it. we see 
Tibetans trying to reassert the traditional patron-client relationship with the 
Nationalist government based on Tibetan spiritual power: 
There are many great nations on this earth who have achieved 
unprecedented wealth and might, but there is only one nation which 
is dedicated to the well-being of humanity in the world and that is 
the religious iand of Tibet which cherishes a joint spiritual and 
temporal system. If the adversaries leave Tibet unhampered and in 
peace and do not continue to hold those formerly seized territories, 
the nations of the world may not suffer disasters of war, famine. and 
so on by the power of the (three) Supreme Jewels and the guardians 
of the Buddhist faith. (Goldstein 1989:542) 
The continuities between the narrative of Tibetanness from 1946 and the Dalai 
Lama's construction of Tibetan Buddhist culture nearly half a centry later are 
striking. The main difference. of course. is that instead of engaging Nationalist 
government officials, the contemporary narrative is meant to engage a wider and 
more diffuse Western public. 15 
The narrative of Tibetanness described above and the cultural self-
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consciousness on which it is based suggests that Tibetans have not been mere 
passive objects of Western desire upon coming into exile. as some have asserted. 
Instead. confronted with the realities of statelessness. Tibetan refugees have been 
self-consciously panicipating in their own objectification. Ironically. by 
representing themselves to the outside world as powerful spiritual beings rather 
than as empowered political actors. and by relying on the same idealized rhetoric 
as that deployed by Westerners. exile Tibetans have tended to reinforce and 
perpetuate rather than challenge Western stereotypes about Tibet and Tibetanness. 
We can see this clearly in an excerpt from a recent Tibet Fund annual repon (Tibet 
Fund is a Tibetan-run non-governmental organization): 
Tibetan culture. although centuries old. is remarkably contemporary 
in the wisdom it offers with regard to our global future. Tibetan 
cultural beliefs teach patience in the face of inevitable human 
suffering. tolerance in light of our need to live together and share 
limited resources, universal responsibility for each other, and 
unceasing compassion towards all individuals and all peoples. With 
this quintessentially modern message coming from our ancient 
culture. we trust you will continue to see the value of a thriving 
community woven into the fabric of the modern world ... and will 
find some means to suppon the Tibet Fund as it continues its 
mission of sustaining Tibetan culture and national identity during its 
second decade. 
As we will see in the next section, the Tibetan claim to outside suppon. aniculated 
in the quote above. plays directly into Western fantasies about Tibetanness. 
An American twist 
Richard Gere's "mystical vision" and the quasi-evangelical manner in which Tibet 
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House framed the Year of Tibet campaign reflects a distinctly American twist on 
the diasporic narrative of "Tibetan culture" described above. It reflects his and the 
other American organizers' deep personal involvement with Tibetan Buddhism. a 
commitment neatly encapsulated in Gere's foreword to the "Wisdom and 
Compassion" exhibition catalogue: 
My history with Tibet began in 1978 in a refugee camp outside of 
Pokhara, Nepal, with perhaps two hundred Tibetans who had 
recently escaped from the killing fields of their occupied country. 
Although a practicing Buddhist. I was unaware of their tragic recent 
history. I found myself stunned by their casual yet complete other-
worldiness, a quality that still moves me today. Behaving like the 
tourist I then was--excited and conveniently oblivious to their 
poverty and suffering-I bargained shamelessly with an old woman 
for a wooden bowl she was hesitant to part with but was forced to 
sell for food. I got my price and left clutching the bowl, feeling 
disgusted with myself. Greed and generosity are their own reward. 
A few years later, I arranged to be in Dharamsala, India. the 
seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. After a week, I was graced 
with an audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Realizing how 
unequipped I was for such a moment, I offered the ceremonial scarf 
and made what I hoped was intelligent conversation. I now recall 
grinning and babbling like a twelve-year-old. But it didn't matter. I 
was safe and deeply happy. I had been in the presence of all that I 
wished to be. In many ways, my life began there in that room. 
(Rhie and Thurman 1991:8) 
Like Western travellers to Tibet described in chapter 7 who were transformed by 
their experience, Gere too was transformed by his encounters with refugees and 
with the Dalai Lama. 
Thus it was with the zeal of a convert that Gere argued for Tibet's 
relevance to the non-Tibetan world: 
Prior to the invasion of Tibet in 1950, the Tibetans were unusually 
peaceful and happy. Isolated for centuries from a chaotic world they 
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deeply mistrusted, they developed a wondrous, unique civilization 
based wholly on the practice of Buddhism's highest ideals. Theirs 
has been a revolutionary social experiment based on spiritual, 
psychological, and philosophical insights that provide us with models 
for achieving intimate and creative relationships with the vast and 
profound secrets of the human soul. Tibet's importance for our own 
time, and for the survival of Earth itself, is more critical than ever. 
Being our most vibrant link to the ancient wisdom traditions. Tibet. 
and the sanity she represents, must not be allowed to disappear. 
(Rhie and Thurman 1991: 8) 
Note how Gere's representation of Tibet echoes and elaborates on standard exile 
history (discussed in chapters 4 and 5) as well as the idealized portrayal of 
"Tibetan culture" produced by Tibetans (e.g., the Tibet Fund annual repon). This 
is not surprising, given the fact that Gere's rhetoric was no doubt shaped by the 
actor's affiliation with Tibet House co-founder, Prof. Robert Thurman. a Tibet 
activist and Buddhist scholar. Thurman is well-known in activist circles for his 
devotion to Tibetan Buddhism and to the Dalai Lama, both of which are the result 
of the years he spent as a Buddhist monk living among Tibetan refugees in India in 
the 1960s. 16 One of the most visible popularizers of Tibetan Buddhism in the 
U.S., Thurman was also one of the chief architects of Tibet House's "culture" 
strategy, which, as we saw in Gere's quote above, depicted pre-occupation Tibet as 
having a society based on an "inner modernity": 
This attitude-a rational, individualistic quest for the full 
meaningfulness and fruition of human life through the development 
of the unlimited powers of the human intelligence, heart, and body-
created a spiritual industrial revolution whose factories were 
monastic universities turning out enlightened human beings. 
(Thurman 1990: 113) 
In many ways, Thurman's idealized construction of Tibetan Buddhist culture 
379 
validates Donald Lopez's argument in "Foreigners at the Lama's Feet" which 
suggests that in the diasporic era. Western-particularly American-scholars of 
Tibetan Buddhism have tended to view Tibet as a land of lamas. "endowed with 
ancient. sometimes secret wisdom and ruled benevolently by a buddha" 
(1995:284). 17 This view, Lopez suggests, reveals a persistent fantasy of Tibetan 
Buddhist culture as 
an entity existing outside of time, set in its own classical age in a 
lofty Himalayan keep. With the Chinese takeover of Tibet. this 
timeless culture was placed in profound jeopardy; there was the fear 
that the exposure to time would cause its contents to wither. like the 
bodies of those who dare to leave Shangri-la. (ibid .• 252) 
One consequence of this fantasy, Lopez observes, is Western scholars' belief that 
"their urgent task is the preservation of traditional Tibetan culture and what is 
regarded as its most precious legacy. Tibetan Buddhism, before its 'loss.'" a task. 
he notes with irony, that seemed to some too important to be left to the exiled 
Tibetans alone (ibid., 252). 13 
ln an effort to debunk the "New Age Orientalism" which permeates 
Western Buddhist representations of Tibet and Tibetans, Lopez reminds us that 
Tibet was not an ideal society, that its system of incarnation was not a kind of 
"cosmic meritocracy above a mundane world of power and politics" but rather that 
"traditional Tibet, like any complex society, had great inequalities, with power 
monopolized by an elite composed of a small aristocracy, the hierarchs of various 
sects (including incarnate lamas), and the great Gelugpa monasteries" (1994: 19). 19 
Unfortunately, Lopez adds, by overlooking these realities, European and American 
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Buddhologists have tended to reinforce Tibetan Buddhist hegemony in exile. 
Thurman's evangelical anirude toward Tibetan culture is perhaps best 
captured by his favorite mantra "liberating Tibet is liberating yourself." This 
quintessentially American formulation. part of what Thurman calls "the politics of 
enlightenment" (1992:28), personalizes and individualizes the Dalai Lama's 
statement that the Tibet issue is not a political maner but a spiritual struggle to 
preserve Tibetan Buddhist culture for the benefit of all people by equating political 
activism for Tibet with individual spiritual liberation. {As we will see, Thurman's 
vision deeply influenced the way in which the "Wisdom and Compassion" 
exhibition, which he co-curated. was framed.) 
I want to argue that the narrative embodied by the Year of Tibet campaign--
Tibetan culture as an endangered global spiritual resource which can only be 
preserved by supporting the return of Tibetans to their occupied homeland-is the 
product of intersecting {and intertwined) Tibetan and American discourses about 
Tibetanness. While I have emphasized Thurman's and Gere's romanticized visions 
of Tibet, I have also tried to suggest that American organizers were not the only 
ones responsible for the idealized way in which the Year of Tibet was framed. As 
I have pointed out earlier in this dissertation, Tibetan refugees have long relied on 
static and romanticized representations to attract Western support for their struggle. 
Therefore Tibetan complicity in perpetuating New Age orientalist images of Tibet 
and Tibetan Buddhism must be acknowledged. 20 One of the aims of this chapter 
and the next is to suggest the complex reactions both within the Movement and the 
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exile community itself to the production and performance of this problematic 
narrative of Tibetanness during the Year of Tibet. 
Tibet House and the "culture" strategy 
From the outset. Tibet House dedicated itself to presenting aspects of Tibetan 
culture to the public. In an early membership brochure. Gere describes why he 
decided to found (and fund. at least initially) Tibet House: 
February 1987 found me in Bodhgaya. India. in audience with His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama. Over the years. we had spoken much of 
the senseless tragedy of a vanishing Tibetan culture and of his 
unique situation as head of a government in exile. Clearly and 
directly, he offered that it was the responsibility of us concerned 
Westerners. Buddhist or non-Buddhist. to muster our resources and 
make a difference ... 
Acting like a truly loyal dharma student. Gere followed his teacher's advice, 
founding Tibet House, along with Roben Thurman. Elizabeth Avedon (Buddhist. 
former wife of writer John Avedon and daughter-in-law of photographer Richard 
Avedon). and Tenzin Tethong (the Dalai Lama's representative to Nonh America 
at the time). upon his return to the States. On September 28, 1987. while on a 
visit to this country, the Dalai Lama formally inaugurated Tibet House in New 
York City. 
Led by Gere's vision and financial commitment, Tibet House came to life 
with a bang. In a son of a rehearsal for the Year of Tibet, Tibet House sponsored 
an ambitious set of programs in its first year, including American tours by monks 
from Drepung Loseling monastery in South India and monks from Gyuto Tantric 
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college. the latter known for their harmonic chanting. 21 Following their tour. 
some of the Gyuto monks participated in a month-long demonstration/exhibit at the 
American Museum of Natural History during which time visitors could watch the 
monks making sculptures out of colored butter. A year later. in 1990. Tibet House 
sponsored a dance tour by monks from Namgyal monastery22 and a tour of the 
Ganden Shartse monk "choir." Winning audiences over wherever they went, the 
monks soon earned a reputation as effective "cultural ambassadors" for Tibet. 
It is worth noting that before there were any monk tours in the West, 
members of the Tibetan Institute for Performing Arts (TIPA) had toured 
internationally. Formerly known as the Tibetan Music. Dance and Drama Society 
(referred to by Tibetans as zlos-gar). TIPA was founded in 1959 at the Dalai 
Lama's initiative and was the first new institution formed in exile. TIPA's purpose 
was to train young children as performers as well as future teachers for the Tibetan 
schools. Concerned about losing this cultural knowledge, the exile government 
made the "embodied transmission" of these traditions a priority: students were 
taught by former Tibetan opera stars, famous Lhasa musicians. individuals well 
versed in Tibetan folk songs and dances, and several monks expert in performing 
monastic dances (Calkowski 1995:4). I will come back to the issue of embodied 
knowledge in Part Three. 
Preservation of cultural traditions was not the only motive behind the exile 
government's support of TIPA. Tibetans also saw the staged presentations of these 
traditions as a potential means of spreading positive propaganda, "We also needed 
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to acquaint the world with our unique culture which had hitherto remained a 
mystery to them due to our having kept aloof from the rest of the world" (quoted 
in Nowak 1984: 115). To that end, an international tour was organized in l 975-76 
in which 23 troupe members travelled to Europe, North America. Southeast Asia. 
and Australia. n Subsequent tours took TIPA to Europe in 1986. to Europe and 
the U.S. in 1991, and to Italy and Germany in 1994. 
TIPA's first tour was "fraught with international political resistance" as the 
troupe encountered cancellations and last minute decisions to deny visa 
app I ications: 
TIPA's first cancellation was Germany. Despite the fact that TIPA 
had bookings and advertisements in eight cities, a guarantee letter. 
and numerous references from people of note, Norbu, on his visit to 
the Germany embassy in the Netherlands, was told by the counsel 
that being Asian, TIPA people were seeking a prosperous country in 
which to seek employment and residence. The irony is, of course, 
that the Germans revoked their decision to give TIPA visas in 
deference to Chinese pressure, since the Germans were seeking 
markets in China ... (Calkowski 1995: 7)24 
Things were not much better in the U.S. where TIPA was heckled outside most of 
their performances, most vociferously in Washington, D.C., Madison, Wisconsin, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles by China sympathizers (including Chinese embassy 
personnel in D.C.!). 25 As their intervention suggests, the People's Republic of 
China clearly recognized these cultural performances as a means through which 
Tibetan refugees could assen Tibetan sovereignty and draw attention to their 
struggle. Eventually the Chinese government responded by sending out their own 
Chinese Tibetan dance and music troupes on tour to the West, creating a "tag-team 
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compecicion" effect in which both sides attempted co demonstrate cul rural authority 
with respect to traditional Tibetan performing arts. One of the most interesting 
aspects of this kind of culrural competition is the publics to whom chese 
performances are addressed. While TIPA tours have been aimed mainly ac a 
mainstream Euro-American audience. the majority of performances by Sino-
Tibetan troupes take place in Chinese-dominated venues. e.g .. Flushing. Queens. 
Chinatown restaurants. sices that attract overseas Chinese audiences more than 
Euro-American ones. 26 
In any event. I bring up the TIPA tours in order to suggest thac the culture 
strategy was not new in 1991. nor was Tibet House the first organization to use 
culture as a cool to mobilize political support. At the same time. however. I want 
co draw attention to Tibet House's innovation which was co shift the focus from lay 
folk performances to tantric rituals by monks. As we shall see. Tibec House's 
preference for monks during the Year of Tibet replicated a long-standing tendency 
within the exile community to privilege Buddhism at the expense of lay aspects of 
Tibetan society. drawing fire from some Tibet activists as a result. 
Although Tibet House was a still a relatively new organization when the 
Year of Tibet began in 1991. it had already garnered a lot of media attention and 
earned a controversial reputation among Movement activists for its high profile. 
high budget programming. Helped by Gere's celebrity, Tibet House managed to 
attract both "uptown" socialites as well as a more fashionable "downtown" crowd. 
By 1991, Tibet House's "uptown" constituency included three Rockefellers (Diana 
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Rowan Rockefeller, Steven Rockefeller, and Laurence Rockefeller) as well as a 
number of other members of New York's moneyed elite (e.g., Leila and Henry 
Luce, John and Jodie Eastman. Elise Frick), all of whom have a longstanding 
interest in Buddhism. The "downtown" crowd included artists such as Laurie 
Anderson, Philip Glass, Allen Ginsberg, and Spalding Gray, all of whom have 
performed in Tibet House benefits over the years. Like Tibet House's "uptown" 
supponers, these artists are either Buddhists themselves or have a longstanding 
interest in Buddhist philosophy. 27 These glitterati members, attracted by Gere· s 
celebrity as much as by his organization, made for great copy but as we shall see 
in the next chapter, the benefit of this type of publicity in terms of the Movement's 
long-range goals remained questionable. 
Tibet House's exclusive focus on culture distinguished it from other 
Movement organizations, such as the International Campaign for Tibet and the 
U.S. Tibet Committee, who have always had more ovenly political agendas. 
Unsurprisingly, Tibet House's high profile activities and its spiritual-cultural focus 
generated a certain amount of criticism, skepticism, and jealousy among other 
Tibet organizations, even more so after it moved into the Tibet building on East 
32nd Street (see description in chapter 6). Once Tibet House had settled into its 
new quarters on the third floor in the spring of 1991, it was easier for employees 
of the older, largely Tibetan-run organizations (e.g., Tibet Fund, U.S. Tibet 
Committee) to observe how Tibet House operated on a daily basis. During my 
stint as a volunteer, I frequently heard these other employees criticize Tibet 
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House·s large expenditures. For instance. one person complained to me. ~Tibet 
House has outrageous budgets. fancy letterhead. health insurance. high salaries. 
stuff that our organization doesn•t have.· This disgruntled attitude reflects a 
grassroots orientation shared by employees in the older Tibetan-run organizations. 
many of whom felt that Tibet House's expenditures contradicted what they saw as 
the purpose of Tibet activism-to help the Tibetan cause and Tibetan refugees. 
Many could not understand that in order to attract the kind of donors Tibet House 
sought (i.e .. celebrities and socialites). Tibet House had to present a polished. 
professional veneer. Tibet House ·s perceived extravagances underscored 
Movement organizations' growing anxieties about access to resources and 
competition over donors. 
Faced with this sort of internal Movement criticism. Tibet House had to 
find a way to justify its activities in terms of the Movement's political goals. 
When asked in an interview how she conceptualized Tibet House's role in the 
Movement, the executive director said: 
The way l see Tibet House is, it's like a gameboard, we pull 
everyone in and then we educate them and then we send them off to 
do the real work, which is the Office of Tibet and the Campaign for 
Tibet in the U.S., that's the real work. We are the froth on the cake 
but without that sweetness out there, you won't get the X's [refers to 
one of the rich donors] and those type of people. 
"In the end,• she added, "Tibet House is a big p.r. firm for the Tibet 
Movement. .. it presents Tibetan culture and then you get thirty thousand dollar 
checks from various foundations to the Tibet Movement. " 
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This point was reiterated by another Tibet House employee at a Movement 
meeting: 
Tibet House is the point of entry for the new American, for 
broadening the grassroots base of support here and perhaps 
internationally as well. .. The easiest door of entry for the regular 
American with money is the culture, is to fall in love with Tibet 
through seeing the beauty of Tibet's culture. You can't sell them 
the religion right off the bat and you can't push them into the 
politics right off the bat, usually. Human rights is an entry, but 
before they pick Tibet as a special human rights concern, they have 
to fall in love with Tibet. So please remember when Tibet House 
may seem to be a little bit of a frill, something sort of extra, some 
high fashion or a luxury thing, remember that in fact it is the 
doorway for mainstream Americans ... 
These comments explicitly acknowledge the skepticism some activists felt about 
Tibet House's "culture strategy" and the organization's claim to be "a big p.r. 
firm" for the Tibet Movement. Questions about the value of publicity generated by 
the Year of Tibet and about the strategy more generally were raised by Tibet 
House's own media strategist in a "post-Year of Tibet" Movement meeting and are 
discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
The fact that Tibet House's targeted constituency was one with a lot of 
money caused no small amount of grumbling among activists, especially younger 
Tibetans and those who could not afford to attend Tibet House benefit events. The 
following incident, which took place one afternoon in early October at Tibet 
House, illustrates my point. For several weeks, Tibet House staff had been busy 
organizing two openings for the "Wisdom and Compassion" exhibition at the IBM 
gallery. The first was to be held on October 15 (1991) with the Dalai Lama as 
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honored guest. Benefit dinners for Tibet House immediately following this 
opening were being arranged, each of which was to be held at a major donor· s 
apartment and co-hosted by a Tibetan. The cost of the dinner was set at $200 per 
person. a fact which would obviously prevent a large proportion of the activist and 
Tibetan refugee community in New York from attending. There was much talk 
about the dinners, VIP guest lists, and which host wanted which guests. and so on. 
Meanwhile, a second opening was being organized for non-VIPs. 
Invitations for this event had been sent out in late September to a select list of 
Tibet House supporters, activists, press, and members of the New York Tibetan 
community. On this early October afternoon, a young Tibetan woman I knew 
came into the office. She asked the Tibetan receptionist for an invitation to the 
non-VIP opening. The receptionist, without checking the list. replied somewhat 
blithely, "I'm sure your invitation is in the mail." After a moment of awkward 
silence, the young woman, looking uncertain, left without an invitation. The 
incident reminded me why many ordinary Tibetans-meaning those not in positions 
of power in the exile community and not involved in Tibet organizations--were 
wary of Tibet House. They often felt excluded by its elitism, by the fact that they 
frequently could not afford, or were not invited to, Tibet House events which they 
felt, as Tibetans, they were entitled to attend. In addition, exclusive social affairs 
such as the VIP opening underscored Tibetans' sense of injustice at the fact that 
non-Tibetans often have greater access to the Dalai Lama than ordinary Tibetans 
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do. 
Lacer. when I asked the executive director about charges of elitism by 
ordinary Tibetans who complained they were either not invited or could not afford 
co anend Tibet House benefits. she replied: 
We're trying co bring in new blood. new money to the Tibetan 
Movement. we're not supposed co cater to the Tibetans. It sounds 
awful but the Tibetan Movement just has to have an array of 
components ... 
She continued by saying if somebody asked her about whether or not they should 
donate money to the "political stuff or to Tibet House," she would tell them to 
give it to the political organizations. to help the refugees. but that if the person was 
not comfortable giving money to support political action, she would recommend 
they donate it to Tibet House. 
Her observation was underscored by another Tibet House employee who 
commented that 
Tibet House has a place in the movement (even though people trash 
it saying it is a place for society types) because it's a kind of place 
where a certain type of person can feel very comfortable. I mean 
they wouldn't show up for a March 10 demonstration and take part 
in civil disobedience but you come for a Tibetan event. Because a 
lot of time those people have connections, they're able to contribute 
resources, and I think what the Year of Tibet did was basically 
educate a lot of them and bring them in an exciting and interesting 
way. 
At first glance, Tibet House's appeal to "society types" more interested in 
attending fashionable openings than doing grassroots political work may seem 
somewhat at odds with the commitment to outreach expressed in its plan for the 
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Year of Tibet. 28 Yet Tibet House set up many "Year of Tibet committees" across 
the U.S. (and elsewhere), each responsible for raising its own money and initiating 
local events. ln order to help empower these local committees, Tibet House 
created a starter kit which was sent to any group that requested it. A fascinating 
document in its own right, the 60+ page kit included such items as a description 
of the organizational structure for the YOT, a copy of the YOT logo, a large 
section on "Event ideas and How To's" (e.g., tabling. theme parties, lecture series. 
film festival, museum display, outreach to local schools. demonstrations), resource 
lists (e.g. films/videos on Tibet, spokespeople for Tibetan issues, Tibetan news 
resources, human rights news resources, etc.), and an extensive appendix 
containing samples of press releases, letters to government officials, petitions. as 
well as a fact sheet about Tibet, maps, and a brief biography of the Dalai Lama. 
ln many ways the starter kit was unprecedented; up to that point, I had never seen 
chis kind of material brought together in one document. In this regard the 
executive director was right when she told me: 
Nobody had ever done that. we directed people. informed people 
about their options, nobody had done that before. you pick up any 
brochure from any Tibet organization and they never mention 
anyone else ... 
Tibet House's decision to empower local Year of Tibet committees and to 
distribute information in this manner made some Tibetans nervous: 
As the number of committees grew. the Year of Tibet ran out of the 
Tibetans' hands ... they always want to control access to information, 
and they were threatened by the fact that people could go directly to 
the starter kit and find everything they needed without having to go 
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through the Tibetans themselves. 
For Tibet activists, Tibet House changed the power dynamics of Tibet activism in 
the U.S. Prior to 1991, the two main organizations through which information 
about Tibet. and more importantly, the Dalai Lama, was disseminated were run by 
Tibetans. Thus when Tibet House was started some prominent Tibetans opposed 
it, including some working for the Tibetan government. They did so in part 
because they recognized an American-run organization which was independent 
from the government-in-exile as an obvious threat to their control over the Tibet 
issue. 29 Indeed, with the starter kit, groups no longer would need to contact the 
Office of Tibet in New York or the International Campaign in Washington to get 
information in order to mount their own local Year of Tibet campaign. These 
sorts of tensions are a recurring motif in the Tibet Movement and reflect different 
conceptions of information and power; I explore this further in chapter 10. 
Although the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans agreed to become a part of 
Gere' s "vision" and participate in the Year of Tibet, they did so at first with some 
reluctance. Certainly control and power were involved, but so was a concern 
about Gere's vision of Tibetanness and how it would be implemented. Concerns 
about how to and who can represent Tibetan interests-political, cultural. and 
religious-in the U.S. were at the center of many internal Movement discussions 
and disputes during and after the Year of Tibet (see chapters 9 and 10). Thus it 
was with relief that Tibetan officials based in the U.S. agreed to work with a 
professional media strategist hired by Tibet House to handle the October events in 
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New York City. Their hope was that this strategist. whom I will call "Jane 
Kelly." would be sensitive and responsive to their specific concerns. 30 
As it turned out. Kelly played an important role in framing Tibetan culture 
during the Year of Tibet, though as a media specialist, she took a very different 
approach than that of either Tibetan or American activists. By the time [ met her 
in September 1991, Kelly had already been fondly nicknamed "Mama Lama" by 
the Tibetan employees whose offices she trudged past every day on her way up to 
the third floor Tibet House office. 
"~lama Lama" 
From my point of view. Kelly played a kind of "diagnostic" role that 
fall. both in terms of the Movement and my research. By this [ mean that she had 
never worked in a professional or personal capacity with Tibetans before taking on 
this job. 31 As she quickly found out, if she was to be effective, she had to 
familiarize herself with the cultural expectations of the Tibetans as well as grasp 
the internal intricacies of Movement politics. Through her effon to design a 
communications strategy for the October events, which, it is important to point 
out, included all of the Dalai Lama's activities, Kelly learned a lot about the Tibet 
Movement. In this sense her experience mirrored mine as an anthropologist, 
though her learning curve was much steeper. 
My initial impression of Kelly as intelligent, perceptive, and good humored 
held fast throughout the Year of Tibet. Sitting at her desk, drinking endless cans 
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of Diet Coke, she managed the phones with consummate skill. Having worked 
with Amnesty and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights for many years. she 
brought with her both credibility and impeccable contacts, ranging from television 
news journalists like Peter Jennings to radio personalities like Scott Simon at 
National Public Radio to reporters like Abe Rosenthal at the New York Times. all 
of whom she addressed on a first-name basis. Most of Kelly's time was spent 
trying co "provoke" stories about the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue in the context 
of the Year of Tibet. The media strategy she designed reflected her background in 
serious political campaigns: she sought co use Year of Tibet events and the Dalai 
Lama's presence as vehicles through which to highlight the current situation in 
Tibet and to advance the press' understanding and coverage of the Tibet issue. For 
instance, following the Dalai Lama's trip co Lithuania and Estonia in September 
l 991, she encouraged her contacts co consider doing a story on the validity of the 
Dalai Lama's comparison between the Baltic states' independence and the Tibetan 
demand for freedom. She also suggested stories on the Dalai Lama's dual role as 
a statesman and monk, writing to one journalist: 
Another aspect of Tibet is the role and personality of His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama. He is both the spiritual and political leader of 
Tibet. I'm sure there are chose at xxx who dismiss the Dalai Lama 
as another Guru on the Go. The prejudice misses the point-he is 
constantly balancing the dichotomy of his dual role: a non-violent 
leader-statesman and monk. I chink the duality makes him 
remarkable. His commitment to non-violence is remarkable. I think 
you could explore this duality in a thoughtful and provocative piece. 
As chis letter suggests, Kelly was in a key mediating position, presenting Tibetan 
394 
values to the American press, many of whom know little about Tibet while 
simultaneously explaining American media expectations to her employers and to 
Tibetan leaders in New York (see chapter 10). 
The week before the Dalai Lama was due to arrive in New York for the 
Year of Tibet events. Kelly spent a lot of time trying to drum up interest in a 
speech he was scheduled to deliver at Yale University. She telephoned her 
contacts and arranged to have press releases faxed and press kits delivered to those 
who expressed interest in covering the speech. Without disclosing exactly what the 
Dalai Lama planned to say, Kelly emphasized that his announcement would be 
"major." In a letter to Peter Jennings, she wrote: 
I hope World News will cover what may be a historic initiative. 
realize I am asking you to seriously consider assigning a story 
without fully informing you in advance what the initiative is. In all 
my work with Amnesty and the Lawyers Committee, I've never 
before tried to provoke interest without being able to offer more 
facts. 
Because the Tibetans themselves were not sure precisely what the Dalai Lama's 
message would be at Yale, Kelly was not allowed to disclose anything specific 
prior to the event itself. This, of course, put her in an awkward position which 
she would occasionally acknowledge to her colleagues over the phone. 
Kelly succeeded in "targeting and placing stories" about the content of the 
Dalai Lama's Yale speech in a number of media outlets. including the New York 
Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, the Associated Press, Reuters, 
UPI, NBC Nightly News, National Public Radio. ABC World News Tonight and 
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CBS Evening News also reponed briefly on the speech. On the level of basic 
reponage, Kelly's media strategy clearly worked. But as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the kind of hard political coverage she succeeded in generating was at risk 
of losing its meaning without an ongoing coordinated media strategy that would 
continue to advance the story. 
[n addition to generating media coverage of the Dalai Lama·s more 
temporally-oriented activities while he was in the U.S .• Kelly attempted to shape 
the way in which his panicipation in the New York Year of Tibet events was 
framed. She was very sensitive to Tibetan concerns that their leader be 
represented in a dignified and suitably respectful manner. Unfortunately her 
effons in this area were somewhat undermined when. at the last minute, panicked 
about not selling enough tickets and making his money back, Richard Gere decided 
to hire a public relations firm (Livet Reichart) to handle the Kalachakra initiation 
publicity separately: this made Kelly and the Tibetan community unhappy as the 
firm did not necessarily have the Tibetans' concerns and interests at hean. 
Kelly's job was thus not an easy one; she frequently expressed frustration 
over having to deal with an uncertain chain of command and an indefinite message. 
not to mention other publicists working at cross-purposes with her. I often found 
myself in agreement with her observations and analysis of these problems, as did 
many of those with whom she worked closely. In fact, as we will see in the next 
chapter, Kelly's running commentary on her work with Tibet activists functioned 
as a son of mirror in which activists could see their reflection. In this way, she 
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played an integral role in the Year of Tibet in New York not only as a cultural 
broker between the press and the Movement but also as a sort of consciousness-
raiser for activists themselves. 
Having introduced the main players and sketched their roles in creating and 
framing the New York events, I now explore one of these events in greater detail. 
ln Part Three, my aim is co examine the "Wisdom and Compassion" exhibition 
and the accompanying sand mandala in relation to the narrative of Tibetanness 
described above and in so doing, to further develop my argument about the 
strategic deployment of culture. 
Part Three 
The October blitz 
ln October 1991, Richard Gere's desire to "blitz" New York City with "Tibetan 
spiritual energy" was realized. More than 60 events took place, ranging from art 
exhibitions to lectures to film festivals to religious teachings (see Figure 14). 
An eight-day Buddhist teaching and tantric initiation given by the Dalai 
Lama in Madison Square Garden's Paramount Theater and the "Wisdom and 
Compassion" Buddhist art exhibition and sand mandala creation at the IBM Gallery 
were the centerpiece events of the Year of Tibet in New York. Many of the other 
major events involved the Dalai Lama, including an interfaith concert at the 
Cathedral of St. John the Divine. a talk by the Tibetan leader at the Paramount 
Theater, introduced by Richard Gere, and then Mayor David Dinkins and New 
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York Congressman Benjamin Gilman; a symposium on Tibet at the Asia Society 
where the Dalai Lama was interviewed by the Society's president; and a "Sunrise 
Meditation for World Peace" in Central Park. 
fn addition to the "Wisdom and Compassion" exhibition. a number of Tibec-
related photographic shows were mounted at galleries and museums. Films and 
videos about Tibet were screened at the Asia Society. which sponsored a two-day 
event focusing exclusively on films about Tibetan religion and ritual; at the 
American Museum of Natural History, which screened films about Tibet and the 
Himalayas; and at Anthology Film Archives where the "Dreams and Documents" 
film festival took place. Meanwhile videos relating to Tibet played hourly on the 
Sony Jumbotron in Times Square; and WNET. one of New York's two public 
television stations. screened Frank Capra's famous feature film from 1930s. "Lose 
Horizon," and a documentary about the Dalai Lama. 
As for live performances, the American Museum of Natural History was 
host to Sakya monks who performed tantric dances as well as monks from Drepung 
Loseling monastery who participated in a month-long demonstration of doll-
making. The Gyuto monks chanted at Town Hall and members of the Tibetan 
lnstitute of Performing Arts (TIPA) performed traditional Tibetan opera and folk 
dances at Symphony Space. Several non-Tibetans gave slide lectures on Tibet. 
including explorer Heinrich Harrer. Finally, lamas representing the heads of each 
of the five Tibetan traditions (Gelugpa, Nyingma, Sakya, Kagyu, and Bon) 
presented teachings in a series called "The Nature of Mind" in a midtown hotel 
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ballroom. and as mentioned earlier, Sakya Trizin gave several initiations. including 
Vajrakilaya and Amicabha Powa initiations. at the Society for Ethical Culture on 
Manhattan's Upper West Side. 
What was it like to be a Tibet activist during this period? One active 
participant summed up what seemed to be the impact for many American 
supporters as well as for myself when she described it as a "heightened moment" 
for her. With the bulk of events concentrated during the two and a half weeks the 
Dalai Lama was in New York, people attended a lot of events in a very short 
period of time. I too found myself frequently running from one event to another. 
sometimes even going to three events in a single day. This meant that activists 
saw each other over and over again, a fact which contributed to a sense of 
solidarity and camaraderie amongst us. 32 
The events in New York were successful not just in terms of the powerful 
cumulative effect they had on panicipants, but also in terms of the numbers of 
people they attracted and the media attention they generated. Each was a complex 
performance in its own right and could easily merit separate discussion. For 
brevity's sake, I will limit my discussion here to the "Wisdom and Compassion" 
and accompanying sand mandala exhibition. 
Wisdom and Comp~ion: The Sacred Art of Tibet 
Organizers at Tibet House considered the "Wisdom and Compassion" show to be 
the backbone of the Year of Tibet. Curated by Prof. Robert Thurman and Prof. 
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Marilyn Rhie, and organized by the Asian An Museum of San Francisco. the show 
included more than 150 objects, among them 31 pieces lent by the State Hermitage 
Museum in St. Petersburg which had never before been shown in the U.S. The 
creation of a sand mandala by monks from Namgyal Monastery accompanied the 
show. at both its first venue in the spring of 1991--the Asian An Museum in San 
Francisco-and its second venue in the fall-the IBM Gallery of Science and An. 
Major funding for "Wisdom and Compassion" was provided by the National 
Endowment for the Arts, along with several private organizations including the 
Luce Foundation and the Merck Foundation. 
According to Rand Castile, one of the organizers who works at the Asian 
Art Museum in San Francisco, while the show was still in the early planning 
stages, he received a telephone call from Henry Kissinger who strongly advised 
him against doing the show. When Castile went public with information about 
Kissinger's meddling, the former Secretary of State denied to a New York Times 
reporter and other journalists ever having made the call. Kissinger reportedly also 
pressured the head of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York to drop the 
exhibition, despite the fact the Met had already begun to work with the show's 
curators. In an interview with a journalist, co-curator Thurman suggested that 
Kissinger's attempts to block the show reflected intensive lobbying by the Chinese 
government which, he argued, recognized the political significance of the 
exhibition all too clearly. By the time "Wisdom and Compassion" travelled to 
London in 1992, China made its objections public, protesting so vehemently that 
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the Times, a conservative English newspaper (no doubt welcoming the opportunity 
to champion Tibet in good anti-communist fashion) ran an editorial the day the 
show opened at the Royal Academy of Art urging Londoners to go see the show. 
These behind the scenes activities by Kissinger and China help explain the 
institutional context of the exhibition: after being dropped by the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Tibet House approached the IBM Gallery of Science and Art 
which gladly accepted the show. It is worth mentioning here that the IBM Gallery 
had less at stake than the Metropolitan Museum of Art in terms of risking censure 
by China. Without a permanent collection such as that of the Metropolitan. it 
faced less of a threat of withdrawal of Chinese cooperation in future exhibitions. 
In an essay titled "Histories of the Tribal and the Modem," James Clifford 
describes two systems in which non-Western objects have usually "found a home"--
either in the discourses and institutions of art or within those of anthropology. both 
of which "assume a primitive world in need of preservation, redemption, and 
representation" (1988:200). 33 Dissatisfied with this systemic opposition. Clifford 
declares, "We need exhibitions that question the boundaries of art and of the art 
world, an influx of truly indigestible "outside" artifacts" (ibid., 213}. In the essay 
he notes one bright spot-a show at the IBM Gallery of the Northwest Coast 
Collection from the Museum of the American Indian--where Kwakiutl artist Calvin 
Hunt put finishing touches on two totem poles in the atrium and left the freshly 
carved wood chips scattered around the base (ibid., 213). (Note, however, that 
Clifford's interest remains in the signs of human presence rather than in the artist 
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himself.) I bring Clifford up to suggest that as a show, "Wisdom and 
Compassion" questioned "the boundaries of art and the art world" both in terms of 
its framing (e.g .. catalogue and labelling) and by the fact that it appeared co 
introduce "truly indigestible" objects-Tibetan Buddhist paintings and sculptures 
whose meanings are considered "self-secret" by the tantric practitioners who use 
them. The key difference, however, between the "Primitivism" exhibition 
discussed in Clifford's essay, for instance, and "Wisdom and Compassion" is that 
Tibetans collaborated in their representation and did it for a very clear political 
end, a fact which puts the primitivism argument (e.g .• Clifford 1988; Torgovnick 
1990) in a new light. 
"Wisdom and Compassion" consisted of thangkas (gouache paintings on 
cotton. many mounted on silk brocade scrolls). sculptures in brass. bronze. silver. 
or wood, and a few tapestries. In the beautifully produced catalogue published by 
Harry N. Abrams, Inc. the curators describe the plan of "Wisdom and 
Compassion" as "symbolically meaningful" in that a mandala structure was built 
into the exhibition's form: 
The exhibition is inspired by the concept of the mandala. On a 
simple level, the mandala represents a paradise, a divine universe, 
the home of a god. Seen more deeply, it symbolizes the divine 
nature of our own world. (Castile 1991 :9) 
In Tibetan Buddhism. mandalas are usually drawn, painted, and sometimes even 
built as three-dimensional structures. The mandala may be "read" and studied as a 
text, memorized for visualization during meditation, and interpreted; Tibetans 
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believe that the simple act of viewing a mandala brings special blessings. By 
organizing the exhibition with a mandala-like structure. the curators intended ro 
have viewers move from the outside of the "mandala palace" to the inside, a 
"progressive journey" parallelling the visualization procedures of practitioners 
during a tantric initiation. 
Thus in the show's catalogue, the curators explain how they intended for 
viewers to begin "with the outer halls of the mandala palace" where they 
encounter objects representing the historical Buddha (Shakyamuni) and the various 
teachers, upholders, and protectors of Buddhism. Moving inward, they enter the 
"middle halls of the mandala palace" where they encounter objects represemacing 
the four lineages, in historical order (Nyingma, Sakya, Kagyu, and Gelug), along 
with their eminent teachers, founders, and even archetype deities (yidam). Finally, 
in the "inner halls of the mandala palace" observers experience images of the 
Bodhisattvas and Buddhas in their celestial and earthly Pure Land forms (Rhie and 
Thurman 1991: 13). By organizing the show in this fashion, the curators attempted 
to "demonstrate the function of this quintessentially religious art within its sacred 
context" (Rhie and Thurman 1994: 12)-which is to encourage an atmosphere of 
transformation, to help believers along the path towards enlightenment. In this 
way the show was meant to offer not so much an aesthetic experience as a spiritual 
one. The Dalai Lama's brief foreword to the catalogue underscores this aim: 
Art expresses the perceptions of a people. Sacred art reveals their 
deepest insights and their highest aspirations. So, to encounter our 
works of sacred art is to experience for yourself some of our most 
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profound visions. (1991: 7) 
ln one of their catalogue essays. curators Rhie and Thurman write that their goal 
of the exhibition and catalogue is two-fold: "to introduce Tibet's compelling and 
mysterious art on its own terms [emphasis in original] to those with little or no 
background in either Buddhism or Tibetan Buddhist art. and to add new 
scholarship on the subject of Tibetan art that reveals its independent tradition. rich 
imagination, high refinement. and profound and universal significance" (1991:12). 
By emphasizing the interpretation of these objects on their own terms. the 
curators basically eschewed the usual "art history" discourse in the catalogue text 
(with the exception of an essay by Marilyn Rhie). Their unorthodox approach is 
perhaps best exemplified by Thurman's essay "Wisdom and Compassion: The 
Heart of Tibetan Culture," which he describes as a kind of 
experiential hand-in-hand walk through one of the most difficult 
images for Westerners to comprehend: a father-mother union 
manifestation of the Buddha that, on first view. is both fearsome and 
erotic. By confronting this image on several levels-symbolic. 
aesthetic, psychological, and spiritual-we hope to make the beholder 
aware of the possibilities inherent in all the works of art that follow. 
Using the provocative image of "Paramasukha-Chakrasamvara Father-Mother" as 
an example, Thurman talks us through the image's significance not only on an 
iconographic level, but on a practical level, in terms of how the image is actually 
used for meditative practice: 
Let us for a moment lay aside our ordinary perceptions of reality 
and follow the Tibetans in their meditation on this father-mother 
union image, allowing it to become an image of ourselves as the 
embodiment of enlightenment. lf we let ourselves observe and 
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experience this image as Tibetans do. we can be inspired about the 
possibility of attaining enlightenment for ourselves. But the 
liberative potential of this image can be fully realized in our 
imagination only if we try to feel the texture of the goal state--if we 
imagine ourselves to be both this male and this female in union. in 
such an embrace. with these arms. these legs. these faces and eyes. 
with these adornments. and holding these symbols. This is. in fact. 
what Tantric adepts do. It is the inner secret of tantric meditation. 
(1991: 18) 
One way of understanding this attempt to communicate how the images work 
experientially lies in the exhibition's title. "Wisdom and Compassion." As we saw 
in Chapter 3. Mahayana Buddhism revolves around the bodhisattVa. who. out of 
compassion for the world. takes a vow to become a Buddha in order to lead all 
beings out of suffering to the bliss of enlightenment. Through long eons of 
spiritual practice. bodhisattvas cultivate virtues such as giving and patience. as well 
as wisdom. Wisdom is the understanding that all things. including persons. are 
devoid of inherent nature. and are. in reality, empty (Lopez 1991: 104). Or. as 
Thurman writes in the "Wisdom and Compassion" catalogue: 
To Buddhists, the "root of all evil" is our desperate clinging to self-
image and self-satisfaction. Wisdom comes through experiencing 
the perfect "transparency" of the self. which leads to utter freedom 
from self-concern ... Wisdom is the bliss of seeing through the 
delusion of self-preoccupation to reveal the underlying dimension of 
freedom. Compassion is the expression of such bliss to others. 
(Rhie and Thurman 1991:17) 
In order to become enlightened. Tibetan Buddhists believe, the bodhisattva must 
develop both wisdom and compassion fully- "must dedicate himself or herself to 
work forever for the welfare of the other while simultaneously understanding that 
all beings, oneself and others. do not exist ultimately. that they do not exist as they 
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appear" (Lopez 1991: 104). According to Thurman. the quintessential Buddhist an 
is "the liberating of all beings from suffering; its fruition is the discovery of truth. 
beauty. goodness. and the capacity for bliss inherent in enlightened life" 
(1991:17). 34 While it is doubtful that the show's curators believed they could 
"liberate" those who viewed the exhibition, it does seem that they were attempting 
to evoke a nonanalytic experience, similar to the experiences of compassionate 
bliss which such images would presumably elicit in tantric practitioners. 
In its evangelism, the exhibition clearly reflected the American curators' 
commitment to and vision of Tibetan Buddhist practice. Although a few Tibetans 
were involved in an advisory capacity and some helped with translations. Tibetan 
participation in "Wisdom and Compassion" was more or less limited to the actual 
sand mandala "performance." I shall explore this latter event later in this chapter. 
Interpreting "Wisdom and Compassion" 
Given the aims of the exhibition and the complexity of the objects' iconography. it 
is no wonder that many who viewed the exhibition found it beautiful but baffling. 
The show's framing appeared to assume an empathetic or intuitive understanding of 
Tibetan Buddhism as a practice, and as a universal one at that, on the part of 
audience. Such an assumption proved problematic, as did the curators' failure to 
acknowledge and explore the cultural dimensions of Tibetan Buddhism. In other 
words, the curators choose to write from the inside, as it were. and not to 
"translate" the terminology and concepts into terms easily understood by a 
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mainstream American audience. 
Perhaps one reason why the curators may have decided not to over-explain 
relates to the nature of tantric imagery and language. Many of the tantric images 
presented in the exhibition would traditionally have been considered out of bounds 
for ordinary viewers, including monks and nuns not initiated into the particular 
tantric practice represented. Their exhibition in the West was justified by a 
convention frequently invoked by Tibetan lamas-that the actual secret tantric 
knowledge encoded in images and words remains hidden to the uninitiated. 
Tantras employ a kind of "enigmatic language that is wHcd 'intentional language· 
in which ordinary words are given an esoteric meaning, making it impossible for 
the ordinary practitioner to make use of a tantric text (whether in Tibetan or 
another language) without oral instructions of a qualified teacher" (Brentano 
1993:43). 
The various ways in which "Wisdom and Compassion" was interpreted or 
"read" reveal interesting struggles with the process of objectification of Tibetan 
"culture." As Clifford (1988) and others (e.g., Karp and Lavine 1991: Marcus 
and Myers 1995) have suggested, the technologies or concepts of museum 
"display" tend to be produced around visual appreciation-aesthetics--rather than 
participation. That is, objects are usually circuited through a neutral. rather than 
an "evangelical" discourse. Given this general practice, how did an critics react to 
the show's framing? In his review, New York Times writer John Russell made the 
point that the nonpractitioner is essentially "cut off from the experience of Tibetan 
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art in its fullest and most effective sense" although the imagery seduces us 
nonetheless. 35 Another critic, Amei Wallach from New York Newsday, wrote 
that "Wisdom and Compassion" represented "the first show I've ever seen that 
actually focuses on religious content, because its primary purpose is to impart a 
religious point of view--even, perhaps, give the viewer a religious experience. "36 
Wallach found the wall labels to be far too long, the catalogue "too unabashedly a 
believer's text." She suggested that while the organizers "want to invent a new 
kind of exhibition that concentrates on the sacred in sacred art," the tools they 
choose-the "old natural-history approach of providing exhaustive context and the 
old art-museum reliance on esthetics "-do not work. 
While most of those who wrote about the show focused on its aesthetic 
value or interest, only Malcolm David Eckel. a professor of religious studies at 
Boston University, paid much attention to the political motivation behind the 
exhibition: 
In their original contexts, these objects served a purpose similar to 
that of the icon of St. Irene to draw believers into a realm of sacred 
reality. But taken out of context and assembled in a major 
exhibition, these objects take on new layers of visual meaning, 
lending themselves to new rhetorical purposes. (1992:3) 
Eckel argues that by moving viewers from the life of the historical Buddha to the 
lives of sages and adepts to the vision of the Pure Lands, the structure of the 
exhibition moved them closer to an idealized vision of Tibet. Citing Richard 
Gere's contribution to the catalogue, Eckel argues that the actor's problematic 
framing of Tibetan culture as the "lifeboat of culture, the storehouse of ancient 
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wisdom, and the last great hope of civilization.. reinforces the myth of Tibet as 
Shangri-La suggested by the exhibition itself (Eckel 1992:7). At the same. he 
argues. the images in .. Wisdom and Compassion" were appropriated for political 
purposes: 
Tibet may have been a bastion of rarefied Buddhist practice. but it 
was also familiar with the very worldly struggle for political power. 
Even the most naive image of Tibet's .. wondrous civilization" carries 
a political message, and an exhibition that leads a viewer by stages 
into a vision of Tibet as a sacred land is more than a tool for 
meditation: it is a marketing device for a political platform and a 
tool for political persuasion. The catalogue of the exhibition opens 
and closes with maps showing the boundaries claimed by the Tibetan 
government at the Simla Conference in 1914, and the Dalai Lama 
opens his introductory message with a reference to "independent 
Tibet" ... The organizers of this exhibition would hardly have been 
offended if someone had stood in front of the great painting of 
Shambhala and thought that this vision called "Tibet" needed to 
move a few blocks east from a temporary seat at the IBM Gallery to 
a permanent seat in the United Nations. (1992:8) 
Like Kissinger and the Chinese officials whose interests the former secretary-of-
state represented, Eckels recognizes the signification of culture as a political 
practice and "Wisdom and Compassion" as part of a larger Tibetan strategy aimed 
at "transforming" the public not just spiritually but politically. 
Embodying Tibetanness: Monks and mandalas 
Despite the exhibition's complexity and impenetrability for those unfamiliar with 
Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and iconography, it managed to attract more than 
250,000 New Yorkers during its ten-week run. If Gallery visitors had some 
difficulty fully understanding all of the show's imagery, they certainly related well 
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to the four monks who worked in the corner of the foyer for several weeks 
creating a sand mandala. Every day at lunch time. a crowd of curious New 
Yorkers gathered around the windows of the Gallery. noses pressed to the glass. 
peering in. What the crowd saw were four monks, heads shaved and wearing red 
robes. hunched over, painstakingly tapping colored grains of sand out of a funnel 
into an elaborate pattern. 
Like the thangkas, sculptures, and tapestries discussed above, sand 
mandalas play an important functional role in Tibetan Buddhism as vehicles 
through which practitioners can achieve spiritual insight. The sand mandala 
created at the IBM Gallery was a Kalachakra mandala. According to Buddhist 
belief, the mandala represents the Kalachakra deity's abode, and serves as a 
blue print for a three-dimensional visualization of an ornate structure 
made of jewel-light ... with various levels, doors, roofs, and porticoes 
in which 722 exquisitely dressed subsidiary deities reside. {Brentano 
1993:48) 
In the past, mandalas would only have been created in the context of an initiation 
into a particular tantra. But in 1988, the first sand mandala to be created by 
monks outside a religious context was made at the American Museum of Natural 
History. 37 This public display of mandala-making proved to be so popular that 
mandalas were soon created in museums and galleries across the U.S. 38 
One of the most interesting aspects of this new "genre" of public mandala-
making is the elaboration of Buddhist-related activities around their creation. By 
this I mean that whereas in the very beginning the monk-artists would have done 
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their preparatory rituals on their own. the process has evolved in recent years. 
expanding to include. among other things. daily chanting and meditation sessions 
on museum/gallery premises which are open to the public and led by the monks. >9 
For instance, when "Wisdom and Compassion" was being exhibited in San 
Francisco. interest was so high that the monks who made the accompanying sand 
mandala were asked to lead meditation sessions. Sessions were extremely popular. 
so much so that it became hard to find a place to put one's meditation cushion in 
the museum· s gallery. When the same monks created a sand mandala at the Field 
Museum in Chicago a few months later. their schedule-published in a museum 
flyer--reflected this increased elaboration: 
The monk's daily schedule will be: 
9 - 10: Daily chanting and meditation 
lO -1: Creating the sand mandala. greeting visitors. and 
answering questions 
2 - 4: Creating sand mandala 
The question and answer session was limited to the first half of the day. no doubt 
to allow the monks to get enough work done each day.40 While no such 
elaboration was allowed at the IBM Gallery in New York, the positioning of the 
sand mandala platform in a visible corner near the entrance of the museum 
nevertheless provided the public an oppOltunity to interact with the monks. 
Inevitably, curious individuals would go inside where they could stand closer and 
perhaps ask a question or two if one of the monks happened to look up or take a 
break. 
Like the Aboriginal artists at the Asia Society described by Myers. Tibetan 
412 
monks have been increasingly participating "as embodied representatives of their 
culture" (1994b:678) .. u In many ways, this is an extension of the role monks 
typically play in Tibetan society. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. the primary 
goal of the Tibetan polity before 1959 was the "production and reproduction of as 
many monks as possible" (Goldstein and Tsarong 1985:17). Thus monks were 
viewed as exemplars of Tibetan society's highest ideal-the pursuit of spiritual 
enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. While not all monks joined 
monasteries in Tibet for this reason alone--there were other more pragmatic 
advantages such as potential access to connections and resources, respect and 
prestige-they nevertheless were perceived in this way. 
On another level, the monks who participated in Year of Tibet events were 
"embodied representatives of their culture" based on the fact that they were bearers 
of cultural knowledge which had been passed on to them. lmplicit in this claim to 
cultural authority is the Buddhist belief in living knowledge-knowledge as 
embodied in persons and transmitted from a lineage master. Discussing the role of 
lineage (gyud) as a vehicle for Tibet's corporate identity via Buddhism. Lopez 
writes: 
Like other Buddhist traditions, the Tibetans based claims to authority 
largely on lineage, and in their case, they claimed that the Buddhism 
taught in Tibet in 1959 could be traced backward in an unbroken 
line to the eleventh century, when the founders of the major Tibetan 
sects made the perilous journey to India to receive the dharma from 
the great masters of Bengal, Bihar and Kashmir, who were 
themselves direct recipients of teachings that could be traced back to 
the Buddha himself. Moreover, this lineage was represented as 
essentially oral, with instructions being passed down from master to 
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disciple as unwritten commentary on sacred text. (l 995b:268) 
Spiritual knowledge in Tibetan Buddhism is thus passed on through a direct 
personal physical connection between lama and student.42 In this regard. lineage 
operates as a kind of metaphenomenon which transcends objects, artifacts. and 
even the monks themselves. What becomes significant is the living knowledge the 
monks bring with them. On a certain level then, the knowledge materializing on a 
surface of a sand mandala, for example, gives the monks (or is evidence enough 
of) their authority to do what they are doing. 43 
As exemplars of Tibetan "culture," the monks who have made sand 
mandalas, chanted, danced, or created butter sculptures in various venues across 
the country have been wildly popular with the American public. This popularity 
with American audiences has elicited some complicated feelings amongst Tibetans. 
particularly those who are younger and feel constrained by a Western tendency to 
privilege Buddhism over lay aspects of exile culture (this in spite of the fact that 
the government-in-exile is frequently accused of doing the same thing).44 One 
incident in particular captures the sense of frustration some Tibetans feel. On an 
early October day in 1991, when I was volunteering at Tibet House, Richard Gere 
came in to do an interview and get his photograph taken for a women's fashion 
magazine that was doing a story on the Year of Tibet. When it was time for his 
picture to be taken, Gere said he wanted it taken with a monk. Unsurprisingly, 
there were no monks working in the Tibet building. Upon hearing Gere's request. 
one of the Tibetans working in the building got very annoyed, exclaiming lacer to 
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those of us in the Tibet House office, "We're not all monks you know!" In the 
end, Gere had to settle for the highest status layperson in the building who 
happened to be the Dalai Lama's representative to Nonh America. Throughout che 
course of my research, I heard many Tibetans voice similar frustration over this 
type of Western essentialism. The anecdote demonstrates how the process of 
objectifying culture rearranges relationships among participants: by privileging a 
Buddhist definition of "Tibetanness," secular Tibetans are made to feel somehow 
"inauthentic" because they are not monks.'5 
While younger Tibetans express resentment at this phenomenon, they are ac 
the same time often protective of the monks and the aspect of Tibetan culture they 
represent. One story, recounted by the same Tibetan who complained about 
Gere's demand for a monk, reveals this contradiction. She described 
accompanying several monks to the Open Center, a New Age-style spiritual center 
in lower Manhattan, where an American man asked the monks to chant "Om" 
while he did what she called a "healing ritual." This son of chant is not something 
monks would ordinarily do as part of their practice; my friend was so disturbed by 
what she saw as an "inappropriate" request that she left during the "performance," 
leaving the monks to fend for themselves. "The monks just do what they're told." 
my friend grumbled, "I told them not to participate but they went ahead." If the 
monks were willing to comply with the request, I was puzzled that my friend, who 
is after all a layperson, reacted so negatively. I later viewed her reaction as an 
expression of Tibetan ambivalence about the recontextualiz.ation of Buddhism in che 
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West (see Chapter 9).46 
Another anecdote, reported in the Wall Street Journal, gives us some insight 
into the qualities upon which the monks' appeal is based. Referring to an incident 
at the Asian Art Museum in San Francisco where a mandala was being made to 
accompany "Wisdom and Compassion," the authors wrote that: 
... the spiritual peace of the Buddhist monks was put to the test in 
May. A seemingly deranged woman walked into the courtyard as 
the monks were completing their four weeks of work on the 
mandala. "She just clambered over their shoulders, jumped on top 
of the mandala and started shuffling her feet; yelling something 
about the CIA and the color black," Mr. Kohn [an expert on Tibetan 
art and religion who helped put the exhibition together] said. 
Although museum staff and visitors who witnessed the 
desecration of the mandala were shaken. some to the point of tears, 
the monks were unpenurbed. "I didn't see a flicker of annoyance." 
said Mr. Kohn. "One of them said, ·That poor woman-she must 
really be suffering.' They started praying for her that day and 
continued the whole time they were here." 
The ruined mandala had to be ritually dismantled, then a new 
one created to replace it. Luckily. the monks' one suitcase of sand 
contained enough not only for mandalas all over the U.S. but even 
some sand for a few extra. (Decarlo and Dintenfass 1991:28) 
The contrast in reactions to the ruined mandala by non-Tibetan museum staff 
members and visitors and the monks is at the heart of the monks' appeal to 
Western audiences. The Tibetans' reaction to the deranged woman and lack of 
concern over the destruction of several weeks of their own hard labor is a 
testament to their religious training. As mentioned earlier, compassion (snying-rje) 
is a fundamental tenet of Buddhism. It is also a core cultural value or ideal 
presented and nunured in exile society along with "respectful behavior" (ya-rahs 
spyod-bzang) and independence (rang-brtsan). Referring to compassion. Nowak 
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notes: 
This word has an extensive range of usages in Tibetan. Ct is 
intimately associated with A valokitesvara, the bodhisattva of mercy, 
and it figures prominently in Jataka stories (tales of the Buddha in 
his previous lives), which stress the supreme importance of taking 
pity on suffering beings. Ct is a part of Buddhist reverence for all 
forms of life, animal as well as human ... this kind of cultivated 
sensitivity-an openness to "being moved by compassion" (a stock 
scriptural phrase), an ability to identify with sympathy and feeling, 
with all sentient creatures-lies at the heart of Tibetan values, and as 
such it figures strongly in the socialization of Tibetan children. 
(1984:92) 
ln many ways, the monks response to the destruction of their mandala epitomizes 
this Buddhist sense of compassion. By reacting as they did, the monks clearly 
demonstrated the value of Tibetan Buddhism to a shocked and outraged Western 
audience. ln fact, this kind of teaching by example has come up on other 
occasions during mandala-making; for instance, [ remember viewers expressing 
surprise and dismay at the fact that a mandala being created at the Rhode island 
School of Design Gallery in 1993 would be "dismantled" and dispersed into the 
local river upon completion. When questioned about this, the monks took it as an 
opponunity to teach their non-Tibetan friends something about impermanence, 
telling them the mandala is made in sand and then destroyed to stress the 
transience of all earthly things. 
The recontextualization of "culture" 
The "embodied" public performances of the monks, whether they involve making a 
sand mandala, doing a tantric dance, or creating a butter sculpture, all raise 
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interesting questions about the recontextualization of "culture." What exactly are 
the monks doing? How are events framed by organizers and how are they 
interpreted by audiences? 
In his essay on the creation of a sandpainting by Aboriginal artists at the 
Asia Society, Myers (l994b) comments on the unsettled nature of the performance. 
pointing out that 
For both indigenous performers and their audience-participants. this 
kind of "culture making" - in which neither the rules of production 
nor reception are established - is fraught with difficulties. 
( l 994b:675) 
Part of Myers' interest is precisely in the unfixed, contingent nature of the event 
and on the varying frameworks participants and audiences bring to it. Unlike 
many commentators, who tend to focus on the ways in which such a 
"performance" is read by the audience, Myers argues that we need to take into 
account the thoughts and motivations of the performers themselves. That to 
interpret the event simply as a spectacle of cultural difference, a process whereby 
indigenous people are "othered," is to neglect these events as forms of social action 
and as "important contexts for the contemporary negotiation and circulation of 
indigenous peoples' identities" (l994b:675). 
In order to make sense of the sandpainting event, it is useful co know the 
circumstances in which sandpaintings are ordinarily produced in Aboriginal 
society. Typically, Myers writes, sandpaintings are 
constructed as part of ritual, including songs and reennactments of 
ancestral activities, in which all those present are essentially 
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participants. Sandpaintings are neither independent entities nor are 
they performances for an audience of spectators. Indeed, 
sandpaintings are ritual constructions to which, like most forms of 
religious knowledge in Central Australia, access is restricted ... in that 
simple sense, the activity of constructing a sandpainting at the Asia 
Society was something new. (1994b:680) 
Like Aborginal sandpainting, Tibetan sandpaintings are normally "neither 
independent entities nor are they performances for an audience of spectators" but 
instead are "ritual constructions" to which access is restricted."" The emergence 
of public sandpainting since 1988 is thus something new, a Tibetan exile 
innovation. Given their novelty, how have mandala activities been framed by 
organizers? During the Year of Tibet, the two mandalas which accompanied the 
"Wisdom and Compassion" exhibition were described simultaneously as Buddhist 
rituals and "art. "48 ln the press kit for the exhibition at the lBM Gallery, the 
sandpainting was described as both "artwork" and "spiritually significant work": 
During the first three weeks of the exhibition, monks from Namgyal, 
the personal monastery of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, India, will 
create an intricate sand mandala. The seven-foot wide circular 
artwork will display thousands of Buddhist symbols. The ritual of 
consecration for this spiritually significant work will inaugurate a 
series of performances, lectures, panels and films that will highlight 
the richness of Tibetan culture. 
As the press kit implies, the monks appeared to have followed some of the normal 
Buddhist procedures such as blessing and consecrating the sand and the space 
where it was to be built and saying appropriate prayers in the process of making 
the sand mandala in New York. When asked about how he regarded the mandala, 
one of the main sand mandala "artists," the Venerable Lobsang Samten (from 
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Namgyal Monastery). said the monks considered the object to be "sacred." despite 
the fact they did not do all the subsidiary rituals such as those which would be 
done during the creation of the Kalachakra mandala for the initiation in Madison 
Square Garden (e.g., daily pujas, use of "wisdom thread" in laying down white 
lines. calling down of the deities or mantra recitation). In other words. although 
the sandpainting was defined in somewhat ambiguous aesthetic terms by the 
organizers. the participants themselves viewed the mandala in a Buddhist ritual 
context. 
In 1988 Samten was quoted in a brochure distributed at the American 
Museum of Natural History as saying: "The sand mandala is an ancient tradition. 
Working on it manifests peace. And even a person who simply sees it may feel 
peace from deep inside ... on many levels." Two years later. when Samten created 
a "Chenrezig mandala" at the New York Open Center, the brochure sent out by the 
center claimed: "Those who witness the creation of a mandala, who watch as a 
vision of sublime beauty unfolds grain by grain, will develop inner peace and 
transcendental wisdom." Thus like the images in the "Wisdom and Compassion" 
exhibition, the sand mandala was framed as offering a potential spiritual experience 
for viewers. 49 
By presenting the Kalachakra mandala at the IBM gallery in this manner. 
exhibition organizers played on one of the frames Myers' suggests that audiences 
commonly bring to performances of cultural difference-the frame of "coming into 
contact with cultural form that is presumed to possess something of an "aura" 
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(Benjamin 1968), of sacred tradition or aesthetic originality" (l994b:678). No 
doubt the daily creation of the mandala was compelling to audiences because of the 
intense focus monks brought to the activity, a focus which is generally interpreted 
by non-Tibetans as meditative. Myers' witnessed a similar sort of silence at the 
Asia Society event which, ironically, "is very untypical of Aboriginal ritual events" 
(ibid., 685). He goes on. "silence at the Asia Society added a sense of what is to 
us [emphasis in original] reverential, meditational concentration that is not at all 
obvious, if present, in the original ritual contexts" (ibid., 685). 
In another essay on Aboriginal an, Myers suggests that how various 
audiences respond to acrylic paintings depend on their historical relationship vis a 
vis Aboriginal society. For instance, critics in Australia "read" the paintings and 
the presence of the painters differently from those in the U.S.: "For an audience at 
the Asia Society, the presence of Aborginals and their paintings is far less defined 
by a sense of the European conquest as constituting the relations between them: the 
painters are not America's victims!" (l 994a: 25). Acrylic paintings were not 
understood by American audiences in the same way as they were by conscience-
stricken white Australians; American audiences' accountability was not drawn into 
the frame of the intercultural exchange (Myers l994a). 
Nevertheless, audiences did not appear to respond to the live presence of 
Tibetans making mandalas at the IBM Gallery in the same way that some members 
of the audience reacted to the presence of Aboriginal anists on stage at the Asia 
Society. I heard no one comparing the mandala part of the exhibition to a 
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"diorama" as was the case for the Aboriginal sandpainting performance, this 
despite the fact that the monks were literally behind glass and on display for any 
passerby to see and watch. Maybe one reason is the fact that Tibet never came 
under the direct colonial domination of a Western power; instead. as we have seen. 
Tibet was transformed into a particular focus of European desire and fantasy 
(Lopez l995b:252). Thus the ideological baggage is not one of historical conquest 
but that of a different sort, an obviously problematic "New Age Orientalism" 
which idealizes Tibetans and their "culture." 
Perhaps another more important reason Western audiences did not object to 
the "objectification" of Tibetan "culture" in this instance stems from the other 
"frame" Western audiences bring to such intercultural encounters-"the 
performance of ethnicity, where cultural difference indexes collective and 
(potential) political identity" (Myers l994b:678). In other words, the creation of 
mandalas by Tibetan monks was read as a demonstration of a Tibetan "ethnic" 
identity which is under threat from the Chinese. Tibetans were viewed as willing 
participants in their own representation or objectification. This interpretation no 
doubt would have been reinforced and further contextualized by the catalogue to 
the exhibition, which, as Eckels points out above, contained maps showing the 
boundaries claimed by the Tibetan government in 1914 as well as references to a 
formerly "independent Tibet." 
Given the Tibetans' collaborative role in the production and "performance" 
of the Year of Tibet, arguments about "authenticity," "commodification," or 
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"spectacle" as well as "ochering" seem to miss the point. Myers is right to call for 
a more complex understanding of the intercultural exchange between the audience 
and performers as he concludes: 
We need to consider these events as forms of communicative action 
in which the rules of production and reception are not established 
and to realize that participants take these venues seriously as 
opportunities to "objectify" themselves not just as a type of people 
but as worthy of international attention and respect. (1994b:690). 
As the Tibetan case so clearly illustrates, these events in novel arenas can serve 
more urgent purposes, such as the transformation of interested audiences into 
political supporters. 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter by asserting that each of the strategies deployed by Tibet 
activists entails the production and assertion of a particular diasporic identity. or 
what I call a "narrative of Tibetanness." In the case of the Year of Tibet, the 
narrative was one of Tibetan Buddhist culture as a locus of endangered spirituality 
and a valuable resource for the world. Part of my interest in this chapter was in 
tracing the emergence and deployment of this narrative of Tibetan culture which. I 
argued, is the product of a number of intersecting processes and complex forces 
including the emergence of "culture" as a valid (viable) display frame for political 
claims, the development of a self-consciousness about Tibetan religious and 
cultural practices within the exile community, the reinterpretation of the patron-
client relationship, and the rise of a kind of New Age Orientalism (e.g., Richard 
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Gere's "mystical vision") in which Tibet is idealized as a purely sacred place. 
The Year of Tibet campaign, based on Buddhist universalism, appealed co 
Tibetans because it comports well with their religious beliefs and offers them a 
means through which to incorporate outsiders into their struggle. At the same 
time, by privileging Tibetan monks as embodiments of Tibetan culture, the Year of 
Tibet ended up reproducing a persistent (but increasingly contested} Buddhist 
hegemony in exile, a fact made evident through some lay Tibetans' contradictory 
reactions to Western interest in the monks. 
The deployment of "culture" raised other issues as well. Although 
motivated by the desire to draw attention to their cause, Tibet House, by depicting 
Tibet as a "storehouse of ancient wisdom and the last great hope of civilization" 
(Eckel 1992:7). ended up playing on Western fantasies and in so doing, reinforcing 
an impression of Tibet as otherworldly and of Tibetans as spiritual beings rather 
than secular actors with legitimate political claims. The paradox of this strategy, 
then, is that while the deployment of Tibetan culture attracts outsiders, the 
orientalism embedded in the strategy is often an obstacle to Tibetan attempts to 
represent themselves and be taken seriously in other arenas. 
On a different level, one of my goals in this chapter and the next is to 
demonstrate what a grounded ethnographic approach can bring to the performance 
of "culture" (cultural difference). It is not enough to simply analyze these 
representations as spectacles of difference which reinforce. in this case, American 
dominance over Tibetans. Clearly we must acknowledge the existence of 
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hegemonic categories which contain and constrain Tibetans. but as I have tried co 
suggest in this chapter. we must also attend to the complex ways in which Tibetans 
creatively engage these representations and produce their own narratives of Tibetan 
culture as part of a larger effort to sustain themselves in exile and to engage 
outside support (find patrons) for their struggle. 
In the next chapter. I continue my exploration of the Year of Tibet by 
focusing on the social processes around the production of a tantric initiation in 
Madison Square Garden. Through this example. I hope to demonstrate more 
concretely both the intercultural negotiations involved with the strategic deployment 
of culture and the limitations of such a campaign. 
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Notes 
l. The Year of Tibet was not the first campaign of its kind. As Brian Wallis writes in 
an essay titled "Selling Nations: International Exhibitions and Cultural Diplomacy" 
(1994), large-scale national cultural festivals have been the favored form in the last 
ten years or so, with the following celebrations staged in the U.S.:"Mexico: A Work 
of Art" (1990); "Turkey-The Continuing Magnificence" (1987-88); and "Festival of 
Indonesia" (1990-92). These festivals have functioned as huge public relations 
gambits, designed to "sell" the nation's image in the United States. As Wallis 
writes, 
Their unabashed purpose is to transform negative stereotypes into 
positive ones and, in the process. to improve the poitical and 
economic standing of their country. These exhibitions are intricate. 
multilayered engines of global diplomacy. which, when staged 
properly, are almost indiscernible as self-promotions. (1991:86) 
Like these other cultural campaigns which bad large art exhibitions at their center. 
the Year of Tibet had "Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred An of Tibet" at its 
center. And like these other exhibitions, Wisdom and Compassion "dramatized the 
most conventionalized versions of their national images, asserting past glories and 
amplifying stereotypical differences" (1991:88). This "self-Orientalizing" mode. 
Wallis notes, entails the nation in question remaking its national image into the 
stereotype American audiences expect to see. I discuss the representation of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the "Wisdom and Compassion" show in the text. 
While Tibet activists certainly participated in a bit of self-orientalizing during the 
Year of Tibet, the larger goal was not so much to use culture to attract capital as to 
mobilize grassroots political support for the Tibet issue. By putting Tibet in the 
public's eye (and therefore the press' eyes). activists hoped to use that attention to 
pressure American officials into changing their policies toward Tibet and China. 
2. In her essay, Calkowski discusses several world tours by performers from the 
Tibetan Institute for Performing Arts (TIPA) in the 1970s and 1980s. One of the 
points she makes is that in the area of performing arts, the confrontation is no longer 
limited to Chinese and Tibetan refugee performers but includes Sinicized Tibetans 
now as well, all of whom claim to represent "authentic" Tibetan culture. 
3. For a sample of postcolonial- poststructural theorizing about representation and 
"cultural othering." see Bhaba 1995; Clifford 1988; Clifford and Marcus 1986: 
Fabian 1983: Foucault 1980: Said 1978; Todorov 1984; Trinh 1989, 1991). 
4. In this chapter, "Tibet activists" includes both Tibetan and non-Tibetans whereas 
"Tibetan activists" refers specifically to Tibetan activists. 
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5. See Brigbnnan 1995 for an extended discussion of current critiques of the culture 
concept, including Clifford's. 
6. Toward this end, Ginsburg bas conducted ethnographic research on media 
production in Central Australi~ focusing on three media groups: the Warlpiri Media 
Association (WMA) in the Central Desert Aboriginal community of Yuendumu; the 
Central Australian Aboriginal Media Association (CAAMA) located outside the town 
of Alice Springs: and Imparja Television, based in Alice Springs but serving all of 
the Northern Territory. In addition, she has also studied the emergence of 
transnational networks of indigenous media producers, viewing film festivals (e.g. 
the Dreamspeakers Festival in Edmonton, Canada) and co-productions organized by 
and for indigenous producers from around the world as the means through which 
these networks are constituted. 
7. For instance. as other researchers have pointed out in the case of Warlpiri media. 
"the ways in which the tapes are made and used reflect Warlpiri understandings of 
kin-based obligations for ceremonial production and control of traditional 
knowledge, as these index cosmological relationships to particular features in 
regional geography" (Michaels and Kelly 1984). 
8. There are profound historical and ethnographic differences between Tibetans and so-
called "fourth world" peoples which accounts. at least in part, for my particular 
focus. Unlike Australia or Brazil, Tibet is associated with a great civilization with a 
complex literary tradition and a world religion. The romance attached to this 
difference is significant. In addition, Tibet was never colonized by a Western power 
(and many people consider Tibet to have been colonized by China), and Tibetans 
refugees consider themselves to be exiles from a formerly independent country. As 
a result, they engage the West very differently-as we have seen throughout this 
dissertation. For indigenous groups who have suffered the most severe long-term 
effects of colonization like the Australian Aborigines and Native Americans, such a 
high degree of incorporation of Westerners into their own processes of cultural 
representation would most likely be viewed by many within the community as highly 
problematic. 
9. There are provocative parallels between post-structural/post-colonial theories of 
identity, such as the ones described above, and Buddhism, which might explain the 
profoundly relational aspect of Tibetanness descn'bed in this chapter (for a discussion 
of Buddhism and post-structural feminism, see Klein 1995). These parallels are 
based on Buddhism's central philosophical tenet of selflessness-defined as the 
absence of a fixed, absolute, unchanging self-and on the Mahayana belief in the 
"objective selflessness" of all phenoma (see chapter 3). With the recognition of this 
selflessness comes the simultaneous recognition of the relativity and relationality of 
all beings. This view of interdependence echoes post-structuralist ideas about 
identities as shifting, multiple. and dependent upon context. 
IO. See Hevia 1993; Ruegg 1991; Shakabpa 1967 for discussions of the role of patron-
lama relationship in Tibetan political history. 
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11. In a discussion with author John A vedon about the early years of cultural 
reconstruction in exile. the Dalai Lama recalled his decision-making process: 
We divided our culture into two types. In the first category we 
placed that which, we determined. needed to be retained only in 
books as past history. The second category included whatever could 
bring actual benefit in the present. These things, we resolved. must 
be kept alive. Therefore. many of our old ceremonial traditions I 
discarded-no matter, I decided, let them go. However, our 
performing arts. our literature. science and religion as well as those 
crafts from which we could earn a livelihood-painting. metalcraft. 
architecture. woodworking, and carpetmaking-these, we took special 
pains to safeguard. To achieve this we employed modem methods 
although they were altogether new to us and posed many difficulties. 
(1984:92) 
12. Among diasporic Tibetans. this hyper-awareness of "culture" exists more strongly in 
Dharamsala, India than in any other Tibetan settlement in India. Several factors 
may account for this. including, as Marcia Calkowski argues, the fact that 
Dharamsala's economy 
has become inseparable from the presentation and promotion of 
"Tibetan culture." Hotels, restaurants. and shops serve an increasing 
influx of tourists, journalists. pilgrims, academics. and others-many 
of whom come to experience the "mysterious" Tibetan culture first-
hand. Many Dharamsala residents have read descriptions of 
themselves in journalistic and academic accounts and are well aware 
of Dharamsala's high ratings as a tourist destination. (1991 :645) 
One of the consequences of this increased self-consciousness about Tibetan "culture" 
has been the tendency of a few individuals to assume the role of "cultural censor" 
and, therefore. to judge the appropriateness of particular cultural items or events 
(Calkowski 1991:648; see also Diehl 1995; Harris 1995). 
13. Anthropologist Margaret Nowak suggests this intertwining of religious and political 
discourse reflects a process of "sacralization" in exile whereby the goal of 
independence (rang-bnsan) is broadened to the point of spiritual transcendence or 
nirvlina. As Nowak discovered during her research in India, one of the goals of the 
exile educational system is the "constantly reiterated aim of preserving and 
promoting Tibetan culture and tradition" which, children are reminded. "has kept 
intact the essential teachings of the Lord Buddha" and which "can be of benefit not 
only to Tibetans but to the whole world as well" (1984:102). The desire for rang-
bnsan, young Tibetans told Nowak, is "not just for independence, but freedom in an 
intangible sense"-that is, "freedom to reach nirvana" (Nowak 1984: 138). The 
arguments deployed by Tibetan leaders as well as the younger generation are 
interesting for the way in which they conflate Tibetan "culture" with Tibetan 
Buddhism. which in tum is conflated with political independence. 
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14. See Klieger 1992 for an analysis of the patron-client dyad in Tibetan history and in 
exile. See also Shakabpa 1967. 
15. Over the last fifteen years. the Tibetan leader has also argued for Tibetan culture·s 
relevance to the modem world using a discourse of "science." a subject which 
happens to be close the Dalai Lama's heart. As be put it in an interview in 1987: 
"Buddhism bas much to say on the nature of matter. and on the brain, mind. and 
nervous system. There is a basis here for cooperation and dialogue with Western 
sciences such as neurology, psychology, cosmology. and so on" (Mullin 1987:22). 
In light of this belief. the Dalai Lama has attempted to show how Tibetan Buddhism 
can be recontextualized in a Western scientific paradigm. On nearly every trip he 
has made to the U.S. since his first in 1979, the Tibetan leader has sought to 
"dialogue" with various scientists in an effort to educate himself and explore the 
connections between Tibetan Buddhist thought and Western scientific knowledge. 
Indeed. one of the first official Year of Tibet events was a symposium called 
"MindScience: An East-West Dialogue" which was held in Cambridge. 
Massachusetts in March 1991. At the meeting, which was attended by the Tibetan 
leader and a group of Harvard University neurobiologists and psychiatrists. 
participants compared and contrasted Tibetan Buddhist mind/body concepts with 
Western biomedical concepts. (For an edited version of the proceedings from this 
conference, see MindScience: An East-West Dialogue (1991) edited by Daniel 
Goleman and Robert Thurman. Boston: Wisdom Publications.) 
16. Thurman was the first Westerner to be ordained as a Tibetan monk. He received 
Upasaka ordination in 1964 and Vajracharya ordination in 1971 in Dharamsala. 
India from the Dalai Lama. 
Today, Thurman is a professor of religious studies at Columbia University (and the 
father of film actress Uma Thurman). 
17. See Lopez l 995b for a description of the early years of exile in relation to the study 
of Buddhism and the rebuilding of monastic institutions in south India. 
18. Lopez suggests that an explanation for this urgency in Western students of Tibetan 
Buddhism can be found in the Buddhist texts they were reading: 
The story is told in a Buddhist sutra of a lone blind tortoise who 
dwells in the depths of a vast ocean, coming up for air only once 
every hundred years. On the surface of that same ocean floats a 
golden yoke. It is more common for that tortoise to place its bead 
through that yoke when it takes its centennial breath. the sutra says. 
than it is for a being imprisoned in the cycle of rebirth to be born as 
a human with the good fortune to encounter the teaching of the 
Buddha. Human birth in a Buddhist land is compared to a rare 
jewel, difficult to find, and, if found, of great value, because it is in 
the human body that one may traverse the path that leads to 
liberation. (1995b:2(l6) 
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Imbibing this rhetoric of urgency from such texts. Lopez argues. Western students 
saw Buddhism as valuable for its power to save the modem world. 
19. Lopez disputes the misrepresentation of Tibet as an isolated and unarmed place full 
of happy peaceful people devoted to the practice of Buddhism in his recent essay on 
New Age Orientalism: 
We often hear Tibetan society was hermetic. sealed off from outside 
influence. Yet reports of travellers from the early eighteenth century 
note Tartars. Chinese. Muscovites. Armenians. Kashmiris. and 
Nepalese established in Lhasa as merchants. ( 1994: 19) 
Similarly, he points out. the monasteries around Lhasa attracted monks from as far 
away as Kalmykia, located between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. from as 
Sichuan province in China. from the Buryiat region in Siberia and from Sherpaland 
in Nepal (1994: 19). 
20. This complicity is widely discussed within the exile community and is an ongoing 
source of tension and ambivalence between Tibetans of various generations and from 
different parts of the diaspora (for examples of critiques of the conservative role 
such representations play in Tibetan exile society. see J. Norbu 1990). 
21. Mickey Hart. the drummer for the Grateful Dead. also helped to sponsor the monk 
tours and even participated in some of their performances. He also bas made studio 
recordings with them which are available on the Ryko label. 
22. Namgyal Monastery is known as the Dalai Lama's monastery. Before 1959 it was 
housed in Lhasa's Potala Palace. where the Dalai Lama lived during the winter 
months. Ct was reestablished by the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in 1959. The main 
responsibility of the Namgyal monks is to assist the Dalai Lama in the preparation 
and performance of ritual ceremonies. Because of their proximity to the Tibetan 
leader. monks from Namgyal are considered to be very fortunate and to have an 
especially high status among the general monastic population. 
In recent years Namgyal monks have toured the U.S .• performing abbreviated 
versions of tantric dance. Io an essay called "Sacred Ritual Dance: (The Gu Tor 
Tradition at Namgyel Monastery}, author Nanci A. Hoetzlein defines monastic 
tantric dance "as a rich facet of tantric practice, albeit ancillary to other more 
prominent functions within the overall ritual pattern" (1991 :314). How to categorize 
these tantric "performances" in a Western context is an interesting issue which I 
address in the text. 
23. See Calkowski 1995 for a detailed description of the tour; see also Information 
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama 1981:233-235. See also J. Norbu 1993:15-
19. 
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24. See also Nowak 1984:115-118 for a description of TIPA's treannent in the U.S. 
25. The resistance TIP A encountered was a sort of initiation for the young performers 
into "international and cross-cultural diplomacy" (Calkowski 1995:6). Indeed. over 
the years, the tours have contributed to the Tibetan community's growing familiarity 
with "the public relations tactics of international politics" (Nowak 1984:118). 
26. In the West, just as China sympathizers often protest exile performances, Tibetan 
refugees have begun to protest Chinese Tibetan events (e.g. see Calkowski 1995: 13 ). 
At one U.S. Tibet Committee meeting in 1992 [remember a discussion about 
possible actions against a Chinese Tibetan dance troupe from Lhasa which was 
scheduled to perform in New York. Some Tibetans at the meeting worried about 
how such a protest would be interpreted by the Tibetan dancers themselves. who 
obviously were under the control of their Chinese "minders." In other words, their 
desire was to reach out and communicate with their "brothers and sisters" from 
Tibet rather than offend them. Various options were discussed, including the idea to 
invite them to a reception. Eventually it was decided that two or three people would 
go early to Town Hall (one of the three venues where performances were being 
held-the others being in a Chinese restaurant in Chinatown or in Queens in a 
Chinese cultural center) where they would hand out "fact sheets" on Tibet prior to 
the start of the show. Then at the end of the performance, activists (preferably non-
Tibetan) would stand up and chant "Long Live Tibet." As one of the Tibetan 
activists characterized it, "the idea is not to have it be like a screaming, disruptive 
thing, but to be like a bravo, bravo type thing." 
It was suggested that a Tibetan who had been raised in Tibet and spoke Chinese 
fluently would offer them $25 each, tea money. When I asked "why?" one of the 
Tibetans at the meeting said "to win them over, also they probably aren't paid to 
perform, it's just a gift ... " A long discussion ensued about the value of having non-
Tibetans do the protesting, about the fact that "the Chinese behave very differently 
around Americans as opposed to other Asians." Although I was out of the country 
doing research in Switzerland when the event took place, I later heard the protest 
went off smoothly. 
27. In an article in the New York Times. Laurie Anderson is quoted as saying, "[ 
suppose the thing that attracts me the most to Buddhism is the sense of freedom and 
that's also why l'm an artist: it's one of the few things you can do where you're 
free. I particularly relate to the nonauthoritarian aspect of Tibetan Buddhism and 
the emphasis on the ability of every single person to become perfect" (Ehrlich 
1995). 
28. ln the brochure handed out at the 1990 New York conference, Tibet House's 
grassroots vision for the Year of Tibet is framed in Buddhist terms: 
The Plan 
Like a mandala of brilliantly colored grains of sand, the International 
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Year of Tibet will consist of thousands of events and programs 
around the world. each dedicated to Tibet and its survival. 
The success of this endeavor depends on the involvement of as many 
organizations. institutions and individuals as possible. We urge you 
to participate by initiating programs and activities dedicated to the 
International Year of Tibet. 
29. I should note. however. that the Dalai Lama·s representative to North America 
joined the board soon after Tibet House was founded and remained on it during the 
Year of Tibet. 
30. The hiring of a media strategist in 1991 was the culmination of a long-standing 
discussion within the Movement for a more sophisticated approach to representing 
the Tibet issue to the public. which included the Dalai Lama's visits to the U.S. See 
chapter 9 for a discussion of media coverage and the Tibet issue. 
31. Jane Kelly•s extensive experience with human rights groups and her work on 
campaigns such Amnesty•s rock and roll world tour gave her credibility in the eyes 
of Tibet activists. 
32. The intensity of the month deeply affected some people: I remember one friend 
asking me if I was "feeling depressed" when we met at yet another Tibet-related 
lecture in early November. I told her no. but that I felt tired. She said she felt 
"deflated" now that the blitz had ended. 
33. For studies dealing with museums as institutional articulations of power and 
knowledge relations, see Bennett 1988. Interesting edited volumes on museums 
include Karp and Lavine 1991; Karp. Kraemer. and Lavine 1992. o·Hanlon 1993 
provides an interesting case study of the collecting and exhibiting process from an 
anthropological perspective. 
34. Tburman·s description of compassion exemplifies his beatific Buddhist vision: 
It is all too often forgotten by students of the central way 
[Madhyamaka]. with their rigorous philosophical attention to 
metaphysical and epistemological questions. that. as Nagarjuna says. 
"emptiness is essentially compassion" ... Nagarjuna·s fundamental 
central way work is called Wisdom. and so he confines himself 
therein to the pathways of critical reason. At no moment. however. 
is he, or should the student. be unaware that wisdom is but the 
doorway for the energy of compassion. The razor-sharp sword of 
critical wisdom cuts through the fetters of conceptual excuses that 
obstruct the open dynamic flow of compassion, full sensitivity to the 
sufferings of other beings who are the fabric of relativity. and 
overflowing love that radiates happiness to them. once all self-
concern has melted in the bliss of self-fulfillment in the great 
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emptiness of selflessness. Wisdom smashes the hard atoms of 
intrinsic identities; compassion is the all-powerful energy released to 
reshape relativity into the gentle jewelline forms of pure lands of 
bliss (Thurman 1984: 171. cited in Samuel 1993:399). 
35. November 6. 1991. p. C23. 
36. November 10, 1991. p. 21. 
37. Samaya Foundation sponsored this first mandala and must credited with bringing 
over the monk-artist Lobsang Samten. Recently, Samaya sponsored a mandala 
project in the Watts section of Los Angeles. Called "Healing the Causes of 
Violence through An," the program was described as an attempt to teach the 
children compassion and respect. Instead of the deities normally depicted in such 
mandalas, the children placed the names of their "protectors," including Martin 
Luther King. Jr., Rosa Parks, Frida Kahlo, Spike Lee, and Malcolm X (Tricycle 
Winter 1994:98). 
This work by Samaya is a dramatic example of the potential flexibility of Tibetan 
Buddhism. which. however, does not go uncontested. Samaya has been criticized by 
some Tibetans and American Buddhists for taking this tantric form and 
recontextualizing it in distinctly non-religious venues. 
38. The cities in which mandalas have been created include San Francisco, Chicago. 
Providence, Ithaca, Miami. Houston. Buffalo, La Jolla. and St. Louis (to name just 
a few). Tibet House has been a co-sponsor (along with local institutions) for most 
of these productions. 
In more recent years mandalas also have been created in Europe and Australia (e.g 
Graz. Austria 1995 and Canberra 1994). 
39. In keeping with Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the monks would only engage in this son 
of activity if requested (e.g. they do not evangelize or proselytize). 
40. When I visited the Rhode Island School of Design in the spring of 1993, two monks 
were making a sand mandala at the school's museum. I spent some time in the 
room with them in order to see how they interacted with the visitors. It was 
towards the end of the day and the monks were not saying much. When I asked the 
person who was with me. who as it so happened had helped to organize the event, 
about the monks' silence. she said the monks had complained about how frustrating 
they found the constant interruptions of questions. Apparently no such boundaries 
had been established as in Chicago between q/a time and work-only, and the monks 
felt obliged to answer whatever questions were asked. 
41. For an analysis of a more overtly problematic form of cultural embodiment. see 
Rydell 1984 on American world fairs and the public display of non-white bodies. 
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42. During his doctoral research at a Tibetan monastery in south India. Lopez was 
struck by the powerful investment in the spoken word and the emphasis placed on 
hearing the words from the mouth of a teacher (1995b). He describes lung. a ritual 
in which one is granted permission to engage in a specific meditation or study a 
specific text through hearing the text read by a lama: "This hearing is accomplished 
through a form of speed-reading in which the lama races through the text at a pace 
that makes the apprenhension of any meaning nearly impossible. But grasping the 
meaning does not seem to be the point. it is rather that the student hear what the 
teacher heard from his teacher. who heard it from his teacher" (l995b:279). It is a 
Tibetan convention. he writes. that "to study a text. it is not sufficient merely to 
read it; one must receive oral instruction upon it from a teacher who has in tum 
received such instruction in the past" (ibid .• 279). 
43. In an article titled "The guru and the conjurer: Transactions in knowledge and the 
shaping of culture in Southeast Asia and Melanesia." ( 1990) anthropologist Frederik 
Barth discusses knowledge in Mahayana!fibetan Buddhism in Bhutan: 
In the Mahayana!fibetan monasticism practised in Bhutan. this 
highly individual path through study and meditation to salvation is 
bound into tight institutional regulation by a system controlling 
authorization: only senior lamas can give the wang 
empowerment/blessing that secures you merit from your studies; and 
only they provide the lung authorization and directives that open the 
path for learning. and should precede every phase of study. Thus all 
religious teaching, although it is based on sacred written texts, is 
regulated as a hierarchical process of handing knowledge down from 
individual Gurus to disciples. This order is embodied in the routines 
of teaching in every monastery: the Abbott lectures to the Head 
teachers. the Head teachers repeat and explain to the monks. the 
monks pass the message on to the monk pupils. For every segment 
of knowledge, the "lineage" of teachers who have passed it on must 
be recited and learned by the pupil, to legitimate the possession and 
vouch for the authenticity of the knowledge. ( 1990:646) 
Barth observes: "There is a breathtaking lesson here: whole. complex traditions of 
knowledge seem to be carried by single persons." He concludes by suggesting that 
only through the teaching activities of Gurus could such bodies of knowledge 
become encapsulated. individualized, and transportable. 
44. These feelings have occasionally been voiced in public by Tibetan activists. For 
instance, comments made at a Tibet support conference in 1993 by a former director 
and leading member of TIP A encapsulate the frustration many Tibetans have 
expressed over the lack of support given to lay cultural organizations by the 
government-in-exile: 
When Tibetans first came into exile, my parents put me in Tibetan 
Children's Village. And from the Tibetan Children's Village. eight 
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boys and eight girls were selected to go to this institute better known 
as Tibetan Music. Dance and Drama Society. it is now known as the 
Tibetan Institute for Performing Arts or TIPA. Since nine, all we 
did basically was to learn Tibetan music. dance and drama, from 
eight in the morning until ten in the evening. That's all we did ... We 
never had the opportunity to build a school... Over the years within 
the Tibetan community. there·s been a lack of support and I'll tell 
you why. The Institute gets members who couldn•t get into TCV 
(Tibetan Children·s Village), ones that were left over were sent to 
TIPA. We always felt that we were somehow low in the eyes of the 
community, we were not put on the same level as the other aspects 
of Tibetan culture. 
But throughout the years. TIPA bas done a lot of good things. For 
example, in India now, you will find dance organizations in Tibetan 
schools at various settlements because we were able to send teachers 
to TIPA. TIPA has also travelled very extensively throughout the 
world. It showed the world that Tibetans have a very unique 
culture, very different from the Chinese. I think in terms of the 
awareness of the Tibetan situation. our organization has done a 
tremendous job . 
... We always felt that somehow the Tibetan administration-in-exile 
did not really think it was important enough to really look after some 
very talented people. On several OQ;asions we tried to request it. 
We said "look. these people are important resources, it's important 
that we give them some sort of recognition." but still I found there 
was a lack of consideration and interest in really trying to sustain 
TIPA. 
So I'd like to take this opportunity to say to those who have been 
supporting the Tibetan cause for a long time, please take a special 
interest in this institute which I think is very important and needs 
support. not only from Tibetans but also Tibetan supporters. 
The various controversies in which TIP A has found itself embroiled over the years 
(e.g. Calkowski 1991; 1995; see also J. Norbu 1989 and Nowak 1984) are 
emblematic of ongoing tensions between lay and religious segments of exile society. 
45. At the post-Year of Tibet meeting in December 1991, a Tibet House staff member 
acknowledged the prevailing attitude towards Tibet House's emphasis on monks in 
her reply to a question about whether the organization planned to continue its focus 
on monks: 
The monks are doing very well on their own; we are thinking of 
focusing on a different sector of the Tibetan population in exile; we 
hope to work now with artists ... 
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46. Why did the monks comply with this request? Their willingness to chant "om" for 
their American audience reflects a fundamentally important aspect of Tibetan 
Buddhism: a recognition that different practices are considered appropriate to 
different persons at different stages of the path. depending on one·s motivation and 
level of understanding. That is. the monks' seeming flexibility stems from their 
training in an open-ended system in which teachers are expected to interpret their 
students' spiritual needs and respond accordingly. Despite the fact that the request 
did not come from a Buddhist practitioner (the person was apparently engaging in 
some other hybrid form of spiritual practice). I would expect the monks could easily 
justify chanting the phrase if they believed it would bring the person some spiritual 
benefit. 
47. Like the tantric imagery discussed earlier. the public performances of sand mandala 
rituals are not believed to reveal secret information to the uninitiated. 
48. Interestingly. the first mandala made at the American Museum of Natural History in 
New York City in the summer of 1988 was described by organizer Barry Bryant as 
a "demonstration." As such. the entire process was videotaped by three broadcast 
quality video cameras by Bryant's Samaya Foundation. 
49. One of the contradictions raised by this framing of the exhibition and mandala is that 
if we define "ritual" as a category of activity whose intention is to transform willing 
participants. how can viewers/participants be transformed by something they do not 
fully understand? How can they have a spiritual experience if they do not know 
how to interpret the complex symbols and iconography of the mandala or the "art" 
on the walls? 
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Chapter 9 The Occidental Buddhist 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I described the "narrative of Tibetanness" formulated by the 
Dalai Lama which equates the Tibet issue with the preservation of Tibetan 
Buddhism. l argued that attempts to transform Western audiences into political 
supponers through a demonstration of the value of Tibetan culture represent an 
elaboration on the traditional Tibetan mode of engaging outsiders and securing 
protection based on a recognition of Buddhism's magical and mystical powers. 
This section focuses on what is perhaps the paradigmatic example of this strategy--
the Kalachakra initiation given by the Dalai Lama in New York City. Despite the 
fact that the "Wisdom and Compassion" show and the sand mandala exhibition at 
the lBM Gallery were framed as potential spiritual experiences, for mosl ordinary 
viewers who could not understand the show's complex iconography and the 
mandala's esoteric symbols, they offered primarily aesthetic experiences. Across 
town, however, at the Paramount Theater in Madison Square Garden, New 
Yorkers were offered a direct experience of tantric practice via the Kalachakra 
initiation and other Buddhist teachings preceding it-e.g., the "Nature of Mind"' 
and "Path of Compassion"2 teachings. (Whether or not participants understood 
tantric practice any better than the exhibition and mandala is discussed below.) 
In keeping with my interest in the social processes through which the Year 
of Tibet was co-produced, my analysis focuses on several examples of thorny 
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issues which organizers of the ritual had to negotiate. issues which ranged from 
questions of sponsorship to disagreement over how co frame the initiation for a 
non-Buddhist public to conflict over the actual staging of the initiation. 3 The 
tensions which arose around these issues reveal the contested processes through 
which religious practice became a field of political action during the Year of Tiber. 
ln chapter 8. [ introduced several of the prominent actors involved in the 
Year of Tibet. including its "visionary," Richard Gere; the media consultant hired 
by Gere ("Jane Kelly"); the executive director of Tibet House; Lobsang Samten. a 
monk from Namgyal Monastery who has been involved in making sandpaintings in 
the U.S.; and Livet Reichart, the public relations firm hired by Gere at the last 
minute. Along with these individuals and organizations, other key players involved 
in producing the initiation include Jean and Frances Paone, the American Buddhist 
couple hired by Gere to organize all the religious teachings, including the 
Kalachakra; Khyongla Rato Rinpoche, a Tibetan lama whose Manhattan-based 
Buddhist organization, Tibet Center, was the Kalachakra's official sponsor; 
Tibetans employees of various Tibet support organizations in New York City who 
shall remain unnamed; and Tashi, the Dalai Lama's ritual master from Namgyal 
monastery who was the head of the "advance team" of monks sent over from 
Dharamsala to oversee preparations for the initiation. By exploring what was at 
stake for these actors (whether institutional or individual) in producing and 
performing (or protesting) the event, I emphasize the internal diversity of the Tibet 
Movement as well as its fluid and ambiguous organization. 
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Backstage politics 
Richard Gere's desire to "blitz" New York City with "Tibetan spiritual energy" 
came true in October 1991. All told. Tibet Center sponsored fifteen days of 
teachings and initiations by the Dalai Lama and high lamas from the five Buddhist 
and Bon lineages." Though each of the events went off smoothly and was 
generally well-attended (the Kalachakra attracted between 3,200 and 3,300 people: 
the "Path of Compassion" several hundred less). things were less smooth behind 
the scenes. 
Part of Richard Gere's vision of the Year of Tibet was to have the Dalai 
Lama give a Kalachakra initiation under Tibet House auspices. But when he took 
the issue to his organization's board of directors, his idea met with a great deal of 
resistance. After much discussion the board decided that Tibet House's goals were 
more "cultural" than "religious" and that it did not want to move in the direction 
of sponsoring religious teachings, especially not ones which would be so 
expensive. At the time, Tibet House was losing money and the board feared that 
Gere would not come through on his promise to cover the cost. 
Tibet House's board members were not the only ones who were wary of the 
Kalachakra; the Dalai Lama himself reportedly told Gere that he was reluctant to 
give the Kalachakra in New York City during the Year of Tibet. The Tibetan 
leader offered to give a "serious Buddhist teaching" instead, as one insider 
recalled, but Gere "was just determined, it was his thing, he felt that "Wisdom and 
Compassion" and the Year of Tibet were all happening without him. he wanted his 
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thing. and the only thing he could find was the Kalachakra." After some more 
back and forth between New York and India. the Dalai Lama finally relented and 
agreed co Gere's request. Why did the Tibetan leader acquiesce? The most 
obvious reason relates to Gere's role as a major patron to the Tibetan exile 
community. Indeed. the Hollywood actor is a big sbyin-bdag who has given far 
more money co the Tibet Movement than almost anyone else. Given this fact. it 
would have been extremely difficult for the Dalai Lama as the symbolic recipient 
of these donations and as one of Gere's spiritual teachers to refuse a request from 
such a prominent patron and student. As one American activist rather crudely 
characterized the situation, "Richard had them by the balls. he still does ... " 
Meanwhile. in response to Tibet House's reluctance to sponsor a 
Kalachakra initiation, Gere took the project to Tibet Center. A Buddhist 
medication and study center located in Tribeca, Tibet Center is headed by 
Khyongla Rato Rinpoche. a reincarnate lama originally from Kham who came to 
New York in the 1960s.5 Rato Rinpoche agreed to Gere's proposal that Tibet 
Center become the official organiz.ational sponsor of the Kalachakra. Sponsorship 
of religious personages or teachings is a social act as well a spiritually meritorious 
one. Therefore it was probably not hard for Gere to persuade Rato Rinpoche to 
cake on this responsibility, especially given that Gere offered to finance the event. 
Following Tibetan tradition. during the actual events, Gere and Rato Rinpoche got 
co offer kata {prayer scarves) and do their prostrations first-visible signs of their 
high donor status. 6 
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Upon hearing that a tancric initiation was scheduled to take place in October 
in Manhattan, several so-called "advisors" to the Tibetan government-in-exile. all 
of them Westerners, attempted to pressure organizers into cancelling the event. 7 
ln an interview, Jean Paone recalled that 
their main argument was that he [the Dalai Lama) would be too 
visible, that it is not in His Holiness' interests to be seen as a 
spiritual leader, as a religious person, that it would jeopardize his 
credibility as a political leader on the world stage, and couldn't we 
do this somewhere out in the country someplace. 
This effect might be further exaggerated, the "advisors" argued, by the fact that 
the initiation was scheduled to coincide with the opening of the UN General 
Assembly. Comparing the Tibetan leader to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, they cold 
the Paones, 
... although Desmond Tutu is a religious figure, you would never 
seem him doing a religious service. His basic persona is political. 
You never see him in a wierd hat or carrying a staff or doing 
anything strange. 
In arguing against the advisors, Jean Paone pointed out: 
His Holiness is a force, you can't calculate him like you can some 
Republican or Democratic candidate. His Holiness has good 
instincts, shall we say [laughing] so if His Holiness thinks it is a 
good thing to come to the city and do a spiritual ceremony, l'm not 
going to argue with him. 
The Paones and the Dalai Lama's "advisors" represent two poles of a continuum of 
commitment within the Movement that ranges from an almost exclusive interest in 
Tibetan Buddhism to an equally exclusive political interest in the situation in Tibet. 
The tensions around the Kalachakra explored in this chapter reflect the ongoing 
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tension between these two orientations-dharma and political-within activist 
circles. 
The other division within the Movement which my analysis considers is that 
between Tibetans and Westerners. Despite the fact that the Tibet Movement is a 
uniquely successful global multicultural coalition, the relationship between Tibetans 
and their Western supporters is nevertheless fraught with complexities and 
contradictions that have co be constantly negotiated. By examining the problems 
which arose during the planning and staging of the Kalachakra, [ hope co shed light 
on some of the structural tensions and limitations of this interculcural alliance. 8 
Seeing that the Paones remained undeterred by their political arguments for 
not holding a Kalachakra in Manhattan, the "advisors" then "went over their 
head," as Frances put it, and attempted to persuade the Tibetan foreign miniscer-in-
exile to intervene.9 While the foreign minister, Tashi Wangdi, did not cry to 
block the Kalachakra, he and many other Tibetans did have reservations about 
holding a tantric initiation in Manhattan during the Year of Tibet, though as we 
shall see, Tibetans' concerns revolved more around the Dalai Lama and questions 
of propriety than the political implications of such an event. According to one 
activist, they felt "embarrassed to have His Holiness in Madison Square Garden in 
New York ... it was offensive to them." When [asked the Paones for their reaction 
co Tibetan concerns about the Manhattan venue, they told me they had received 
similar criticism two years earlier when they produced a Kalachakra initiation in 
Los Angeles. At that time, the couple was criticized for organizing the teaching in 
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the Sama Monica Civic Auditorium, a space where rock and roll bands play 
regularly (including Bob Dylan, who played a few days before the initiation and 
whose name was still on the marquee when Tibetans began arriving in town for the 
initiation). In addition to questioning the appropriateness of the venue, lay 
Tibetans from the Los Angeles Tibetan community challenged the Paones' ability 
to handle the Dalai Lama properly, reprimanding them, for instance, for failing to 
provide hot water for the Tibetan leader at his "birthday celebration" which took 
place prior to the teachings. To the Tibetans, Frances noted, "this was a major 
transgression." 
Anticipating criticism of Madison Square Garden as a venue. Jean 
summarized her view of the issue in characteristic Buddhist terms: 
We knew from our experience in the Civic [in Santa Monica] that 
His Holiness transforms the environment. It's not like you have to 
present him with a pure land, he creates it. And it is the essence of 
His Holiness' thing ... taking a space that's used for even something 
as gross as boxing and making it into an arena where where deities 
come down ... 
The debate outlined above reveals the different stakes various actors had in the 
initiation. For Buddhists like Jean and Frances Paone, the initiation represented a 
spiritual opportunity; for some others, particularly the self-designated American 
"advisors" to the Dalai Lama, the initiation represented a potential obstacle to the 
realization of the Movement's larger political goals. In contrast, Tibetan concerns 
over the initiation centered on how the Dalai Lama would be treated by organizers 
as well as how he would be represented to and perceived by the public and the 
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press. 
ln order to understand these concerns. it is necessary to remember the 
incense feelings Tibetans have for the Dalai Lama. Tibetans believe there is much 
spiritual benefit to be gained by being near the Dalai Lama. lndeed. his very 
presence is why so many refugees have settled in Dharamsala. Even better than 
living near him, however, is to have some form of physical contact with him, e.g .. 
through presentation of an offering scarf. (This is why, for instance, escapees 
from Tibet always go first to Dharamsala before doing anything else; as new 
arrivals, they are assured a personal audience and blessing from the Dalai Lama). 
The highest form of contact comes from being present at an initiation given by the 
Dalai Lama, such as the Kalachakra, where he "empowers" one to do certain 
practices associated with the Kalachakra tantra. Empowerment establishes a strong 
bond of attachment to him as one's "root guru" (rtsa-ba'i lama). Given the strong 
religious sentiment which surrounds the Dalai Lama under normal circumstances, it 
is not surprising that tantric initiations, which are, after all, important arenas for 
the construction and display of the Dalai Lama's spiritual authority, are often sites 
of internal struggle. [ return to this point below in my discussion of the staging of 
the initiation. Here [ simply suggest that to have an initiation organized largely by 
non-Tibetans only heightens anxieties which Tibetans may already feel over how 
the event "should" be handled and how the object of their devotion should be 
treated. 
The various concerns which emerged around the decision to have an 
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initiation in the heart of Manhattan reveal significant divisions among Tibet 
activists over the role of tantric practice in political mobilization. At the same 
time. they underscore the ambivalence many Tibetans feel about the 
recontexrualization of Tibetan Buddhist culture in novel arenas. 
Framing the Kalachakra 
Once plans to hold the Kalachakra initiation were finalized. organizers had co 
decide how to frame the event in the context of the Year of Tibet. In the past. 
Kalachakra initiations in the U.S. (in 1981 in Madison. Wisconsin; in 1989 in 
Santa Monica, California) had been advertised only within American Buddhist and 
Tibetan circles where presumably people understood what they meant. In this 
instance, however. the Paones were faced with the challenging task of representing 
a tantric initiation for a primarily non-Buddhist audience. 
In deciding how to frame the Kalachakra, Jean and Frances Paone worked 
closely with Jane Kelly. who, as I mentioned in chapter 8. had been hired to 
handle publicity for all the programs in October. One of the first things Kelly did 
when she started working for Tibet House was to meet with representatives from 
Tibet House. Tibet Center. Tibet Fund. International Campaign for Tibet, and the 
Dalai Lama's representative to North America. The purpose of the meeting, 
Frances Paone recalled, was to get 
a good idea of all the elements involved in the Tibet Movement and 
where it is going and how to move it along-what our real objectives 
were for the Year of Tibet ... 
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Although no objectives were formulated (see chapter 10), the meeting gave Kelly a 
sense of the activists' various perspectives. In the weeks that followed, she made 
an effort to take the Tibetan leaders' concerns into account by consulting with them 
regularly. Her task was made easier by the fact that she worked in the same 
building with several Tibetan-run organizations: during my time as a volunteer at 
Tibet House, I often saw Kelly talking with the Dalai Lama's representative or 
getting help from the Columbia University-trained Tibetan "press officer" for the 
government-in-exile-both of whose offices were on the second floor. 
Through these regular consultations, Kelly decided on a media strategy 
which would attempt to tie Tibetan culture, politics, and religion together. 
Although she was concerned with representing the Dalai Lama as a serious 
political leader, she was reluctant (as some advised) to paper over the Dalai 
Lama's role as a global spiritual figure. Recognizing the Dalai Lama's spirituality 
as the basis of his moral authority within the exile community and Tibet itself as 
well as with his non-Tibetan followers around the world, Kelly adopted a strategy 
which acknowledged the Dalai Lama's dual status as statesman and monk and 
emphasized Tibet's "unique culture and history." In a letter to a radio producer, 
she wrote: 
On the one hand, the Dalai Lama meets presidents and addresses the 
Congress of the United States and the Parliament of Lithuania. On 
the other hand, he is a Buddhist teacher. You will hear the teacher 
at the public talk at the Paramount, Madison Square Garden, and the 
Path of Compassion teachings and the Kalachakra initiation for 
students of Buddhism. 
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By framing the Tibetan leader in this way. Kelly sought to improve on how the 
media generally represents him (see discussion in chapter 10 on framing the Dalai 
Lama). 
In any event, Kelly's job became much more complicated after Richard 
Gere hired a public relations firm, Livet Reichan. to handle the Kalachakra 
initiation as a separate event three weeks before it was scheduled to cake place. 
Although Jean and Frances Paone had already begun working with Kelly on media 
strategy for the Kalachakra. at this point they switched and started working with 
the new firm. When I asked Tibet House's executive director why Gere had 
decided to hire Livet Reichan so late in the day. she explained: 
At one point Richard panicked, he put in a hell of a lot of money 
and they'd only sold one third of the seats and he said, we need 
more pre-event publicity. Jane Kelly isn't getting it, I need 
somebody who is going to go to the Post, to the shitty newspapers, 
and get publicity. So he brought in Livet Reichan, who, of course, 
thought they were going to be able to monopolize everything .. .Jane 
had begun all the processes, it was all ready to happen. but Richard 
didn't have the patience to wait. 
Best known for its celebrity clients and an-world connections, Livet Reichan took 
a markedly different approach to the handling the Kalachakra, as we shall see. 
After hiring Livet Reichart, Gere arranged for a meeting between Ann Livet 
(co-founder and head) and several other Livet Reichan employees, Jane Kelly, and 
Tibet House staff. One of the purposes of meeting was to communicate the 
complexity of the Tibet issue and Tibetan sensitivities regarding the Dalai Lama co 
Livet Reichart. As one Tibet House staff member recalls, at one point during the 
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meeting, Liver Reichart's manager told Kelly, "[ have total respect for what you 
are doing but my client is Richard, and l'm going to do what Richard says and l'm 
going co push Richard forward." Jane Kelly replied that she would do her best co 
serve Tibet House's interests, which by definition meant the Dalai Lama's 
interests. As the executive director recalled 
Jane thought that the media should focus on different aspects, not on 
Richard and how he loves Tibet and his career and so on, which is 
obviously the way we were going to get more press but Jane thought 
it was the wrong type of press ... 
After this meeting, Liver Reichart never sought approval of their plans from Kelly. 
Tibet House staff, nor any Tibetans. [remember one day when someone from 
Liver Reichart called Tibet House asking for photographs for their press kit. After 
hanging up the phone, the director told those of us in the room, including Jane 
Kelly, with evident frustration that Livet Reichart was doing its own 
"comprehensive press kit." This meant not only were their employees duplicating 
Kelly's work (she had worked closely with the Tibetan press officer co put together 
a Year of Tibet press kit), they were obviously going co frame the Kalachakra 
initiation in their own way. This and other similar incidents contributed co the 
mounting tension between Livet Reichart and Tibet House/Jane Kelly. 
Because they were hired to publicize the Kalachakra, that is precisely what 
Livet Reichart did. Following Rato Rinpoche's desire to "blow out" the 
Kalachakra over the other teachings by the Dalai Lama and other lineage 
representatives, 10 the firm designed a publicity campaign which described the 
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event as the "Kalachakra for World Peace." The half and full-page print ads 
which appeared in the New York Times and the Villa&e Voice (see Figure 15) read 
as follows: 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama will confer the highest and most 
profound teaching of Tiber.an Buddhism--the Kalachakra. And for 
the first time in the West. senior representatives from all Tibetan 
religious traditions will be in one place at one time to offer teachings 
for world peace. Practitioners and non-practitioners are welcome. 
Although the ads were designed professionally (and approved by the Paones). when 
they began to appear. Kelly and many Tibet.ans got upset. Kelly had decided 
previously not to advertise the Kalachakra in the newspaper, preferring to highlight 
the Tibet.an leaders· less esoteric programs-including an ecumenical service at the 
Cathedral of St. John the Divine--instead. As we shall see in the next chapter. she 
felt the advertisements worked against the impression she was trying to create of 
the Tibetan leader as a world spiritual leader and statesman; by inviting non-
Buddhists to attend. she felt the Tibetan leader might appear to be proseltyzing 
which would send a conflicting message to the media. 
Many of the New York Tibet.ans I spoke to also disapproved of the ads 
though for very different reasons. In addition to feeling that the ads were in poor 
taste (especially the use of an old photograph of the Dalai Lama), the Tiber.an 
community worried that the ads made the Kalachakra appear to be a sort of "show" 
starring the Dalai Lama. These concerns were exemplified by the comment of a 
Tibetan man that 
the teachings are not a show. and while the Dalai Lama has to 
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operate within this environment, here it's something that is raken out 
of a cultural context and put in something totally alien ... for Tibetans 
in India or Tibet, if a lama gives a teaching. that teaching is viewed 
in the same way as the teacher views the teaching which is 
something very religious, it's not just something Hollywood. Some 
Americans think the Dalai Lama comes and for them it is a show, 
and the Dalai Lama is nothing other than a Hollywood actor doing 
his piece and leaving the stage. But for a Tibetan, he's not an actor. 
he's trying to help you attain enlightenment. 
Tibetan anxieties about the way in which American audiences perceived the Dalai 
Lama were further heightened when Livet Reichart began planting stories and 
photographs linking Richard Gere to the Dalai Lama in newspapers and magazines. 
For example, in the October 10, 1991 "Chronicle" column of the New York 
Times, Nadine Brozan wrote a piece titled: "Richard Gere follows the Dalai 
Lama." The story quoted Gere as saying, "I have been planning this for four 
years ... it took years to get Tibet House going and the last year to crank up for the 
Year of Tibet, and now it's a 20-hour-a-day gig." On that same day, William 
Norwich wrote a piece about the Dalai Lama in the New York Post, noting "where 
goes the Dalai Lama these days so goes Richard Gere ... and the actor's significant 
other, Cindy Crawford" (1991: 12). Stressing the celebrity-appeal of the Dalai 
Lama, the article named a number of famous artists and society figures who 
planned to attend Year of Tibet events in New York. Around the same time, an 
article appeared in another newspaper gossip column which mentioned the legal 
feud between John Avedon (son of photographer Richard Avedon) and his former 
wife, Elizabeth, who had left her husband for Richard Gere a few years earlier. 
The article mentioned that all three were followers of the Dalai Lama and were 
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involved with Tibet House. Deeply offended. one Tibetan complained: "to put the 
Dalai Lama in the center of that story is disgusting." Other Livet Reichart-
generated stories included: "Dalai High: Richard Gere's intoxicant of choice is 
Tibet" in Women's Wear Daily (Ryan 1991:7); "Gere-ing Up for the Guru" in 
New York Live (Hays 1991); and "Tibet Festival in High Gere," New York Post 
(Farolino 1991). See Figures 16-22. 
Sometime after the Year of Tibet ended, I asked one of the Tibetans 
working at Tibet House what she thought about the job Livet Reichart did in 
promoting the Tibet issue. She replied: 
They are special events people. They should be promoting parties 
and gallery openings, I don't really think it is appropriate to bring 
people like that in, to promote something of substance and of a 
serious nature like the Tibet issue ... Richard brought them in because 
he felt they needed more fluff. 
The only good thing about the firm, she added, was that they managed to "make 
sure Bianca Jagger showed up at the Tibet Film Festival and you need that son of 
stuff." 
Tibetan concerns about how the Kalachakra and the Dalai Lama were 
represented by Livet Reichart highlight one of the problems associated with the 
"culture strategy." most obviously the fact that meanings of these productions often 
escape the circuits of their intention. That is, once you decide to objectify culture 
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Tibetan concerns about how the Dalai Lama and the Kalachakra were represented 
to and interpreted by Western audiences point to an ambivalence about the 
recontextualization of Tibetan Buddhist culture. Tibetans were not the only ones 
worried about how the initiation would be read in the West; many serious 
Buddhists. including the Paones and a New York-based Tibetan monk, expressed 
their concern as well. Myers' discussion of the "unsettled nature" of the 
sandpainting performance at the Asia Society by Aboriginal artists (see chapter 8) 
is relevant to understanding the issues which arose around the Kalachakra 
initiation. For instance. Myers' observation that for both participants and their 
audience. the staging of the sandpainting in a new context "is fraught with 
difficulties" in that neither the rules of production nor reception are established. is 
useful in helping us think about the Kalachakra. Despite the fact that the basic 
snucture of the initiation always remains unchanged regardless of where it is 
conferred. the rules for its production and reception are not necessarily clearly 
understood when the event takes place in novel arenas. This was certainly the case 
for the Kalachakra in Madison Square Garden which attracted large numbers of 
non-Buddhists, most of whom had little idea what the initiation actually was. This 
section explores organizers' ambivalence about the presence of so many non-
Buddhists and how they negotiated framing the Kalachakra for an audience whose 
understandings varied so widely. To grasp the organizers' concerns about the 
Kalachakra, however, it is necessary to outline briefly its unique role in tantric 
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practice. 
Samuel identifies the key aspect of tantric practice as "interaction with. and 
in more advanced stages. self-identification with various visualized divine forms 
(tantric deities. or yi-dam). This is combined with practices involving the 
manipulation of subtle "energy" within the body" (1993:204). Before students can 
perform tantric practice, however, they have to receive the appropriate 
"empowerments" in which the student is introduced to the tantric deities and to the 
mandala. or divine palace. within which they reside (ibid., 205). These practices. 
known as "deity yoga" form the heart of tantric or Vajrayana Buddhism. 11 
Empowerment into a particular tantra occurs through an initiation. Cozon 
defines initiations as rituals involving 
extensive visualization, prayers, offerings, and the use of ritual 
implements and substances, its purpose being to purify defilements, 
to confer upon initiates permission to practice the tantra, to teach 
them the procedure of the stages of practice, and to establish in them 
potencies for successful practice. (1986:34) 
During the initiation process, the lama takes on the identity of the tantric deity in 
order to empower students so that they can subsequently perform the practice and 
themselves identify with the deity (Samuel 1993:244). Through a series of formal 
"consecrations," the lama's power and blessing (chinlab) is transferred to the 
student (Samuel 1993:244). In Anuttara Yoga Tantra, the highest of the four 
classes of tantra, there are two stages--generation and completion. Both are 
concerned with the transformation of one's mind and body into the mind and body 
of a Buddha. In generation stage practices, one "generates a vivid imaginative 
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visualization of one's transformation into a deity"; then completion stage practices 
"complete" the transformation "by actually bringing about a new physical 
structure, that is, by transforming one into an actual deity, a Buddha" (Cozort 
1986:27). 12 As part of the empowerment, students undertake to observe a series 
of vows. According to Samuel, practitioners are expected to have already taken 
the Pratimoksa vows 13 and the bodhicitta vows 14 before receiving a tantric 
empowerment (1993:205). 
Tibetans believe the tantric methods of Vajrayana Buddhism offer the 
possibility of a more rapid attainment of enlightenment, perhaps within a single 
lifetime, rather than at the end of a long sequence of lives. Samuel writes, "for 
the Tibetans, this is an often-repeated message; tantra is much faster than other 
forms of practice ... tantric practice, however, is "difficult" and is also "dangerous." 
especially if undertaken without the proper preparation or without a competent 
guru" (ibid., 204). Proper preparation means an adequate understanding of the 
concept of emptiness (silnyatii.) or at least inferent understanding of constructedness 
of all identity and perception. This safeguards an individual against getting carried 
away with actually thinking he or she is a deity. 
While tantric practice continues to be a crucial part of monastic training in 
most of the re-established monasteries in India and Nepal, in recent years tantric 
ritual has emerged as a primary site for the transmission of Buddhism to the West. 
Ordinarily, because the tantras involve advanced practices for the transformation of 
consciousness, initiation into these practices is restricted to qualified students and is 
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performed privately in the monasteries, and in the West, in meditation and retreat 
centers. However this is not the case for the Kalachakra tantra where initiations 
are given to the general public. 
According to Geshe Lhundub Sopa, the Kalachakra, or "wheel of time." 
plays a unique and paradoxical role in Tibetan Buddhism. As the Tibetan 
scholar/lama writes, 
On the one hand, most Buddhists believe it to represent the very 
pinnacle of Buddhist esoterism. The Kalachakra presents the 
Buddha's most profound and complex statement on matters both 
worldly and religious, and its intricacies have placed it beyond the 
ken of all but a specialized few scholars and practitioners who can 
master it only by understanding a vast range of traditional ideas. On 
the other hand, initiations into the meditational practices of 
Kalachakra are the only Anuttara Yoga tantra initiations that are 
offered to the general public. (Sopa, Jackson, and Newman 1985 :91) 
The reason the Kalachakra is given openly has to do with its eschatology; it is 
associated with the mythical realm of Shambhala, a "pure land" whose inhabitants 
live by the non-violent precepts of Buddhism. According to prophecy, 
a time will come in the not-tOCKlistant future when barbaric forces 
threaten to destroy all forms of civilization. Then, Raudra Cakri, 
the 25th king of Shambhala. will emerge to defeat them in a gigantic 
armageddon. This event will mark the transition from the end of 
our current "degenerate age" (kaliyuga) to a new age, which will 
begin with a revival of Buddhism and a period of peaceful co-
existence among nations ... (Brentano 1993: 15) 
For this reason, the Kalachakra is associated with harmony among people and 
world peace. (As we saw above, the 1991 initiation was framed as a "Kalachakra 
for World Peace"; I discuss some of the political implications of this framing 
below.) 
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Since 1981. the Dalai Lama has given the initiation numerous times. In his 
introductory essay to the Kalachakra "program" handed out at the 1991 
empowerment in New York, Rato Rinpoche wrote. 
On one occasion, when His Holiness was in Dharamsala and making 
preparations to confer the initiation, he had a dream in which 
goddesses appeared entreating him to spread the Kalachakra 
teachings widely. In response. he has conferred this initiation more 
frequently than any of his predecessors, travelling far to accomplish 
this. He conferred the initiation in 1981 in Madison, Wisconsin; in 
1985 in Rikon, Switzerland and in Bodhgaya, India; in 1989 in Los 
Angeles, California; and in 1990 in Sarnath, India. 
According to Sopa, presence at a Kalachakra initiation, whose blessings are 
believed to help one be reborn in Shambhala in the future, is considered highly 
auspicious: "Such initiations, particularly when offered by a Dalai Lama. usually 
are attended by thousands of the faithful" (Sopa, Jackson, and Newman 1985:91). 
This point is underscored by Sogyal Rinpoche in the Kalachakra "program": 15 
ln a world where change of all kinds is occurring at a dramatic pace. 
the holding of the Kalachakra Initiation for World Peace in New 
York City, along with a gathering together of all the great Tibetan 
traditions, is an event of great significance. What a blessing it is to 
receive this empowerment and these teachings from His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama himself; in Tibet, to receive this initiation from him 
would have been the life-long wish of everyone. 
Despite the Tibetan tradition of giving the initiation to large crowds, Jean and 
Frances Paone worried about "blowing out" the Kalachakra and using Livet 
Reichart's public relations skills to fill seats because it meant a much larger 
number of non-Buddhists would be present at the initiation than would otherwise 
have been the case. These concerns were underscored by the numerous phone 
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calls after advertisemenrs appeared in newspapers for the event, most of which 
were from confused or curious New Yorkers asking "what is it?" Sometimes. 
Frances said, he tried to explain over the phone that you don't find out what the 
initiation entails until you receive it: "I went through the Tibetan method of 
training or at least what I've been exposed to, that is, you get the initiation first 
and then you find out what you've gotten yourself into afterwards." 
Given the secret nature of tantric teachings and the belief that keeping the 
pledges and vows one takes during an initiation is extremely important. Jean and 
Frances initially felt ambivalent about the presence of non-Buddhists at the 
Kalachakra, many of whom obviously would not realize the significance of the 
commitmenrs to practice their participation might produce. Eventually, however. 
they decided that it was better to encourage people to attend so they might "get the 
blessing on whatever level they could rather than discourage them because they 
were not Buddhist." To ensure that these individuals understood the implications 
of their presence at the Kalachakra, Jean and Frances made sure the flyer 
announcing the event contained a clear description of the motivation required for 
attendance. It read: 
Although the Kalachakra Tantra is meant for practitioners of the 
highest faculty, it also has a special connection with all the people of 
this planet. For that reason, the initiation is traditionally given 
openly, giving ordinary people the opportunity to establish a karmic 
link with Kalachakra. His Holiness has explained that the initiation 
is a powerful force for the realization of world peace. 
Of those who wish to receive the initiation for practice, the 
best disciples have the actual experience of bodhicitta and emptiness; 
the medium-level disciples have at least a slight experience of 
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bodhicitta in meditation and a correct understanding of reality from 
study and reasoning; the lowest-level disciples should have at least 
an intense appreciation for and interest in developing bodhicitta and 
understanding the true nature of reality. 
Those who wish to receive the initiation as a blessing, to 
establish a karmic relationship with Kalachakra, may anend. The 
initiation can be conferred on this basis to those who sincerely 
appreciate the opportunity. 
According to the flyer, "teachings are given prior to tantric initiations such as the 
Kalachakra to develop the prerequisite qualities of bodhicitta, or the wish to 
become enlightened for the sake of others, and the understanding of the true nature 
of reality" (see Figure 23). Thus another way in which the Paones tried co make 
sure non-Buddhists had the correct motivation vis a vis the Kalachakra was to 
encourage them to anend the "Path of Compassion" teachings which preceded the 
Kalachakra so that they could see "if they had any connection, if it sparked 
anything inside them to really continue." As Frances recalls, "We felt that if they 
came to the "Path of Compassion" and sat there for two days or a day and felt that 
there was some connection, then they should certainly come to the Kalachakra." 
Lobsang Samten, one of the monks responsible for creating a sand mandala 
at the IBM Gallery, shared the Paones' concerns. In an interview with Robyn 
Brentano, he revealed his own ambivalence about the transmission of tantric 
practice to the uninitiated: 
Both Tibetans and Westerners lack a basic foundation of 
understanding tantric practice, and they just take initiations without 
knowing what the commitments are; they then realize after having 
done it that they can't keep up with the difficulties of daily practice, 
i.e. reciting mantras. The initiation should be taken because of a 
desire for practice, not just for meeting His Holiness or taking the 
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Tibetans believe that to take an initiation and not do the practice shortens the life 
of the lama who gives the initiation (e.g "hurts their karma"). In the case of the 
Kalachakra, however, because the Dalai Lama usually explains to the audience that 
those who are not prepared to do the practices should not participate in 
visualizations and take the vows during the empowerment, it is believed to be less 
of a problem. During the "Path of Compassion" teachings. which were geared 
coward helping the audience to generate "bodhicitta," the Dalai Lama specifically 
addressed the non-Buddhists in the auditorium, telling them they did not have co 
take the pledge to •enhance generated bodhicitta mind" but instead should just cry 
co "generate admiration for a good heart and kindness and say prayers. "17 
Another danger of transmitting tantra to the uninitiated, Samten told 
Brentano. is that teachers and students will not "examine" one another long enough 
before engaging in tantric practice. In the past, he noted, once a connection was 
made between a teacher and student, it usually took an average of twelve years of 
examination of one another before the giving and receiving of tantric initiations. 
During this time teacher and student would get to know and build their trust in one 
another. 18 As Roger Jackson has observed 
Successful tantric practice--far more than other Buddhist practices--
requires a very close working relationship between disciple and 
master. A tantric master must be both knowledgeable and skillful in 
the various meditative techniques, and must be sensitive to the 
various problems the disciple may encounter. A tantric disciple 
must be confident of the master's qualifications, and unquestioning 
in the fulfillment of the instructions that the master has given-for 
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the subtlety and danger of tantra is such that capriciousness or 
disobedience can lead to dire results. (Sopa. Jackson, and Newman 
1985:21) 
"Nowadays," Samten lamented, "we are not examined by anyone. we just saw the 
flyer and we go there and take the initiation. "19 
Sam ten's concern was brought home to me during the Kalachakra when an 
American man sitting in the row ahead of me began to act bizarrely. l had seen 
this person before at many Tibet-related events; he usually wore a white tuxedo 
and tennis shoes, tied his long hair back, and had a glazed expression which 
convinced me and others that he was mentally unstable. At one stage of the 
initiation, when consecrated water was distributed to the audience, the man refused 
co pass it down the row and handed it instead to a woman sitting directly in front 
of him. The next day, after a distribution of yoghurt in small plastic cups. he 
refused to give the cups to the person collecting them and also threw a book at 
someone sitting behind him for no apparent reason. On the last day of the 
initiation, without provocation, he shouted angrily at an individual sitting near him. 
The man's erratic behavior demonstrates why it might be dangerous for uninitiated 
individuals to be taught how to visualize themselves as deities. Without careful 
supervision and a strong foundation of mental stability, such tantric practices could 
potentially be destructive to vulnerable people. 20 
The Occidental Buddhist 
Up to this point, I have focused on Americans who knew little about the 
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Kalachakra but who attended anyway. Organizers did not have to worry about 
framing the initiation for Tibetans or for Western Buddhists. ln this section. [ 
explore some of the differences between Tibetans and Western Buddhists in terms 
of how they engaged the initiation. 
For Tibetans. an initiation is a social as well as a religious occasion. At the 
Kalachakra initiation in 1989, I interviewed a young Tibetan man from Canada and 
asked him why he had driven all the way from Calgary to Los Angeles to be 
present at the event. For us, he said. the initiation is "a social gathering," a 
chance to meet and catch up with old friends. "At the same time," he added. "we 
come to take the blessing." The accounts I have read about Kaiachakra initiations 
given by the Dalai Lama in India underscore the young man's point about the 
profoundly social nature of such events for Tibetans. In her book on refugees in 
Nepal, Ann Forbes writes: 
ln December of 1985, the Dalai Lama traveled to Bodh Ga ya, the 
site where the Buddha achieved enlightenment in 500 B.C. to bestow 
the Kalachakra initiation. More than 300,000 people had traveled 
for days, crammed between boxes and people, to reach this sacred 
site in time, to attend the largest Buddhist gathering of the century 
and to receive the blessing of the 14th reincarnation of Chenrezig, 
the Tibetan god of compassion-the Dalai Lama of Tibet . 
. . . On this occasion, video tents, magic shows, and sidewalk 
stalls crowd into the normally sleepy roadway. Everything from 
Indian toilet paper to silver artifacts carried down from the Tibetan 
plateau could be found in the markets. The tea shops were jammed 
with people: carpet sellers, yak herders, restaurant owners, beggars, 
monks, Western dharma bums, and world travelers. There were 
Bhutanese with barely enough money to get to the border of Bhutan, 
Ladahkis who had been walking for weeks, Germans, Sherpas, and 
Americans. Most prominent, however, were the Tibetans. (1989: l) 
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Like all Kalachakras in India, this one was held in the open-air and people camped 
out for the twelve day initiatory period. The atmosphere was quite festive: there 
was a lot of trading, visiting with friends and relatives, as well as dancing and 
singing by Tibetans from Tibet who had been allowed to leave under temporary 
relaxation of Chinese religious policies in Tibet and who were celebrating their joy 
at seeing the Dalai Lama for the first (and possibly last) time in their lives. 
In a recent paper, ethnomusicologist Keila Diehl analyzes the "sonic 
offerings" provided for more than 50,000 Tibetan pilgrims who travelled to 
Mundgod, a Tibetan settlement in Karnataka State in south India, for a Kalachakra 
initiation given by the Dalai Lama in December 1994. Her description suggests 
the essentially social nature of the Kalachakra experience: 
As soon as the first pilgrims began to arrive at Mundgod and settle 
themselves into their relatives' homes or in the temporary tent 
village that had been erected for the event, the Yaks started selling 
their cassettes from roadside table equipped with speakers blaring 
their songs. Several other Tibetan music groups from southern India 
had had the same idea, rendering the main thoroughfare of the camp 
into a festive, but cacophonous, zone of sonic marketing. The 
band ... set up an enormous tent and stage made of rented bamboo 
poles and colorful expanses of canvas. Across the road, just beyond 
the makeshift bazaar that had sprung up to serve the event, the 
Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts set up a similar tent and stage 
for their planned nightly performances of traditional Tibetan song 
and dances .... most pilgrims attended both performances, even 
several times over, since there was nothing else to do after the 
teachings ended each afternoon. (n.d.: 10) 
In addition to viewing the Kalachakra as an important social gathering, which it 
obviously is for those in diaspora (and, in some instances, for Tibetans from 
Tibet), Tibetans see the initiation as an opportunity to be blessed by the Dalai 
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Lama. As we shall see. this belief contrasts greatly with those of Western 
Buddhists. 
When I asked the young Tibetan-Canadian man in Los Angeles what he 
thought about the Western Buddhist approach to the Kalachakra. he laughed. 
saying he noticed many of them taking notes and trying hard to understand 
everything the Dalai Lama was saying. "They want to achieve enlightenment in 
this lifetime." whereas for Tibetans. "we come. we don't try too hard to 
understand, we just take it as it comes ... " Or as another New York-based Tibetan 
said to me. " ... when you Westerners study Buddhism, it's not the fact that you 
believe in Buddhism, you son of study it very systematically, read texts. but for 
Tibetans it's just belief." 
These observations highlight an important distinction between lay Tibetans 
and American Buddhists: whereas ordinary Tibetans do not presume to be able to 
make sense of tantric teachings, Western Buddhists approach the dharrna as serious 
would-be tantric practitioners. With conven-like zeal, Western Buddhists have 
embraced tantric Buddhist practice in ways that are quite similar to those of monks 
and nuns. For example, in recent years, hundreds of lay Westerners have done the 
traditional three-year retreat, which is considered to be a prerequisite to serious 
tantric practice and is usually done only by a select group of Tibetan monks, nuns. 
and laypersons who seek to become tantric yogis (see Samuel 1993:576). 21 The 
fact that there are many more lay tantric practitioners than monastic tantric 
practitioners in Western Buddhism is perhaps the most innovative aspect of the 
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transmission of Tibetan Buddhism to the West. 22 
At the same time that Western Buddhists approach tantric practice with the 
seriousness of Tibetan monks. nuns. and other would-be yogis. taking notes and 
practicing the meditations they are empowered to do, they nevertheless do so in a 
manner that is distinctly un-Tibetan. This difference is most manifest in the ways 
in which Westerners interact with their Tibetan teachers. For instance. an older 
lama named Kirti Rinpoche told Brentano that he gives Western students much 
more detailed explanation: "They cannot be taught the way Tibetans are 
taught ... They expect "scientific" proof. they grew up in society with logical 
explanation." One of my own friends, a Tibetan lama living in New York City. 
told me that when he teaches, he is constantly interrupted by his American 
students, who ask questions and push for more information. He commented more 
than once on how exhausting and exhilarating such classes are for him and how 
radically different his experience of teaching non-Tibetans is from teaching 
Tibetans, who would never dream of interrupting the lama to ask a question. 
Although my ethnographic data on who actually attended the initiation. 
other than Tibetans and some Western activists, are rather limited, Brentano (1993) 
has observed that many of the Western Buddhists who participated were already 
involved with Tibetan, Zen, and Theravadin practices. Others who came, 
including Christians and Sufis, were interested in the meditational practices of 
Buddhism. Their orientations 
ranged from the intellectual to devotional, and from professional 
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(academic) involvement co involvement for social reasons. Some 
held traditionalist views. while others were experimentalists. 
synthesizers. or spiritual tourists. ( 1993:72) 
Of chose Brentano interviewed. most were in their 30s and 40s and 
linked their spiritual aspirations co experimentalism and idealism of 
the 1960s and early 70s ... Quite a few said they had become 
disillusioned with their original (mostly Christian and Jewish)n 
faith because of its philosophical inconsistencies. or lack of 
satisfying anwers co the problem of suffering. or because they 
wanted a more personally engaging spiritual discipline. Nearly 
everyone said that they were attracted co Buddhism because its 
meditational system provides a pragmatic and progressive framework 
for personal change. Whether they were responding co a life crisis. 
a sense of alienation. or spiritual yearnings. people found the 
structured discipline as it is presented in a logical framework 
amenable co their need for an intellectually rigorous spiritual 
program. (l 993:73)24 
The individuals Brentano interviewed reflect Buddhism's largely upper middle and 
middle class, white. college-educated constituency in this country. 25 
Staging the initiation 
At this point. I turn to some of the pragmatic issues surrounding the actual 
production of the event. Through my discussion, I draw attention co some of the 
problems posed when those staging the event have varying understandings of the 
rules of production for such a ritual. 
I begin by exploring some of the consequences of holding the initiation in 
an expensive space in the heart of Manhattan with limited seating and set hours of 
access. To offset the high cost of renting the Paramount Theater for twelve days. 
the Paones decided to charge the following registration fees: $200 for the "full 
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program" ("Nature of Mind." "Path of Compassion." and the Kalachakra 
initiation), $100 for the entire "Nature of Mind" series, and $25 per day for a 
single "Nature of Mind" teaching. The decision by organizers to charge these 
rather large fees disturbed members of the Tibetan community in New York and 
some Western Buddhists who viewed it as a violation of a basic Buddhist tenet--
that teachings should be offered for free and be accessible to everyone. The fact 
that organizers decided to sell tickets for single-day admissions further appalled the 
Tibetans. some of whom felt the decision represented a blatant 
"commercialization" of what should be a personal relationship to the lama giving 
the teaching. The charging of fees for Buddhist functions in the West. which is a 
common practice, routinely offends Tibetans who believe it is not possible to 
ascribe a value to sacred teachings. Yet. as one anthropologist has pointed out. 
for the practical circumstances of rebuilding the Tibetan religious 
system. supponing the monks, flying high lamas around world to 
visit their missions, the patron-client relationship with the West has 
become monetized. Payment by cash of services rendered is a 
successful way of generating funds, as it is compatible with western 
economic practice and expectations, it is readily accepted into the 
West. (Klieger 1992:94) 
One of the Tibetans I interviewed in New York complained that this 
"monetization" of the relationship between Tibetan lamas and Western students has 
created a situation in which Tibetan lamas are "corrupted." By this he meant that 
because Western Buddhists are able to sponsor teachings in the West more readily 
than Tibetans in India, due to their relative affluence, lamas are spending more 
time in the West than ever before. The problem with this, he told me. is that "if 
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you wish to maintain the viability of your culture, it should be Tibt:tans who know 
more about Buddhism ... otherwise then after this whole generation goes it will be 
like a vacuum." My friend's comments suggest one of the contradictory roles 
Western Buddhists play in exile society (for a discussion of role Western Buddhists 
play in the Tibet Movement. see conclusion). On the one hand. donations by 
members of the Western Buddhist community have enabled Tibetans to rebuild 
their religious institutions in India and Nepal and to preserve a wide range of 
spiritual practices.16 On the other hand, Western interest in Tibetan Buddhism 
has been a crucial factor in the permanent resettlement of some of the exile 
community's most knowledgeable and experienced lamas in the West. 
The relatively small size of the Paramount Theater necessitated a smaller 
number of participants at the Kalachakra compared to the Kalachakras given in 
India which are held in the open-air and are attended by thousands, if not hundreds 
of thousands, of people. Moreover, the bureaucratized nature of Madison Square 
Garden entailed a much more limited schedule than would otherwise have been the 
case. Tashi's (the ritual assistant sent over from Dharamsala) comments to Robyn 
Brentano underscore this point: 
In India, whenever we are doing the Kalachak:ra initiation, the time 
totally depends on us. We have the freedom ... to start whenever we 
want, to stay as long as we want. In New York, in Madison Square 
Garden, we have no real freedom like that because they open at a 
certain time, they close at a certain time, so time is very limited 
here. Madison Square Garden doesn't open before 8 o'clock so we 
have to wait until 8 o'clock to start. 17 
The artificial aspect of the Manhattan venue posed a third problem as well, one 
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that involved an adjustment of a preliminary ritual procedure. As Tashi told 
Brentano: 
In traditional Tibet. in natural places. we have to dig and we also 
have to do a special preparation ritual to ask permission [to hold 
initiation]. In the West. in a place like Madison Square Garden. 
there's no ground to dig. So in this case. we do the ground ritual. 
ask permission, but this time there is no direct action of our digging 
the ground. There's just visualization of the ritual...digging and 
asking permission. It's very equivalent to real digging, but in 
Madison Square Garden we can't dig. 
From what l could tell. the monks and lamas who participated in the teachings 
ironically tended to be more flexible and relaxed about the accommodations 
necessitated by the performance of the ritual in the Paramount Theater than anyone 
else. As l described earlier, many lay Tibetans worried about the appropriateness 
of the venue, as did the more politically-oriented American activists. Likewise. 
Western Buddhists like Jean and Frances worried about the sanctity of the initiation 
and the effect non-Buddhists would have on the event. 
The monks' flexibility was demonstrated in another incident which the 
Paones recounted in our interview. On the day after the Kalachakra initiation was 
finished. participants were invited to "view the mandala" onstage. That is. they 
were invited to look at the Kalachakra sand mandala which had been created prior 
to the initiation and which housed the Kalachakra deities. Jean and Frances 
arranged for the audience to view the mandala in a counterclockwise, rather than 
clockwise direction. Several prominent lay Tibetans who were onscage criticized 
the Paones for not having the audience view the mandala in a clockwise direction. 
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as would be done if they were circumambulating. As Frances explained: 
But they weren't circumambulating. They were going to view it. r 
mean viewing something and circumambulating something are two 
different things in my mind. And so the issue wasn't 
circumambulation. the issue was viewing the mandala. Well, a 
couple of lay Tibetans on the stage hit the ceiling ... Now I had three 
thousand people lined up and I had this dilemma of. their talking 
about tradition, and they were freaking out, because we were 
making a major blunder. 
When the Paones asked some monks what to do, they told him "they can go 
anyway you want them to, it's really viewing the mandala ... " Unlike the lay 
Tibetans, Frances added, "the monks were cool." The Paones concluded from this 
incident that lay Tibetans "do not really understand that we really practice 
Buddhism." Instead 
they basically see us like ... dilettantes, not really 
serious Buddhists, we're just son of dabbling in this 
fine culture but they are the repository of Buddhism 
and culture. and they know how to treat the Dalai 
Lama. 
The Paones comments underscore the tension which exists between lay Tibetans 
and Western Buddhists. 
The unprecedented presence of so many high lamas in one place at one time 
created additional logistical challenges for Jean and Frances. Due to space 
limitations and the high cost of providing for the lamas while they were in New 
York, the Paones tried to limit the size of each lama's entourage. The task was 
not easy, as the Paones soon discovered: 
We invited the lamas and asked them to bring one attendant. We 
had a budget for where they were staying, travel arrangements, 
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seating. and so on. Sakya Trizin immediately needed to have two 
attendants. Well. okay. so we understood that. again. he is the head 
of a lineage and he was travelling with a quite large entourage 
because he was doing the Vajrakilaya in the U.S. and he travels 
business class [laughs]. Then we were asked by the cultural affairs 
office [in Dharamsala] if the Nyingma Rinpoche could bring an extra 
person and we said no. it's not okay because we're providing 
transportation. And then the Rinpoche wrote to us directly and so 
there was no way to say no. so he got his two attendants. We told 
him. don't tell anybody we're paying for this ... [laughing]28 
As the numbers of lamas and attendants grew, so did the Paones responsibilities. 
As Frances pointed out. "We just thought we'd bring five lamas. you put them 
here, you get them to the hall. and they give a teaching. But it BALLOONED into 
a whole lot." Indeed, the Paones had to figure out how to distribute resources co 
each lineage. e.g .• who got which dressing rooms, how many telephone lines 
would they get. where would they be housed. how would they get around the city? 
Jean and Frances' difficulties in trying to limit entourage size underscores the fact 
that not only is the Kalachakra a social and spiritual occasion for Tibetans. it is 
also a profoundly political one. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
discussions about seating. 
Where one sits at a Tibetan Buddhist ceremony is an important sign of 
one's social and religious status. For example, the closer one sits to the throne of 
the lama giving the teaching or initiation. the higher one is presumed to be in the 
Buddhist hierarchy. Eager to avoid getting drawn any deeper into the intricate 
machinations over Tibetan Buddhist power than necessary, Jean and Frances 
decided to delegate the task of deciding who would sit where on stage to Tashi. a 
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monk whose job as a member of the Dalai Lama's "advance team" from India was 
to handle precisely these kinds of problems. According to the Paones. Tashi was a 
bit concerned about making the decisions himself because he usually deferred to his 
superior at Namgyal Monastery: "this was the first time he was the person who 
had to make the decisions, so he was faxing back and forth to his office to get it 
straight!" In his interview with Brentano, Tashi confirmed that he frequently faxed 
the General Secretary to the Dalai Lama, who was a very old monk and one of the 
few experts alive on official protocol involving the five lineages. Tashi's goal was 
to avoid insulting anyone or creating conflicts between lineages over seating. 
In a recent essay on ritual and resistance, Nicholas Dirks argues that ritual 
constitutes "a tremendously important arena for the cultural construction of 
authority and the dramatic display of the social lineaments of power" (1994:487). 
Because of the centrality of authority to the ritual process, he writes, "ritual has 
always been a crucial site of struggle ... while rimals provide critical moments for 
the definition of collectivities and the articulation of rank and power, they often 
occasion more conflict than consensus" (ibid., 488). As perhaps the most 
important arena for the construction and assenion of spiritual authority in Tibetan 
Buddhism--which, as we have seen in previous chapters, often translates into 
political power--it is not surprising that tantric initiations such as the Kalachakra 
are often marked by the sorts of disputes which Tashi sought to avoid. These 
disputes, Tibetans are careful to point out, are usually not generated by the lamas 
themselves (who are supposedly unconcerned about their status in this world), but 
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rather by the people just under them, e.g., their secretaries and assistants. who 
have a vested interest in enhancing their own lama's social prestige and political 
power. In any event, after much negotiation and consultation with people in 
Dharamsala, Tashi decided that all the high lamas would sit flanking the left and 
right side of the Dalai Lama's throne, which was center stage, and that they would 
choose seats for themselves. The only rule was that Sakya Trizin. as the only 
actual lineage head present at the initiation (other than the Dalai Lama), got to sit 
elevated above the rest on his own small throne. Other people who got to sit close 
to the throne included the event's sponsors, Rato Rinpoche and Richard Gere. a 
number of high status laymen who were tulkus (recognized reincarnations of 
previous lamas), and Robert Thurman, who was the first Western man to take 
monastic vows in 1964 but who has long since disrobed. All of these individuals 
were regarded as deserving special treatment, though for different reasons. 
If the lamas' high status could be read from their proximity to the Dalai 
Lama onstage, the Tibetan and Western nuns' low status likewise could be read 
from their distance from the throne. With only one exception, the female 
practitioners were relegated to the edge of the stage, where they sat behind the 
eighty or so Tibetan and Western monks who filled out the rows behind the lamas 
and other special guests. The women's position on the outskirts of the stage 
reflects the traditional low position of women in Buddhism. 29 While there is not 
enough space here to explore the issue further, it is important to note that due to 
the large number of Western women practitioners, traditional gender hierarchies 
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increasingly are being challenged in the Western Buddhist context. 30 
Just as the Paones had to deal with the presence of a lot of high lamas and 
anendants, they also had to make arrangements to handle a large number of 
American "VIPs", including Cindy Crawford (Gere's then-wife). Uma Thurman. 
Melissa Mathison (Hollywood screenwriter and wife of actor Harrison Ford) as 
well as "celebrity Buddhists" such as Phillip Glass. Laurie Anderson, Spalding 
Gray, Allen Ginsberg, and John Avedon (to name just a few). 31 ln an interesting 
parallel, the celebrities, like the lamas, were given special treatment, including the 
best seats in the house. In fact, the entire front section of the auditorium (closest 
to the stage) was cordoned off to form a VIP section. 32 During the initiation, 
Madison Square Garden security personnel guarded access to the area; if you did 
not have a ticket indicating you were sitting in this section, you were not allowed 
in. This procedure created a great deal of grumbling and frustration among the 
non-VIP participants at the initiation, many of whom wanted to go to the edge of 
the stage to greet their lamas and others seated onstage. At the Kalachakra in Los 
Angeles, although the VIPs sat in front close to the stage, no one was denied 
access to the stage during breaks. Just as the seating of the high lamas onstage 
reveals their position in the social and religious hierarchies of the Tibetan 
community, so the preferential treatment of the American VIPs and "celebrity 




... His Holiness [the Dalai Lama] said there is no difference between 
Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan politics, and Tibetan culture. They're all 
the same. He went further than that. He said that in fact there'd be 
no point in preserving Tibetan cul:ure if it were not for the 
Buddhadharma being so integrated into the culture. He came to the 
point: well, what do we have to offer the world? His answer was 
Tibetan Buddhism. our practice is what we have to offer the world. 
If we don't have that. what's the use of saving our culture? (Frances 
Paone. L 1/5/91)33 
When I began this chapter, I suggested that the performance of the Kalachakra 
during the Year of Tibet was a paradigmatic example of a distinctly Tibetan mode 
of engaging outsiders based on their recognition of the value and power of Tibetan 
Buddhism. As we have seen, this mode of engagement dates back several 
centuries and is based on a lama-patron relationship (mchod-yon) in which Tibetan 
(and Mongol) hierarchs gave Buddhist teachings and tantric initiations in exchange 
for protection and support from Manchu and Chinese sovereigns. In a recent 
essay. James Hevia (1993) argues that the relationship between Tibetan lamas and 
Manchu emperors involved attempts by both parties to "encompass and include 
others in their own cosmologies through joint participation in rituals of inclusion 
and transformation" (246). For the Manchus, this entailed effons to assert their 
superiority through audience rituals; for Tibetans, this meant attempts to transform 
the emperor, through Buddhist instruction and tantric initiations, into a patron who. 
having received such teachings, would accept the lama's intellectual and spiritual 
superiority as well as a responsibility to "protect the lama and his teachings, and 
promote Buddhism in the patron's domain" (ibid., 247). Following Hevia's 
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analysis, the Kalachakra described in this chapter can be said to represent an effort 
by Tibetans to encompass and include non-Tibetans in their own cosmology. It 
embodies Tibetan attempts to create a more binding relationship between 
themselves and non-Tibetans through ritual participation and, presumably, 
transformation. 
To what extent were audiences transformed? To what extent was the event 
understood as constitutive of political relations between the participants and the 
Dalai Lama? The answers to these questions are far from clear and I shall not 
attempt to answer them here. What I do want to do is suggest that the tensions 
which arose between Tibetans and Westerners as well as between politicos and 
serious dharma practitioners during the planning stages of the initiation reveal the 
contested processes through which Tibetan religious practice became a field of 
political action in the Year of Tibet. 
When asked whether or not they felt the Kalachakra was "political," the 
Paones argued that the initiation was implicitly political. As Jean put it, 
The whole thing is a political statement. lt's political that His 
Holiness is giving the Kalachakra initiation, that Tibetan Buddhist 
teachings can be given and are being given is a political 
statement ... From our side, look at what these remarkable people 
have done. They have preserved centuries of Buddhadharma in 
exile, without their country, under extremely adverse conditions, and 
preserved it in such a way that they can now bring it to other 
countries ... their art, their religion, their philosophy, their science of 
mind, it's incredible. So [ guess ... it's political and it's good. 
At the same time that the Paones saw the initiation as implicitly political, they did 
nothing that was "overtly political as we know it in America. We did not ask 
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people to sign petitions. we did not hand out postcards. we did not do anything ... 
According co Jean, the couple was not approached by any Tibet suppon 
organization to do anything political, so they decided to keep the event 
"spiritual...The fact that it was the Year of Tibet, the fact that it was to promote 
awareness about the plight of Tibet ... we didn't do anything, and nobody did 
anything else either." (I come back to this point again in chapter 10.) 
It is not surprising that the Paones chose not to emphasize the political 
dimensions of the Kalachakra. In many ways, their approach is in keeping with 
the stereotype within the Movement about Western Buddhists--that they prefer 
spiritual practice to political activism. While this is not true of all practitioners. it 
characterizes the attitude of a majority of American Buddhists with whom I have 
come in contact. It would therefore be a mistake to assume, as some have done, 
that Western Buddhists play an imponant role in transnational Tibet activism. At 
almost every Tibet Movement meeting, the issue of how to get the relatively large 
but quiescent American Buddhist community involved in activism for Tibet comes 
up. Lay Tibetans often express their frustration openly in such situations with both 
American dharma students and their Tibetan teachers. The fact that lay Tibetans 
do much of the grassroots organizing in the Tibet struggle while monks are 
recognized and revered by the Western public as embodiments of Tibetanness only 
increases the existing tension between the two groups in the Movement context. 34 
Western Buddhists claim the reasons why Tibetan lamas are not more active 
in the Tibetan political cause relates to their religious training. They argue that 
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lamas are caught in the dilemma of wanting both to suppon the Dalai Lama·s <and 
Buddhism's) universal message as well as express their nationalistic desires. As 
one Western nun put it in an interview with Brentano. "the old geshes are not very 
nationalistic; they love Tibet but they want peace everywhere as much as they wane 
it in Tibet. "35 This religious explanation. while it may be accurate up co a point. 
does not entirely account for the phenomenon. 
To understand why many religious figures in the Tibetan community shy 
away from political involvement. it is useful to remember that the non-Gelugpa 
lineages generally were not central actors in the Tibetan policy. Instead. they 
operated autonomously. living far away from Lhasa, the seat of the Dalai Lama's 
Gelugpa government. As a result. Nyingma. Sakya, and Kagyu lamas' regional 
and religious affiliations far outweighed any potential nationalist loyalties. Upon 
coming into exile. lamas and lineages were scattered across the subcontinent; most 
operated independently of Dharamsala and the Tibetan government-in-exile and 
thus did not share the commitment to Tibet as a state with those who participated 
in governing Tibet in the past (e.g., Gelugpa monastics and aristocrats). Klieger 
makes this point in his book on Tibetan nationalism. He argues that despite the 
fact that great efforts have been made by the exile government to display unity and 
that all the sects generally acknowledge the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet • 
. . . many of these lineages have their own intricate networks of 
missions abroad and are not necessarily dependent upon the 
Dharamsala establishment or the Dalai Lama's own Gelugpa lineage. 
This is essentially as it was in the past. characteristic of those twin 
forces of centralization and decentralization which competed at the 
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expense of the unification of the Tibetan state. (Kl ieger 1992: 89-90) 
The Kagyu lineage's success in exile demonstrates Klieger's point. Kagyu lamas 
resettled in Sikkim where they repossessed Rumtek monastery which they had built 
much earlier and received the generous patronage of the kings of Bhutan and 
Sikkim: "Having perhaps the widest network of centers abroad. the Kagyupa seem 
co be quite economically autonomous from Dharamsala" (Klieger 1992:90). Given 
the history of sectarian division in Tibet, that representatives from all the lineages. 
including Bon. came to New York to give "Nature of Mind" teachings and 
participate in those given by the Dalai Lama was no small achievement. It enabled 
Year of Tibet organizers to reinforce an impression of wholeness and to smooth 
over the persistent tensions in exile between lineages and institutions. 
Due to China's suppression of religion in Tibet, there have been no public 
initiations in that country since 1959. For this reason, as the Paones suggest, the 
very act of performing a religious ritual such as the Kalachakra has political 
implications. These implications have been recognized by the Chinese 
government, especially when initiations have been given in India. For example, 
classified documents leaked from Beijing indicate that the Chinese saw the 
Kalachakra initiation held in Sikkim in April 1993 as a political threat. Analysts at 
the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) summarized the Chinese fears in a 
recent publication devoted to the documents: 
Holding a religious ceremony presided over by the Dalai Lama so 
close to the Tibetan border is politically much more sensitive than 
Western observers have believed. It is likely that thousands of 
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Tibetans applied for exit permits. or left without them, causing both 
political embarrassment for Chinese authorities and desrablization 
from the return of Tibetans. The initiation itself, and the public 
activities surrounding it have no oven political content in a Western 
sense, but for Tibetans-and Chinese authorities-anything to do with 
the Dalai Lama has major political ramifications. Moreover. 
Tibetans attending the Kalachakra from Tibet could easily have read. 
and be in possession of, literature banned inside Tibet such as 
speeches by the Dalai Lama, or political tracts originating in 
Dharamsala or the West. (1993:7) 
Despite Chinese accusations that the Dalai Lama uses events such as the 
Kalachakra to stir up trouble, the Tibetan leader has consistently mainrained that he 
gives the initiation in order to "give some insight into the Tibetan way of life and 
thinking" as well as to "make an effon, on an inner level, in favour of world 
peace" (Gyatso 1991:204). 
As I wrote in the previous chapter, the Dalai Lama's commitment to 
Buddhist universality has led him to claim that the Tibet issue is not a political 
matter but a spiritual struggle. While this intenwining makes sense in a Tibetan 
context, for non-Buddhist Tibet activists in the West, such a formulation is often 
confusing or frustrating. If this is true for activists, it is even more so for 
members of the mainstream media. In the next chapter. I explore the Tibet 
Movement's encounter with the press during the Year of Tibet. 
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Notes 
1. The heads of each of the four Buddhist and Bon lineages gave teachings which 
collectively were referred to as "Nature of Mind." Running from October 11 
through October 15 (one per day). the teachings consisted of the following talks: 
"Nature of Mind" by Ven. Lopon Tenzin Namdhak Rinpoche, Bon 
tradition 
"Ozog Chen" by Ven. Trulshik Rinpoche. Nyingma tradition 
"Mahamudra by Ven. Tenga Rinpoche. Kagyu tradition 
"Inseparability of Samsara and Nirvana" by Kyabje Sakya Trizin 
Rinpoche, Sakya tradition 
"Union of Bliss and Emptiness" by Ven. Lati Rinpoche. Gelug 
tradition. 
2. The Path of Compassion teachings (given by the Dalai Lama) were based on the 
famous Buddhist text: Bodhisattvacharvavatara. A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of 
Life. The main subject of Shantideva's book is the generation of bodhicitta and the 
conduct of the bodhisattva. In the program handed out at the teachings. Khyongla 
Rato Rinpoche writes: 
Bodhicitta is the altruistic motivation to achieve enlightenment in 
order to free all sentient beings from their suffering and lead them to 
liberation. The conduct of the bodhisattva is to engage in 
developing and perfecting six types of practices known as the six 
perfections: generosity, ethics, patience, joyous effon, concentration, 
and wisdom. The final result of these practices is complete 
liberation from the mental afflictions and the attainment of 
Buddhahood. 
3. For an analysis of the actual performance of the 1991 Kalachakra initiation, see 
Brentano 1993. For a brief definition of tantric initiations, see Cozort 1986:34. 
The two-pan interview with Jean and Frances Paone which is cited in this chapter 
was conducted jointly by Robyn Brentano and me in November 1991. In addition, 
Robyn Brentano generously shared transcripts of interviews with Lobsang Samten. 
Tashi, Kini Rinpoche, and Lozang Trinlae whom she interviewed for her master's 
thesis in performance studies at New York University (see Brentano 1993). 
4. This number does not include the separate initiations and talks given by individual 
lineage heads through their own local dharma centers in New York. For instance, 
Sakya Trizin gave a number of tantric initiations to his Western students at various 
venues on Manhattan's Upper West Side. 
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5. See Rato Rinpocbe's autobiography, My Life and Lives: The Story of a Tibetan 
Incarnation (1977). See also Samuel (1993, pp. 339-341) for a comparative analysis 
of Rato Rinpoche's Buddhist training. 
6. As anthropologist Dorsh Devoe notes. although Tibetans usually lived with rigidly 
defined, ascribed social status. 
there is some evidence that great donors achieved social recognition 
for their generosity. Even in exile, the public is witness to gifts 
given. Every religious puja or festival must be underwritten by the 
devout. A wealthy Tibetan may sponsor the entire event; or, each of 
several families may contribute to it. In the latter case. donors' 
names are listed and read in order of amount given. The most 
generous donor is in return given the privilege of receiving the first 
blessing bestowed by the presiding lama. (1987:57-58) 
7. The term "so-called" is used because the individuals I am referring to here were 
unofficial advisors to the Tibetan government-in-exile and the Dalai Lama. Except 
for a Dutch lawyer. the rest were Americans who worked behind the scenes in 
various capacities on strategizing and promoting the Tibet issue in Washington. D.C. 
8. For an interesting discussion of another kind of intercultural alliance, see Landsman 
and Krasniewicz 1990. 
9. One of the ironies of the situation, Jean Paone pointed out, was that while these 
individuals argued against the wisdom of having an initiation in Manhattan during 
the Year of Tibet, once the initiation was scheduled, those same individuals "made 
sure they got good seats!" 
10. According to the Paones, Raco Rinpocbe had two reasons for wanting to headline the 
Kalachakra: he felt it would be a bigger draw and he thought that people would 
benefit just by coming into contact with the word Kalachakra-that it would have 
some positive effect on them (this despite the fact that most of those coming into 
contact with the word would not know what it meant). Raco Rinpoche's argument 
reflects Tibetan Buddhist belief in the efficacy of particular words to induce certain 
states of mind (see Lopez l 995b for a discussion of Tibetan Buddhist investment in 
the spoken word). 
11. My synopsis of tantric practice is by necessity over-simplified. Vajrayana is hard to 
grasp for a number of reasons, including, as Geoffrey Samuel observes, the self-
presentation of Tibetan lamas which bas a historic depth that we cannot even begin 
to understand (1993). Elizabeth Stutchbury's work on the complex processes 
through which Tibetan lamas construct their identities reinforces Samuel's point (see 
Stutchbury 1994). She argues that identities are constructed in relation to 
genealogical lineages, reincarnation, and transmission and teaching. 
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12. In his class on Buddhism at Columbia University (fall 1989). Rohen Thurman 
identified four distinct stages of tantra: 
I. The establishment of a goal vehicle orientation. Goal vehicle 
orientation refers to the desire to reach enlightenment for the benefit 
of all sentient beings (see discussion of bodhicitta in note 4). 
2. In the second stage. practitioners envision the world as a perfected 
world of the mandala. This involves a withdrawal from a 
"perception of ordinariness to one of extraordinariness." 
3. The third stage entails meditation on "Buddha pride" -a process 
wherein one constructs a self-image of oneself as a Buddha. This 
process is based on a view of emptiness which Thurman describes as 
a kind of "melting of the subject being isolatedly there. and coming 
into being relatedly, interconnected to everything and everyone 
else." 
4. The fourth stage involves the "perfection stage yogas" in which 
tantric adepts. through meditation, become isolated from physical. 
verbal and mental "ordinariness." As Thurman describes it, "yogis 
do this, they die and are reborn in a subjective way many times; 
they can arise and go to other universes, then return to themselves 
and reanimate their coarse body and ordinary self." 
According to Thurman, the yogis who mastered all four stages of tantric practice 
were considered extremely powerful people in old Tibet. Often they "lived in 
cemeteries, wore bones as jewelry to show that death didn't bother them." As I 
suggested in chapter 3, revered and protected by all, yogic adepts had a son of 
"culture hero" status in Tibetan society. 
13. These vows are associated with the various Vinaya grades common to Hinayana. 
Mahayana. and Vajrayana (Samuel 1993:205). 
14. Samuel writes that "these vows are the defining characteristic of the Mahayana 
practitioner and a prerequisite for tantric practice" (1993:205). 
15. The program, a fascinating artifact of the process of representing and transmitting 
Tibetan Buddhism to the West, was a slickly-produced eighteen page booklet with 
black and white photographs of the Dalai Lama, the five heads of the Buddhist and 
Bon lineages, and Rato Rinpocbe. In addition to a short biography of each of the 
lamas giving teachings, the booklet contained a prayer by the late Ling Rinpoche. 
one of the Dalai Lama's tutors, an "Introduction to Kalacbakra" and "Introduction to 
Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life" by Rato Rinpoche, and an essay by the 
best-selling Tibetan Buddhist author Sogyal Rinpoche called "Taking to Hean." By 
including the spiritual biographies of each of the teachers, the organizers were 
following Tibetan Buddhist tradition whereby lamas are described in terms of their 
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lineage and the various empowerments they have received and transmitted. But by 
explicating in Buddhist terms some aspects of Kalachakra and including Sogyal 
Rinpoche's instruction on bow to receive (or "take to heart") the initiation. 
organizers broke new ground. 
Interestingly, at the previous Kalachakra. which was held in Santa Monica in 1989. I 
did not see any evidence of attempts to make the initiation comprehensible in this 
way-participants were given a book which was essentially a translation of some 
aspects of the initiation (but not the secret parts) and various prayers; most of this 
book therefore did not make sense without the Dalai Lama's verbal instructions. 
Fortunately. The Wheel of Time: The Kalachakra in Context (published by Deer 
Park Books in 1985) was available at the time of the I989 Kalachakra initiation. It 
is one of the few books which attempts to describe the Kalachakra tantra in terms 
comprehensible to a non-practitioner. 
16. After the Kalachakra in 1989. the Dalai Lama reponedly observed that despite the 
presence of some 3,000 people in the Santa Monica Civic Auditorium. "only 25 
people really got the initiation." "This." he is quoted as saying, "is because most of 
them didn't understand emptiness and compassion and renunciation." 
In order to actually "receive" an initiation. Tibetans believe a student must have 
three prerequisites: 1) renunciation. or the strong desire to abandon the causes of 
cyclic existence; 2) bodhicitta, or the compassionate motivation to become 
enlightened for the benefit of others; and 3) insight into emptiness. As Brentano 
notes, "it is assumed that students take many years to develop these understandings 
and motivations. so they are encouraged to take initiations many times. in order to 
experience the transmission with greater and greater insight" (1993:45). 
17. In another instance. on the first day of the Kalachakra. the Dalai Lama 
acknowledged the presence of non-Buddhists and implied they should not worry 
about participating. Laughing, he said "It is possible in the audience today there 
may be non-Buddhists. Those of you who are here. you can be alen and when 
nothing is happening, you can occasionally doze off!" 
18. The issue of trust between student and lama came up during a question and answer 
session following the second day of the Dalai Lama's "Path on Compassion" 
teachings. I recorded the exchange as follows: 
Q: If our guru contradicts another guru's teachings, what attitude should 
we take to maintain respect? 
DL: Personally. I should suggest one to be cautious right from the 
beginning so as to not get caught relying on a teacher who is 
unreliable. Although the guru's instruction and transmission is 
crucial, it should accord with the general structure of the Buddhist 
path ... In the Vinaya [monastic code], the procedure of how to relate 
to the guru is explained. If the guru gives advice that does not 
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accord with the dharma. it should be opposed. Similarly. in 
Mahayana sutras. instructions which do not accord with the dbanna 
should be disregarded. In tantra. if instruction is beyond your 
personal ability. explain to your teacher why you cannot carry out 
that instruction. However, what I have said is general. it doesn•t 
rule out extreme cases like Milarepa where both teacher and disciple 
are extremely exceptional. Yet in some cases can be extremely 
skillful means on the part of the teacher to help student accomplish 
particular ends. 
19. Samten·s concerns are not unwarranted. Indeed. there have been incidents in the 
West in recent years involving sexual harrassment and endangerment by Tibetan 
Buddhist teachers (both Tibetan and American). some of whom clearly did not have 
the best interests of their students at heart. For a discussion of one such (allegedly) 
problematic guru-student relationship. see a recent article on the suit brought by 
"Janice Doe" against best-selling author Sogyal Rinpoche for sexual harrassment. 
coercion and abuse ("Sexual healing" by Mary Finnigan. The Guardian (1995). See 
also Fields 1991. 
20. When I asked an American man sitting near me what he thought about the man's 
strange behavior. he suggested that 
lots of really wierd. dark things come up when people are gathered 
together and taking a teaching like this. Obstacles and defilements 
arise. stuff that he has probably kept a lid on come up and interfere, 
karma comes up. but I think it will be okay. Some people's practice 
is more ferocious than others ... 
This response. framed in Buddhist terms. fails to acknowledge that the man might be 
mentally ill. Although the man in question no doubt considered himself to be a 
Buddhist (I had seen him at numerous Buddhist teachings and meditating in front of 
the UN after a demonstration). his behavior. if interpreted in non-Buddhist terms. 
indicated that he had a serious psychological problem. 
21. See "Tenzin Palmo in Conversation" for a fascinating interview with an 
Englishwoman who became a Tibetan Buddhist nun in 1964 and spent twelve years 
in retreat in India (Cho Yang No. 6. 1994:91-98). 
22. One of the many ironies entailed in the Western embrace of Tibetan Buddhism is the 
fact that Westerners often misunderstand traditional lama status hierarchies. In his 
book. Klieger describes an incident involving the discovery of a reincarnation of a 
Tibetan lama named Lama Y eshe in Spain. The discovery of Lama Osei attracted 
world wide media attention and created quite a stir in certain Western Buddhist 
circles. Many exile Tibetans were surprised and dismayed by the inaccurate 
representation of Lama Osei as the reincarnation of one of the most important lamas 
in the diaspora. As Klieger writes. "Westerners were blamed for not seeing beyond 
Shangri-la; not appreciating or understanding the traditional order ... " (1992:88). 
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Indeed. Klieger observes. 
In the West. Buddhist students often do not have the opportunity to 
know the position of their teacher in regards to the traditional (or re-
established) hierarchy. There is sometimes a tendency to presume 
that one's preceptor is a more imponant personage than they actually 
are within Tibetan society. (1992:88) 
23. For an interesting discussion of American Jews who become Buddhists, see 
Kamenetz's The Jew in the Lotus (1995). 
24. In examining the reasons why Westerners are attracted to Buddhism. Robyn 
Brentano argues that the discourse of enlightenment 
resonates with Western ideals of self-perfection and Judeo-Cbristian 
notions of salvation ... The Buddhist goal of self-realization finds 
ready acceptance in an individualistic society, but its compassion-
driven ethos based on the idea of selflessness challenges Western 
ego-centered notions of human purpose. (1993:72) 
In her book Turning the Wheel: American Women Creating a New Buddhism (1988: 
reprint, Boston: Beacon Press. 1993) Sandy Boucher suggests that 
Another aspect of Buddhism's appeal in the West has arguably been 
its optimistic views of what is humanly possible. The Theravada, 
Tibetan, Pure Land, Soka Gakkai, Zen, and other Tibetan forms of 
Buddhism, which have been among the most well received in this 
country, promise the possibility of superior mental states or even 
enlightenment in this lifetime. Such emphasis on personal 
achievement maps well onto a capitalistic mentality, even as it 
appears to offer spiritual respite from materialistic goals (Boucher 
1993:49). 
In a recent book on Buddhism and feminism, Anne Klein cautions against easy 
comparisons and offers her own interpretation: 
It seems natural to suppose that dilemmas of self-hood peculiar to 
our time and place are part of what brings Americans and other 
Westerners to Buddhism. Buddhist thought and practice does. in 
some measure, speak to these issues, but in order to make best use 
of its resources, it is important to be clear on the ways it does NOT 
explicitly address them. The Buddhist spiritual journey is very 
different from the Western psychological journey, to which it is 
often too swiftly compared. "Finding oneself" in the contemporary 
Western sense means identifying one's unique talents, limitations. 
and place in the world so as to make choices consistent with this 
identity. Buddhist practices, by contrast, are celebrated for their 
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ability to access universal faculties such as clarity. focus. or an 
experience of the unconditioned. Unless this difference is clear. one 
is in danger of recreating the experience of a California woman who 
after many years of Zen practice observed. "My concern now is that 
I used Buddhism as an escape from growing up." (1995:59) 
25. For a discussion of tension between white (or Euro-American) and black and Asian-
American Buddhists. see "Waking up to Racism" by bell hooks; "Confessions of a 
White Buddhist" by Rick Fields; and "Buddhists in America: A shon. biased view" 
by Addie Foye. all of which are to be found in the fall 1994 issue of Tricycle (pages 
42-57). 
26. Given that Buddhism is about practices which must be transmitted from teacher to 
student. it is important to recognize the role Western students. as a receptive 
audience for tantric teachings. play in sustaining lineages of practice in exile. 
27. Compared to Madison Square Garden. the Civic Auditorium in Santa Monica was 
much more flexible in its scheduling. As a member of the film crew documenting 
the 1989 initiation for archival purposes. I remember filming monks from Namgyal 
doing pujas every morning at 6 am for several hours before the Dalai Lama arrived. 
28. For Tibetan Buddhists. it would be considered extremely disrespectful to deny a 
very high lama's request for a second attendant. 
29. For analyses of the role of women in Tibetan Buddhism, see Havnevik's Tibetan 
Buddhist Nuns: History. Cultural Norms. and Social Reality (1989), Paul's Women 
in Buddhism (1979), and Willis's Feminine Ground: Essays on Women in Tibet 
(1989). 
30. In a recent article in the Buddhist magazine Tricycle (Fall 1994), Rick Fields 
observes that American Buddhism, as it is being defined by white Buddhists, is 
"based on a strenuous, if not athletic, practice of meditation and is becoming 
increasingly democratized, psychologized, and socially engaged. There is also a 
growing concern with moral standards and norms, as well as a receptiveness to 
feminist critique. " 
31. I first encountered "celebrity Buddhists" at the Kalacbakra in Santa Monica. At that 
time, working as a volunteer member of a film crew documenting the event, l 
operated the camera located on the front left-hand side of the stage. Thus l was 
quite close to the front of the auditorium where all the "VIPs" sat. among them 
Barbra Streisand. Uma Thurman. Gary Busey, and Richard Gere. 
32. According to Jean and Frances, they decided to limit access to the stage and VIP 
section in New York for security reasons. 
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33. The Dalai Lama made the statement quoted above in response to a question about 
the relationship between culture. politics and religion at a public talk in New York 
in October 1991. 
34. It is important. however. not to forget that monks and nuns have been at the 
forefront of independence demonstrations in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet since 
1987 (see Schwartz 1994 and Barnett and Akiner 1994). 
35. Lozang Trinlae, an ordained nun interviewed by Robyn Brentano in 1991. 
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Chapter 10 Mediating "Tibetann~" 
Introduction 
Much has been written in recent years about "global cultural flows" (Appadurai 
1990:3) and the accelerated circulation of representations as defining characteristics 
of late twentieth century life. One of the most important aspects of this 
contemporary condition is that increasingly the groups represented by academics. 
journalists, and others share the same social space with the words and images 
intended to represent them. As I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, 
representations of Tibet as "Shangri-la" and of Tibetans as spiritual beings have 
mediated relations between Tibetans and Westerns for many years. What makes 
the Tibetan case so interesting is how successfully Tibetans have engaged these 
Western fantasies in order to reproduce themselves in exile and mobilize suppon 
for their struggle. Chapters 8 and 9 offer ethnographic examples of this process 
and, in so doing, reveal how Tibetans self-consciously panicipate in their own 
objectification through the co-production (with American activists) of 
representations of Tibetan culture as well as through the creation and enactment of 
their own narratives of Tibetanness. 
In my examination of the "Wisdom and Compassion" exhibition in chapter 
8, I used the anecdote about Kissinger trying to persuade museums to drop the 
show to make a point about the inextricability of representation and political 
action. Today, anyone with a political agenda, from the Chinese government to 
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the Tibet Movement, must confront the importance of Western mainstream media. 
as they have become increasingly central to all political activity in the global arena. 
For most. however, the process of representing themselves to the media does not 
come easily; instead, it must be learned. This chapter explores the Tibet 
Movement's experience with this process. focusing on activists' encounter with 
Jane Kelly (a pseudonym), the media strategist hired by Tibet House to handle the 
Year of Tibet events in New York. Kelly represents a class of information 
managers who play a crucial role in contemporary American society but who have 
received surprisingly little anthropological attention. By examining Kelly's work 
with Tibet activists, I offer an ethnographic account of the complex mediations 
entailed in the strategic deployment of culture. 
Instead of focusing on Kelly's participation on a day-to-day level in the 
Year of Tibet, this chapter explores two presentations made by Kelly after the 
campaign had ended. The first took place at a "post-Year of Tibet" strategy 
meeting in New York in December 1991; the second presentation took place in a 
workshop on media at a large Tibet suppon conference in Washington, D.C. in 
January 1993. The purpose of the "post-Year of Tibet" meeting, which was held 
at the Office of Tibet, was to develop strategies aimed at taking advantage of the 
"worldwide energy, suppon, and goodwill" the Year of Tibet had generated up to 
that point. 1 It became the first in a series of post-Year of Tibet strategy sessions 
that ran through September 1992 and which were attended by the heads of each of 
the main Tibet suppon organizations. Although this particular cycle of meetings 
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played a crucial role in creating a structure for the Tibet Movement in the post-
Year of Tibet period. my focus in this chapter is on Kelly's presentations and 
activists· responses rather than on the larger role meetings play as forms of 
organization through which the Movement is constituted. 
Jane Kelly as mediator 
Although Jane Kelly was hired to "represent" Tibetans to American journalists. in 
the process of trying to do her job. Kelly found herself representing American 
journalistic "culture" back to the activists, many of whom had little or no 
understanding of how media actually operate. l attempt to demonstrate this point 
by exploring Kelly's detailed description of press practices and reactions to her 
suggestion that activists learn "how to talk to that culture"--the culture of print and 
electronic journalism. At the same time that Kelly tried to enlighten activists about 
the structural demands of the mass media, she took pains to represent the Tibet 
issue to her colleagues in the press in as sensitive a manner as possible. By 
meeting regularly with Tibetan leaders in New York in order to inform them of her 
strategy as it developed and give them the opportunity to voice their concerns. 
Kelly quickly gained a good understanding of their concerns about the media, 
which she in turn tried to address in her strategizing. Although the job of media 
strategist by definition necessitates a degree of mediating between the client and the 
press. through her work with the Tibet Movement, Kelly became a mediator of 
cultural values. 
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ln this role. Kelly served an important "diagnostic" function for me and for 
the activists with whom she worked. Because there were so many different Year 
of Tibet events in New York telescoped into the period of a single month and 
because Kelly was responsible for devising a media strategy that encompassed them 
all. her immersion in the Movement was intense. As someone who had worked 
with a range of organizations and political campaigns such as Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights and Amnesty International. Kelly brought a seasoned media 
professional's perspective to the weaknesses of the Movement and how they shaped 
the kind of coverage she was able to generate during the Year of Tibet. Part of 
her job was to communicate her insights and suggestions to those who had hired 
her. During the course of my research on the Year of Tibet. activists cited Jane 
Kelly frequently. Clearly she played a crucial role in bringing certain issues into 
their consciousness. l argue that this process reached its height during the "post-
Year of Tibet" meeting when Kelly made her presentation. lndeed. as we will see. 
for those who had not come in contact with Kelly before this point. the meeting 
was an important learning experience. if not a transformative one. 
Kelly's actual analysis of the Year of Tibet from a media perspective forms 
the heart of this chapter. At the more exclusive "post-Year of Tibet" meeting, she 
told activists that there was not a coordinated media strategy behind the campaign. 
Despite her best efforts to coax a coherent message out of them, the activists with 
whom she worked failed to articulate a goal or set of goals for the Year of Tibet. 
Kelly also spent a lot of time discussing how the Dalai Lama should be framed or 
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"packaged" for a press corps that understands little about his dual status as spiritual 
and temporal leader of the Tibetan people. The issues Kelly raised touch on some 
fundamental problems at the core of the Tibet Movement and thus it is not 
surprising that they elicited strong reactions from activists at the meeting. 
Thirteen months lacer. at the "Tibet conference of the Americas" in 
Washington. D.C .• Kelly spoke more generally about how the U.S. press works 
and what it expects. Although she reiterated her argument about the Tibet 
Movement's need to develop a long-term media strategy. she concentrated on 
outlining some of the basics about media strategizing for a roomful of eager 
Tibetan and American activists. ln exploring these two different presentations. I 
demonstrate the actual process through which Tibet activists became conscious of 
their role as mediators of Tibetanness and in the process came to see themselves as 
members of a social formation engaged in collective action with a shared purpose. 
A confrontation of representations 
As [have noted in previous chapters, since 1959. Tibetan refugees have been 
engaged in an ongoing "confrontation of representations" (Goldstein 1994b: 15) 
with Chinese officials in which the two sides compete to legitimize their own 
representations of the situation in Tibet. In recent years, the display of culture has 
become one of the most important means through which Tibetan and Chinese 
claims to political legitimacy are contested. At the same time that the 
confrontation between the PRC and Tibet activists in exile has moved into the 
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arena of cultural performance, both sides have become increasingly aware of the 
need to make their case in the media. While each side recognizes che cencrality of 
media co political struggle, neither has mastered the art of media manipulation yet. 
Despite che fact that the PRC is represented by nineteen different public relations 
firms in the U.S. alone2 (most of which deal with trade, development and related 
issues), the Chinese government is not always successful in generating the kind of 
positive coverage it desires. One reason for this is that the PRC is often its own 
worst enemy, behaving in ways that do not endear it to Western governments or 
press corps. For instance, China has repeatedly tried to block the Dalai Lama and 
Tibetan refugees from participating in various U.N. conferences. From a Western 
media perspective, such blatant obstructionism has been disastrous, drawing 
criticism from Western governments and journalists, and, if anything, creating 
even more sympathy and support for Tibetans than existed before. 
Tibetans, on the other hand, have had quite a different experience with che 
Western press. As Jane Kelly pointed out at the "post-Year of Tibet" meeting: 
You have wonderful friends in the press. There's a basic rightness 
of your cause which opens up wonderful channels of communication 
to the U.S. media. First of all, you're a great story and any 
reporter wants a great story. But there's something about the 
rightness of this cause that makes them not just interested in 
covering you. but interested in getting close to you. 
As I pointed out in chapter 6, Tibetans have been overwhelmingly well received in 
the U.S., particularly in comparison to other refugee and diasporic groups from 
Asia. The stereotype of Tibetans as special beings from "Shangri-la" that many 
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Americans hold and the lack of guilt about Tibet due to the fact that it was never 
colonized by the U.S. are both factors that have influenced the unusually positive 
interaction between Tibetans and Americans. Because of these factors. Tibetans 
have a remarkably different relationship to dominant American society. including 
the mainstream media, compared to other groups. Just as such diverse figures as 
Richard Gere, Jesse Helms. Barbra Streisand, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. (to 
name just a few) support and admire the DaJai Lama, so do important individuals 
in electronic and print journalism such as Tom Brokaw. Peter Jenningc;, and Abe 
Rosenthal. By having friends such as these, Tibetans have been able to draw 
attention to their struggle in a way that is dramatically out of proportion to the 
actual size of the community here. 
At the same time, Tibetans are in the paradoxical position of never having 
had to generate interest in their "culture," but of having that interest be focused coo 
much on the Dalai Lama or Tibetan's spirituality rather than on the hard political 
realities of the Tibetan situation. Indeed, representations of Tibet and Tibetans that 
circulate in the international public sphere tend to be generic stereotypes which 
misrepresent the complexity of the Tibet issue as well as Tibetan priorities, a 
process of which Tibet activists are well aware. One Tibetan intellectual attributes 
this to the "constant mythologization of Tibet" which has "obscured and confused 
the real nature of the Tibetan political struggle": 
A myth has a power and reality of its own. In the case of Tibet, the 
myth of Shangri-la has influenced the Western perception of the 
Tibetan political struggle .. .If the Tibet issue is to be taken seriously, 
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Tibet must be liberated from both the Western imagination and the 
myth of Shangri-la. (Shakya 1992: 15-16) 
Even though the Western media "give extensive coverage to Tibetan issues." 
Shakya claims. "not a single government or institution has taken the Tibetan 
political issue seriously" (1992: 13). This has changed in recent years, in pan 
through the efforts of the Tibet Movement and human rights organizations, both of 
which have succeeded in making the Tibet issue an important factor in U.S.-China 
relations (e.g., linking the renewal of China's most-favored nation trading (MFN) 
status, to improvements in human rights in China and Tibet). Despite the fact that 
Tibet activists have accomplished a great deal in terms of influencing American 
governmental attitudes toward Tibet since 1987-e.g., a number of Congressional 
resolutions on Tibet have been passed calling for the end of China's occupation of 
Tibet, and the Dalai Lama has met with two sitting American presidents (Bush and 
Clinton)-activists have been slow to seize the initiative in learning how to shape 
media coverage so as to consolidate these gains and make further progress. 3 
Having said that, Tibet activists, like the Chinese government, recognize the need 
co use the media more effectively; that media strategists have been hired on short-
term bases to handle events such as the Year of Tibet in 199 l and the Kalachakra 
in Los Angeles in 1989 demonstrate this fact. Nonetheless, during the course of 
my fieldwork, the issue of needing to hire a media coordinator on a permanent 
basis came up at a majority of the Movement meetings I attended. Tibetan and 
American activists generally reacted to these suggestions (which were always made 
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by non-Tibetans) with ambivalence, expressing one of two views: that engagement 
with the media is a mysterious process and thus somewhat beyond their ken. or 
that hiring someone to help them "package" their story for media consumption is 
not a good or desirable thing. 4 
In many ways, activists' resistance to the media is not surprising. Learning 
how to work with the media is a time consuming and expensive process. one that 
many overworked, understaffed and underfunded support organizations are 
reluctant to pursue. In addition, public relations and media coordination are 
complex, sophisticated practices which are grounded in certain requirements and 
assumptions and which demand certain interpretations. Most Tibet activists (both 
American and Tibetan) know little about these practices and the discourse on which 
they are based and find the prospect of intervening in the media arena daunting. 
Yet Tibet activists do not resist engaging the media for these reasons alone. As we 
shall see, most have an ambivalent attitude toward the media. 
A paradoxical profile 
First of all, I want to say that I've seldom ever worked with a media 
campaign that is as complicated and interesting as this Year of Tibet 
campaign was. So with all the positive things that happened, all the 
structural complications, all the personalities ... it's a very interesting 
issue, with very interesting people ... this issue is so pregnant with 
possibilities that it is very, very exciting. Then it gets depressing 
because you have some things in your structure, in your set of 
unique personalities, in the relationship of national support groups to 
international celebrity in the form of the Dalai Lama to a 
government-in-exile, that present you with rather unique 
opportunities but at the same time are crippling and confusing your 
505 
overall media message. 5 
Jane Kelly's opening statement co activists neatly encapsulates the Tibet 
Movement's paradoxical position vis a vis the media; while there are many things 
that make the Tibet issue compelling, including the presence of the Dalai Lama and 
celebrities like Richard Gere, these very same elements make for a complex. as 
opposed co simple, Movement structure and, as Kelly puts it, "profile." "For good 
or for bad." she told the activists, 
a lot of the profile is in one person who is an international media 
figure, who is a very complicated figure for a press corps like the 
U.S. press corps to understand because of his unique role as a 
political and spiritual leader. 
Kelly's point about the Dalai Lama's complicated "profile" is underscored by many 
journalists' tendency to refer erroneously to him as a "god-king" instead of the 
Tibetans' spiritual and political leader. In part it was this inability of the press to 
understand the Dalai Lama that prompted some of the Dalai Lama's "advisors" to 
argue against the wisdom of holding a Kalachakra initiation in New York City in 
the first place; they worried that the political side of the Dalai Lama's "profile" 
would be obscured by media attention on the more exotic spiritual side of his 
persona. 
Given the complexity of the Movement's profile, Kelly told activists that 
they did not define their message as "definitively" as they should have during the 
Year of Tibet. Acknowledging that many of her colleagues in the press corps as 
well as in the U.S. government are generally uncomfortable with the combination 
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of dharma and politics which characterizes the Tibet issue, Kelly tried in her media 
strategy to present the Dalai Lama in as substantive and un-exoticizing a manner as 
possible. 
As we saw in the previous chapter. Livet Reichart, the public relations firm 
hired by Gere to handle the Kalachakra, did not share Kelly's approach. Instead. 
they focused on generating publicity through whatever means possible, which 
meant a lot of stories about Richard Gere and his friendship with the Dalai Lama 
in the society pages of newspapers and magazines such as Women's Wear Daily. 
the New York Post, New York magazine, and so on. By presenting the issue 
through celebrity Buddhists, Kelly argued, 
... you have potential media conflict. You have Tibetan Buddhism 
which in fact in a U.S. mainstream context is viewed as a fringe 
religion, as something alien, as something of a practice of the 
young, of the rich and famous, of the people who gave up smoking 
dope but continue to meditate. You are dealing with all sorts of 
stereotypical perceptions of what Buddhism might be that gets 
attached to a people whose religion is Buddhism, as they continue 
their own political agenda. So that's a negative projection floating 
out there. 
Kelly criticized activists for not taking advantage of the positive aspect of his 
profile, which she claimed derives from his status "as a political leader whose 
political vision is rooted in his moral authority." Because internal Movement 
discussions happen in such a chaotic, seat-of-the-pants way, Kelly observed, 
activists end up allowing themselves to be defined in terms of the negative 
stereotypes attached to Western Buddhists. Referring to Livet Reichart's decision 
to run full- and half-page advertisements for the Kalachakra in the New York 
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Times and Village Voice. Kelly argued that the ads made it appear as if Tibetans 
were proselytizing: 
... you have a very well coordinated media strategy where we are 
going to the religion editor at the New York Times rather than the 
foreign desk to understand what the Kalachakra might be, or we're 
going to the foreign editor at Newsweek who has a long-term 
interest in the institution of the Dalai Lama. Then we're putting ads 
simultaneously in the New York Times that say come to the revival 
meeting and become a Buddhist. They didn't say that, but I'm 
saying that there are conflicting themes that we're complicating by 
not having a coherent message. 
Apparently missing her point, several activists' responded to Kelly's criticism by 
protesting that they thought the Year of Tibet campaign was "terrific" and that it 
received a lot of media coverage. Kelly argued back that the Year of Tibet's 
success was due to luck rather than any real strategy on the Movement's part. 
Reiterating her explanation of the difference between publicity and media strategy. 
she told activists: "Publicity is insignificant and useful only so far as it sells out 
events" whereas "a media strategy is meant to help an organization or movement 
develop long-term relationships with the press which in turn can be used to further 
ongoing objectives." Kelly argued that publicity based on celebrity "hooks" leads 
to superficial coverage of the Tibet issue and undermines activists' efforts to 
appear to be credible, serious political actors. To demonstrate her point, Kelly 
imagined a scenario in which Gere's celebrity could work against activists: 
... for example, if you have a Frank Mankewiecz in Washington who 
is representing China with the MFN debate ... he is one of the most 
skilled information-spreading people I've ever had the pleasure to 
work with ... without ever saying a word about Tibet or the rightness 
or wrongness of it, if Frank goes out to lunch with Jack so-and-so or 
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whoever from the New York Times and says. gosh. isn't that a 
funny picture of Richard Gere with that funny Kalachakra hat on? 
Who is that Richard Gere anyway? ... 
Through subtle insinuation. Kelly implied. a public relations person like 
Mankewiecz could turn Gere's presence at Kalachakra into a negative thing for the 
Movement. ln other words, by not putting out their own message. Kelly warned 
activists, "there are lots of p.r. agendas that can use what could be perceived as 
weakness to begin to put some questions in people's minds about what you do." 
Drawing on her own experience working with Sting and Peter Gabriel (among 
others) during Amnesty's rock and roll tour for human rights, Kelly asserted the 
double-edged nature of celebrity involvement in a political issue or campaign. 
Although "personalities" such as Richard Gere "have brought you access to the 
media and people into your world," at the same time they carry with them a 
certain amount of "baggage" which must be carefully "presented and handled" so 
that they are "useful rather than detrimental" to the cause with which they are 
associated. 
Faced with a disparate array of Year of Tibet events-from lectures to dance 
performances to tantric initiations-Kelly suggested activists include "one single 
coordinated action" to tie them all together and to make clear why they were being 
held: 
Now, r wrote a paper, I laid out a plan, I talked to pretty much 
everybody before I wrote the paper, it seemed agreed co that we 
were going forward with the plan to develop these long-term 
profiles. I said some things needed to be considered. One was, 
putting out this much activity, 62, or 97, or 114 events that you 
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were doing in one city, New York. which happens to be the national 
media capital. means that this question of what do I do now is part 
of your story. The issue of having one coordinated action. that 
would happen at every single event. That never happened and it 
created a weakness is your overall media strategy. 
At this point. Kelly was interrupted by an American who said he did not 
understand what she meant. Annoyed, Kelly replied: 
It's real simple. You talked to two million people in New York City 
over a four week period in your events and another, potentially. 25 
million people nationally and locally through the media coverage. 
To have that kind of audience and not have one little postcard that 
said "Join Tibet Committees" or "Write a letter to blah blah blah." a 
son of coordinated thing. I'm not talking about a heavily politicized 
action. rm talking about a very generic thing that showed the press 
why you were doing this. 
By not including this sort of coordinated action, Kelly suggested, activists failed to 
indicate what they were trying to do to remedy the situation in Tibet and what they 
wanted others to do about it; from a media perspective, this failure made their 
"story" incomplete. 
The reason there was no coordinated action, the Paones told me in our 
interview, was that there were no clear objectives for the Year of Tibet. Although 
Kelly met with representatives from Tibet House, Tibet Center, the International 
Campaign for Tibet (ICT), as well as with officials from the Tibetan government-
in-exile (TGIE) in order to find out "where the Movement is going and how to 
move it along, what our real objectives were for the Year of Tibet," Frances 
recalled, "one of the things that did not happen is any real objectives being 
formulated." When asked why not, Frances surmised: "the groups are so diverse 
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and everyone had different interests. in addition to the Tibetan government-in-exile 
not having clear objectives as to what they wanted to obtain." With no substantive 
goals forthcoming. activists thus were forced to take a fallback position of viewing 
the Year of Tibet as an educational process to broaden awareness of the situation in 
Tibet. 
Opening the kimono 
The issue of Dharamsala not having clear objectives was a recurring motif 
throughout my research on the Tibet Movement. On numerous occasions, I heard 
activists complain that when they looked to the government-in-exile for direction in 
terms of policy and where the Movement should put its energies. guidance was 
rarely forthcoming. Some blamed it on Dharamsala's political naivete, isolation. 
or preoccupation with managing refugee communities across the Indian 
subcontinent; others, however, took a more skeptical view, especially Tibetans 
from India who were more familiar with the workings of the government-in-exile. 
They argued that it was not that the TGIE has no clear objectives, but that they 
were not divulging them to anyone, including other Tibetans. This observation 
reflects on a central issue of Tibetan culture--the importance of secret knowledge in 
the constitution of political power. 
In old Tibet, where religion and government were intertwined and the head 
of state was considered to be an emanation of the Buddha A valokitesvara. the most 
prized knowledge was spiritual in nature and was regulated through a hierarchical 
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process whereby a guru handed down his (in rare cases her) knowledge co a 
disciple. Obviously there was no "civil society" in the Western sense because 
Tibet was not democratic; there was no concept of the public's "right co know" or 
equal access co information. In refug~e communities, especially those in India. 
information still has a different currency than it does in the West. Like many 
other non-Western societies that operate in what Michaels and Kelly (1984) call an 
"economy of oral information," Tibetan hierarchies in exile continue to be based 
on differential access to information. These hierarchies endure and distinguish the 
ways in which Tibetans understand media and, for that matter, grassroots activism. 
I first became aware of these issues at the first international Tibet support 
conference in Dharamsala in 1990 where a session was held to discuss the 
importance of media. One of the panelists, a Dutch journalist, asked the audience 
somewhat rhetorically, "are Tibetans willing or capable of adapting to Western 
media?" Noting that the Tibetan community "does not want to be packaged and do 
not know the mechanisms of the media," the Dutchman observed, "you have to 
open up your kimono every once in a while." For those of us in the audience who 
were relatively new to the Movement at the time, the kimono comment was 
confusing. After several years of participant observation, however, I came to 
understand all too well what the Dutchman meant. By saying that Tibetans have to 
"open their kimono" every once in a while, the journalist implied that the Tibetan 
government-in-exile needs to be less secretive, more open, about its political 
objectives and plans. Otherwise, how can it expect to achieve its goals and 
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communicate its message to the press? 
Dharamsala' s tendency to be enigmatic about its activities was a favorite 
topic of discussion among the American activists with whom I worked. Many felt 
that traditional Tibetan methods of behind-the-scenes politicking and secret deal-
making, coupled with a typically Asian style of diplomacy which prizes saving 
"face" through indirectness over more confrontational tactics, foster a vagueness 
that makes it hard to discern exactly what Dharamsala wants to have happen. The 
Tibetan government's tendency toward secrecy is well-known and well-
documented, not just by would-be media strategists, but also by Tibetan 
intellectuals in exile. For example. a recent editorial in the Tibetan Review 
questioned the TGIE's silence on a possible visit by the Dalai Lama to lsrael: 
So the question arises again: why the secrecy? The answer is that 
this is how the Tibetan government always likes to function, even if 
there has been a generational change in its composition since coming 
into exile. I remember that a long time ago in Dharamsala, the 
cabinet office locked up a copy of Time magazine because it 
contained an anicle on Tibet. There was no reason except that they 
seemed to believe that ordinary people-again, for some 
unfathomable reason-should be kept out of anything they considered 
important. This method of running a government pretty much seems 
to have survived the vicicitudes [sic] of time. (1994:3) 
I argue that Tibetan officials' predilection for secrecy and control over information 
made them wary not just of the grassroots Year of Tibet campaign (in which local 
groups were given access to information that Tibetans usually controlled; see 
chapter 8), but also of the mass media whose demands challenge many of the basic 
premises of Tibetan political culture. For instance, many Tibetans are 
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uncomfortable with the necessity of articulating a specific, concrete objective in 
order to design a media strategy; the concept of putting forward a single message 
for media consumption runs contrary co the way they conduct their diplomacy. In 
a previous chapter. I noted the government-in-exile's tendency to assert both 
Tibet's historical independence from China and at the same time leave the door 
open for a negotiated settlement in which Tibet remains associated with the PRC 
but handles some of its own affairs. This diplomatic vagueness. while very much 
in keeping with the way Tibetans traditionally handled relations with China, often 
annoys more outspoken Tibetans and Western activists who argue Tibetans should 
hold out for complete independence and should make this claim publicly in the 
media. 
Tibetans are also extremely cautious about exposing their leader to ridicule 
or criticism; as I described earlier, Tibetans do not tolerate criticism of the Dalai 
Lama by other Tibetans (despite the fact that the Tibetan leader himself has urged 
Tibetans to express their opinions, including ones about his policies). This is 
particularly true in India where those who dare to say anything are often 
ostracized, if not verbally and at times physically threatened by fellow refugees. A 
desire to shield their revered leader from such treatment, while it contradicts 
efforts to create a democratic polity in exile, may be behind Tibetans' reluctance to 
subject him to the rough and tumble of Western media practices. 6 Jean and 
Frances Paone implied as much when asked to describe Tibetan attitudes toward 
the press: 
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Ifs gotten to become a resistance over time ... it has to do with 
Eastern and Western approaches to things. Because His Holiness is 
the key to the whole movement. from the Western side there's 
always this soundbite-packaging-handling approach. It's not going 
to work with His Holiness ... whether that's coming directly from His 
Holiness or from the ministers in the government. they're not going 
to let it happen, they're not even gonna let anybody get close to His 
Holiness to start anything like that ... and they themselves don't seem 
to be able to come up with an alternative so there isn't a media 
strategy ... the attitude is just keep those reponers outta here! 
At the second international support conference in New York City in 1990. a media 
professional who had worked with the Paones on publicizing the Kalachakra in Los 
Angeles reiterated this point, telling participants in a workshop on media that 
Tibetans (and some Western activists) view the press as if it were the "bad guy." 
Tibetans' ambivalent attitude toward the press is ironic given the fact that they 
have very powerful friends in the press and, if anything. have been much better 
treated than many other interest groups/social movements who face an up-hill 
struggle for access to mainstream media. 7 
Finally, on a more practical level, media require specialization which 
challenges Tibetan generalism. That is. in old Tibet, those who worked in the 
bureaucracy were all generalists (the main criterion for a government post. other 
than coming from the right social category. was excellent penmanship and 
knowledge of various Tibetan scripts). At every large Movement meeting I 
attended where media were discussed, media professionals suggested that a group 
of government-in-exile employees be trained as specialists in dealing with the 
media. Only recently has this suggestion been implemented; two Tibetan men who 
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studied at Columbia School of Journalism now work for the exile government in 
London and in Dharamsala as "press officers" (see Mclagan 1996 for a portrait 
of one of them). 
The Yale incident: Raising the ante 
Of all his activities during the Year of Tibet, the Dalai Lama's visit to Yale 
University was perhaps the most important one from a political standpoint. The 
invitation co speak in New Haven was viewed by the Dalai Lama's staff as an 
opportunity for him to engage in a bit of political symbolism by presenting his 
policy toward China at then-President George Bush's alma mater where he had 
outlined his China policy some months before. To prepare for the visit, several of 
the Dalai Lama's American "advisors," in consulation with Tibetan officials, 
drafted a speech which was then given to the Dalai Lama when he arrived in the 
United States. At the press conference, the Tibetan leader appealed to the world 
community to put pressure on China to allow his return to Tibet for a fact-finding 
mission. 8 His conditions included the right to travel at will and the freedom to 
speak to all citizens, without reprisals against them. He also asked that the world 
press be present as well as officials of the Chinese government. After making his 
statement, the Dalai Lama took questions from newspaper and television 
journalists. For my purposes, what is most interesting about the press conference 
and speech in New Haven is how it was read by Kelly and by activists who 
accompanied the Dalai Lama to New Haven. As we shall see, what I am calling 
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the "Yale incident" exemplifies the Tibetans' distinctive style of politics described 
in the section above. In her analysis of the incident. Kelly (unwittingly) put her 
finger on a central tension in Tibet activism: the lack of clear communication 
between the government-in-exile and Tibet support groups. which, I argue. is 
rooted in Tibetans' and Western supporters' different approaches to information. 
Jane Kelly worked hard to "provoke" stories on the Dalai Lama and the 
Year of Tibet. Without disclosing what the Dalai Lama would say at Yale. she 
described the announcement he planned to make as "major" and wrote to 
colleagues such as Peter Jennings that she hoped he would cover "what may be an 
historic initiative." Much to her credit, Kelly succeeded in generating interest and 
coverage of the Dalai Lama's speech in a number of media outlets, including the 
New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, the Associated Press. 
Reuters, UPI, NBC Nightly News, ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening 
News, and National Public Radio (see Figures 24-27). In her remarks at the post-
Year of Tibet meeting, however, Kelly seemed less than pleased about the outcome 
of the Yale event. She told activists there were a lot of complications she did not 
fully understand when she began working on the Year of Tibet: 
I was very frustrated, for example, when I went and read every 
clipping, everything that had ever been done, and I kept finding a 
softness when the Dalai Lama spoke about the political message of 
Tibet. 
Much to her dismay, this "softness" was evident at the Yale press conference 









~~ ~ ~ 
-· ~i 
..., ~ 
-· > 3 "O fl "O ~ ~ 
~(I) 













ruu New YORK TIMBS INTERNATIONAL THURSlJAY. ocroeuu10, .,,, ~~~~~~~~~~ 
Dalai Lama Appeals for Help 1°n Goi"ng Home 1••••1c11"'·,hcd1o 1-•nl•n•'"mm11h•1 o.1a1t..m•h .. no1,••muph1a,,., 
WIN • w for a vlall and ntnlual 1lon ol 1~....., or Tlbel " 
re1urn ul Ille •plrllual leader. The Chi· In 1he pell Ille l"hlneae Govitrn"*' 
-- neac, who had ln1l11ed lhal Ille O.lal ha• bellllled 01he 1l•ndlo11 ol lhe ua,., 
•1 Alll L GOLDMAN Int. The Cblneoe Ocwemmm1 had no Jlbel. Ila naked for lhe rl&hl lo lrnef lam• md hi• adviicary Of lndepencl- Lama. II ha1 KC'UMd him o1 bea:t••· 
_,., .. _ ••• •- lmmedl11e nt1ponae loday, II• embH· •I wlll ancl Iha freedom 10 apealo lo •II etl<'a for libel •nd live In Bej .... uutra11 and a lroulllema•er " It 
NEW HAVEN. OGI. t - The o.1a1 •1 In Walhl1111on aeld. r1111en1, wllhou( repl'laall aaa1n11 dnipped lhe re11dency requlrelMlll. -raflnJ 11111tr -rla co 
a.a-, Che a.lled leader of Tlb:!t, loday The 1>11181 Lama, who II In Iha Unlled 1llem. II• al1a •••eel 1ha1 lhe -Id In •urn, Ille Delal Lama beaan ID la Ollna 1 allaln. Ii' 
mMwtd 1111 effort• ID viii! hll hatM· Slaln IOI' Ille Mcond llme 1hl1 year 10 preo1 be pre1e111 11 well 81 olfldall of lfll'llk ol • free cle1110Crallc Tlllet ••• ,..,.. Prtae 1 ...... 1 _, ,, , land by a~allna lo IM -Id Co put lllllB a rearlona lnlernallDnalcelebra• Che OllMH Govern-. daled Wllh Ollna nilller lllan 811 lnde- IM're_... cacu ... 
prt9111re on Cblna lo allow 1111 mum Clon ol Tlbel,Nld Ille Clme ••• rl&hc 1111' ......._ pendenl libel The Dalal Lama'• -W 1111~111 ,1111' • IKl·llndlnt ml11lon. a viii! lo hi• ""-land. . c A•-• C•,... lhlll••lr Al Y•lt lodalJ' Ille O.lal Lama Mid lllcreaHd, llowever, e 11111 
In 111marll1 •I Yale Unlverally Ille "lnr -ldha1dlN!teddram•llca~ Chlne1e e•prr11 In Ille Unlled S1a1H lhal Ille ;,;;Qilallonl lad nowllare. ••• •••rded 1he Nabe'r:.ace p, In 
Tlbltan leader HPfflMd ffllllnillon I)' In Ille la9' few ,....., .. he .. w. lie and Bellina IAkl lhal II ••• unllllelr l'Dln•lna 10·-liii-· ••n, he 1ald of Che Hit. Lal Aprl~ ll'fer Che llbJefl 01 
•llh II-. pn11rarted Mpllallana be. -IDM<l lhe ~- In Che Soviet lhal Chl1111 would •11rn lo auch COndl- Clllne1e: "II -med lllal - of lllelr Clllllll, f'fftldcnt luall nw< .. 1111.:'-' 
1w- h11 reprnenca11- and Ollna, Union and £alleni Europe, •ddlna. Cioni, •Ince IC WOUid further whal Ille or11n1, lhelr 1111°""'1 orpn, waa ,.,... llbel"" becomllll Che flr11 ,.,.._, 
ll•llna 111111 he wa1 ready lo ao "•• "The human dnlre for fnedom will C11""1e l'l'l•rd •• die 0.lel Lam1'1 "'!·" lo 1r1nc him 111C11 RCll&lllllon. 
- •• ponlble." ulllm11111 prevail no mauer Ille !!'!f111 ellurt1 10 Hparafe Tlbel from Ille f'eo. n • wrlllm 1l11emen1 luued on In hla remarll• here, ihe lllllal Liiiia 
A viii! lo Tlbel, which -.Id require nor lhe MVerl11 ol •n1 reprenlan. • ple'1 Rrpullllc:. Srpl. 2J, lhe Cblne" Emba11y In W•llh· ~ed \he ffllOtt• of human rfllll• 
Chinni 1pprcw111 would be Ille flral by 1111 Dalal Lam•, who llvn In lndla over • decade DI can1ar11, llw Chi· lnalon blamed Ille Dalll llm• IOI' lhe or11•nb1ckinl lhal lhe ctilnne lillvr Ille lplrlllNll 1e-r 11nc9 1111 .. ,,. In MC •veral CDlldlllona for a vlllt 10 - Govcmmet11 and Ille 0.111 Lama !allure of Ille 1•1111. The rODI c1111e, Ille •ll•rlled Bucldlllll mon•1, ... nlrtd 
llllemetM 1ald, "lie• In Ille l•rl lhal lhe ltmpln and .-ved mllllona of Clllneer 
-----~L_A!l 
111101 lbel. Au reoull, he Mid, Tlbel 1 t are • mlnorll)', wllh I mllllon •• . poled ID U million Chinese. 
In answer 1u 1 """11on 11 Y •Ir lo· 
day. Iha lluddh1111rechar •mon11rn1. 
I'd lhal h .. nallonlllflllc hope Wftl dlf· 
le1tn1 lrom lhole who rvmanlk'lle 
1bou1 a homeland. Illa a11arhmento10 
Tlblt ha• more ID do Wllh Ille people 
lh•n 1lle land, he aald. " 
"I ronolcler all 11111 world IM aame 
home of humanll7," he 1ald. "Wlwrev· 






~ lf lfl!f1':1HUJ!j[jijjijlj!~ Uif !f if!!l!W1ei'Hf!mw,u !I . u ~ ~ :I ~~,11lf1t tr!; ft•! r!Jf~.1f · · ~:!Pif !1'W~J .Jh Jft!u•tifl 1¥ a 'i ~ 8 b;4 'g i' l, 1•1~ ... I ~ ·1!h J ~ h1~1i ' '~ ! r rt .g ~ I!. . en !3 . I 
nz ihhf; rbff 1 hul.:1! lid ·n1!m~1 ;Jmi~!!l ulnh . JI ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~J!l!fiill~if~~lflili~flii!1 .eitD~w9B~g~i ~~OR~·~-~~~ ~~"-- ---
~ § ff~ 
<A l~ : f1i111~1:1c:.1a rf•iii1!JiJ~1=i;iif,1rm1!fJl11!iiiJf :t:r1.111•11 i•H; iR 1 ~ n> ~ ~ ~ "' ~fDEi~ f le. lffrrt 1•J6 i (; ·11ri~1~ ~elsfitr-· - !11 lfl rt- = ~ ~ t Mlid•fof t !in 1 n.J nl..nBu.b ·sir lilr .n f,i;.J~ H . 





IL. A.c.eut-~ AJ ~ 
OJ=,, 11 ,' I!-' J 
9 '1 U [) r1 ,~ I .~ l r By Howard Altman 
I 
Hello Dalai 
Reponer' s Ngtebook: His Holi~ss rubs shoulders with the press 
n "'°"- "11131 - Ill !be ock 11u1n pcltllts frantically ••anl. 
--He.-, CCllllllJ-.. ft bluns. ••ffe•s 
COlllUIJ- •• 
The H .. ""' refrn IO IS !flS Halin<ss. 
Tenlln G•auo. bmer kno-n u die 
Dalal um.. 
··w11ar·s lie,_ c1o~·· asts -
'"""*'~mrllc........S."Walkonllil'!"" 
The c1onm or~ •bo crmn 
""' ua1e II Woolsey HaU far Ille 
'l.fecba e • .,. orr11c Week 1as1 Wednis-
aay 1et OU1 • ca11ca ..... .., or~ 
potnllllCftL The OaW. foll~ 
ela.dy by H11 Oilier Holaaess. Yale 
Prmdelll ~ c. Sclanadt, rakes • 
more mundllle ra.a •~lbc uqE. 
They walk aaass rllc balcony. -
lllln lit. IO mee< die press. Rcpanen 
and TV iypes ft pdlmd ro hear die 
Dalli t..an-wbo IS Waf1lll I lddi-
llOClll ............ and KllnalllnJ ~· 
'tftlbtmJ I UI/(- plMs IO 
ietum 10 his iw,.e Tibet. He 11asa·1 
seen His homeland sona: die Cbmac. 
"'ho oeevpied 1he COlllllt) m 1949. 
mo.c Hun OUI 10 yan lmr. 
Schmidt. """"' one ID llllSS Ill op-
paruinuy ID lllillt Ill)' and &II Yale Cllll-
ncctaaM. ~ 11111 Ille blue llld 
"'illlC v:3tf """" by lbe DaJai IS - I 
tallu. ltldilJonll pn!Cf sha>wl or Qr. 
lllodo• Jew.. II IS. Sl)'S lflS Odltt lfolj. 
neu. • Yale Scarf. 
Sidi. lllc COMCC1IOll betwun lhe 
Dalli and~ IS •md. 
There Ire ... mdlian Tibcans llYlllJ 
under lllc hlnll nlfe o( lllc Chmcse. 
Hund~ or dlouslftds or Tibeuas 
ha•• been ranuml and mutdclal. , .... 
for bcmJ Tibow!S. 
The Dalal IS here 10 ICll reponctS 
llw hr ,.ant• ro p home. 
To - 1r he can c1m1se "*-
The Daill 11 cool 
The phy•1t•I embocl1111cn1 or 
Budd>ll vndcs. 
He JOkc:s 
He, ... ,. .... 
He is muth more r.... dla die ,._ 
And die Ayllllllall. wllo may llllilcd. 
.... ~ Jf"'ft ID random displayo o( 
Jood--and wllllldl lib die D.iai. 
Tbc Daill IS die pafca - IO 
die bts1 • leM -- ~ t tc I die 
Mama Llma-wbo ill4s onlcn II 
~ pdlcrtd IO dloal His 
ffolinaL 11 rnasr bt - tan olll.i-
dhisl ~ die blPP7 pilucky 
Dalli bavinS sudl I smty--.crlO 
w11111 ap die crowd. Ma)'bt dm di· 
~ 1Swl!ll11UKtSIClllf Ridlud 
Ciae. who IS waldllnt die ncnll fian 




The O.W is • lllllP Kl ., opai for. 
The Dalli IS also roup acl for mm)' 
oldie rqianen. wllo know bale aboolt 
His Holl:ICU and CYCll less lbolll 
Tibet. I myll>Cal land ftCSlled -S 
die 111111 peats 11111 c1ocp .aney. or a H.......,._ 
.. Jeez. wlm """"41 at lam'!"" Ilks 
one TV·l)'pc. wbosc lilllltcd tnowl-
..SS:olTaba ._ ,,_ wlldanf old 
- ol S/toltfn-Lo. 
""I don'I know.•• mpoads I Jiii* ~ 
paner. ""Why don'l 10U at tan rf hlS 
Sllllle IS die mall of dmne pidalu. 
or from .-..m1 IOO mucb Tibcud 
hash. .. 
Tbc media .• c:ollCal1re IJllO'lllCC IS 
- :icnlalOol. Who knew mudl .,,,. 
•i.i 11er- ""' ""lleroa or 0escn 
Stom1"" blew Ille btll 11111 ordle l*e? 
Tibct has no od and we - -
likely IO USC Ille pilCC ISi bac ol ma-
ICJIC OIJCfllXlllS. 
So "hY bodler wub ""' plrJll. or 
mdlais lr>UIJ lllldetlbe111111 rna ofdle 
C!uncse~ There 1re more lftlPOIUlll 
pans or lbc wor1c1 10 worry about. 
Pllea 11111 - ......... r. 1css ll'Ollb-
1esome dlan Clttna. 
Places hke Plmma 11111 ~ 
Hello Dalai 
"11111 IS I •try i:omplrascd qua-
DOii. .. ..,.. Ille Dalas. when ....,, 1( he 
IS diuppomlcd llm die Busb ldmn· 
- parusllcd die Clmw:sc for dlr 
r-Sq..- masacn: Ill' offer. 
"'I !ban Mesi FnoRd SlllOn rnde 
-. 
Apia. he smiles. He sluln h11 
bead and """JS Ills slQaldcrs. 
"II~ - be""" ID ISOluc dlr 
om-. - U1S die Dalal. wlla. dlOqll 
...- ID rid llis borne or romp oc· 
._.an IS llO naif. ""Tbcy Ire lbe -popuroas-.·· 
Gi-it:n die Busb admuibilllui"s ~­
KIMI ID llctJinJ. and p•en dlr U.S. 
,...__., rcfasal IO r=optU hlS 
.,._-.re.""' o.w Lama 
IS Ille~ of potiacwhen nkcd 1(bt 
CSJllllC1S Ill)' mpparr from WISlhnfDI 
II fas dfon ID l'Clllnl IO TiboL 
"11ic lllllUde o( lbe ldnumsllllton 
bas been mDft and nae favanblc." 
he..,.. polillrl)' ... , dJlalt 11111 -
peaple. 110 ftllllCt what lllcy ClpRU 
Clllhtlldly.a ~--
Symimb)'. boweTa'. -.rU - sa Ille 
Clllliae0111 olTiba. 
Md die Dal&i k-. IL 
"l'lmaol llld =-,,_._. n....-itlcam"ICS formducalt 
llCttSSltl' •llanJC:· sayt lllc Dalaa. 
""lbe - respanse - bt l!'PIMll 
., China .. indl die --' ....... 
111111111)' """*<II m nosponse ID calant· 
alislll llld baman npu 111 odlef !*IS 
ordle-i.t. .. 
Thou1b he flu an oa1er almnen 
11111 btfm a 111111 who an ina:c bs .,. 
miry bai:t .. die 1"11 caxury. when 
die tint Dllas Lama lpptlml oa lbe 
soene. dlis Dalal L.aata-che I .,b 
Ollar lam>-<• no t1malun1 •iolei 
when II ClllllCS ID maklllJ a poalt. 
""Tiiey Ire mis""'I 111 orpn. •• he 
.. ,.. or 111c °""""' leaden - ""'° 
refused .. let""" boclr: ia die..,._, 
"Tbc I~ orpa d """'"I- They 
ft llOI btaml •Ila WC - ID Sly 
Figure 26 
New Haven Advocate, October 17, 1991 
520 
Figure 27 
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opporrunity to put forward a clear message: 
I put the US national press corps in front of his face. for him to 
totally and completely exploit their media outlets with his message 
about this trip, and he presented it as a more equivocal kind of trip 
that doesn't serve him or the Movement well. 
One of the Americans in the room seconded Kelly's point. arguing that the Tibetan 
leader departed from the "very fine speech about the announcement of the trip back 
to Tibet" and "gave a dharma talk instead." 
As Kelly noted. the Dalai Lama's tendency to equivocate runs like a thread 
throughout his public appearances in the West. According to the Paones. the Dalai 
Lama did much the same thing at a press conference held in Los Angeles in 1989 
prior to the Kalachakra. Although the audience of reporters wanted to discuss the 
political situation in Tibet, Frances recalled, "he gave them teachings on 
compassion, to the press conference ... it was wonderful to listen to ... but it's hard 
for a journalist to walk away with a substantive story, if they can convince their 
editors that this is the story." Marvelling at the Dalai Lama's reluctance to make 
the most of his media opportunities, Frances cited his appearance on CBS's "Sixty 
Minutes" where 
they were handing him the questions-"don't you think China's been 
a little bit harsh on Tibet?" and His Holiness took the question and 
went somewhere else with it. He didn't say. "they're sons of 
bitches, they have sterilization programs, they have forced abortions. 
they have torture." He didn't go into this whole litany of things, I 
mean it was handed to him!9 
The Dalai Lama's determined optimism and jovial manner often confuse reporters. 
audiences, even his fellow Tibetans, who expect him to stress the victimization of 
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Tibetans by China over the last four decades. ln trying to make sense of why che 
Tibetan leader is cautious in his public statements on Tibet, Kelly suggested it is 
because of the impact his words might have on the lives of Tibetans inside Tibec 
whom she called "vinual hostages." However, as I argued above and in previous 
chapters, there are other reasons which might better explain the Dalai Lama's 
seeming reticence, including the tendency in Tibetan political culture toward 
"vagueness" and the tension between his commitment to Buddhist universalism and 
Tibetan nationalism. 
Kelly's analysis of the Yale press conference elicited strong reactions from 
people at the meeting, including two Tibetan government employees who up to chis 
point had kept silent during her presentation. Their story of what "really 
happened" at Yale was fascinating and revealing, both of the inner workings of che 
exile administration and the way in which the Dalai Lama makes decisions. With 
frustration in his voice. one Tibetan official (I'll call him "Namgyal") who 
participated in the planning of the event began by saying that everyone agreed Yale 
was a "wonderful place for him to make a speech; he agreed, he prepared, and 
then finally his own staff people said that no, this is not the first point co give that 
message." Blaming conflicting advice on the Dalai Lama's friends and staff 
members who traveled with him from lndia for the Dalai Lama's equivocation. 
Namgyal recalled: 
So what happens, the very last moment, just one hour before he 
delivered his message, he becomes indecisive. Because he gets 
different feeling. For many months we've been saying that Bush 
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went to Yale to give his China policy statement ... you should go and 
give your China policy at Yale. He said. alright. I'll do it! rm 
going to say it. Then he lands here in the United States. and I do 
not worry but some of his advisors tell him no. you should not talk 
politics at YaJe. that's not the right place. You are misusing the 
hospitality. He backed out! 
At this point of the narrative. an American activist chimed in: "I was there. At 11 
am he was ready to go with the speech in a modified form; by 2 o ·clock he'd 
changed. by 4 o'clock he changed again. 6 o'clock it was down to ... " Looking ac 
Kelly, Namgyal added "he should do it! Because we have already circulated your 
statement" [referring to Kelly's press release]. 
To prove his point, Namgyal mentioned another incident that also took 
place during the Year of Tibet in which the Dalai Lama's susceptibility to advice is 
well illustrated: 
For months together many of you have been telling us this 
organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, is the most 
important and most prestigious forum for him to go and talk. All 
right! We worked very hard arranging it ... and then someone goes 
and tells His Holiness that it's a bunch of retired people, that they're 
not important! 
At this point everyone in the room asked Namgyal who were the people giving the 
Dalai Lama this sort of advice. Saying it was not important and refusing to 
divulge any names, Namgyal's candid remarks suggest the existence of a group of 
senior advisors in the Dalai Lama's entourage who appear to have a somewhat 
different agenda from other exile officials, including those working in the West, 
and whose influence over the Tibetan leader's decision-making processes is 
considerable. What is important, Namgyal stressed, "is that those of us must give 
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him clear message, must give him consistent advice. because if we tell him all kind 
of different things ... " He continued his discussion of the issue by remarking that 
what was needed was a clear hierarchy of access to the Tibetan leader so that when 
he comes to the U.S .. for example. he speaks to only the most important 
mainstream reporters and activists pass information through his representative 
rather than demand a private audience with him. He lamented that generally 
people, including members of the press, want "direct access" to the Dalai Lama 
and feel that if they have to go through his representative, it reflects negatively on 
their status. 10 
Although Kelly criticized the equivocal manner in which the Dalai Lama 
presented his desire to go back to Tibet, she argued that from a media perspective 
the idea of wanting to go home was "wonderful": 
"I am going to Tibet"-that was, on a media level, a fantastic 
opening. It framed the coverage .. .in a rather exciting way ... You 
got lots of coverage of this announcement ... The idea of this trip. 
that the Dalai Lama wants to go home to talk to his people about 
non-violence, it is a provocative idea. 
What made the idea especially provocative, she told activists, is that the Dalai 
Lama invited the world press to accompany him. In doing so, he played "right 
into the middle of their self-interest in a very clever way." 
Now, every reporter who has an interest in Tibet knows that this 
would be a big deal to be standing at the border with Nepal, with 
His Holiness while he was turned back, and they would all want to 
be standing there to get that picture. I can only tell you what it was 
like when Kim II Jong went home and he put out a call saying I'll 
let the press ride on the plane with me. I mean people were 
trampling all over each other to get on that plane! 
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Kelly then asked activists •What happened afrer the Dalai Lama announced the 
trip'?• ·Nothing• was her answer. What should have been done to maintain a 
coherent media campaign. according to Kelly. was that five or six days lat.er. when 
news of riots in Lhasa came over the wire services in mid-October (1991). there 
should have been another press release using the events in Tibet to justify the Dalai 
Lama's desire to return to his homeland. In this way. the idea ·continues to be 
provoked.· At the same time. Kelly added. the idea needs to be ·endorsecr by 
people in the press in the United States: in this way, the story becomes not a news 
story but an editorial story. To make this transition, activists were told they 
should have pressured newspaper columnists and scheduled editorial briefings soon 
after the DaJai Lama·s announcement in order to •keep the story moving.· By 
doing so, it ·allows the press to continue to talk about you.• 
Kelly then outlined the next stage of what should have been done to funhcr 
the Tibetans· media strategy: the Dalai Lama should have taken some kind of very 
public action through which he reiterates. again. his desire to go home to talk to 
his people. By doing some visible action which is covered by the press. she 
suggested. the world media ·which are essentially on your side. is used to provoke 
government response.• If the request to go home was not a serious one. ·if it was 
just like everybody yelling at all the TibetanS that you had to do something• and 
they came up with this idea. Kelly encouraged activists to be honest with each 
other and create a media strategy to modify the press• expectations. 
Kelly warned activists that they were now playing for very high stakes. that 
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by raising the ante so much. they could ·screw up really. really badly· by not 
following through. 
On a political level. you·ve raken the U.S. government ro the point 
where you have resolutions in Congress that call China.·s occupation 
illegal. you have the President of the United States meeting with the 
Dalai Lama •.• you are not just suppon groups who know some of the 
facts. You are panicipating in the most complex bilateral foreign 
policy debate of the United States. in terms of your role in the 
discussion with China. It means that your spokespersons. your press 
releases. everything you publish. your informal relationships with 
the press. have to be rooted in opponunities to put forward expenise 
and analysis. 
Kelly acknowledged her role in helping Tibetans to ·raise the ante• by being so 
successful at generating media coverage of the Dalai Lama"s Yale announcement· 
Remember that rve been beating myself. like. oh my god. why did I 
rake it so seriously. because rve now put you on the line with Jim 
Mann who is the Los Angeles Times' China expen; I put you on the 
line when I got Mark Cousins, foreign editor at NBC and Tom 
Brokaw on the phone and said ·1ook something's gonna happen at 
Yale. His Holiness is malcing the most significant announcement he·s 
made ro date. if you·re not there. you·re going ro kick 
yourselr ..• and then I gave them enough little teases ro let them 
know that it was important so that they were there and did a 
story ..• they·re waiting now to see what happens. 
By putting Tibetans on the line. Kelly had also put her own credibility on the line 
with her colleagues in the press. After all. when her job on the Year of Tibet 
ended. Kelly would move on to help the Croats. among other groups. In order to 
do for them what she did for the Tibetans. her credibility would be crucial. Kelly 
concluded her comments on the Dalai Lama's Yale appearance by suggesting 
activists think more seriously about ·packaging• for the media. Having raised the 
ante so high. she argued. they could no longer afford not to do so. 
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Paclr•ging the Dalai Lama 
Kelly: I guess what rm suggesting is that you need to think a 
liale bit more about packaging to the media •• .I think 
the role of the Dalai Lama. as an internationally 
known personality. using that perception of who he is. 
the relationships he establishes. what people project 
onto him and accept from him. he could be using that 
more to communicate a media message if in fact it got 












from who he is. a simple Buddhist monk. 
So you·re suggesting that His Holiness adopt a media 
strategy? 
Yes. I would suggest. and forgive me for being 
arrogant enough ro say this. but I have tt>-1 would 
suggest that the government-in-exile adopt a media 
strategy also. 
Well. that·s different. 
r said also! 
r think ifs a problem asking His Holiness to adopt a 
media Strategy. 
I know. 
I just think it is a problem asking His Holiness to 
adopt a med12 strategy that packages his message in a 
certain wiy. 
By suggesting that the Daa1 Lama adopt a media strategy. Kelly touched a nerve. 
as the above exchange between Kelly and an American activist demonstrates. 
Indeed. despite the fact that act1v1sts aclcnowledged the Dalai Lama's 
528 
indecisiveness. panicularly with regard to the Yale incident. they nevenheless 
expressed a deep sensitivity to suggestions that somehow the fault might lie with 
the Tibetan leader himself. As I have already argued. Tibetans worship the Dalai 
Lama with a faith both devout and nationalist. Therefore it is not surprising that 
Kelly"s critique of his performance at Yale. in addition to claims that he was 
·over-cxposecr during the Year of Tibet and that he is not considered a good 
interView by members of the American press. rankled and puzzled his supponers at 
the meeting. 
Keny·s role as mediator was evident in her discussion of the need for the 
Dalai Lama to adopt a media strategy in that she spent a lot of time explaining the 
mechanics of media. most importantly the fact that ·media do not understand 
through explanation. they understand through pictures.• That is, the Tibetan 
leader"s actions ·have to express more simply and clearly what he believes.• One 
of the problems about ·a personage lilce His Holiness.• Kelly told activists. ·is that 
when you have to keep talking and talking. the media messes up what you say. 
they contradict what you say. they over-evaluate. they over-explain it. and they get 
bored with iL • Her point was that ·someone lilce His Holiness has to appear more 
and more in the press with what he does. not what he says.• Arguing that the 
Tibetan leader needs to have an ·aaive presence• in order to generate substantive 
media coverage. Kelly suggested he consider presenting himself as the ·most 
famous refugee in the world.· and that he begin to do things that connect him to 
other refugees and their suffering. If he did this. it would dovetail well with what 
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Tibetans might want to accomplish at the U.N. and vis a vis China: 
China's hold on the world is its hold on the third world, in many 
ways ... His Holiness starts popping up in Africa to experience a camp 
of refugees in the Sudan, or Ethiopia, or Ghana, the Chinese go ape-
shit! ... it puts him in a forum where he has things to talk about that 
are new ... 
Kelly suggested that the Tibetan leader, "just for the sake of who he is, is 
overexposed." Perplexed, one of the activists in the room asked "over-exposed or 
over-extended?" When Kelly replied, the American man asked what she meant. 
She claimed that the Dalai Lama had been in the press too much recently just for 
being a Nobel Prize winner; that there had not been enough about what he does on a 
substantive level. She told activists "He should never open his mouth with nothing 
to say." To this, several people in the room responded defensively, "but he always 
has something to say!" Referring again to the Livet Reichart involvement in the 
Kalachakra, Kelly also pointed out that there were too many pictures of the Dalai 
Lama "appearing in too many newspapers of too much confusion." She urged 
activists to control photographers' access next time the Tibetan leader came to the 
U.S. in order to guard against a blizzard of contradictory images. 
When someone asked Kelly why the Dalai Lama had not yet had the "one-
on-one half hour or hour with Tom Brokaw, like Anwar Sadat," she quickly replied, 
"because he doesn't deserve it," plus, she added, "many in the press feel that His 
Holiness is a BAD interview." She described the process through which decisions to 
do such interviews are made: 
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It has to be someone who has something to say that is so provocative 
and so interesting within the context of what the media judges as 
interesting ... now. the Dalai Lama is infinitely interesting. has a very 
provocative and important message but based on the way the press 
makes it judgment. he doesn't have the actions or the hook to make 
that framework right now. Sadat wouldn •t have had it before the 
Camp David experience: Oandhi wouldn't have had it before the salt 
march. 
Kelly's comments took many people in the room aback. including one prominent 
American activist who defended the DaJai Lama, arsuing •tt is the failure of his 
staff and the people working with him, but not his failure.• At th~ same, 
however, the man admitted that in the put, the Dalai Lama had not always been 
encouraged to ·ra1ce a more powerful tone as a world moral leader and be more 
blunt and straightforward and outspoken.• As a result, he observed. 
he seems to temporize on issues. when Tom Brokaw asks him a 
question and he goes, •well I don't know, and maybe this and it's 
not for me to say• ... he·s full of all this self-doubt. That's where the 
message doesn't come across. Whereas when he talks as an aside 
during a dharma lecture or to friends during a penonal interview. he 
is incredibly dynamic and his message is incredibly inspiring. 
Another activist suggested that it was Kelly's choice of the word •deserved· that 
·has put everybody on edge as it means that he's not done something he should be 
doing.· adding that the Tibetan leader 
has a certain way of presenting things which is his very individual 
and personal way of doing things. Nothing is going to change that. 
At this point one of the Dalai Lama's representatives to North America told the 
group two anecdotes that illustrate the Dalai Lama's distinctive way of doing 
things: 
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Like for instance, when he was invited co Washington, he also 
accepted an invii.:ltion from a college in Findlay, Ohio. The people 
in Findlay, they we.-e shocked to find out, why's His Holiness 
visiting here, a small town, and someone from Findlay called me to 
say "why is His Holiness choosing Findlay as part of his visit?" 
... He visits Washington, Boston, New York, not a really small town 
in Ohio. What does he want to accomplish by visiting a small town? 
The group of activists sitting around the table laughed heartily as he continued: 
l'm telling you His Holiness does not judge wha~ he can accomplish 
by coming to a place, of course we do have severa! invitations, and 
out of several. he just picks one. And he thinks that perhaps by 
visiting this particular university, he can benefit those who have 
invited him. Of course, we try to make recommendations, but then 
he doesn't go through the recommendations, he has his own choices. 
This anecdote reflects the Dalai Lama's Buddhist conviction that his primary 
purpose is to provide spiritual "benefit" to those with whom he comes into contact. 
His deep commitment and unconventional ways were further underscored by the 
representative's second anecdote: 
When the Nobel Peace Prize was announced ... we were in Newport 
Beach. And we had calls from all the media networks, including 
Diane Sawyer, she wanted to interview His Holiness. We went to 
His Holiness and explained that we have a lot of demand for the 
interview. Then he said there is no time. Just bring the schedule. 
And we got the schedule and there was some unimportant meetings 
and then we suggested that we could cancel a few of them. He said, 
"Look, no matter whether these are important or not, we have 
committed to meet these people three months back. Now how could 
I say that I have more important work to do and cancel these and 
give an interview? I can't do that." He said that if there is any time 
left over after meeting these people, we are free to schedule. But of 
course after meeting these people there was no time ... 
Kelly's response to the representative's evident exasperation was to suggest that he 
and other activists view the Dalai Lama's difference from other people as a 
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potential strength: 
The frustration of dealing with somebody who would rather keep a 
three month commitment than have lunch with Diane Sawyer is, of 
course, mind-boggling. But the other part is that it sends our a 
strong image that this is a person who will control their message. 
So that has to be used as a strength ... that's something that 
everybody who deals with media around him has to understand. It's 
a characteristic about him that is strong ... you accept that as a reality 
and you plan on how you are going to get the Diane Sawyer 
imerview ... but it's you being in control, not reacting. 
Kelly recalled that when she had been offered the job working on the Year of 
Tibet, she hesitated because her colleagues in the press said that it was "too 
confusing dealing with the Tibet Movement, you never know who you are talking 
to." The story I had heard about Diane Sawyer underscores Kelly's point: when 
the Nobel Peace Prize was announced, the Office of Tibet in New York was 
practically empty as the entire staff had gone with the Tibetan leader to California. 
With only one young person left in charge of the phones (who in fact had trouble 
reaching the Tibetans after the announcement herself), many press requests, 
including Sawyer's, went unanswered. 
Kelly said her solution to the Sawyer interview dilemma would have been to 
tell her office that the Tibetan leader was already committed but to invite her to go 
to Dharamsala in a month to interview him. She urged activists to learn to take 
control of their representation and their relationships with the press, stressing that 
the key is being in control of their agenda and the press' access to their main 
spokesperson. For Tibetans to take control of their representation, they need to 
have some degree of control over the Dalai Lama in terms of where he goes and 
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whom he talks to. However. as the anecdotes about Findlay, Ohio and Diane 
Sawyer demonstrate, the Tibetan leader is not necessarily controllable and rarely 
sticks to his own "script." much less that of his handlers. 
ln an introductory speech to the media workshop at the "Tibet Conference 
of the Americas" thirteen months after the post-Year of Tibet meeting. Lodi Gyari. 
the Dalai Lama's special envoy to Washington. D.C. and president of the 
lnternational Campaign for Tibet. expressed his reservations about trying to 
"package" the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue. 
Some people say that the Tibetan government and me are 
conservative, but everything in the U.S. is so commercialized, 
everything is packaged. everything is sold, like a commerical 
product. This is how you sell your president, this is how you sell 
your senators. congressmen. your products, everything is sold as an 
item. Now with Tibet, the strength of the Tibetan Movement is 
very unique. there's something different. there's something which I 
think we should never package. For example. I don't think we 
should ever try to package and sell His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
because he is a great man, because he's specialized precisely at 
being the opposite. 
At the same time, I do agree that we have to refine our 
approach, I myself have been trying to find a kind of middle path, a 
middle way. while maintaining our unique characteristic way of 
doing things, at the same time make it effective by adopting some of 
the specialized tactics. For example, as I said the other day, 
everywhere, particularly in this town, Washington, D.C .• all the 
governments, all the major corporations hire very highly qualified 
and skilled public relations firms to promote their cause with the 
government, with the Congress. There have been many suggestions 
... that we should try to hire a qualified person to help promote the 
cause of Tibet and somehow I have always had hesitations, I have 
always resisted the idea because as I said earlier, I'm not just saying 
it because she's here but Jane Kelly has been an exceptional person 
in this field. I have had experience with others and to be frank, you 
are almost told to redefine your goals so that they can sell you ... now 
that is something I find not acceptable because I think that for us the 
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most important thing is our goals, our principles. Now if you have 
to redefine them or redesign them ... or compromise or replace 
them ... they are really not worth it. Therefore I have been very 
resistant to that. 
Gyari's remarks about the media's tendency to sell politicians, along with just 
about everything else, are representative of the attitudes most other Tibetans have 
toward the press. I suggest that in addition to wanting not to compromise the 
principles on which the Dalai Lama's leadership of the Movement is based, the 
issue of control is one of the reasons Tibetan officials have resisted "packaging" 
the Tibet issue and the Dalai Lama. As we saw in chapter 8, Tibetan officials 
were unhappy with the fact that Tibet House made it possible for activists across 
the country to not have to go to them for information, in that the "Year of Tibet 
starter kit" gave Americans the means to create their own event without first 
calling the Office of Tibet or the International Campaign for Tibet. By resisting 
suggestions about how to "frame" their message, Tibetans in effect resist Western 
influence which, as we have already seen, is substantial in a number of arenas of 
Tibet activism. In other words, by holding back information and not conforming 
to the requirements of the mainstream media, Tibetan officials believe (on some 
level) they can hold onto their power and continue to control the way the Tibet 
issue is handled and represented. 
Despite his criticism of Western-style "packaging" of issues and people, 
Lodi Gyari revealed that he had nevertheless learned something through the process 
of working with Jane Kelly on the Year of Tibet. He demonstrated this fact by 
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mentioning two instances in which he and his colleagues failed to frame the 
importance of two things which were consequently misinterpreted by the press as 
well as the ge:ieral pub I ic. The first instance was the announcement of the 
Strasbourg proposal by the Dalai Lama at a visit to the European Parliament in 
June 1988. (According to the proposal, Tibet would relinquish its right co conduct 
its own foreign policy in exchange for "total and real autonomy within the whole 
of traditional Tibet.") According to Gyari, who was in charge of the lnternational 
Relations and Information Office in the government-in-exile at the time, he failed 
to see that it was framed properly so that the media understood its significance and 
value. As a result, 
all the media came out with bad headlines, such as "the Dalai Lama 
compromises," "Dalai Lama gives up on independence," very 
negative headlines ... the fact is that many people, including some our 
own people, immediately jumped to the conclusion that it really was 
a sellout. Then it became impossible to do any damage control and 
people didn't even want to read it! 
The other incident which was misinterpreted by the press was the Tibetan attempt 
to get China's record on human rights in Tibet condemned at the 1992 session of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Proud of his and others' 
efforts, Gyari told the audience that they did very well at the Commission, despite 
the fact that they ultimately lost the resolution on China. Unfortunately, they were 
so busy that they forgot to think about how their efforts should be projected: 
Word went out that Tibetans were defeated, that we lost .. .I think 
that if we had had someone like Jane Kelly helping us, it would have 
made it an entirely different story. The whole idea of going was not 
just to get the resolution through, it was to create awareness, to raise 
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the issue at the highest level. 
By acknowledging that having a media strategist involved could have helped in 
these instances, Gyari demonstrated a new level of consciousness about the role 
media strategizing can play in communicating political messages. 
The discourse of information management 
In my discussion of representation and cultural difference in chapter 8. I cited 
Ginsburg's argument about the importance of looking at the activities and social 
organization of media work as arenas of cultural production (1994c:378). I extend 
her point by exploring public relations/media coordination as a related form of 
cultural production worthy of ethnographic attention. 
Many scholars have written about the defining power of the mainstream 
media. Nowhere is this more evident than in the domain of politics. In her book 
"Prime Time Activism," (1991), Ryan argues that mainstream media tend to 
reinforce the political views of the powerful by promoting insiders' "framing" of 
events and by employing notions of "newsworthiness" that reinforce the status quo 
(ibid., 5). In this way, she writes, "media help set the social and political agenda 
by deciding what's news and who's news" (ibid., 7). Because of the central role 
media play in assigning importance to issues facing the public, 
media framing (or "packaging") has become a fundamentally political activity. 
As the sheer amount of information and media outlets has proliferated, 
media professionals who specialize in "framing"--defined by Ryan as the "ordering 
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of information into a coherent story" -have come to play a crucial role in the 
production of media. These individuals. whose titles range from "publicist" to 
"communications coordinator" to "media strategist." are essentially intermediaries 
in the creation process of media; their basic goal is twofold: to represent their 
client's interpretation or "point of view" to the press and to present his or her 
client as a credible and regular source of information. (As Kelly's comment about 
the press· view of the Tibet Movement ("you never know who you are talking to") 
reveals, Tibetans are not regarded as reliable sources by mainstream media and 
thus are not regularly contacted in routine newsgathering processes. For this 
reason, Kelly urged activists to develop long-term relationships with reporters and 
to improve the quality of their press materials so that they might eventually become 
valued sources.) 
In the process of representing their client's point of view, media strategists 
must compete with other "sources," including newsmakers such as government and 
corporate figures, informed commentators, as well as other publicists, all of whom 
are busy putting forward their own interpretation of events or issues. As a result, 
not only is news not an objective mirror of the day's happenings, it is profoundly 
shaped by these outside "sponsors" who seek to intervene in the decision-making 
processes of editors and reporters: 
In the process of story-making, reporters and editors do not 
necessarily search out raw happenings, since deadlines and short-
staffing severely curb the investigative urge. Instead, they are 
bombarded by prepared, pre-packaged events aggressively marketed 
by sponsors who, be they establishment institutions or social 
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movements, hope these events will carry their frames in media 
coverage. (Ryan 1991:75) 
During my fieldwork at Tibet House, I observed Jane Kelly preparing press 
releases and press kits on the Year of Tibet to be delivered to major news 
organizations such as the New York Times and NBC. After these were sent. she 
followed up with telephone calls in order to suggest potential "angles" through 
which her "story" might be covered. In listening to her talk on the phone. it 
became clear that she had close contacts with several individuals at each 
organization and that her access enabled her to "pitch" stories with relative ease to 
important journalists. The fact that Kelly was largely successful in generating 
news coverage of the Dalai Lama's visit to Yale as well as several feature stories 
on the Year of Tibet, most of which carried her "frarne"-e.g., the "remarkable 
duality" of the Dalai Lama as a Buddhist monk and statesman-underscores the fact 
that media organizations exist in a complex, interdependent relationship with 
"sources," including publicists/media strategists. 
Tibetans have a distinctively different approach to information from their 
Western counterparts, which, as I argued earlier, accounts in part for their 
wariness of the practices of public relations/media coordination. In her public 
presentation at the "Tibet Conference of the Americas" in 1993, Jane Kelly 
revealed some of the basic assumptions of public relations as she tried to explain 
the role of information and the press in American society to activists: 
Within our culture, we view open information as something which is 
the grease that makes the system work, if in fact you have a whole 
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country of people who have information and who can participate in 
decisions based on the information they have. So the press is a very 
important part of society here, it's a part of the society that both 
creates the culture and reflects the culture. 
Although Kelly asserts that the circulation of information is key to an open society. 
public relations discourse also assumes that information has to be managed: 
My work is basically in how you communicate information, my 
primary interest has always been once people have information. what 
they can do with it, so my starting point is working with the 
information itself, finding ways to get it into vehicles, and get it to 
people. 
As information managers, publicists/media strategists are very self-conscious about 
their audiences. Kelly demonstrated this fact in her presentation when she urged 
activists to learn how to "segment" the press into different categories and approach 
them in the appropriate way: 
There are newspapers, there's television, there's magazines, I think 
more and more we have to look at the alternative sources of 
information that go beyond the Washington Post editorial, Nightline. 
or a New York Times front page story .. .It's important in defining 
your communication goals to have a strong sense of who your 
audience is. That audience again is multi-tiered, and is different at 
different times ... 
One of the goals of a good media strategist then is to generate media coverage that 
is in dialogue with specific audiences. 
In a recent essay, Ginsburg noted the various ways in which mass media 
"are contributing to the mediation and construction of cultural difference within 
and across societies" (1994a). Following her point, I argue that public 
relations/media strategizing practices represent a powerful and far-reaching form of 
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cultural mediation that parallels and extends the mediation that takes place through 
the display of culture described in the two previous chapters. 
As I have tried to demonstrate. Kelly played an important mediating role 
between the press and activists during the Year of Tibet. In the process of 
initiating activists into the culture of the American mainstream media. she herself 
was initiated. so to speak, into the culture of the Movement. For me. Kelly served 
a crucial diagnostic function in that she identified a fundamental problem at the 
hean of the Movement-the lack of a unified goal and hence "message" from 
Dharamsala. During my research, I realized that the lack of communication 
between groups and between activists and Dharamsala, about which American 
activists constantly complain, was not simply a practical problem but rather that it 
represented a central dynamic permeating all levels of the Movement and reaching 
all the way to the top to the Dalai Lama himself. Less emotionally invested than 
her clients, Kelly was the first person to articulate the problem in such direct 
terms. 
Kelly served a similar purpose for Tibetan and American activists who 
clearly had their consciousnesses raised through her presence. This was especially 
evident during my interviews with the people with whom she worked most closely 
at Tibet House and Tibet Center, who referred to and quoted her frequently. ln 
the process of working with Kelly and then seeing their actions reflected through 
her eyes at the post-Year of Tibet meeting, activists gained a certain self-
consciousness about their roles as mediators of Tibetanness to the general public. 
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Though activists clearly negotiated these roles in relation to different stakes and 
toward a number of different commitments (as we saw in chapters 8 and 9), in this 
moment they overcame their differences and saw themselves as engaged in a 
collective action with a shared purpose. 
Conclusion 
One of the larger points that can be drawn from my analysis is the fact that co 
understand the Tibet Movement's encounter with the American press in 199l, it is 
necessary to undersrand the degree to which it was profoundly shaped by Tiberan 
cultural values and attitudes. Tibetans' reluctance to relinquish control of their 
image/representation to mass culture circuits they could not control, as I argued, 
stemmed from a distrust and ambivalence toward the press and a different approach 
to information. In making this argument, I engage Escobar's call (1992) for an 
anthropology of social movements that takes into account the intertwined nature of 
culture and political practice. Because the discipline has tended to ignore social 
movement theory, Escobar suggests, a gap has arisen recently in anthropology 
between "the link between the cultural and the political," and "the nature and 
modes of political practice" (ibid., 401). My focus on the social processes through 
which media representations of Tibetanness were produced during the Year of 
Tibet enabled me to address this gap by allowing me to look at the "micro-level of 
everyday practices and their imbrication with larger processes" (ibid., 420) and in 
so doing, to move toward "a more dynamic understanding of culture, a new 
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theorization of the political and of otherness and difference" (ibid., 419). At rhe 
same time, my examination of the role of media and mediation involved in political 
campaigns such as the Year of Tibet suggests a fruitful arena for future 
anthropological research, one that is largely unexamined but extremely important ro 
understanding contemporary social movements. 
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Notes 
l. The quote is from an internal memorandum circulated prior to the meeting. 
Although the Year of Tibet did not officially end until March 1992 and events 
continued up to that date. the meeting was held to take advantage of the support 
generated by the high profile events in New York City. 
2. This figure is from 1991; the source is Jane Kelly. 
3. Before 1987. relatively little was written about the Tibet issue; that which was 
written was often inaccurate or ill-informed. To a large extent. China's tight control 
over information coming out of Tibet accounts for this gap. though the lack of an 
organized "lobby" or movement in the West is also an important factor. 
For an analysis of the coverage of Tibetan refugee and Chinese perspectives on 
Tibet based on a year-long survey of the U.S. media (June 1987-June 1988), see 
Carlson 1992. 
4. In a report to her Tibetan clients. a media strategist hired to handle the Kalachakra 
in Los Angeles wrote: "I discovered that opinions about media messages, print 
materials, spokespeople, and planning strategy varied greatly among the people 
pro~iding me direction and felt at least one media planning meeting with all key 
decision makers would have greatly reduced the confusion." 
5. In this chapter. [ have used quotes to highlight certain key words in Kelly's public 
relations/media strategy discourse. e.g. "provoke," "story," and so on. 
6. Tibetans are not only sensitive to tough political criticism or questioning by the 
media. They are also sensitive to what they deem to be disrespectful treatment of 
the Dalai Lama by members of the press. One such example of this latter point took 
place at a press conference prior to the Year of Tibet in late September 1991 where 
the Dalai Lama was treated very disrespectfully by a reporter from the "Howard 
Stem Show" who stood up and asked him if people ever say "hello Dolly" to him 
(or something along those lines}. The Dalai Lama did not understand the question 
and it had to be translated into Tibetan and the joke explained. The Tibetans in the 
room reacted immediately to this affront to their leader's dignity. glaring and 
glowering at the young man who was the only person to laugh at his joke. 
7. Kelly reiterated this point in her talk at the Washington. D.C. conference in 1993: 
I have never worked before with a movement or group of people 
who had more friends in the press than this community. You have 
some of the most powerful friends in the press that I've ever 
encountered in any group I've worked with. Your message is 
interesting and important on a personal level to managing editors of 
major network television programs, to managing editors of 
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newspapers. editorial page editors. foreign editors ... 
8. The staging of press conferences prior to events such as this one are a standard 
public relations procedure. They allow reponers to hear the gist of what someone is 
going to say without necessarily having to sit through an entire event and it provides 
them the opportunity to ask questions. Often reponers cobble together stories from 
what they hear at a press conference and from press releases which contain excerpcs. 
if not entire copies, of the statements made in person. 
9. In an article in the New Republic, Jim Holt (1991) made the following observation 
about the Dalai Lama's public talk at the Paramount Theater during the Year of 
Tibet: 
Politically, the Dalai Lama's message was oddly quietistic. "If you 
want to cultivate inner serenity. we were told, "the external 
environment cannot harm you." What about the long suffering 
people of Tibet, someone in the audience wanted to know? How can 
we help them? "We'll talk about that some other time" was the 
response. 
According to my fieldnotes, when asked this question, the Tibetan leader said quite 
a bit about Tibet. including the fact that Tibet is occupied; "human rights violations 
in Tibet are immeasurable" and so on. He concluded by saying that what is being 
done is still inadequate "but we'll talk about that later." The point is that the press 
is also at fault sometimes, misquoting the Dalai Lama in order to show him in an 
unfavorable light. 
10. In her presentation, Kelly urged Tibetans to set aside enough time for the Dalai 
Lama to meet one on one with the more important journalists, such as Tom Brokaw 
and Peter Jennings. 
The other issue is that you HA VE to allow time in his schedule not 
for interviews only that are going to result in coverage. but for the 
appropriate background briefings with the most influential media 
who want to be briefed and have occasional meetings with him. 
Unfortunately, those have to be one on one. You know, Tom 
Brokaw doesn't want to have breakfast with the Dalai Lama and with 
Peter Jennings; it just isn't going to work! 
545 
Chapter 11 Conclusion 
Introduction 
[n chapter I. [ observed that the issue of producing a collective identity in the 
absence of a politically recognized territorial base is one of the most interesting 
and challenging problems of contemporary life. where large-scale migrations and 
displacement have disrupted any presumed balance between space and cultural 
identity. Tibetan refugees represent an unusual and virtually undocumented group 
whose relative success in producing a transnational Tibetan identity is deserving of 
scholarly attention. ln this dissertation, [ have focused on the processes through 
which "Tibetanness" is produced in exile and how that identity is used co mobilize 
support for the Tibet cause. The degree to which Tibetans incorporate non-
Tibetans into these processes has been my starting point; [ have found the most 
fruitful context in which to examine this phenomenon to be the "Tibet Movement" -
-an ethnographically rich nexus of people and activities. discourses and 
representations, and as such an important domain in which understandings of what 
it means to be Tibetan are formulated. circulated and contested by both Tibetans 
and their Western supporters. 
Representations of Tibetann~ 
This dissertation is based on the assertion that unlike most other refugee groups. 
Tibetans have a set of religious and cultural traditions which are deeply appealing 
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to some Westerners. For these individuals, Tibet-as "Shangri-la" --represents 
spiritual values that have been lost in the dominant rational cultures of the 
industrialized world. In the beginning of the thesis, I suggested that these 
representations of and fantasies about Tibetanness have mediated relations between 
Tibetans and Westerners for most of this century, leading me to pose the questions: 
how have these representations shaped the production of a collective Tibetan 
identity in diaspora? How are they used by activists to produce an exotic 
Tibecanness for a particular political end? 
To answer the first question entails consideration of the role Westerners 
played in the early years of refugee life in exile. When the Dalai Lama fled Tibet 
in 1959, he was followed by thousands of people, many of whom literally dropped 
what they were doing when they heard news of their leader's flight and walked out 
of Tibet with only the clothes and valuables they could carry on their backs. 
Within a very short period of time, the Dalai Lama and his newly formed 
government-in-exile found themselves confronted with the monumental task of 
resettling and rehabilitating a flood of destitute refugees. Having few resources of 
their own, the Tibetans turned to the government of India and to Western aid 
agencies for help. As we saw in chapter 5, assistance was immediately 
fonhcoming from both sources. Although no doubt some of the Western aid 
agencies responded to requests for help out of a sense of humanitarian duty, many 
were quite eager to provide support for other reasons as well, including fascination 
with Tibet and a desire for interaction with Tibetan people. Compared to other 
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groups in similar situations. Tibetans have received a steady and substantial flow of 
aid which in the case of some agencies has continued for more than thiny years. 
Drawing on work by anthropologists in India (e.g .• Devoe 1983. 1987; Goldstein 
1975: Klieger 1992: and Nowak 1984). I argued that this aid. combined with 
resources provided by the Indian government, has formed the basis upon which 
Tibetans have been able to not just rehabilitate themselves, but more important. to 
reconstruct their religious and cultural institutions. Through the support of 
Western aid agencies and individuals, which was (and still is) based on certain 
ideas about Tibetanness, Tibetans have been able to maintain their Buddhist culture 
in exile. And as we have seen, it is Tibetan Buddhism which has proved to be the 
link and key to constructing a communal identity that subsumes regional and 
sectarian differences among refugees. By making this argument, I in no way mean 
to diminish or devalue either the important contributions the Indian government has 
made over the years to Tibetans' survival in exile, nor the perseverance and 
adaptability demonstrated by the Tibetans' themselves in the face of considerable 
hardship and dislocation. However, the degree and nature of West.em support for 
Tibetans as Tibetans is unusual and clearly crucial to their ability to flourish 
outside their homeland. 
To fully understand the role Westerners and their representations play in the 
exile community's ability to reproduce itself in exile, one must also look at how 
Tibetans have responded to outside interest and aid. I argue that just as Western 
donors construct Tibetans as worthy recipients of aid based on their spirituality 
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(see Devoe 1983; 1987), so Tibetans construct Westerners as sponsors. or sbyin-
bdag, patrons of religion. Since coming into exile, Tibetans have construed 
support from Western donors in terms of this traditional social relation. and in so 
doing transformed them from interested outsiders into patrons. What makes the 
use of this cultural construct so interesting is that Tibetans apply it both to Western 
Buddhists, whose patronage of lamas and their monasteries in India are a classic 
example of sbyin-bdag principles at work, as well as to non-Tibetans whose funds 
go to support the basic needs of ordinary Tibetans. The larger point is that 
Tibetans have not remained simply passive objects of Westerners' desires but have 
actively engaged these fantasies, entering into exchange relationships with donors 
which in turn have enabled them to reconstruct monasteries, establish schools. and 
basically "remain Tibetan" in exile. 
In chapters 8, 9, and 10, I extended my analysis to explore the part 
representations play in the process of poiitical mobilization. I argued that in the 
Year of Tibet campaign, Tibetan and Western activists productively engaged the 
first world fantasies of their audiences, framing Tibetans as inheritors and 
preservers of a vital spiritual tradition in need of protection by the rest of the 
world. Far from being constrained by Western expectations or desires for an 
exotic otherness, the Year of Tibet events suggest that Tibetans' power, to the 
extent that they have any, derives from their ability to transform Westerners' ideas 
about Tibetanness into political support. Yet we have to ask whether the exiles' 
reliance on the culture strategy, as I call it, and its mode of engaging outsiders 
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based on Tibetan Buddhism. merely reproduces the status quo (as some lay 
Tibetans argue) and inhibits progress in other. more explicitly political, arenas. 
Further work needs to be done on this question (see discussion below) and on the 
basic contradiction between the exile community's dependence on a form of 
Western sponsorship that is based on a fascination with traditional Tibetan culture. 
and the desire/need to reform exile society along more democratic lines. As 
chapter 5 reveals, unless or until the underlying lay/religious division of Tibetan 
society itself changes, the contradiction will not be easily resolved. 
The "middle ground" of Tibet activism 
As the above discussion suggests, the degree to which non-Tibetans (and their 
representations of Tibetanness) are incorporated into Tibetans' own processes of 
reproduction and political mobilization is without doubt the Tibetan diaspora's most 
distinctive characteristic. One of my goals in focusing on the social processes 
around the display of Tibetan "culture" during the Year of Tibet was to illustrate 
what was at stake in these cultural productions for Tibetan and American activists. 
This question reflects my larger theoretical interest in how intercultural alliances 
actually work "on the ground." However, as I stated in my introduction. when I 
set out to do this project, I found few models in the anthropological literature to 
explain the kind of intercultural phenomena I was witnessing in the field. 
Although the parallels between Tibet activism and other forms of activism which 
bring so-called "first world" and "third" or "fourth world" peoples together are 
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obvious and abundant. the number of ethnographic studies on how such alliances 
actually work remains relatively limited. Recently, Beth Conklin and Laura 
Graham published an article on Amazonian Indians in Brazil and transnational 
"eco-pol itics" ( 1995), which offers an interesting analysis of how such 
collaborations might be understood and which is relevant to the Tibetan case. 
In their discussion of Amazonian Indians and environmental activism. the 
authors use the concept of a "middle ground" (borrowed from historian Richard 
White) to characterize the relationship which has emerged between the Indians and 
first world activists in the course of working together. This middle ground 
involves "the construction of a mutually comprehensible world characterized by 
new systems of meaning and exchange" (White 1991:ix). As Conklin and Graham 
explain: 
White developed the middle ground concept to describe Indian-white 
relations in North America's Great Lakes region in the 17th to 19th 
centuries. Through processes of confrontation, negotiation, and 
creative innovation, Indians and non-Indians developed systems of 
communication and exchange through which both sides perceived 
their goals could be achieved. White argues that these middle 
grounds were pragmatic, mutually constructed accomodations that do 
not fit a simple rubric of domination, subordination, and 
acculturation. (Conklin and Graham 1995:695) 
Revising White's concept somewhat, the authors conclude that the contemporary 
middle ground they have discerned "is neither a geographic territory nor a social 
space where neighbors meet face-co-face. Instead, it is a political space, an arena 
of intercultural communication, exchange, and joint political action" (1995:696). 
The middle ground concept is useful in that it offers a way of understanding 
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how groups from different cultures. with different histories and commitments. can 
come together and form. however temporarily. an alliance which both sides 
perceive to be mutually beneficial. Conklin's and Graham's key insight is that the 
politics of the middle ground is a "symbolic politics" wherein "ideas and images. 
not common identity or economic interests." are what mobilize political actors 
across wide gulfs of distance. language. and culture (1995:696). In the case of the 
Tibet Movement. Tibetan and non-Tibetan activists share an attachment to a set of 
ideas about Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist culture which unites them across numerous 
boundaries. The alliance is enhanced by the unusually close "fit" between 
Westerners· and Tibetans• goals in terms of the former's desire for interaction and 
the latter's need for material and political suppon. 
One of the methods I used to discover the various attachments people have 
to Tibet and their involvement in the Movement was to analyze narratives by 
Tibetans who fled Tibet in 1959 and Westerners who visited Tibet nearly thirty 
years later. As I argued in chapter 4. Tibetan narrators tell stories of fleeing and 
suffering as a means of constituting Tibet as a lost homeland and constructing a 
Tibetan collectivity in exile. Western travellers to Tibet. on the other hand. 
produce narratives that frame their experience in more individual terms. reflecting 
personal desires and identifications and the formation of each narrator's political 
consciousness. Although these "diaspora narratives" and "Tibet narratives" reveal 
that activists do not necessarily share the same motivation for participating in Tibet 
activism. the Year of Tibet campaign illustrates that they still manage to come 
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together in contingent moments of unity. Having said that. joint political action is 
not accomplished effortlessly. Indeed. as Conklin and Graham--and the 
controversies around Year of Tibet events in New York--suggest, the middle 
ground of cross-cultural collaboration is forged through ongoing processes of 
confrontation, negotiation, and innovation. 
Conclusion 
In a recent essay, George Marcus notes a "hypersensitivity to emergent 
phenomena" in anthropology, the result of a growing realization that contemporary 
processes and events cannot be adequately apprehended, much less theorized. by 
our given categories of analysis (l 994:7). l want to conclude my discussion of the 
Tibet Movement by making the case that it represents an emergent form of 
political activism, one that requires rethinking current social movement theory and 
adjusting our traditional methods in order to encompass its full complexity. 
As we have seen, the Tibet Movement is comprised of a heterogeneous set 
of actors with diverse agendas and varying stakes in the issue. Together these 
actors produce and circulate representations of Tibetanness. While none of this is 
especially new or unusual, the Movement is distinguished by its global organization 
which I argue elsewhere (see Mclagan 1996) is greatly facilitated by the use of 
computer mediated communication to link various "nodes" of the diaspora and 
foster solidarity among Tibet supporters and organiz.ations dispersed around the 
world. It is also distinguished by its embrace of several "transnational 
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metropolitan discourses" (Brosius 1995b) such as human rights. democracy. 
cultural survival, and the environment. While [ was able to focus only on the use 
of the discourse of cultural survival in this thesis, Tibet activists have become 
increasingly adept at framing and reframing their struggle in terms of other 
discourses as well, thereby appealing to different publics and attracting resources 
and attention across a wider spectrum than would otherwise be the case. Tibetan 
participation in all five of the recent UN World Conferences, ranging from the 
"Earth Summit" in Rio (1992) to the NGO forum at the Women's conference in 
Beijing (1995), exemplifies this point. Each of these conferences was based 
around a particular universal discourse and provided unparalleled opportunities for 
diasporic, exile, and other "marginal" groups to make their case before the world 
community. Taken together, these various dimensions of the Tibet Movement 
reveal a multilevel mode of political practice, one in which various strategies are 
deployed simultaneously, and which operate in a variety of institutional and 
geographical arenas. 1 Through this emergent form of "transnational grassroots 
politics" (Smith 1994:15), Tibetans (with help from their Western supporters) have 
been able to create a new political space for themselves on the international stage. 
As my description of the Movement implies, Tibet activism is a dynamic. 
ongoing process and this dissertation is merely a snapshot of a particular moment 
during which I happened to be carrying out research. Indeed, since 1993 Tibet 
activism has continued to evolve, becoming ever more sophisticated, especially in 
terms of its work in the international arena. In the future, [ hope to expand and 
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develop arguments in my thesis regarding this dimension of the Movement. 
Specifically, l want to explore Tibetans' embrace of human rights discourse and 
their engagement with international legal structures and processes relating co human 
rights as this is an area where they have been particularly successful in recent 
years. By examining how Tibetans insen themselves in this particular field of 
political action, l hope to broaden our understanding of how these fields are 
constituted and the role the transnational forms of political organization, 
mobilization, and practice they engender play in the rearticulation of political. 
social and cultural spaces in the post-cold war era. 
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Notes 
l. See Ghosh 1994 and Malkki 1995 for discussions of the need to look more closely at 
complex transnational institutions and organizations and transitory social contexts. 
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